to Central Europe

1) It is a more subtle form of influence compared to direct military, political or
economic ways used to pursue interests, leaving mainstream political and civil
actors unprepared or unaware of these kinds of endeavors;
2) The Kremlin’s ideological impact joins forces with other global reactionary
forces: the Russian Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, different
evangelist movements in the United States, and thousands of pro-life, profamily,
and anti-abortion traditionalist NGOs, not to mention the dense
network of far-right, and, bizarrely, far-left movements running on similar or
overlapping agendas;
3) Russia is the only sovereign state with unmatched capabilities among
developed countries taking a direct part in global traditionalist networks vying
to reverse the development of worldwide human rights efforts in the 21 st
century.
Brexit provides a new chance for Russia to capitalize on anti-Western sentiments, spread
its illiberal ideology, as well as strengthen its illiberal allies throughout Europe, since the
fiercest anti-Kremlin member state, Great-Britain, has left the Union. This kind of upheaval
is best exemplified by the 34 anti-EU or anti-immigration referendums already set in
motion by (mostly pro-Russian) political players. 7 State Duma Deputy Sergei Zheleznyak
immediately called the Brexit referendum result an “expected outcome”, which might
trigger “a series of referendums in other European countries, the marginalization and the
collapse of the EU.” The mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin, bluntly stated that “without
the U.K., there will be nobody in the EU to defend sanctions against Russia so zealously.” 8
The refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks in Europe provide additional opportunities,
strengthening the dichotomy of “Strong Russia” against the “weak, decadent West”.
Value export via different channels: shades of influence
The Kremlin is clearly taking different approaches to spreading its influence in each
country, adjusting the forms of influence and the messages to the particularities of the
recipient countries. The two most important factors in this process are the host country’s
cultural proximity (e.g., shared cultural and historical origin, language, and values) to
Russia and the public’s perception of Moscow. The pro-Russian orientation of the elite and
the public in general determines the room for maneuvering and modus operandi (e.g.,
using more manifest or subtle channels of influence).
Generally, the cultural infiltration and the value export activity are much stronger via
fringe organizations (radical parties, small NGOs, diaspora organizations, fringe media)
than via the mainstream of the political spectrum. Fringe organizations are simply easier
to influence and “buy up.”
Given that in none of the examined countries did we find dominantly pro-Russian public
opinions (contrary to, for example, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, or Serbia), the value export
activity rather takes the form of indirect ways. This is especially true in Poland, where
influence from Russia is not welcome. But the Russian regime can take advantage of
different reactionary societal structures.
7 The world according to Europe’s insurgent parties: Putin, migration and power.
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/the_world_according_to_europes_insurgent_parties7055
8 Russia reacts to Brexit referendum. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russia-reacts-tobrexit-referendum/573389.html
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