118World2000 Network operators are not alone, however, in wanting to forge themselves a place on mobile Internet portals;other players are equally eager to gain a foothold on this market:- manufacturers have also taken the initiative of creating their own portal. Such is the case of Nokia, andits Nokia Club portal, which has signed a number of partnership agreements with service providers suchas CNN, Amazon, AOL… for offering turnkey solutions to mobile operators and new entrants alike.Terminal manufacturers may team up with software firms with the goal of operating specialised portals;- specialised retailers (PhoneHouse, Unicom,….) and, more generally, large retail chains, are developingmobile portal offers to rival mobile network operators;- traditional portal operators (i.e. those found on the web) also intend to be present on the mobile market.Here, they have the advantage of expertise in content development and existing consumer knowledge oftheir brand;- content providers, particularly large communications groups (CNN, TF1…), software editors (IBM,Oracle…) and even car manufacturers such as PSA (in collaboration with Vivendi );- the many start ups which, in Europe, saw in WAP the chance to exploit a new bouquet of services wereparticularly hard hit by the market's sluggish beginnings, and the insistence with which operators soughtto control the market. The last point was the subject of much debate throughout 2000.Operators were accused of holding their subscribers hostage by locking the mobile terminals that weremarketed as part of a package. This "locking" consists in the pre-configuration of the mobile terminal in sucha way that the web can only be accessed via the mobile operator's gateway. All mobile Internet connectionsgo by way, then, of the manufacturers' or operators homepage. Following complaints from independentportals, and under pressure from the regulator (the obligation in France, for instance, to indicate the phonenumber which allows users to reconfigure the portal, as well as a similar decision handed down by theEuropean Commission to limit Vizzavi's exclusivity practices), subscribers are now able to access all mobileportals.This issue concerning the opening up of mobile Internet content, rather comparable in fact to the debate inthe US over open cable access, brings us back to questions surrounding not only the legitimacy, but also theeconomic efficiency, of operators' vertical integration strategies: how far can they and must they go incontrolling content?By way of a conclusionIt appears highly likely that the year 2000 will be remembered as the year when decisions of a structural naturewere taken, shaping mobiles' future and, more generally, the telecoms industry itself, even though it is stillhard to fully measure the impact that these decisions will have on the landscape in the years to come.Over the last few months, Europe has focused particularly on the revenues that are likely to be generated fromthe mobile-Internet convergence: over 130 billion € for UMTS licences and an at least equivalent sum forbuilding the networks. The emergence of the mobile Internet market via WAP proved much more difficult thanexpected. Faced with the prospect of additional revenues, which would be only gradually generated, while thevoice ARPU is continually decreasing, anxiety has set in. In light of the debts incurred or expected, this anxietywas first felt by the financial markets, investors and banks which, after having contributed to the entirelyunreasonable valuation of the mobile Internet market, now intend to limit their share of the risk. Naturally, thegeneral state of alarm hides a wide diversity of contexts, depending on the operators and the national marketsin which they have invested. It is therefore possible that a new consolidation phase in the sector will comeabout.© IDATE www.idate.fr
World2000 119The year end woes also derive from questions regarding manufacturers' capacity to supply tens of thousandsof base stations (BTS) which will be ordered for 2002 and 2003, and particularly their ability to supply amassive amount of quality terminals at a reasonable cost and which, at term, offers speeds that correlate withexpectations. The delays in the launch of UMTS are not in themselves a source of worry for existing mobileoperators. They could stagger their investments and learn the mobile Internet business via a GPRS platform.But, given the fact that they did not expect to have to make such massive investments for UMTS licences,they will be required to uphold their commitments, at term, and to provide the services. Here, it is reasonableto wonder whether the EU's very determined timetable, to which European governments have more or lesscommitted, remains pertinent and, more generally, it is equally legitimate to wonder whether Europe is indeedset to lead the pack. The Japanese have confirmed 2001 and 2002 as the launch dates for W-CDMA services.As we have seen, this will come about without the arrival of new competitors and without the additional costof licences. At the outset, the Japanese do not have the same functional and financial demands as Europeans.First, UMTS will allow them to enjoy new spectral capacities, which they required, before being able to offerradically altered performances in terms of speed. Next, they have been able to create a significant source ofadditional earnings with i-mode…Should we then, following the somewhat naive optimismwhich reigned in early 2000, now wallow in the systematicpessimism of certain analysts? A number of considerationsmust, above all, be kept in mind:• First, we must not overlook the remarkable, andcontinuing, growth of the mobile market in Europe (cf.table). The mobile telephony market is not yet saturated;there remains a significant potential, given the verycautious predicted penetration rate over 80%. UMTSinfrastructures will be increasingly perceived as highlyprecious assets required for responding to this growth.• The increasing success of messaging should becombined with a re-launch of data services in GPRSmode, to develop a complementary turnover and slow theever-lowering ARPU. Regardless of the limits of theJapanese model, the i-mode example serves to indicatethat in order for mobile Internet's potential to be fullyexploited, large creative and marketing investments arerequired. Mobile operators will, in particular, have to proveTable 7: Mobile’00 growth in Europe1999 2000Austria 51.80% 73.05%Belgium 31.36% 49.83%Denmark 53.28% 69.26%Finland 65.55% 76.10%France 33.80% 49.43%Germany 28.10% 57.60%Greece 36.37% 56.41%Ireland 37.41% 69.34%Italy 53.61% 72.02%Netherlands 43.57% 71.01%Norway 63.57% 72.09%Portugal 48.05% 62.37%Spain 38.18% 63.74%Sweden 56.74% 73.48%Switzerland 37.97% 67.33%UK 40.51% 68.17%Average 39.79% 62.90%Source: IDATEtheir ability to make use of the expertise and imagination of their various partners in order to offer attractiveservices on their portals, capable of wooing the various target markets.• Explosive growth of mobile Internet revenues is not the most likely scenario. It is not, in any case, the onethat operators are banking on in their business plans. And while pay-back forecasts vary between 5 and 10years, depending on the cost of the licence, the projected market share (in part attributed to the existing GSMbase), and the financing needs which diverge from one player to the next, it is by no means a given that themarket will be reduced to an oligopoly of 3 or 4 operators dominating all of Europe. It goes without sayingthat governments and regulatory bodies will have to remain vigilant to avoid this and, in certain cases, beable to adapt to the demands borne of the euphoria in early 2000. This risk appears to, above all, be set tobe tempered by the limits which the economies of scale could come up against during the market'sprogressive structuring, which will not be the same as mobile telephony's. Mobile Internet will becomeentrenched via increasingly complex business models and a value chain which, while not indifferent toscope, opens the way for new players.© IDATE www.idate.fr