incorrect

point of the focus shifting to other areas and maintaining
support to the CMRE is a unique facet of the intelligence
mission.
The Battlefield through CMRE Eyes
Though each of the four SBs that were charged with the
CMRE mission conducted operations differently to address
the rapid changes of retrograding and supporting the closure
of the Afghanistan Theater, root factors and concerns
remained the same. An area of operations (AO) that spans
an entire country, not an RC or two, is not the norm for the
SB. Previously, two SBs would cover the CJOA-A. The AO
becomes the specific installations and the area of interest
(AOI) is now the MSR/ASR. Should the MSR status change
or become impaired or the materiel is unable to pass, everything
becomes backed up causing a “log jam” and the
mission is hindered or delayed. The CMRE doesn’t move the
materiel and has little influence on the security of the MSR.
The mission of the S2 becomes more predictive, defensive
and forward looking to complete the mission. The analysis
must focus on the future passability of an MSR or GLOC and
less on the immediate threat of attack on the convoy. That
analysis that will identify the event that will close a route or
gate over a longer duration of time before the event occurs,
rather than the improvised explosive device (IED) that will
slow traffic today.
Information to predict reduced flow through an MSR,
gate, or GLOC must be drawn from less common sources.
The patterns of life and significant activities become less relevant
and a more holistic view and approach must be taken.
When conducting analysis, less of the Military portion of
PMESII-PT must be looked at and a more in-depth look must
be taken at the political, economic and social aspects.
The most effective intelligence an S2 provides a CMRE
commander is the prediction of delaying circumstances giving
the commander the knowledge needed to support decisions
of flow and routes. Tactical level intelligence plays
a small role in the intelligence support to the commander.
In the traditional SB role a commander would most likely
need more of this; for a CMRE a more operational, local,
and/or strategic focus, as effects throughout a theater of
operations will affect the movement and flow of materiel.
It should be noted that, a CMRE may not be able to directly
influence or affect decisions on what occurs but some foresight
in reduced flow to an area may reduce the overall effect
on the mission.
An example of this is the closure of a GLOC due to local
government no longer securing the area and allowing its
people to protest. This effectively closes the GLOC for reasons
the CMRE was not part of. It is the second and third
order effects of a decision made by the OEO to execute (or
the method of execution) the Theater mission that trickles
down to affect the CMRE. In some cases this cannot be
helped but the analysis must be provided to show a commander
how (and the duration) this affects the flow of retrograded
equipment. A closure for a day may not show
much impact to the CMRE mission; a closure for 30+ days
may back up holding yards to the point of over taxing the
yard’s storage space slowing its productivity.
One task the S2 always has is getting inside the planning
and attack cycles of the enemy. The CMRE is able to do this
by assessing political, social, and economic areas of concern
as well as potential areas of engagement. At the initial onset
of the CMRE mission all materiel was hauled by truck,
(military and contracted white truck off an installation) and
moved to a central hub containing an RSY. This process was
not only costly but forced many Soldiers and equipment to
be placed at a higher risk. As the process slowly morphed
into how the mission is executed now, a series of RSY and
forward retrograde elements (FRE) are set up across the
CJOA-A like a spider web of retrograde support. One of the
secondary effects of this is a disruption in the insurgency
support base surrounding an installation. With actions
pushed to a local area so also comes additional required
local contractor support that would normally be filled at a
large installation. With the economic benefits of contracting
and sale of scrap material to the local community the
enemy’s ability to disrupt and destroy is reduced. A threat
is still there but the forces on the installation were more a
part of the local economic system than a threat.
The greatest threat on CMRE operations is indirect fire
(IDF) or Green on Blue attacks. Often CMRE elements would
be tied to local disputes over materiel or land. As time went
on the focus of responsibility for causing these disputes
turned away from the CMRE and more to the Afghanistan
Government office that was levying the requirement. If
an area was to be transferred to the Afghans (this was any
government entity from the Ministry of Education building
a school for women to the Afghanistan National Army
establishing their own installation) the facilities were released
through a Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP)
or Foreign Excess Real Property (FERP) process. These were
agreed upon between the land owner or recipient and a
Coalition Forces’ representative. Only that which is determined
to be able to be maintained by the recipient and is
demilitarized is offered.
An example of FEPP is used appliances that have little
value (either because of condition or function) to the Army
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