Delivered Into Enemy Hands - Human Rights Watch

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document in the folder marked “UK” mentions that Abdullah Sadeq (the name Belhadj was using at the time), travelling under a French or an Iraqi identity, “is being held in the Sepang detention center in Malaysia” with his “pregnant wife.” 281 The document is undat- ed, but notes that the couple was traveling around February 21. 282 Two faxes found in the folder marked “USA,” both dated March 4, 2004 and marked “Secret Release Libya Only,” appear to have been sent by the CIA to the Libyan Security Service. One has a subject line that reads, “Clarification Regarding the Rendition of Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq.” 283 The other had a subject line that reads, “Urgent Request Regarding the Extradition of Abdullah al-Sadiq from Malaysia.” 284 It is not clear which fax was sent first, but the fax seeking clarification begins by thanking the Libyan security service for the “hospitality” that it showed to CIA officers during their recent visit to Libya; remarks that the discussions had during that visit were “very productive;” and pronounces that they are “committed to developing this relationship” for the “mutual benefit” of both services. It then goes on to read: Our service is committed to rendering the terrorist Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq to your custody. To this end, we have been in touch with the Malaysian authorities to help facilitate the transfer of custody in atimely [sic] manner. We do not yet have all the details from our station in Kuala Lumpur regarding how and when this transfer will take place, but we are very hopeful for a [sic] expeditious resolution to this matter. We will provide you with the details as soon as they are available to us. 285 The other fax dated the same day, with “urgent request” in the subject line, says the United States is working “energetically” with the Malaysian government to “effect the extradition of Abdullah al-Sadiq” from Malaysia. It says that the Malaysians have “promised to cooperate and to arrange for Sadiq’s transfer to our [the CIA’s] custody” and that they will be “very happy to service your debriefing requirements” and “will share the 281 Ibid. 282 Ibid. 283 Tripoli Document 2173. 284 Tripoli Documents 2173 and 2174. 285 Tripoli Document 2173. 95 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | SEPTEMBER 2012
information with you [Libyan security service].” The fax also says that the CIA was “at a delicate point in [its] discussions with the Malaysians” and therefore asks that the Libyans temporarily “cease any further engagement” with the Malaysian government until the CIA has “custody of Sadiq” or has judged that the Malaysians are “unwilling to cooperate with the U.S. government.” 286 Two days later, on March 6, the CIA sent the Libyans another fax saying that Belhadj and his “pregnant (4 months) wife” would be leaving Kuala Lumpur on the evening of March 7, on a commercial flight to London via Bangkok, corroborating Bouchar’s belief that her captors knew she was pregnant. 287 The CIA said it planned to take custody of the couple in Bangkok, and that it was “vital” that a Libyan security officer be present to accompany the couple on the flight from Bangkok to Libya. 288 Also on March 6, the CIA sent another fax, with the subject line “Schedule for the Rendition of Abdullah al-Sadiq,” to Libyan intelligence. 289 It details the flight plan for the aircraft that was supposed to pick up Belhadj and his wife and take them to Libya. The fax informs the Libyan intelligence service that the flight will leave Washington, DC Dulles International Airport on March 6/7, make a stop in Tripoli and refuel on March 7, then fly to the Seychelles, where it will remain overnight. Then on March 8, it will leave the Seychelles for Bangkok, where it will refuel, presumably pick up Belhadj and his wife, and fly to Tripoli, with a stopover for half a day in Diego Garcia (a US naval air base in the British Indian Ocean Territory). 290 The fax asks the Libyans to make sure their officers “have the proper documentation for [the Seychelles], otherwise they will not be allowed to leave the aircraft.” 291 286 Tripoli Document 2174. 287 Tripoli document 2172, a fax from the CIA to the Libyan intelligence service. 288 Ibid. 289 Tripoli Document 2171. 290 Ibid. Representatives of the British government denied that Diego Garcia played any role in the global rendition program, including in meetings with Human Rights Watch, but later, after confronted with evidence, apologized and admitted that in fact two rendition flights had refueled there in 2002. Colin Brown, “Official apology after CIA ‘torture’ jets used UK base,” The Independent, February 22, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/official-apology-after-cia-torture-jetsused-uk-base-785596.html (accessed July 25, 2012). There was no mention at the time of the 2004 Belhadj or Saadi renditions, and the government Foreign Office has declined to comment further. Cobain, “Special report: Rendition ordeal that raises new questions about secret trials,” The Guardian; See also “Abdel Belhadj: The rendition flight,” The Telegraph, April 18, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9210950/Abdel-Belhadj-the-rendition-flight.html (accessed July 23, 2012). 291 Tripoli Document 2171. DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS 96
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H U M A N R I G H T S W A T C H Del
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Copyright © 2012 Human Rights Watc
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Mustafa Jawda al-Mehdi ............
