to Central Europe

Russian actors, in a semi-coordinated manner with the regime, might invest more in this
ideological export in the future in order to compensate for the loss in terms of economic
influence of the Putin-regime.
Both Brexit and the refugee crisis provides a good opportunity for Russia to push its
ideological narratives.
The “weaponization” of the media will continue. A new doctrine on information is
currently being formulated in Russia, to be accepted next year. 11 The expansion of the
value export via media is planned to be accelerated in the future: according to the Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s recent speech on the 10-year anniversary of Russia
Today, RT can expand to other countries, such as Serbia, Hungary, Romania, and Portugal
as well. 12 Where these media outlets do not operate, alternative media may serve as the
main channel of dissemination of regressive ideological messages.
Recommendations
The dispersion of the anti-progressive agenda in the EU Member States (MSs) we
examined happens through different channels and tools of ideological influence. The
following channels are worth highlighting:
o “grassroots” organizations and strong political influence on the far-right in
Slovakia;
o new media and far-right, far-left political parties and fringe organizations in the
Czech Republic;
o pro-Russian political organizations, ultra-conservative Christian organizations
and broader nationalistic movements in Poland;
o fringe media and the FPÖ in Austria;
o right-wing political parties and some “pseudo-NGOs” in Hungary.
Taking into consideration the diversity of political and ideological influences in the
respective countries, there can be no “one size fits all” strategy to push back the growing
attempts of the export of ultraconservative values in these countries.
With this in mind, we propose some general recommendations:
1) More efforts are needed. The major difference is that while Russia is actively interfering
with European politics and societies, in Europe (and in the US) there are more discussions
than actions. At the moment, the political will to push back the efforts of soft power
tactics such as ideological export lack in the respective member states and beyond. While
the European Union has set out the task to “counter Russian propaganda,” 13 such efforts
would require significant resources and a strong political support from the EU MSs—
conditions that have not yet been fulfilled. Support for projects aiming at countering these
11 See the following reports: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2829842,
https://news.mail.ru/politics/23585916/?frommail=1, and the official description of the earlier version of the
doctrine: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/6/5.html.
12 See speech at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rwNmzD22dfg&app=desktop
13 See more on this in Gotev, G. (2015). „Tiny EU task force set up to counter Russian propaganda”
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/tiny-eu-task-force-set-counter-russian-propaganda-317148 and
Jozwiak, R. (2015). „EU to counter Russian propaganda by promoting 'European values’”
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/25/eu-russia-propaganda-ukraine
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