THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY

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APACHE TRANSFERS AND RELATED ISSUES Photo by 4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division Public Affairs An Apache crewmember with the 1st Cavalry Division prepares the helicopter for take-off in Iraq. from aviation units (including Apache units) would rotate from stateside locations and serve roughly nine months in Korea, using equipment that is pre-positioned there. The personnel from these units would then return and be replaced with personnel from other stateside units. Based on the experience of commissioners and discussions with senior Army leaders, the Commission concludes that these short-term rotations will not permit aviation units the time needed to properly mitigate risks posed by the threat situation in Korea, which features a volatile military environment and the potential for no-notice hostilities. Specifically, rotating units will not have time to master the geographic and environmental conditions well enough to operate effectively and safely in the region. Rotating units also will make building and retaining enduring relationships with our Korean allies more difficult, relationships critical to warfighting success. Rather than rotating a Combat Aviation Brigade, Option Three calls for a CAB to be forward stationed in Korea, which is the current practice. This would mean that the CAB would remain while individual soldiers rotate, providing a more stable fighting force. Forward stationing has disadvantages. It would increase costs by a net amount of about $40 million a year, largely because of added costs for permanent-changeof-station moves and personnel allowances. Additionally, with forward stationing, a stateside Army division would not have an assigned CAB and would have to work with other stateside aviation units to provide needed training capability. Nevertheless, greater stability for the fighting force in Korea argues for accepting these disadvantages. Finally, Option Three calls for the Army to review its emerging requirements for aviation in Europe, taking into account recent Russian adventurism. The Commission concluded that it makes sense to rotate aviation units to 88 National Commission on the Future of the Army
APACHE TRANSFERS AND RELATED ISSUES Europe, but these units must have an appropriately resourced mission command element to ensure mission success. Consistent with its charter and its time constraints, the Commission focused on the issue of Apache transfers and did not make recommendations regarding other aspects of the ARI, including retirement of all Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopters and use of Lakota helicopters for initial training. For costing purposes, Option Three assumes implementation of the ARI proposals regarding retirement of all the Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopters and using Lakota helicopters for initial rotary wing training. Advantages of Option Three According to TRAC analyses provided to the Commission, Option Three would offer more wartime capacity compared to the ARI. Capacity early in the war would be similar to the ARI because both maintain the same number of Regular Army Apache units. Later in the conflict, the four Army National Guard battalions would be mobilized and would provide added capacity. Classified analyses considered during the Comprehensive Analytic Review generally corroborate these findings (see NCFA Classified Annex for details). Option Three also provides wartime surge capacity by maintaining approximately 280 Apache pilots and associated helicopters and equipment in the Army National Guard. These pilots and their units would be available to surge during wartime. This is less than the NGB Alternative’s 420 pilots, but significantly more than the zero level of surge capacity offered under the ARI. Option Three would also help with peacetime operational tempo. The forward stationing of an aviation brigade in Korea significantly reduces the number of deployed units because forward-stationed units are not considered to be deployed under Army counting rules. Primarily for this reason, the peacetime operational tempo for Regular Army Apache battalions improves significantly. Nevertheless, forward-stationed units could be away from their families and experience many of the stresses associated with deployments. Even if forward-stationed units were counted as deployed units, however, routine call-up and use of the Army National Guard Apache battalions provided under this option would permit Regular Army units to slightly exceed the goal that calls for units deployed for one year to spend two years in non-deployed status. The added peacetime capacity available under Option Three would be particularly useful if world events in Europe or elsewhere increase the demand for Apache units. Finally, assessments by the CAA suggest that Option Three would be more cost effective than the ARI. The CAA analysis considers the time to deploy Regular and Army Guard units in a wartime scenario and the average annual costs of keeping and using them in both the Regular Army and Army National Guard. CAA did not attempt detailed budgetary analyses and did not consider all operational impacts. However, based on average annual costs, CAA concludes that options with Apaches in the reserve components would be more cost effective than the ARI. Disadvantages of Option Three Option Three would add to costs, a significant disadvantage. However, the Commission offers an illustrative proposal to offset