incorrect

y Lori S. Tagg, Command Historian, USAICoE
On January 14, 1991, the Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System (now referred to as JSTARS, but at that
time stressed as the “Joint” STARS) had its first operational
mission as part of Operation DESERT SHIELD in the Persian
Gulf. The air offensive was scheduled to begin two days
later, and the US Central Command (CENTCOM) was desperate
for targeting information. Up to this time, the Army
lacked a long range, near all-weather, night and day intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and targeting
capability. JSTARS was meant to fill that gap.
The JSTARS was comprised of an E-8 platform and several
ground station modules (GSMs). It could provide wide-area
surveillance through a moving target indicator (MTI) and
two- or three-dimensional imaging through synthetic aperture
radar (SAR). Both the Army and Air Force had parallel
development programs for similar systems in the 1970s. In
the early 1980s, however, Congress ordered that the two
programs be integrated into a single system and a joint program
office was established.
As a joint program, both Army and Air Force operators flew
onboard the aircraft. Although they looked at the same realtime
radar data, each had a different perspective of what it
meant and where it would be most useful. Air Force operators
looked for immediate targeting data for attack aircraft
and could track moving targets in real time. Army operators
manipulated the data differently, especially in the GSMs,
to look at changes through time to predict enemy ground
movements.
In September 1990, JSTARS conducted a successful
Operational Fielding (Feasibility) Demonstration for both
American and allied personnel in Europe. It was tasked with
locating and targeting three 25-vehicle convoys moving at
night. JSTARS easily passed the test. Shortly thereafter, a
team of Army and Air Force program and system managers
traveled to Saudi Arabia to brief the system capabilities
and status to General Norman Schwarzkopf, the CENTCOM
commander. Earlier in the summer, GEN Schwarzkopf had
requested, then cancelled JSTARS deployment to Southwest
Asia because the system was still in its testing phase and
its maturity for use in wartime was in question. By the
December briefing, however, he had reconsidered and immediately
requested deployment of the system to be operational
by January 15, 1991.
In less than a month, the Army needed to form a unit,
standardize all the equipment, identify and train personnel,
arrange for the shipment of the GSMs, and develop a concept
of operations for how the system would be employed
in theater. At this time, the Army had no policy or procedures
for integrating developmental systems into a theater
of operations. No provisions existed for authorizations to
form a provisional unit. The Commanding General at the
U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Major General Paul Menoher,
personally worked with the Department of Army Staff to get
a provisional JSTARS detachment manned, equipped, and
trained in time for deployment.
The whole process was contrary to policy and an exception
to standing procedures. Colonel Martin S. Kleiner, the U.S.
Army Training and Doctrine Command Systems Manager for
JSTARS, formed the JSTARS Operational Detachment One
and recruited and trained personnel from the Intelligence
Center to operate the GSMs. The Air Force established its
own 4411 th JSTARS Squadron. Preparation time was so compressed
that integrated training with USAF and Army personnel
was still ongoing during the 17-hour flight to Saudi
Arabia.
By January 12, two E-8A aircraft and five GSMs (a sixth
came later) arrived in Saudi Arabia. Two days later, JSTARS
was flying its first mission. COL Kleiner remembered that
first mission as a learning experience: “The aircraft was airborne,
it was down-linking radar and the ground stations
were receiving it. Quite frankly, we had no idea what we
were looking at. Our application of the system was pretty
much being developed on the fly. This was a revolutionary
capability. It wasn’t simple evolution moving from one capability
to incrementally something better. No matter how
much you test or how much you postulate, until you actually
get into an operational environment, you don’t know
what you are going to see.”
78 Military Intelligence