THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

during presidential, parliamentary and local elections. 383 This happened in the four decades
that marked the post independence KANU regime in Kenya.
Mr. Jackson Ole Kamoye, the chairman of the Narok Chamber of Commerce, said politicians,
council officials and the provincial administration officials had benefited from the forest
illegally through such dubious political schemes. He informed the researcher that Politicians
grabbed forestland and sold it to their friends, relatives and tribesmen purely for party,
presidential and parliamentary bids for re-election, an aspect that depicts the client-patron
relationships in the current biodiversity crisis in Kenya. 384
Kartodiahaijo and Supriano noted that, often governments cannot control illegal operations.
The two argue that this lack of control can either be deliberate (often linked to patrimonial
politics) or determined by limitation of their capacity. 385 While the two authors were writing
about conservation and forest degradation in Indonesia; their exposition represented the real
features obtaining in the Kenyan forestry and biodiversity sector. In one way or the other,
illegal use and destruction of forest biodiversity is rampant in many of the Kenyan forests.
Kakamega, Mau or Karura only afford us a microscopic view of the entire national picture.
By their nature, the true extent of illegal operations in the Kenyan biodiversity enterprise and
more importantly in the forestry sector cannot be accurately known. But available evidence
indicates that such activities continue, and their existence is important in unearthing the
underlying causes of these mosaic practices in the country.
Patrimonial politics weakens the administrative apparatus of the state decisions, as
fundamental decisions are biased against activities that do not attract personal concessions or
put in another way bribes. 386 As a result, a lot of illegal activities linked to degradation
continue to occur. An overview of Kenyan forest governance has revealed inconsistencies and
contradictions between legalities governing biodiversity in Kenya. These contradictions occur
between different levels of administration in government and will be explicitly illustrated in
the next chapter. In countries like Kenya, different levels of government ministries, agencies,
provincial and local governments possess overlapping legal and regulatory systems that are
always inconsistent with each other.
Shleifer and Vishney argue that this is sometimes used as a ploy by the actors in the
patrimonial political games. 387 Although we cannot make outright conclusions in this regard,
some instances in the Kenyan context act as glowing examples in this direction. One such
example is illuminated by the presidential pronouncements that were thought to have a direct
bearing on forest conserving forestry biodiversity. For instance, in 1986 the President
383 Key Informant interview with Mr Joseph Masinde NEMA 29 Sept 2005.
384 Key Informant Interview with Mr Jackson Ole Kamoye, the chairman of the Narok Chamber of Commerce.
385 Kartodiahaijo,H and A.Supriano. 2001. The Impact of Sectoral Development on Natural Resource
Conservation and Degradation:The case of Timber and Tree crops in Indonesia. CIFOR Occasssional Paper
No.6. Borgor,Indonesia.
386 Oyugi, W.O. 1993. Local government in Kenya: A Case of Institutional decline. In Local Government in the
Third World, edited by P. Mawhood, 24-48. Pretoria Africa Institute of South Africa.
387 Shleifer, A and R.W, Vishney. 1993. Corruption Quatery.Journal of Economics10(8): 599-601.
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