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This report is based mostly on Huma
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These stories provide new details a
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Gaddafi opponents in Libya. Ten of
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treatment. Nor did they protect det
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two more the following April. Commu
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esponsibilities. Mehdi and Shoroiey
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identified in this report to Libya,
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of compiling the names of those who
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Libya from the 1970s to the 1990s I
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Gaddafi also made major changes to
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Abu Salim massacre, in which prison
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insurgency, mainly in eastern Libya
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In late autumn of 2007, these repor
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econciled with Gaddafi and a number
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PLACES OF ARREST, DATES OF TRANSFER
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Shoroeiya and Sharif said that once
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Arrest and Detention Shoroeiya and
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CIA Rendition Transportation Proced
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Both were detained in this first lo
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Abu Yasser al Jazairi, from Algeria
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Sharif also said he learned the nam
Page 49 and 50: Afghanistan on April 25, 2004. Both
Page 51 and 52: Shoroeiya and Sharif both alleged t
Page 53 and 54: The Interrogators Shoroeiya said th
Page 55 and 56: He said there were doctors present.
Page 57 and 58: Mohammed Shoroeiya said his interro
Page 59 and 60: stan.” 191 Both thought they migh
Page 61 and 62: Shoroeiya said there were intrusive
Page 63 and 64: “The biggest suffering for any pr
Page 65 and 66: Majid Mokhtar Sasy al-Maghrebi Maji
Page 67 and 68: him in Pashto, they spoke to him in
Page 69 and 70: Loud music was blaring constantly.
Page 71 and 72: On various occasions while detained
Page 73 and 74: he was in Karachi, Pakistan. After
Page 75 and 76: faces. He said he saw from the eyeh
Page 77 and 78: His interrogators would come to him
Page 79 and 80: He again went on hunger strike, ask
Page 81 and 82: Di’iki was detained in solitary c
Page 83 and 84: Mustafa Salim Ali el-Madaghi Mustaf
Page 85 and 86: took photos of him; put him in diap
Page 87 and 88: flight plan to go into Nouakchott,
Page 89 and 90: Mehdi said he first went to Saudi A
Page 91 and 92: Pakistanis responded in Pashto. He
Page 93 and 94: There were about 12 interpreters, p
Page 95 and 96: know what’s going to happen to yo
Page 97 and 98: Departure from Libya Belhadj was bo
Page 99: ‘This is it.’ I thought I would
Page 103 and 104: equests for information from Abu
Page 105 and 106: subsequently was able to receive vi
Page 107 and 108: Sami Mostefa al-Saadi © 2012 Human
Page 109 and 110: making harsh statements against the
Page 111 and 112: denied permission for the Libyan ai
Page 113 and 114: Saadi said he was held without char
Page 115 and 116: complicity in his transfer back to
Page 117 and 118: Abu Farsan spent the next decade at
Page 119 and 120: They noted in the fax that they und
Page 121 and 122: On June 7, 2006, Abu Farsan was tra
Page 123 and 124: Safrani in Afghanistan, said that t
Page 125 and 126: V. The Case of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Lib
Page 127 and 128: In late 2001, Pakistani authorities
Page 129 and 130: 2004, al-Libi recanted the informat
Page 131 and 132: held until December 2006, when the
Page 133 and 134: It is not clear when Ibn al-Sheikh
Page 135 and 136: Mostafa al-Mehdi (see above) saw al
Page 137 and 138: VI. Detainees Rendered From Other A
Page 139 and 140: appointed a lawyer who he said did
Page 141 and 142: In early 2008 he was charged with b
Page 143 and 144: government. After 1992, when the go
Page 145 and 146: governments during the Gaddafi gove
Page 147 and 148: conflict or emergency, may “opt o
Page 149 and 150: them to Libya in violation of their
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each country to which the agency de
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shelving the Gibson Inquiry and wou
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To the US Congress • Create an in
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To the Government of the Netherland
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Acknowledgments This report was wri
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Recreation of Document 2144 SUBJECT
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Translation of Documents 2164-65 Al
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Delivered Into Enemy Hands US-Led A
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