U.S. shipments of the domestic like product fell by *** percent, dropping <strong>from</strong> *** pounds in2003 to only *** pounds in 2008. 170 The number of PMC’s PRWs, the number of PRW hours worked,and worker productivity decreased overall during the review period. The number of workers declined<strong>from</strong> *** workers in 2003 to just *** workers in 2008; 171 the number of PRW hours worked dropped<strong>from</strong> *** hours in 2003 to *** hours in 2008; 172 and worker productivity declined <strong>from</strong> *** pounds perhour in 2003 to *** pounds per hour in 2008. 173The domestic industry experienced operating losses in every year during the review periodexcept 2007 when its operating income was just $***. 174 The domestic industry’s operating lossesranged <strong>from</strong> $*** in 2008 to $*** in 2003. 175 The industry’s operating income was *** percent in2003, *** percent in 2004, *** percent in 2005, *** percent in 2006, *** percent in 2007, and ***percent in 2008. 176 The domestic industry’s capital expenditures were nonexistent to minimal during thereview period, ranging <strong>from</strong> *** in 2003, 2006, and 2007 to a period-high of $*** in 2005. 177We find that revocation of the order would likely have a significant adverse impact on thedomestic industry. As noted above, the volume of subject imports is likely to be significant if the orderwere revoked, especially since subject imports represented a large and growing presence in the U.S.market even with the order in place, and subject producers possessed substantial excess capacity andwere highly export-oriented during the review period. Subject imports undersold the domestic likeproduct in *** percent of price comparisons during the review period, even with the order in place, andin *** percent of price comparisons during the original investigation when they were not under thediscipline of the order. Given the substitutability between subject imports and the domestic likeproduct, we find that, in the event of revocation, low-priced subject imports would likely increase inabsolute terms and market share at the expense of the domestic industry, significantly undersell thedomestic like product, and depress and suppress prices for the domestic like product. Accordingly, wefind that revocation of the order would likely have an adverse impact on the domestic industry,including the domestic industry’s production, shipments, sales, market share, employment, and profits.We also have considered the growing presence of non-subject imports in the U.S. market. TheUnited States remains an attractive market for subject imports; subject imports gained 35.1 percentagepoints of market share during the review period, even under the handicap of the antidumping dutyorder. 178 Although non-subject imports’ market share increased by *** percentage points during thereview period, subject imports gained market share at a higher rate. 179 Also, non-subject imports’market share declined at the end of the review period, falling <strong>from</strong> *** percent in 2007 to *** percent in2008, whereas subject imports more than doubled their market share in the final year of the review170CR/PR at Table C-1.171CR/PR at Table C-1.172CR/PR at Table C-1.173CR/PR at Table C-1.174PMC was profitable, albeit barely, in 2007 only because it produced no saccharin in 2007, and did not haveany production costs in that year, but was selling previously produced and imported saccharin out of inventory.CR/PR at Table C-1.175CR/PR at Table C-1.176CR/PR at Table C-1.177CR/PR at Table C-1.178CR/PR at Table C-1.179CR/PR at Table C-1.22
period, increasing <strong>from</strong> *** percent in 2007 to *** percent in 2008. 180 Non-subject imports <strong>from</strong> Korea,which was the largest source of non-subject imports during the review period, actually declined <strong>from</strong>3.4 million pounds in 2004 to 2.6 million pounds in 2008. 181 182 Moreover, the average unit values(“AUVs”) of non-subject imports were higher than the AUVs for subject imports in 2007 and 2008,indicating that subject imports would likely be priced more aggressively than non-subject imports if theorder were revoked. 183 We therefore find that subject imports are likely to have a significant adverseimpact upon the domestic industry if the order were revoked notwithstanding the growing presence ofnon-subject imports in the U.S. market.CONCLUSIONFor the reasons stated above, we determine that revocation of the antidumping duty order onsubject imports <strong>from</strong> <strong>China</strong> would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury tothe domestic industry within a reasonably foreseeable time.180CR/PR at Table C-1.181PMC Posthearing Br., Exh. 1 at 45.182See, e.g., Hearing Tr. at 137 (Delaney) (“My opinion is that, especially the Koreans, they look at the U.S.market and if the antidumping order is revoked, then prices are going to come down substantially and they may nothave a business anymore. They may not be able to enter – the Koreans may be out of this market.”).183CR/PR at Table IV-1.23
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- Page 6 and 7: CONTENTSPagePart III: Condition of
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- Page 11 and 12: mouthwash. 14 By weight, it is abou
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- Page 44 and 45: Table I-8Saccharin: U.S. shipments
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Table V-3Saccharin: Weighted-averag
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wilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES72
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APPENDIX BCALENDAR OF PUBLIC HEARIN
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In Opposition to Continuation of th
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Table C-1Saccharin: Summary data co
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U.S. PRODUCERS COMMENTSThe Commissi
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***“***.”***“No.”***“No.
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DOC/ITC regulations. Their own prod
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***“*** could lower inventories b
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***“*** cannot comment on this, n
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The Commission requested foreign pr