62) decentralised governance of irrigation water in cambodia - CDRI

that Cambodians have practised large-scale irrigation agriculture for over a millennium, most
famously during the Angkor era (see, for example, Moore 1989). Dating back to the 11 th century,
the eight by two kilometre West Baray reservoir is an example of Angkor-era infrastructure
which is still in use today. Overall, while Cambodia’s history of water management may not
be as linear, uniform or well-documented as Bali’s, it still provides an important backdrop for
modern irrigation governance.
2.4 Water Scarcity and the Irrigation Service Fee
Compared across different contexts, what does “paying for water” really mean?
In developed and developing countries alike, most 21 st century farmers can now expect to
pay a fee in return for access to irrigation systems. Even where upfront infrastructure costs are
covered by the state, ongoing operation and maintenance (O&M) costs are increasingly being
shifted on to local communities and outsourced to private contractors (Molle et al.: Wester
2009: 341-342). This transition has occurred in the context of two (probably related) trends:
the neoliberal era contraction of central government budgets, and the Agenda 21 promotion of
decentralisation and “subsidiarity”.
In Australia and the United States, water has come to be regarded as a scarce resource
with a distinct economic value and farmers must pay a market-based price for their water
allocations and entitlements. In contrast, water is rarely seen as physically scarce in Cambodia.
However, the economic significance of water is a serious consideration. The new PIMD policy
has introduced a new rule for Cambodian farmers to pay an Irrigation Service Fee (ISF) to
their local FWUC committee. The ISF in Cambodia and the water fees in Australia are based
on very different economic premises. On the one hand, Australia’s Murray Darling Basin is
infrastructure-rich yet water-poor; it suffers from what Molden (2007) would term a “physical
scarcity” of water. To manage this scarcity, the water is rationed by price: the region’s farmers
must pay a fee for the water itself (i.e. per megalitre). In comparison, Cambodia’s ISF is
designed to address the very different problem of “economic scarcity”. Cambodia is relatively
water-rich, yet is infrastructure-poor; despite the abundance of water, Cambodian farmers do
not have the means to exploit it productively. Accordingly, the ISF goes to the improvement
and maintenance of water infrastructure and supports the operation costs of the FWUCs. It
does not relate to the amount of water actually used.
The distinction between “economic” and “physical” scarcity is based on sound economic
logic and is well accepted in academic and policy-making spheres. However, when applied to
complex local situations, it is a distinction that is apt to become blurred. There are a number
of possible reasons for this. First, due to lapses in communication, local people may not
understand the purpose of user fees. For example, given that the “ISF” is commonly translated
into Khmer as “water fee” rather than “infrastructure fee”, do Cambodian farmers actually
know what they are paying for? And how does this perception influence their willingness to
pay? Second, a generalised label of “economic scarcity” at the river basin scale can mask
acute physical scarcity at the village and plot scales. In Cambodia, this might occur when an
upstream farmer blocks an irrigation canal and thus prevents water from reaching the farming
plots located further downstream. Furthermore, physical scarcity in the dry season is a growing
issue with increased double-cropping often relying on schemes originally designed and built
for wet season supplementary irrigation only.
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