IranThe Virtual Iran Beat‘Speaking Farsi helps expand our ability to gather news. It means we can tapinto a more extensive network and speak to more Iranians, even if we’re notbased in Tehran.’BY KELLY GOLNOUSH NIKNEJADThe Pakistani taxi driver I havedirected to the Iranian Embassypumps his brakes as we approachthe U.S. Embassy, a seven-storybuilding that resembles the hull of abattleship. Tall and arrogant, it loomslarge over the Abu Dhabi Desert. I hadrecently started a job in the capital ofthe United Arab Emirates (UAE) as thediplomatic affairs correspondent for anew English-language newspaper. TheAmerican Embassy is down the roadfrom the Iranian one—close enoughthat the Iranians refer to it when givingdirections to their own.“Here?” the driver asks, turningaround for another quick look. Ihave olive skin and my dark hair isdutifully covered for the occasion.But the accent behind the hijab isunmistakably American. “No, theIranian Embassy,” I repeat, this timewith more emphasis.As he pulls away from the curb, Ifeel a deep pang of separation, coupledwith excitement: This is the closest I’vebeen to Iran in more than 20 years.The embassy’s turquoise-tiled walls,evoking something in my childhood,shimmer in the distance. What looklike thick black scribbles give way tofancy calligraphy—Qur’anic verses, Iassume—as we get closer.Like many Iranian Americans, I feelas if I’m from a broken home: Theparents are divorced but still feudingafter three decades. As a journalist, myposition is more precarious.In what has been called a cold warbetween Iran and the United States,the UAE has emerged as a Vienna ofsorts—a place where America’s Iranwatcherscan mingle with thousandsof Iranians. One hub for this is theexpanded Iran Desk at the U.S. consulatein Dubai, the more cosmopolitanUAE city-state up the coast from thecapital. If Iranians are suspicious ofjournalists, it’s partly because our reportingjobs can seem like the perfectcover to gather intelligence.Iranians have a deep-seated paranoiaabout spies and conspiracies.There is a long history of politicalintrigue to explain such suspicions. In1953, a CIA-engineered coup oustedthe democratically elected governmentof Prime Minister MohammadMossadegh and reinstalled the shah,under whose reign American agentsroamed the land. CIA and Israel’sMossad reportedly trained Iran’s secretpolice. More intriguingly, CIA directorRichard Helms was appointed U.S.Ambassador to Iran after he left theagency in 1973. (Incidentally, Helmsstarted his career as a journalist.) Whenmilitants seized the U.S. Embassy inTehran in 1979, they dubbed it “theden of spies.”The 1980’s were particularly bleak.Soon after the Islamic Republic wasestablished, the regime consolidatedpower in the brutal ways a state does.While it fought an eight-year warthat its neighbor Iraq started, it alsowaged internal battles with domesticfoes—the Kurds, the communist TudehParty, and especially the IranianMojahedin, a quasi-Marxist cult onthe U.S. terrorist list.Much has changed in Iran sincethat decade in which I left Iran, butsome important progress made in the1990’s has been stymied by those whothink the way forward is to revert topractices they themselves deploredunder the shah—and ones that led toa revolution. Economic and culturalreforms slowly put in place after thewar were effectively rolled back inthis decade, especially since MahmoudAhmadinejad took office in 2005.Things got worse the following year,when the Bush administration askedCongress for tens of millions of dollarsto secretly fund NGOs and activists todestabilize the Iranian government.It stoked government paranoia andbecame an effective tool in the handsof officials who have used it to stifledissent and spread fear.If the Iranians believe this is vitalto their survival, the fear may bemisplaced. As Ervand Abrahamian,a U.S.-based Iran scholar, argues ina recent paper, it was not a reign ofterror, the eight-year war, oil revenue,or even the strength of Shi’ism thatsustained the Iranian regime—butpopulism. The challenge the regimenow faces, according to Abrahamian,is to “juggle the competing demands ofthese populist programs with those ofthe educated middle class—especiallythe ever-expanding army of universitygraduates produced, ironically, by oneof the revolution’s main achievements.This new stratum needs not only jobsand a decent standard of living butalso greater social mobility and accessto the outside world—with all itsdangers, especially to well-protectedhome industries—and, concomitantly,the creation of a viable civil society.”The Iranian PressThe press is one place to start. Themedia in Iran is often state ownedand always closely supervised. Thosenewspapers not run directly by thestate are associated with politicalparties and prominent figures whosefactional rivalries sometimes spill over46 <strong>Nieman</strong> Reports | Summer 2009
