bunching evidence from Hungary

APPENDIX
Table 11
Robustness analyses: DID esmaon for changes in real producon (control group includes firms with 2-6 % stable profit
rate)
Dep. varbs. profit wage bill employees investment
T i 1 -0.0979 0.0229 0.0769*** -0.0424*** 0.0316** -0.0162*** -0.0135***
(aer reform) (0.276) (0.0144) (0.0135) (0.0153) (0.0136) (0.0032) (0.0034)
D i 1 -1.941*** 0.0711*** 0.0764*** 0.0950*** 0.0875*** -0.0109*** -0.0111***
(treat. group) (0.285) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0140) (0.0031) (0.0035)
T i ∗ D i 1 0.816** 0.00408 0.0029 -0.0105 0.0014 0.0093** 0.0089**
(effect of reform) (0.372) (0.0194) (0.0182) (0.0207) (0.0183) (0.0044) (0.0045)
Constant 2.849*** 0.363*** 0.117*** 0.362*** 0.125*** 0.0802*** 0.0980***
(0.463) (0.0102) (0.0227) (0.0108) (0.0227) (0.0023) (0.0056)
Controls X X X X
N 9 959 11 155 9 959 11 155 9 959 11 155 9 959
Note: The control group includes firms with stable profit rates, i.e. in the 2-6 per cent interval for three years before the reform (2004-2006), and
the treatment group includes firms with stable profit rates in the 0-2 per cent interval. Wage bill, employment, and investment are normalized by
the balance sheet total, while reported profit is not in order to look at the fiscal effect of the reform. The control variables include pre-reform lag
profit, lag tax base, lag net turnover, lag employment, lag immaterial assets, lag net property, lag net machines, lag share capital, and industry code.
Variables taking also negave values are yearly winsorized at the boom 1% and at the top 99%, variables without negave values are winsorized
at the top 99%. The sample in the regressions contains firms with variables that were not dropped during the winsorizaon process. All monetary
variables are in million forints. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and stars indicate stascal significance level. * = 10% level, ** = 5% level,
*** = 1% level.
Table 12
Robustness analyses: DID esmaon for changes in real producon (control group includes firms with 2-10 % stable profit
rate)
Dep. varbs. profit wage bill employees investment
T i 1 -0.756*** 0.0219*** 0.0679*** -0.0353*** 0.0331*** -0.0153*** -0.0132***
(aer reform) (0.234) (0.0073) (0.007) (0.0078) (0.007) (0.0019) (0.002)
D i 1 -3.949*** 0.0809*** 0.0806*** 0.0940*** 0.0863*** -0.0120*** -0.0116***
(treat. group) (0.331) (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0104) (0.0099) (0.0025) (0.0028)
T i ∗ D i 1 1.607*** 0.00697 0.00653 -0.0107 -0.00334 0.0089** 0.0089**
(effect of reform) (0.435) (0.0137) (0.0129) (0.0147) (0.0130) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Constant 4.867*** 0.338*** 0.129*** 0.342*** 0.138*** 0.0814*** 0.0969***
(0.485) (0.0052) (0.0144) (0.0055) (0.0145) (0.0014) (0.0041)
Controls X X X X
N 9 959 11 155 9 959 11 155 9 959 11 155 9 959
Note: The control group includes firms with stable profit rates, i.e. in the 2-10 per cent interval for three years before the reform (2004-2006), and
the treatment group includes firms with stable profit rates in the 0-2 per cent interval. Wage bill, employment, and investment are normalized by
the balance sheet total, while reported profit is not in order to look at the fiscal effect of the reform. The control variables include pre-reform lag
profit, lag tax base, lag net turnover, lag employment, lag immaterial assets, lag net property, lag net machines, lag share capital, and industry code.
Variables taking also negave values are yearly winsorized at the boom 1% and at the top 99%, variables without negave values are winsorized
at the top 99%. The sample in the regressions contains firms with variables that were not dropped during the winsorizaon process. All monetary
variables are in million forints. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and stars indicate stascal significance level. * = 10% level, ** = 5% level,
*** = 1% level.
MNB WORKING PAPERS 3 • 2016 37