types of households to cope with higher rates of crime associated with cities. 21 As the <strong>gentrification</strong>process unfolds one group of newcomers is succeeded by waves of usually more affluent residents.Thus the working artists, whose search for inexpensive studio space drove their initial move to agiven neighborhood, are replaced by high-income professionals seeking the ambience of lofts andcoffeehouses.These preferences create higher demand-side housing pressures and are reinforced bychanging demographics. The country’s baby boomers are reaching the empty-nester stage of lifeand are often cited in our case studies as a factor in the <strong>gentrification</strong> process. In addition:• Twenty-something workers at Silicon Valley firms are much more inclined to live in adynamic city such as San Francisco than quiet and expensive suburbs near their jobs. Manyyoung newcomers in the Mission District are attracted to the cultural diversity there.• In Washington, D.C. and Atlanta, distinctive, but under-utilized architecture is clearly one ofthe attractions of the neighborhoods that are gentrifying.4. Increased Traffic Congestion and Lengthening CommutesFrustrations with increasing traffic congestion and long commuting times were expressed asfactors contributing to <strong>gentrification</strong> in three of our four case studies (with Cleveland being theexception). As metropolitan populations rise and infrastructure ages, commutes (and thereforehours away from home) lengthen, congestion increases, and overall quality of life declines. Somenew residents clearly desire the opportunity to walk or take a short subway ride to work, and somesupport “smart growth” policies that include “transit-friendly” housing. Even those who reversecommuteto suburban jobs may have quicker commutes from in-town neighborhoods than theywould from a suburban residence.5. Targeted Public Sector PoliciesWhile economic forces seem to drive <strong>gentrification</strong>, government policies of the past orpresent can either facilitate or impede <strong>gentrification</strong>. Cities use a range of policy levers to revitalizeneighborhoods or accomplish other goals, including direct investments, tax expenditures, and zoningregulations. In some cases (sometimes years after the implementation of the original policy orinvestment), these investments and their resulting effects can yield <strong>gentrification</strong>, oftenunintentionally. Many cities pursue revitalization policies with the expressed intention of providingincentives for middle- and high-income families to move into distressed communities, orinducements for original residents to upgrade their homes, including:• Tax Incentives: These include tax credits and abatements for new city homebuyers, taxcredits for historical preservation, below market land sales, and land bank purchases. As partof the federal commitment to revitalize Washington D.C. as the nation’s capital, Congress21 Berry, p 75.12
created a $5,000 first-time homebuyer tax credit which appears to have been a factor in alarge number of recent home purchases there. 22 Both Cleveland and Atlanta have madeaggressive use of tax abatements to lure middle and higher income households into the city.In San Francisco, the favorable tax treatment of live/work lofts, totaling in the tens of millionsof dollars 23 is believed to have been an important factor in the development of large numbersof these upper income units in the South of Market area (SOMA).• Public Housing Revitalization: Another direct policy lever that may have the indirect effectof increasing <strong>gentrification</strong> is the federal HOPE VI public housing revitalization program.This program is premised on the need to reduce the extremely high and problematicdensities in many aging and dilapidated public housing developments, and to increase theincome diversity of their residents. HOPE VI provides leveraged funding for the demolition oflarge projects and creation of replacement housing that is less dense, and has asubstantially greater income mix. Many of the targeted projects are located in or neardowntown areas. While these developments might have been significant deterrents toneighborhood revitalization before reconstruction, many now no longer are, and theirreconstruction is attracting nearby investment. While it is clear that HOPE VI is reducing thecrime, blight and density of public housing projects, it appears too early to tell whether HOPEVI is contributing to <strong>gentrification</strong>. 24 Nevertheless, observers in both Cleveland and Atlantaare bracing for <strong>gentrification</strong> pressures spurred by HOPE VI projects.• Consequences of Other Federal Policies: Some federal policies may have the effect ofcontributing to <strong>gentrification</strong>. Wyly argues that the federal role in mortgage market regulation,among other changes in mortgage finance (including securitization and standardization) hasreduced or eliminated many of the practices responsible for redlining, but in so doing hasstimulated powerful <strong>gentrification</strong> pressures. 25 Marcuse also notes that affordable housinggoals governing government-sponsored enterprises – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – mayalso have the unintended consequence of contributing to <strong>gentrification</strong> by directing mortgagecapital into “under-served areas” which may be vulnerable to <strong>gentrification</strong>. 26 A number ofcontacts also indicated that federal Empowerment Zone incentives also contributed to<strong>gentrification</strong> pressures in several cities.22 Philip Dearborn and Stephanie Richardson, Home Buyer Credit Widely Used, The Greater WashingtonResearch Center, Washington D.C., May 5, 1999.23 Strategic Economics notes that “the San Francisco policy which waived certain requirements for developersof live-work units in SoMa has meant that the City has foregone $5.5 million in school fees, $2.6 million inplanning fees, and 207 affordable housing units that would have been included under normal city rules. Thesebreaks . . . may be fueling <strong>gentrification</strong> and displacement by raising land values and rents while doing nothingto add to the stock of affordable housing,” p. 16.24 Wyly and Hammel. The authors argue that <strong>gentrification</strong> is a necessary but not sufficient condition for thesuccessful inclusion of mixed-income and market rate housing in HOPE VI projects. Also, at this time, HUDhas little data about the locations and satisfaction of those residents who do not return to newly renovateddevelopments.25 Ibid p. 763. Note that this argument suggests that market barriers prior to these innovations andrequirements had the effect of slowing natural tendencies toward <strong>gentrification</strong>.26 Peter Marcuse, “Comments on Elvin K. Wyly and Daniel J. Hammel’s ‘Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal:Housing Policy and the Resurgence of Gentrification’” Housing Policy Debate, 1999 Vol. 10, No. 4, p. 796.13
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- Page 4 and 5: POLICYLINKSUMMARY OF RECENT PUBLICA
- Page 6 and 7: ABSTRACTThis paper serves as a prim
- Page 8 and 9: PREFACEThe Brookings Institution Ce
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- Page 13 and 14: owners, and developers—better und
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- Page 17 and 18: A. How Big a Trend Is Gentrificatio
- Page 19 and 20: espective metropolitan areas, this
- Page 21: uilt only 31,000 new homes. 18 The
- Page 25 and 26: consequences are perceived by varyi
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- Page 31 and 32: sale. 42 The street’s mix of busi
- Page 33 and 34: communities (such as in Cleveland)
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- Page 50 and 51: VI. CONCLUSIONThis paper provides a
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- Page 54 and 55: taken out of the San Francisco mark
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- Page 58 and 59: developed among long-standing Afric
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- Page 66 and 67: Hot Housing Market. Perhaps the mos
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just over seven percent of all perm
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But neighborhood watchers see the c
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BIBLIOGRAPHYAtkinson, Rowland, “M
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Mission Economic Development Associ
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Walker, Mary Beth, A Population Pro