18 SAcLJ 314 <strong>Manag<strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Mens</strong> <strong>Rea</strong> <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore 36187 While the use <strong>of</strong> a “common law” version <strong>of</strong> due diligence istechnically difficult to defend <strong>in</strong> view <strong>of</strong> (the enacted) s 79, there ispragmatic sense <strong>in</strong> the result that the “common law” defence is not boundby the peculiar limitations <strong>of</strong> reasonable mistake <strong>in</strong> s 79. Be that as it may,due diligence or reasonable mistake, this development is one <strong>of</strong> the fewbright spots <strong>in</strong> a bleak landscape. Aga<strong>in</strong>, although it has not beenexplicitly decided that either due diligence or reasonable mistake is<strong>in</strong>variably available – <strong>in</strong> Canada it is limited to <strong>of</strong>fences which put theaccused <strong>in</strong> risk <strong>of</strong> imprisonment 139 – the <strong>in</strong>dications are that they are. 140The result is perhaps the complete abolition <strong>of</strong> strict liability itself, 141called absolute liability <strong>in</strong> Canada, 142where mens rea <strong>of</strong> any k<strong>in</strong>d isirrelevant to liability. No doubt it is the lowest form <strong>of</strong> mens rea –negligence with the burden reversed – but it is mens rea no less. Werecases like PP v Mohamed Ibrahim 143 and PP v Teo Kwang Kiang 144 to bedecided today, the result may or may not be different – but at least theaccused persons will now have the opportunity <strong>of</strong> show<strong>in</strong>g that they hadbehaved reasonably, which is all that can be legitimately expected <strong>of</strong>them.88 But all is not well at the first stage – the preservation <strong>of</strong> theprocess <strong>of</strong> presumption and rebuttal <strong>of</strong> mens rea (which the prosecutionhas to prove) has meant the cont<strong>in</strong>uation <strong>of</strong> all the arbitrar<strong>in</strong>ess andillogicality that has plagued it <strong>in</strong> the past. If one were to l<strong>in</strong>e up the cases<strong>in</strong> which the presumption prevailed aga<strong>in</strong>st those <strong>in</strong> which it was held tobe rebutted, one would search <strong>in</strong> va<strong>in</strong> for any conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g dist<strong>in</strong>guish<strong>in</strong>gfeature between them. Consider, on the one hand, Bridges Christopher vjurisprudence, and would require strict justification to survive Charter scrut<strong>in</strong>y.Impos<strong>in</strong>g a burden <strong>of</strong> production is less <strong>in</strong>trusive and requires less justification.139 Or imprisonment <strong>in</strong> default.140 In Comfort Management Pte Ltd v PP, supra n 130, the court applied the duediligence defence to an <strong>of</strong>fence which carried a maximum penalty <strong>of</strong> a $5,000 f<strong>in</strong>e.All f<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> S<strong>in</strong>gapore are potentially subject to imprisonment <strong>in</strong> default:s 224(b)(iv), Crim<strong>in</strong>al Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed).141 Although it rema<strong>in</strong>s to be seen if the courts will resile from its current position <strong>of</strong>strict liability (ie, Canadian absolute liability) for the <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> contempt <strong>of</strong> court:see, for example, AG v L<strong>in</strong>gle [1995] 1 SLR 696, AG v Wa<strong>in</strong> [1991] SLR 383. Thesedecision pre-date the <strong>in</strong>vention <strong>of</strong> “due diligence” <strong>in</strong> the late 1990s. In pr<strong>in</strong>ciple,there is no reason to treat contempt <strong>of</strong> court differently, but it is such a peculiar<strong>of</strong>fence that it is not immediately obvious what due diligence might mean <strong>in</strong> thatcontext.142 The recent trend, s<strong>in</strong>ce the adoption <strong>of</strong> Canadian due diligence, has been forS<strong>in</strong>gapore courts to use the strict–absolute liability dichotomy.143 Supra n 125 (accused held strictly liable for be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> possession <strong>of</strong> obscene books forsale).144 [1992] 1 SLR 9 (accused held strictly liable for possession <strong>of</strong> contam<strong>in</strong>ated vegetablesfor sale).
362S<strong>in</strong>gapore <strong>Academy</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Law</strong> Journal (2006)PP 145 where the court upheld the presumption <strong>of</strong> mens rea <strong>in</strong> the context<strong>of</strong> an <strong>of</strong>fence <strong>of</strong> communicat<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>of</strong>ficial secret <strong>in</strong> these terms: 146[T]here must be knowledge that the <strong>in</strong>formation is secret <strong>of</strong>ficial<strong>in</strong>formation. The same applies to the other th<strong>in</strong>gs mentioned <strong>in</strong> s 5(1). Ido not see how remov<strong>in</strong>g the requirement <strong>of</strong> knowledge will beworkable ... It is a fact <strong>of</strong> life that the actual duty <strong>of</strong> communication is<strong>of</strong>ten delegated to subord<strong>in</strong>ates ... The person actually do<strong>in</strong>g thecommunication may well turn out to be a very junior <strong>of</strong>ficer …It is no part <strong>of</strong> the duty <strong>of</strong> the junior <strong>of</strong>ficer to question each and everyorder from his superiors to communicate the <strong>in</strong>formation to whomeverhe is directed to. Adopt<strong>in</strong>g a strict liability approach would mean thatthe junior <strong>of</strong>ficer would have committed an <strong>of</strong>fence under this Act if,unknown to him, his superior or someone higher up actually has noauthority to order the release <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation or has wrongly (orwrongfully) classified certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation as not be<strong>in</strong>g secret <strong>of</strong>ficial<strong>in</strong>formation …An <strong>of</strong>ficer or government servant is entitled to rely on his or hersuperior’s representation that any particular piece <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation is notsecret <strong>of</strong>ficial <strong>in</strong>formation … The entire civil service cannot operate likethe secret police. In any event, the deputy public prosecutor has notexpla<strong>in</strong>ed how impos<strong>in</strong>g strict liability on a member <strong>of</strong> the public canfurther the objective <strong>of</strong> protect<strong>in</strong>g government secrets.[emphasis added]89 It is certa<strong>in</strong>ly not true that mak<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficial secrets <strong>of</strong>fences strictliability, especially when there is now the recourse to the defence <strong>of</strong> duediligence, would be “unworkable”. There are <strong>in</strong> existence regimes <strong>of</strong> strictliability where many people currently operate with just such a sword <strong>of</strong>Damocles suspended over them. Also, the court could not have beenserious about the failure <strong>of</strong> the prosecution to expla<strong>in</strong> how the objectives<strong>of</strong> the Act will be protected by strict liability. The answer is simple and isthe same as for any justification for strict liability. All those who woulddeal with <strong>of</strong>ficial secrets will redouble their efforts to make sure that such<strong>in</strong>formation is not leaked to the public. What the court was perhaps reallysay<strong>in</strong>g was that it would be unfair to impose strict liability – with theresult that totally blameless people would be guilty <strong>of</strong> a crim<strong>in</strong>al <strong>of</strong>fence.However, strict liability is always unfair, and it is not more so simplybecause those who would be sla<strong>in</strong> by it happened to be governmentservants.145 [1997] 1 SLR 406.146 Id, at [74]–[76].