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Strengthening <strong>G7</strong> summitry<br />

IN CONVERSATION<br />

Progress will<br />

be difficult<br />

or impossible<br />

without China<br />

The efforts of <strong>G7</strong> members to reduce tensions in parts of<br />

East Asia can only go so far without cooperation from Beijing<br />

Beijing is not quite psychologically or<br />

materially ready to put the economic<br />

headlock on Pyongyang, but if Kim Jong-un<br />

does not begin to whistle at least a<br />

somewhat different tune, expect China to<br />

come closer and closer onside with <strong>G7</strong><br />

members – provided that they (and South<br />

Korea) can assuage its very visceral fear of a<br />

North Korean collapse that results in a united<br />

Korea with American troops on the Yalu River.<br />

With respect to other regional security<br />

challenges, China shows little sign of<br />

coming in from the cold. The East China<br />

Sea, at least, has settled into a modus<br />

vivendi, albeit one with distressingly<br />

frequent encounters between Chinese and<br />

Japanese vessels and distressingly frequent<br />

Japanese fighter scrambles from Okinawa.<br />

Since the election of Tsai Ing-wen as<br />

President of Taiwan, Beijing has gone quiet<br />

on cross-Strait relations, indicating that<br />

some re-evaluation of Beijing’s strategy<br />

is under way. Given that engagement has<br />

clearly failed to woo Taiwan back, I fear<br />

the next strategy will involve fewer carrots<br />

and more sticks.<br />

In the South China Sea, matters appear<br />

to be coming to a head. Beijing’s refusal to<br />

clarify its precise claims, its breakneck land<br />

reclamation programme, its militarisation<br />

of artificial islands, its refusal to move<br />

forward on a code of conduct, its insistence<br />

on bilateral solutions and its hysterical<br />

reaction to the Philippines arbitration case<br />

have triggered balancing behaviour by<br />

others and have weakened China’s hand<br />

rather than strengthened it. Here, Chinese<br />

behaviour is not driven by assertiveness,<br />

aggressiveness or confidence, but by fear:<br />

it is caught between domestic expectations<br />

of inflexibility and a deteriorating security<br />

environment at a time when the regime<br />

is becoming increasingly aware of its shaky<br />

legitimacy. It is hard to imagine how we<br />

get from here to a happy ending.<br />

Q What role has the <strong>G7</strong> played in the<br />

past in managing these challenges?<br />

A Not much, frankly. Others have taken<br />

the lead on major security issues to this<br />

point. The defunct Six-Party Talks took<br />

the point position on North Korean nuclear<br />

weapons; the United States and Japan,<br />

through their bilateral security treaty, have<br />

taken the lead on the East China Sea; the<br />

United States has unilaterally taken the<br />

lead on backstopping Taiwan against<br />

China (largely informally, but nevertheless<br />

very seriously); and the Association of<br />

Southeast Asian Nations has tried – but<br />

failed miserably – to take the lead on the<br />

South China Sea.<br />

The <strong>G7</strong> has never been in a position<br />

to assert leadership on these issues<br />

because only two members (Japan and<br />

the United States) are major stakeholders,<br />

and they are on the same side of every<br />

issue. But the <strong>G7</strong> may begin to speak in<br />

a louder voice, as it did recently in the<br />

foreign ministers’ Hiroshima Statement<br />

on Maritime Security.<br />

Q Will any of these issues<br />

escalate into military conflict?<br />

A There is always that potential. The<br />

good news is that nobody wants a shooting<br />

war. The bad news is that sometimes you<br />

get a shooting war when absolutely no<br />

one wants one. The chief danger of<br />

military conflict on the Korean Peninsula<br />

lies either in a desperate gamble by<br />

Kim Jong-un to stave off collapse, or in a<br />

new American administration that runs<br />

out of patience with diplomatic tools<br />

and reaches for the military hammer<br />

before North Korea masters ballistic<br />

missile technology.<br />

In the East China Sea, the problem is<br />

an inadvertent clash – which, with luck,<br />

everyone will seek to contain as quickly<br />

as possible. With Taiwan we probably<br />

have some time, but since Taiwan will<br />

never willingly return to the fold, the<br />

big question is whether China will lose<br />

patience before it loses interest.<br />

In the South China Sea, inadvertent<br />

conflict is always a danger, but if the<br />

Philippines arbitration case goes in<br />

Manila’s favour we may see more assertive<br />

military action in defence of claims.<br />

Q Which issues are most likely to<br />

become acute in the coming months?<br />

A Keep an eye on both North Korea<br />

and the South China Sea. <strong>G7</strong><br />

g7g20.com May 2016 • <strong>G7</strong> Japan: The Ise-Shima Summit 119

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