incorrect

supply system and are not deemed worth the risk or cost to
have critical military assets, both Soldiers and trucks, move
them across the country or the added expense of shipping
back to the U.S. An example of FERP is something that can’t
be hauled away as a usable item (i.e., concrete pads, brick
structures, or water and power infrastructure). FERP can
also include buildings. FEPP items (i.e., heating and air conditioning
units) inside buildings remain and become part of
the FERP.
With the enacting of this process, enemy significant actions
were greatly reduced. The few disputes over shares of
materiel or control of land were minor in comparison to the
previous frequency and severity of attacks.
Communicating across CJOA-A
No unit conducts operations in a vacuum. Communication
throughout the unit’s ranks and across the Theater, both
higher and lower, is critical. Operating over the entire CJOA,
the units and their daily business practices vary greatly. Each
RC or TAAC will have their preferred systems for mission
command and enemy threats. The Capital region will focus
on magnetically attached improvised explosive devices and
vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED); East region
may add IDF also; South and Southwest will see IDF and
IED before VBIED as the primary threat. Commonalities will
always occur for threats, specifically Green on Blue threats
and attacks. Where the specific unit or troops are at a given
time will drive the focus of the S2. The RC intelligence sections
provide a good indicator but the Task Force covering
an installation is key to communicate with.
In effectively communicating with commands while conducting
operations across the CJOA, the S2 must be fluid
and capable of operating on an array of systems. Each region
operates with their primary form of communication
or platform for an intelligence common operational picture
(COP). Some systems are part of an Army program of record;
others will be third party. There is no longer a one-stop shop
for communicating or gaining awareness of ongoing events
in real time. The final submission of events or reports will be
published on common databases such as multimedia message
manager (M3). The process for finalization and publication
is not timely enough for battle tracking and requires
an S2 to be tied into live feeds and conversations.
Using programs such as Adobe Connect to Microsoft
Internet Relay Chat (mIRC) to joint chat (J-Chat) or the
Command Post of the Future (CPOF) over different networks
battle tracking becomes a daunting task. The task is
manageable if the initial communication is done with the
OEO/base operating support-integrator (BOS-I) and working
relationships are established. Without the relationship
building of analyst to analyst connections, intelligence sharing
and threat tracking can’t be done in a timely manner.
Force Protection (FP) with Heavy Intelligence
Injects and Support
FP is a high priority that is always built into each plan.
Within the vast area (roughly the size of Texas) in which
the CMRE operates enemy tactics, techniques and procedures
(TTP) will change as open plains and desert in the East
change to mountainous vegetated areas where the foothills
of the Hindu Kush mountain range begin. When an element
would go to a new area a threat assessment would be conducted
along with an FP analysis. Upon arriving at a new
area all FP would already be in place as these were mature
installations. As the installation was reduced to the agreed
upon transition size or back to the original state of the land
prior to construction, the security threat to the installation
increased. It is important to remain cognizant of not only
the change in enemy TTPs across the RC/TAACs as mentioned
previously but also the cultural aspects. An Afghan
power base must be maintained for local political and military
leaders as operations are conducted to ensure continuation
once Coalition Forces leave.
A disruption in this hierarchy or natural economic flow
causes devastating effects to Soldiers and equipment.
Examples of this can be found in analysis of enemy attacks
during the closing of installations. Attacks have occurred
over control of land or the hand over and distribution of
materiel and resources to the local population. The ownership
and distribution of materiel and resources must be
thought out. Is it best to give to a local elder or leader and
let him decide or should coalition forces distribute everything
equally? In some cases in small communities and rural
areas, distribution done incorrectly causes a shift from
a typical insurgent TTP to an attack directly on a weakened
installation as opposed to a convoy.
In other more urban areas when local contracts or security
forces became more involved we would see a natural
Afghan economic flow occur. Local security commanders
would gather waste (from the CMRE perspective) materiel
and consolidate it for sale and construction. During
the deconstruction of an installation the wood from razed
buildings was collected by Afghans and consolidated until
removal could occur. All of this was done by the order of the
local Afghan commander ensuring equal distribution and
preventing the monopolizing of materiel amongst local entities.
Safety and security was maintained for U.S. Soldiers
and the Afghan people, attacks decreased and no significant
events or attacks occurred.
46 Military Intelligence