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PART III — COUNTRY PROFILeSactually rolled back progress made after schoolsreopened in 2002. In 2009, for example, more than 70per cent of schools in Helmand province and morethan 80 per cent in Zabul province were closed. 398 InMay 2012, the Ministry of Education reported thatmore than 590 schools were closed in areas at risk,mostly in Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar provinces. 399As of 2011, 400 gross primary enrolment 401 was 97 percent, gross secondary enrolment was 52 per cent andgross tertiary enrolment was 4 per cent. 402 Net attendancewas only 66 per cent for boys and 40 per cent forgirls at primary school level, and 18 per cent for boysand 6 per cent for girls at secondary level (2007-2011). 403Attacks on schoolsTypes of attacks on schools included the use of improvisedexplosive devices (IEDs), landmines and suicidebombs in or around school buildings, rocket attacks,grenades thrown into school playgrounds or facilities,the burning down of buildings, looting and forcedclosure of schools. 404The UN reported 613 school-related attacks in January-November 2009, compared with 348 in the whole of2008, with attacks on schools increasing in areasaround Kabul and in the east, including in theprovinces of Wardak, Logar, Khost, Laghman, Kunarand Nangarhar. 405 For instance, unknown armed menused dynamite to blast a high school in Nadir Shahkotdistrict of Khost province in May 2009, destroying 18classrooms. 406 However, the number of incidentsdropped to 197 in 2010. There were spikes in thenumber of attacks in September 2010, at the time ofthe parliamentary elections, just as there were duringthe 2009 presidential elections, when schools wereused as polling stations. 407 But the number fell to 167in 2012. (There were at least 133 attacks on schools orschool-related victims in 2011, but the UN report didnot clarify how many other of the 185 incidents ofattacks on schools and hospitals were attacks onschools.) 408Anti-government groups were responsible for the ‘vastmajority’ of attacks in 2012, the UN Mission inAfghanistan, UNAMA, verified. 409 However, thesegroups operated both covertly and publicly,sometimes claiming responsibility for attacks andsometimes denying activities attributed to them byothers, making the overall conflict – and efforts todetermine the source of attacks – complex. The UNMission also verified four attacks by armed groupsthat were not anti-government in 2012 and at leastnine by Afghan Local Police, 410 as well as one incidentin which American forces ‘bombarded’ a school inNangarhar province, injuring 12 children and a schoolemployee and damaging the school building. 411 TheUN Secretary-General’s Report on Children and ArmedConflict said that among documented – as opposed toverified 412 – incidents, attacks by anti-governmentelements outnumbered those by pro-governmentforces by two to one and approximately one in fourattacks were by unidentified perpetrators. 413 An earlierstudy reported that criminal gangs have alsothreatened or attacked schools in Afghanistan. 414Motives for attacks by armed non-state groupsincluded opposition to the perceived ‘western’ or ‘un-Islamic’ curriculum, external affiliations of the schoolor the perceived role of Western forces in rebuildingsome schools, the education of girls generally, or anyoperation of the central government. 415 Other attackswere motivated by the wider political objectives of theinsurgency in particular areas or the use of schools byopposing forces (see the Military use of schoolssection of this profile). 416In 2012, the Taliban made public statements saying itdid not oppose education but only curricula that triedto supplant Islamic and national values with westernculture. It also denied responsibility for attacks onschools. Nevertheless, the UN reported that attacksand threats of attack continued in areas controlled byanti-government groups, including the Taliban. 417 Insome places, the Taliban allowed schools to reopen,sometimes due to public opposition to theircontinuing closure. In these areas, there is evidencethat Taliban officials sought to control the curriculumand the appointment of teachers, and place additionalrestrictions on girls. 418 They also appointed‘controllers’ or shadow directors who distributedTaliban directives on schools and pressed localofficials to change the curriculum in line with Talibanthinking. In some cases, they checked if teachers andstudents were turning up to school. 419116