to Central Europe

In Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary public diplomacy played and continues to
play a crucial role in spreading socially regressive ideologies of the Putin regime via
mainstream (even governmental) political players. While the socially regressive agenda
is the strongest in Poland, Russia plays a marginal role in the dissemination of these
messages due to the dominant fears over Russian expansion in the country.
In several countries, value export is helped by political players. In Hungary, the far-right
Jobbik, the strongest opposition party, is the servilient supporter of Russian interests - for
example, by promoting the implementation of the Russian regulation on “foreign agents”
in Hungary 9 . The mainstream (governmental) policy is also strongly in favor of Russia. As
far as Slovakia is concerned, only a part of the governmental elite’s sympathies are with
Russia, which co-exist with a stronlgy pro-Western group, which includes President Kiska,
who is sometimes even more radical than politicians in Poland and the Baltic States.
Additionally, the media is also strongly influenced in these countries (in Slovakia more so
than in Hungary) as well as in the Czech Republic.
Public opinion is the most receptive to cultural and ideological influences in Slovakia,
where the pan-Slavic sentiments are generally strong.
In Slovakia, different paramilitary organizations seem to be the most important tools and
sources of influence, while in the Czech Republic it is the pro-Russian media, in Poland the
nationalist and pro-life movements, and in Hungary the governmental party Fidesz and its
satellite organizations, the far-right Jobbik and traditionalist NGOs. In Austria, beside
strongly pro-Russian political players (FPÖ, most notably), organizations are rather used
for reaching specific political and economic goals rather than to exert ideological
influence.
International cooperation
The traditionalist pan-European networks help Russia in the promotion of its
“conservative” agenda. On the right side of the political spectrum, for instance, neo-Nazi
movements and far-right parties have established far-right cultural networks infusing
neo-Nazi ideology with the Neo-Eurasianism of Alexander Dugin.
Traditionalist pro-life, pro-family organizations encounter a similar international network
of NGOs close to the Kremlin (e.g., CitizenGo or the World Congress of Families).
In a bizarre manner, radical left groups, with a long history of international cooperation,
are also promoting some values that the Russian regime emphasizes (peace, selfdetermination,
autonomy 10 ).
What to expect – predictive remarks
While the economic crisis, the low oil prices and the sanctions reduced the capacities of
actors close to the Kremlin to invest into ideological export, this capacity is still significant.
9
A Jobbik a zsidók után a civileket listázná.
http://index.hu/belfold/2013/10/03/a_jobbik_szerint_a_kulfoldrol_tamogatott_civilek_ugynokok/
10 Krekó, P., Győri, L. Russia and the European Far Left.
(http://www.statecraft.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/Peter%20Kreko%20Far%20Left%20defini
tive.pdf
8