Digital Dialogueinto the papers. Those in power oftenassert it by shutting down a rival’smouthpiece.There’s another reason to reform thepress in Iran. Since a systematic crackdown,which has included journalists,bloggers, academics and researchers,journalism there has become synonymouswith jail and tyranny. Adoptingmore liberal press practices is likelyto do Iran far more good than harm,and here’s four reasons why:1. The work of any journalist or propagandistpale in comparison to thefar-fetched scenarios swirling inIranian living rooms, taxi cabs—and,above all, in the Iranian imagination.I’ve heard them all and, believe me,reality is not always stranger thanfiction.2. Satellite dishes are illegal but on theascent in Iran. They crop up fasterthan officials can take them down.Most of the programs they watchstream in from Los Angeles, wherethere is a lot of singing and dancing,but from where dissidents have beenunsuccessfully trying to topple theregime for 30 years. Both the BritishfundedBBC Persian service and theU.S. government-backed Voice ofAmerica have expanded their radiobroadcasts to include television. Sogreat is the audience, that essentiallythe government is not shielding anyonefrom anything.3. Foreign journalists have a difficulttime obtaining permission to reportfrom Iran or to set up bureaus there.Visiting reporters are obliged to employ“minders” from the Ministry ofCulture and Islamic Guidance, somethingthey fail to tell their viewers andreaders. This might help authoritiesfeel in greater control of the informationthat trickles out. But the newsvacuum about Iran is filled not byThe New York Times or ABC Newsbut by information disseminated byinterest groups, dissidents and othermuch more biased parties.4. What do the arrests and jailing ofjournalists and bloggers accomplish?If anything, it attracts more attentionto their work. And it reinforces theworst stereotypes everyone alreadyTehran Bureau’s home page.has about Iran. Why not breakthem?Tehran Bureau: An OnlineNews HubThe decision to create TehranBureau.com, an online news magazine towhich journalists familiar with Irancontribute stories, emerged out ofmany conversations and e-mails witha classmate from Columbia JournalismSchool. Each of us wanted to reportnews about Iran, but not in the simplisticway that country is too oftencovered by the Western mainstreammedia. As much to avoid the dangersof Iran’s factional politics as to escapethe Western news media’s bias againstIran and Iranians, we decided to takeadvantage of the Internet and set upa virtual bureau. In part, our thinkingwas guided by us knowing thatIranians are as much plugged in asany developed society.At a time when world news shouldbe more important than ever, newsorganizations continue their contraction,and to do this they’ve shutteredor scaled back foreign bureaus. Thoughthe trend in journalism is specialization,news organizations appear tobe investing fewer resources in thecultivation of editorial and reportingstaffs who can become, in effect, areaexperts.This reduction in reporting knowledgeand resources has consequences,as information slips through as newsthat shapes Western perceptions andpolicy. Four years ago, soon after thelast presidential election—the oneAhmadinejad won—a black-and-whitephotograph purporting to show thenew president as a hostage-taker inthe 1979 embassy takeover circulatedwidely in the media. To an Iranian,certainly, the person in the picturelooks nothing like him. I e-maileda professor who was working on abook about the hostage crisis to gethis perspective.“That was first sent out by an MEKaffiliatedWeb site,” he wrote back,referring to the Iranian Mojahedin, anIranian opposition group living in exile.“The two individuals in the photo havelong since been identified as a MEKpartisan who was later executed andanother student who was killed in theIraq War.” More interestingly, in theeight years Ahmadinejad’s predecessor<strong>Nieman</strong> Reports | Summer 2009 47
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