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MEMORANDUM

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paper is thus not a conclusion, its aim is only to give some pointers for the next phase in<br />

Leontief saga, the phase which by his own expression, would “bring up the other wind.” 238<br />

The monograph was exceedingly well documented but had no appeal to the general<br />

reader. It documented an innovation in economic analysis at just the right time in history.<br />

The monograph was not suitable as a textbook. This was reflected in the sales figures<br />

which were dismal compared with those of books by Leontief’s Harvard colleagues. The<br />

delay in the publishing process implying that the book was not published until the<br />

beginning of 1941 detracted from the general academic attention to the book. But at the<br />

same time the demand for what Leontief had to offer was noticed by some of those highly<br />

concerned with the need for better tools for analysis for the mobilization of wartime<br />

resources. This led into the second phase of Leontief’s involvement with input-output<br />

project: the cooperation with the Bureau of Labor Statistics. That story will not be told<br />

here; main features of it can be found in Kohli (2001).<br />

Leontief said in an interview in 1997 that Roosevelt’s Secretary of Labor, Frances<br />

Perkins, the first woman to be appointed to the Presidential Cabinet, had written to him that<br />

the President had asked what would happen to the American economy after the war. 239<br />

Perkins had in 1933 appointed Isador Lubin as Commissioner of Labor Statistics. Lubin<br />

had succeeded in upgrading and expanding the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to become<br />

a professionally-staffed institution with considerable analytic capacity. In April 1941,<br />

while Leontief was still on sabbatical in Mexico, Congress invited to Lubin (bypassing<br />

other agencies) to set up a Defense Problems Unit to study the problems the United States<br />

would have to address to resume normal economic operations after the war. As this was<br />

before Pearl Harbor USA was not at war but the building up of the defense had been going<br />

on for some time and would clearly demand more resources, and much more if USA was<br />

drawn into the war.<br />

Lubin accepted and left it to one of his Chief Lieutenants, Donald Davenport, to<br />

establish a division right away. It was called the Defense Labor Problems Division.<br />

Davenport had come to BLS from Harvard but had never met Leontief at Harvard but was<br />

aware of his work. The division studied Leontief’s work but was uncertain how to make<br />

use of it for their assignment. It was obvious that a new input-output table was needed<br />

based on the 1939 Census. Leontief and BLS worked out that this could be done by setting<br />

up a unit at the Littauer Center, manned by BLS, and directed by Leontief.<br />

The acting head of BLS, Dal Hitchcock, cabled Leontief on 5 December 1941 to<br />

request an appointment at Harvard on the afternoon of 11 December to confer on the<br />

238 «The input-output analysis represents an attempt to straighten out our line of advance by<br />

bringing up the other wing – the study of interindustrial relationships.» Leontief (1951, p.204).<br />

239 See Foley 1998, p.122. It is not when the letter was written.<br />

112

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