THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

the subsequent lack of general or socially acceptable validity in the claim. 213 It is about
reasoning together over which solution should be sought and about developing and testing
arguments concerning which preferences, norms or behavioural rules should be supported in
the defined social setting among others. People seem to exhibit interest in both, using their
environment as well as conserving it. Conservation initiatives may benefit from people who
exhibit conservation interests. Thus, utility or willingness to pay forms the basis for individual
rationality. On the other hand the ability of communities to follow existing institutions forms
the core of social rationality. 214
From the above analysis we observe that cooperation, trust and communicative action are
paramount to institutional success. In short, we are talking about individuals as paramount
institutional structures. Therefore, understanding individual behaviour is of essence, since it
informs the wider set of individual motivations as implied by the classical institutional
position. Such behaviour is favoured by the establishment of markets or market surrogates. 215
We must also mention that individual choice in the neo-classical sense has to be supported by
structures such as private property rights, accounting devices, corporate business forms,
markets, land access rights etc. 216 This raises a crucial question; which institutional structure is
best suited for treating the issue at hand? Is it the market or is it the forum? One can quickly
answer; it is the market not the forum. The answer to this question though simple, is also a
confusing one. While the idea of individual rationality is best fostered by the establishment of
markets – by creating non-communicative exchange processes – the idea of social rationality
is in itself plural. Its institutional counterparts can take a variety of forms. 217 This is actually
the challenge faced when formulating communicative or deliberative institutions for making
environmental choices. 218
There are two crucial aspects to the choice of proper value articulating institutions. First, one
has to ask which issues are at stake. Are they individual? Is calculation and exchange the
proper solution implying that the goods at stake can be interpreted as commodities? Or are
more societal issues involved moving us to consider a forum type value articulating
institution? If the latter is chosen, the issue of which type of forum to choose involves an
evaluation of the type of the problem at hand. It does however, also involve a second issue:
that of evaluating the overall institutional setting in which the specific problem appears.
Furthermore, we note that no institutional structure can be set up independent of the historical
context in which an issue is to be treated. Existing resource rights, property rights or others
213
Dryzek J.S. 2002. Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Liberals, Critics, Contestations.
214
Elster, J.1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
215
Dryzek J.S. 2002. Opcit
216
Lucas, R. E. 2000. Some Macroeconomics for the 21st Century’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 14
(1):159–78.
217
Hall, P. and R. Taylor. 1996. Political science and the Three New Institutionalisms. PoliticalStudies 44: 936-
957.
218
Bates, R et al. 1998. The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture,and Transition. Politics and Society
26(4): 603-638.
45