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LSB September 2017

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COMPETITION LAW<br />

International competition policy: Is<br />

Australia surfing the wave?<br />

NICOLAS PETIT, RESEARCH PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA SCHOOL OF LAW, & JOHN MANSFIELD QC<br />

The UniSA School of Law, in<br />

partnership with the Australian<br />

Competition and Consumer Commission<br />

(ACCC), will hold the 15th edition of<br />

its Competition Law and Economics<br />

Workshop in Adelaide on 13-14 October 1 .<br />

Emphasis will be placed on the domestic<br />

and international context. On both<br />

fronts, the tides are rising for Australian<br />

competition policy.<br />

MARKET INVESTIGATIONS & NEW<br />

LEGISLATIVE POWERS<br />

At the domestic level, the Federal<br />

Government has requested the ACCC to<br />

conduct a market investigation into the<br />

retail electricity pricing sector. 2 The topic<br />

is politically sensitive. Polls have singled<br />

out energy prices as a top priority for<br />

Malcolm Turnbull’s government. 3 Failure<br />

to deliver quick and effective solutions to<br />

this matter could prove divisive when<br />

it comes to public support for green<br />

energies and fossil fuel emission targets. In<br />

addition, this investigation could pose an<br />

administrative challenge for the ACCC. It<br />

comes on the heels of an array of ongoing<br />

market investigations in the dairy sector,<br />

new car retailing and communications<br />

sectors. As such, this additional<br />

investigation could potentially stretch the<br />

resources of the ACCC.<br />

16<br />

THE BULLETIN <strong>September</strong> <strong>2017</strong><br />

At the same time, however, the ACCC<br />

could soon assume new powers. Draft<br />

legislation released in 2016 proposes<br />

to introduce an express prohibition of<br />

“concerted practices” in the Competition<br />

and Consumer Act (CCA) of 2010. 4<br />

This amendment purports to fill a gap.<br />

Under the 2010 CCA, the law only<br />

prohibits “contracts, arrangements and<br />

understandings” that substantially lessen<br />

competition, thereby leaving beyond the<br />

ambit of the law less formal instances<br />

of collusion, such as price signaling<br />

and information exchanges. 5 The new<br />

amendment to the CCA, could allow the<br />

ACCC to operate more efficiently and<br />

confidently in such cases, with lower<br />

risks of review before the Australian<br />

Competition Tribunal. 6 Yet the CCA<br />

amendment implies an additional<br />

workload for the ACCC. Firms involved<br />

in “concerted practices” will certainly seek<br />

protection under the leniency programme<br />

by reporting their conduct to the ACCC.<br />

Moreover, the prohibition of concerted<br />

practices could burden administrative and<br />

judicial proceedings with endless quarrels<br />

among economists. All competition<br />

systems with a similar provision have, at<br />

some point in their history, had to address<br />

the issue of whether conscious parallelism<br />

amongst oligopolists – think, for example,<br />

of two petrol stations on either side of a<br />

street – could (and should) be enjoined<br />

as a concerted practice short of any<br />

explicit agreement. 7 This hard question<br />

is contentious. Short of an agreement,<br />

there is nothing to remedy. Unless, of<br />

course, one requires oligopolists to behave<br />

irrationally.<br />

TRUMP, BREXIT AND INDUSTRIAL<br />

POLICY?<br />

On the international scene, last year’s<br />

election of President Trump in the US<br />

may well be a game changer in an area<br />

where international convergence had<br />

until then been a stable equilibrium.<br />

President Trump’s “America first”<br />

rhetoric, and the early withdrawal from<br />

the Trans-Pacific Partnership augur a<br />

non-trivial possibility that antitrust laws<br />

could be used to protect and promote US<br />

businesses. At the same time, Republicans<br />

have traditionally supported minimalist<br />

antitrust enforcement. The Party may<br />

thus be reticent to embrace the idea of<br />

reinvigorating antitrust in pursuit of a trade<br />

agenda. As for other policies, the policy<br />

line of the new US administration remains<br />

to date in limbo. And key functions within<br />

the US antitrust agencies (the FTC and the<br />

DOJ) remain to be filled.<br />

Besides, Brexit could also prove a<br />

disruptive force. At present, the European<br />

Union (EU) internal market rules leave no<br />

space for industrial policy interventions<br />

in the form of State subsidies, restrictions<br />

on foreign takeovers, and discriminatory<br />

regulations. But this outlook could<br />

be entirely different in a “hard Brexit”<br />

world, where UK competition policy<br />

has taken back control over market<br />

regulation. Should we conjecture a revival<br />

of industrial policy in the UK? 8 Theresa<br />

May’s Government has already announced<br />

it will review the public interest regime in<br />

UK merger control and consider greater<br />

controls on foreign investment. And the<br />

Labour opposition has expressly advocated<br />

industrial subsidies and public ownership. 9<br />

Whoever ends up at Downing Street UK

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