incorrect

By the third OAR rotation, 2 d MI Battalion had to rotate
eight CI Agents every 179 days from the field office platforms.
Since field offices maintain a persistent mission to
provide Title 10 CI support to FP, sustaining both Title 10
support and OAR became untenable. CI Agents are a finite
resource, and reducing an entire field office’s capabilities is
impractical. Therefore, in an effort to accommodate both
enduring mission sets, the Battalion exercised the art of
command by creating composite teams comprised of one
HUMINT solider paired with one fully credentialed CI agent
or MICECP to deploy to OAR. This effort alleviated the manning
constraints by mixing intelligence disciplines forward
in OAR, while also keeping the same intelligence disciplines
operationally engaged in protecting USAREUR garrisons in
the rear.
Maintaining the composite team concept poses a unique
challenge in itself. Each CI Agent, HUMINT Soldier, and
MICECP must be eligible to participate in OAR based on the
OML. 2 d MI accounts for this through the semi-annual validation
exercise by creating a training scenario that encompasses
individual MOS specific tasks and collective tasks
associated with OAR. These exercises keeps Soldiers’ collective
and individual tasks trained, while keeping them thinking
critically outside of their normal duties in the field office.
The validation exercise also allows a dispersed battalion to
come together twice a year to train and share best practices
from across the unit. An additional purpose the validation
exercise serves is bringing intelligence Soldiers from varying
duty locations together for training. Considering that
is how they deploy. Teams often comprise a member from
each field office, considering the cost to a field office if two
personnel deployed from one office at a time. Lastly, the
varying scenarios ensure that intelligence professionals remain
challenged and agile against the vast emerging threats
they face.
An active OML including both MICECP and Soldiers is imperative
to maintain intelligence team rotations in and out
of OAR and other deployment requirements while maintaining
the requirements to each garrison through the field
offices. 2 d MI currently rotates teams through OAR every
120 days. This keeps the rotations offset from the RAF and
teams under the 179 temporary change of station requirements.
Initially 2 d MI sought to deploy only Soldiers to OAR
with MICECPs maintaining continuity in the field offices, but
soon realized there are simply too few Soldiers to maintain
that type of cycle. Thus, MICECPs started rotating through,
which allowed these civilians to gain a holistic set of intelligence
skills and bring those skills back to the platforms.
This OML keeps Soldiers and MICECP rotations fair and all
members of the team mentally fit with rotations every third
or fourth time.
Conclusion
The combination of these four personnel measures ensures
that 2 d MI Battalion maintains an operational presence
in OAR for the expected long duration of the operation.
Without measures like an OML, MICECP and Soldier rotations,
the validation exercise, and composite teams one
mission would surely suffer. However, the priority of both
OAR and FP support to USAREUR garrison are both too important
to fail.
USAREUR is using OAR to usher in a new era of theater
security cooperation across Europe. The Baltic States are
just the beginning. Long term, OAR may encompass a mixture
of persistent and intermittent presence in nation states
throughout Europe through RAF elements engaged for 90
plus days or simply a team of RAF elements conducting a
joint exercise. As 66 th TIB continues its transformation into
the TIB for Europe, the unit faces several other challenges
to provide an anchor for RAF unit integration into Europe
while remaining constantly engaged in multiple forward
deployed locations to counter potential threats. Measures
such as the semi-annual validation exercise, RAF integration
into the validation process, deploying composite teams, an
OML, communications systems training, and off-setting intelligence
teams ensures that 66 th TIB maintains the multiple
competing priorities in OAR and ensuring a Strong
Europe well into this new era of operations.
Endnotes
1. US EUCOM Communications and Engagement Directorate Media
Operations Division, Operation Atlantic Resolve Fact Sheet, 2014. Retrieved
25 January 2014 at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2014/0514_
atlanticresolve/FactSheet_OperationAtlanticResolve_3Jul14.pdf.
2. U.S. Army Europe Homepage, What is Operation Atlantic Resolve?, 2014.
Retrieved 25 January 2015 at http://www.eur.army.mil/landforceassurance/.
Other Reading
Uri Friedman, Russia’s Slow-Motion Invasion of Ukraine, The Atlantic, 29
August 2014. Retrieved 25 January 2015. At http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2014/08/russias-stealthy-slow-motion-invasion-ofukraine/379312/.
MAJ Buchanan is the Battalion S3 for 2 d MI Battalion, Wiesbaden,
Germany. He has served in a variety of positions including multiple
deployments as a Battalion S2, MICO Commander, and MiTT Intelligence
Advisor. He holds an MA from San Diego State University and an MSSI
from the National Intelligence University.
CPT Lewandowski is the Battalion Operations Officer for 2 d MI Battalion,
Wiesbaden, Germany. He has served in various HUMINT roles during
multiple Iraq and Afghanistan deployments, most recently while serving
as an SFAT advisor to the 205 th ANA, BDE.
April - June 2015
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