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Soviet and Russian Lunar Exploration

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Ye-6S, Ye-6LF, Ye-6LS series: scientific outcomes (with Zond 3)<br />

Very weak magnetic field around the moon (distortion of the interplanetary magnetic field?).<br />

No lunar magnetic poles.<br />

No differences in radiation emission levels between lunar lowl<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> highl<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

Cosmic radiation at 5 particles/cm 2 /sec.<br />

198 meteoroid impacts (Luna 10).<br />

No gaseous atmosphere around moon found.<br />

Finding of anomalous zones of mass concentrations below lunar surface disturbing the lunar<br />

orbit (mascons) (Luna 10); characterization of such zones (Luna 14).<br />

Broad composition of lunar rocks (basaltic).<br />

Selection of l<strong>and</strong>ing sites for manned <strong>and</strong> rover l<strong>and</strong>ings.<br />

Infrared, ultraviolet scan of lunar surface (Zond 3).<br />

Assessment of reflectivity of lunar surface <strong>and</strong> inferred density.<br />

ORBITERS, IN CONCLUSION<br />

During 1966-8, the <strong>Soviet</strong> Union sent up seven orbiters to explore the lunar environment<br />

<strong>and</strong> map the surface. Of these, two failed (Cosmos 111, 7th February 1968) <strong>and</strong><br />

one partly failed (Luna 11). Only one photographic mission succeeded (Luna 12), but<br />

we do not have access to the archive which it assembled. Luna 10, despite being<br />

improvised, appears to have returned a substantial amount of scientific information.<br />

The <strong>Russian</strong>s also ran a series of communications missions, the Ye-6LS, which shows<br />

their thoroughness in approaching the moon project <strong>and</strong> which have no direct<br />

American comparison.<br />

There was discussion, in the Western popular press, as to the need for proceeding<br />

to manned flights to the moon when so much useful information had been already<br />

retrieved by automatic probes. Later, when the <strong>Russian</strong>s were beaten in the moon<br />

race, they raised the question in retrospective justification for their use of automatic<br />

probes. In reality, this important discussion was given little airing within the two<br />

respective space programmes themselves, for the political decision had already been<br />

taken to go for a manned flight around the moon <strong>and</strong> to its surface. This decision had<br />

little to do with a calculation of the best way to obtain a scientific return, but, as<br />

President Kennedy himself put it, would be the approach 'most impressive to mankind'.<br />

It is back to this larger project that we now turn (Chapter 5).<br />

REFERENCES<br />

[1] Surkov, Yuri: <strong>Exploration</strong> of terrestrial planets from spacecraft - instrumentation, investigation,<br />

interpretation, 2nd edition. Wiley/Praxis, Chichester, UK, 1997.<br />

[2] Tyulin, Georgi: Memoirs, in John Rhea (ed.): Roads to space - an oral history of the <strong>Soviet</strong><br />

space programme. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995.<br />

[3] Ivanovsky, Oleg: Memoirs, in John Rhea (ed.): Roads to space - an oral history of the<br />

<strong>Soviet</strong> space programme. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995.

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