those added costs. Under Option Three, operating costs would increase by a net of about $165 million a year. This figure reflects the added costs of four Army National Guard Apache battalions (including costs to deploy them on a regular basis) and costs to forward station a CAB in Korea. These additional operating costs are partially offset by savings from foregoing the operation of two Army National Guard Black Hawk battalions. In addition, Option Three would result in one-time costs of about $420 million to remanufacture twenty-four Apache helicopters from the D to E models. These remanufactures would likely occur at some time beyond the next five years. These added operating and procurement costs are small compared to the total defense budget. The Administration or the Congress may therefore be able to offset added costs through savings in budgets outside of the Army or in the nonaviation portions of the Army budget. In earlier chapters, the Commission offered some alternatives for offsetting costs. However, the Commission recognizes that some or all of the offsets required to pay for this Apache option may have to come from within Army aviation. Therefore, the Commission proposes an illustrative approach to offsetting the added costs of Option Three from within aviation funds. The Commission did not attempt to create a detailed, time-phased budget plan; instead, these illustrative savings examine a five-year period when all changes are in place. A portion of the added costs in Option Three could be offset by maintaining two fewer Black Hawk battalions in the Army National Guard. Another offset could be the savings from personnel cuts designed to leave Army National Guard personnel at the level of 335,000 planned in PB16. The remaining offsets could be achieved through a modest slowdown in the procurement program for Black Hawk helicopters. Option Three makes no change in the L-to-V conversion program for Black Hawks, a program that produces a fully digitized Black Hawk and, according to Army aviation leaders, a highly capable aircraft. However, buys of new Black Hawks (UH-60M) could be slowed. To offset the added costs of Option Three, the Army would probably have to buy five to ten fewer new Black Hawks per year. Based on information National Commission on the Future of the Army 89
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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE O
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TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY “Not later than
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Developing One Ar
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U.S. Army National Guard photo by S
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WHY THE NATION NEEDS AN ARMY CIVILI
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WHY THE NATION NEEDS AN ARMY Figure
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WHY THE NATION NEEDS AN ARMY “The
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National Commission on the Future o
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THE COMMISSION’S MISSION AND METH
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U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Richard W.
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FUTURE CHALLENGES Figure 7 ARMY IN
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FUTURE CHALLENGES Iran poses a mult
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FUTURE CHALLENGES terrorists or oth
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FUTURE CHALLENGES anti-Americanism,
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Page 45 and 46: U.S. Army photo. “The Commission
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Page 49 and 50: FISCAL CHALLENGES if the Army is to
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Page 53 and 54: “The Commission shall…make reco
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Page 57 and 58: THE ARMY FOR THE FUTURE Recommendat
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Page 63 and 64: THE ARMY FOR THE FUTURE POSSIBLE ST
Page 65 and 66: U.S. Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class B
Page 67 and 68: DEVELOPING ONE ARMY Figure 9 ARMY F
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Page 85 and 86: DEVELOPING ONE ARMY “When you joi
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Page 89 and 90: APACHE TRANSFERS AND RELATED ISSUES
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Page 131 and 132: APPENDIX F: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AA
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Page 135 and 136: APPENDIX G: TESTIMONIES AND COMMENT
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APPENDIX G: TESTIMONIES AND COMMENT
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APPENDIX H: COMMISSIONERS AND STAFF
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APPENDIX I: SUBCOMMITTEES OPERATION
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APPENDIX I: SUBCOMMITTEES FORCE GEN
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APPENDIX I: SUBCOMMITTEES DRAFTING
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APPENDIX J: SOURCES CONSULTED Defen
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APPENDIX J: SOURCES CONSULTED U.S.
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APPENDIX J: SOURCES CONSULTED U.S.
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THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY

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