incorrect

current conflicts, it became necessary for GR/CS to evolve
into a versatile asset capable of providing both large-scale,
strategic intelligence and accurate, NRT, tactical intelligence.
1 st MI BN took the traditional GR/CS tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) and developed new ones to better suit
the needs of customers engaged in the asymmetric environment
of OEF. In addition to the wide-area, large-scale
collection that GR/CS is known for, 1 st MI BN adapted key
positions in the Home Station to provide intelligence at a
significantly faster pace.
The battalion utilized Mission Managers (MMs) to oversee
and filter collected intelligence, and began tipping in NRT to
ground commanders using secure internet relay chat (IRC).
In order for this new TTP to work for ground commanders,
increased pre-mission coordination and planning was
necessary. As an extension of the Guardrail “name brand,”
the liaison officer (LNO) is the daily face of Guardrail to the
Regional Command Collection Managers and to customers,
responsible for fostering unit rapport. He or she is a hand
selected, seasoned MM who is collocated downrange with
the pilots. The LNO must balance strategic interests while
working directly for the customers to establish pattern of
life analysis, enemy network exploitation and development,
etc.
The LNO is the relay to the Home Station during the mission
planning process with customers and aircrews as well
as providing GR/CS capabilities briefs to the customers. In a
short amount of time, 1 st MI BN was able to rewrite the book
on GR/CS operations, adapting it to an asymmetric combat
environment, and the creating the trust required to operate
effectively in today’s combat space. This trust extends from
ground units to 1 st MI pilots and back to the Home Station.
Developing trust between forward deployed customers
and GR/CS operators at Home Station proved to be one
of the most difficult challenges to overcome. GR/CS MMs
were forced to develop trust with ground commanders and
troops via IRC. Without an in-person relationship to build
on, the intelligence produced by GR/CS had to be reliable.
Over time ground commanders began to recognize the
qualities of Guardrail and it became an asset synonymous
with speed and reliability.
The pilots, having historical tactical background seeing
Troops in Contact, developing and learning NRT IRC threat
tips during the Post Mission briefing, recognized a way
to bridge communications from the cockpit. After seeing
the effectiveness of this NRT tipping 1 st MI BN took
the Guardrail concept one step further, and began incorporating
GR/CS pilots in the PED process by adapting the
“Aircrew Coordination Concept” from the aviation doctrine
to fully integrate the pilots, MMs, LNOs, and operators into
a working “remote aircrew” dependent on each other for
complete mission SA. Unlike traditional aircrews, the intelligence
professionals conducting the PED are not located on
the platform, but instead are located at the Home Station.
By incorporating GR/CS Pilots into the PED process, 1 st MI
BN was able to transform GR/CS from a solely strategic asset
into an extremely valuable tactical asset.
Built into the architecture of the GR/CS hardware is a secure
communications line between the GR/CS ground shelters,
pilots, and MMs called Voice over Wire (VOW). MMs
began utilizing VOW to pass pertinent intelligence to 1 st MI
BN pilots, who in-turn would pass that intelligence quickly
via secure radio to Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC) embedded
with Special Operations Forces. This quick accurate
intelligence turn-around from Home Station operators to
units on the ground has been extremely effective in supporting
tactical operations. In an environment where minutes
can mean lives, 1 st MI BN significantly reduced imminent
threat tipping time to units on the ground. In a traditional
GR/CS framework, ground troops would not see GR/CS intelligence
until hours after it was processed and exploited,
or 10 to 15 minutes later utilizing IRC. 1 st MI BN has reduced
that time to an average of 4 to 7 minutes, utilizing the “direct
tipping” method through VOW.
The transition to a more customer focused mission, the
incorporation of pilots into the GR/CS PED process, and the
method of direct tipping identified an issue between two
very different ideologies with little common ground. Army
pilots come from a rotary wing background as Chinook,
Blackhawk, or Apache pilots, and their tactical experience
proved crucial to the success of 1 st MI BN GR/CS doctrine.
Many of the Military Intelligence (MI) professionals working
in the Home Station, however, have limited tactical experience,
and have spent most of their time supporting the strategic
environment.
In order to make 1 st MI BN’s version of GR/CS successful,
it was clear that the pilots and MI professionals needed to
learn to trust one another and also to communicate effectively.
Upon further review of the pilot and Home Station
integration, it became apparent that neither group really
understood the other’s job and was unable to effectively
communicate or discern the other’s needs or technical
lingo. The pilots looked at the MMs, operators, and LNOs
as uninitiated junior Soldiers with limited understanding of
aviation, far from the actual conflict, and nothing personal
at stake.
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