THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG

environmental externality function will depend upon whether people are the generators or
recipients of external benefits or costs. 346
Namara and Nsabagasane mention that tensions between national and local objectives
concerning issues like foreign exchange, watershed management, conservation and
commercial production and local livelihoods interfere with the individual powers over natural
resource conservation and environment. Within this theatre of local tensions, there is a
common tension between technocratic practices of development managers and the newly
pluralistic political practices of development managers. 347 Therefore, this illuminates what
usually happens when unmitigated efforts to manage a natural resource common meets with
varied individual preferences. There emerges a shift in perceptions and preferences among the
different actors at both the state and local levels. Although the two authors don’t delve in the
intricacies of the political and social tensions, this study is further interested in appreciating
the existing relationship between the different actors in the management of the nation’s
biodiversity.
Analysts of common resource regimes for grazing and forestry resources often note the
importance of political institutions for managing the common resources, particularly during
times of stress and more specifically for the rural poor. Jodha analyzed the contribution of
such political institutions to the welfare of rich and poor households in 82 villages in seven of
India's dry states. He found out that the poor derived much larger proportions of their fuel
supplies, animal grazing, employment and total income from common forest resources than
did the wealthy. For example, both the wealthy and poor derived an average of 80% and 20%
of their household needs, respectively, from common natural resources. Common natural
resources contributed 14-23% of the income of the poor but only 1-3% to the income of the
wealthy. The contribution to the income of the poor increased to between 42% and 57%
during times of drought. 348 However, evidence is less clear for Africa.
Migot- Adhola et al. found out that the rural poor in Kenya relied on foods harvested from
common resource regimes more than the wealthy and that those foods were particularly
important in drought years. 349 Alila in his research on formal and informal credit in rural
Kenya found that the poorest households in rural particularly those in Vihinga, generated a
high proportion of their money income from common natural resource regimes under
communal and customary arrangements than did the relatively wealthy households, who live
on land purchased from their incomes. 350 He notes that these also have a different perspective
346 Meyers, R et al. 1994. Institutions, Enviroment and Organisations.Thousand Oaks: CA Sage.
347 Namara, A and X. Nsabagasane. 2001. Decentralised Governance and Wildlife Management: Devolving
Rights or Shedding off Responsibility? The case of Bwindi Impenetrable National Park, Uganda.
Environmental Governance working Paper. Washington D.C: World Resources Institute.
348 Jodha, N.S. 1992. Common Property Resources: A missing Dimension of Development Strategies. World
Bank Discussion Paper No.169. Washington D.C: World Bank.
349 Migot- Adhola, S.E et al. 1994. Security of Tenure: Land and Productivity in Kenya. In searching for land
Tenure Security in Africa, edited by J.Bruce and ,S.E Migot- Adhola, 251-265. Dubuque: Kendau/ Hunt
Publishing House.
350 Alila, P. 2000. Formal and Informal Credit in Rural Kenya. IDS occasional paper, University of Nairobi.
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