62) decentralised governance of irrigation water in cambodia - CDRI

authorities, influenced no doubt by elements of Cambodian culture which may deem public
complaints to be disrespectful. In DAP, farmer participation in decision-making does not
exist, and decisions seem to be made by PDOWRAM while the FWUC’s role is more one of
reporting upwards and waiting for PDOWRAM’s instructions. This is in part attributed to the
vastness of the scheme which puts it beyond the financial and technical capacity of the FWUC.
Also significant is that reporting upwards and waiting for instruction is strongly embedded
in the Cambodian culture, where it this perceived to be the right behaviour for lower and
less powerful governance bodies within the patron-client hierarchical governance system. In
Rolous, farmers have hardly participated in the election of the FWUC association because they
simply do not trust the election as a mechanism for selecting good and capable leaders who
could solve their problems. Participation in terms of ISF contribution varies from case to case.
Findings from the three case-study schemes show some positive outcomes from enforcing the
ISF policy; however, the low economic status of many farmers complicates the collection of
ISF. Even though paying for water is not rooted in Cambodian history, the findings demonstrate
that people do not mind paying for it as long as the governing body (FWUC) is able to deliver
water and infrastructure services to them. In terms of the nuances of Cambodian culture, paying
state authorities for services is not a new thing.
The fourth reason is the lack of congruence between the water policy and its implementation
as well as the internal inconsistency in the water policy itself. The two main goals of PIMD
are to deliver efficient, sustainable, reliable and environment-friendly irrigation systems (i.e.
an improved physical irrigation infrastructure), and to increase the roles and responsibility
of the FWUC at every stage of programme implementation (i.e. IMT approach to enhance
community participation). Yet, as shown in Rolous and DAP, implementation of the PIMD
policy has generally focused on establishing the FWUC, and rarely on improving the holistic
physical infrastructure to a minimum acceptable standard. Moreover, little attention has been
given to forming a complete support system to coordinate with FWUCs, such as FWUGs to
work at the smallest scale i.e. farm plot level and a support team to work from the provincial
level. This might be because the essence of Cambodia’s water policy does not really permeate
to the level of community implementation and the PIMD implementing agencies (MOWRAM
and PDOWRAM especially) lack the financial and technical capacity to make this happen. As
noted earlier, once established the FWUCs are expected to be independent despite their lack of
financial and technical capacity.
PIMD policy documents suggest that the success of the PIMD programme completely
depends on whether a FWUC can be capable of governing and financing the management of
an irrigation system sustainably. This research has shown that in practice, FWUCs are more or
less powerless and inefficient. Additionally, their inefficacy and meagre resources undermine
their ability to generate local legitimacy. For example, the Rolous FWUC committee was not
aware of the extent of its discrete power. One of the PIMD policy principles states that local
people are the ones who define what water services they will receive and the ones who select
their service providers. This means that any private company operating within a scheme should
be selected by the FWUC; in practice, the FWUC in Rolous did not even dare to question the
setting up of a new private water company in their command area. The company only needed to
contact the provincial governor and then find a place in the commune to establish its operation.
All that the FWUC (and CC) could do was to ask the company to register with PDOWRAM.
This is an example of the way in which the political culture in Cambodia blurs the regulatory
boundaries of the legal framework.
36 Decentralised Governance of Irrigation Water in Cambodia: Matching Principles to Local Realities