2. Managing Mens Rea in Singapore - Singapore Academy of Law

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18 SAcLJ 314 Managing Mens Rea in Singapore 319contemplated, it is not clear precisely how far along the chain theintention must extend. The courts have used this device sparingly butspectacularly. In Mohamed Yasin bin Husin v PP, 12the Privy Councilsurprised the legal community by quashing a murder conviction whichhad been upheld in the Court of Appeal. In the course of robbery andrape, Yasin had sat on the chest of his 58-year-old victim in order tosubdue her. This resulted in multiple rib fractures, shock, cardiac arrestand death. The uncertainty at the core of 300(c) was exploited to thefull: 13In the instant case, the act of the appellant which caused the death, vizsitting forcibly on the victim’s chest, was voluntary on his part. He knewwhat he was doing; he meant to do it; it was not accidental orunintentional. This, however, is only the first step … Not only must theact of the accused which caused the death be voluntary in this sense; theprosecution must also prove that the accused intended, by doing it, tocause some bodily injury to the victim of a kind which is sufficient inthe ordinary course of nature to cause death.…[I]t would not have been necessary for the trial judges in the instant case toenter into an enquiry whether the appellant intended to cause the preciseinjuries which in fact resulted or had sufficient knowledge of anatomyto know that the internal injury which might result from his act … Itwas, however, essential for the prosecution to prove, at very least, thatthe appellant did intend by sitting on the victim’s chest to inflict upon hersome internal, as distinct from mere superficial, injuries or temporary pain[for which there was no evidence].[emphasis added]10 It would have been unexceptionable if Yasin had landed on hisvictim’s chest accidentally, perhaps as a result of tripping oversomething. 14It would have also been uncontroversial if Yasin hadintended a wholly different injury, for example, if he intended to sit onthe victim’s arm but missed the target and sat on her chest instead. Thenovelty here was that the court was willing to use this device in asituation where the accused had “voluntarily” set off a chain of eventswhich led inexorably to death. Yasin had set about to sit on her chest andto do that with a degree of force which was (objectively) sufficient tofracture her ribs – and that is exactly what happened. The Privy Council12 [1975–1977] SLR 34 (PC) (“Yasin”), [1972–1974] SLR 263 (CA).13 Yasin, id, at 36–37, [8] and [11]–[12].14 As was the case in PP v Abdul Nasir bin Amer Hamsah [1996] SGHC 138.
320Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2006)had indulged in an inquiry which it had itself seemed to deny wasnecessary – the acquittal was in fact based on a lack of an intention tocause the “precise injuries” which finally killed the victim. The courts ofSingapore were thrown in confusion. In a case that followed shortly, PP vVisuvanathan, 15the High Court quickly sought to restore the former“broad” inquiry by feebly attempting to explain away the Privy Council,saying that while the “precise injury” approach was “factuallyappropriate”, it was not “of universal application” – it was never spelt outwhy it was appropriate on the facts in Yasin, nor was it explained in whatcircumstances it is appropriate and in what others it is not. 16 When thematter went up to the Court of Appeal, Yasin was simply ignored as if ithad never been decided. 1711 Technically, neither Yasin nor Visuvanathnan are clearly in theright or in the wrong. The ambiguity is inherent in the formulation ofs 300(c). This uncertainty created a discretion in the courts to broaden ornarrow the subjective inquiry. What the decisions do not tell us explicitlyis when the discretion will be exercised one way or the other. It is ofcourse hazardous to aspire to clairvoyance, but it is difficult to resist thespeculation that the controlling factor is something which every courtsince Virsa Singh has declared to be taboo under s 300(c) – that ofwhether the accused contemplated death when he or she embarked onthe violent enterprise. 1812 Two other children of Yasin seem to bear this out. In PP v Ow AhCheng, 19 the accused was in the course of committing theft when he wassurprised by a 14-year-old girl. Ow subdued her and pressed a pillowonto her face in order to prevent her from shouting. She died ofasphyxiation. The High Court granted a rare acquittal in these terms: 20The question was whether the degree of force used was so extreme as tobe consistent only with an intent to cause bodily injury, and the bodilyinjury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course ofnature to cause death. If the accused wanted to kill Ah Lian, the pressure15 [1975–1977] SLR 564 (“Visuvanathan”).16 Id at 568, [14].17 Visuvanathan v PP [1978–1979] SLR 49.18 For a recent declaration, see Tan Chee Wee v PP [2004] 1 SLR 479 at [42]:Section 300(c) thus envisions that the accused subjectively intends to cause abodily injury that is objectively likely to cause death in the ordinary course ofnature. There is no necessity for the accused to have considered whether or notthe injury to be inflicted would have such a result.19 Supra n 7 (“Ow Ah Cheng”).20 Id, at 804–805, [36].
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