Delivered Into Enemy Hands - Human Rights Watch

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oom was monitored with cameras. During this period he said he overheard two police women arguing: “They were talking in their own language and I didn’t understand everything, but I did hear ‘CIA’ about four or five times, so I expected that something not good was about to happen.” After 13 days of detention, the Hong Kong authorities told him he would be sent back to China. On or about March 28, 2004, Saadi said he was handcuffed, his legs zip-tied, and he was taken along with his wife and four children onto an empty plane with an Egyptian crew. He and his children were taken to the back of the plane, while his wife, who was screaming and in what he described as a “terrible psychological condition,” was kept elsewhere. It was not until five Libyan security personnel—four men and a woman—appeared on the plane during a stopover in Bangkok that Saadi realized he was being rendered to Libya. Once he realized it, he lost consciousness. Saadi is diabetic and his blood sugar had risen. “That’s when I first realized I was being sent back to Libya. It was a mixture of horrible emotions: anger, fear, sadness.” “I felt like we were being kidnapped. I was very scared. I thought they would execute us all,” Kadija al-Saadi, Saadi’s oldest child who was 13 years old at the time, said. 332 Around this time, she came to the area of the plane where her father was. When she saw many soldiers around him and the needle in his arm while he was still handcuffed to the chair, “I fainted too,” she said. Later during the flight, about half an hour before they landed, Libyan security agents came and told her to come and say goodbye to her father. “I expected that that was when they would come and execute him,” she said. 333 The Tripoli Documents corroborate Saadi’s story. Saadi’s return appears to have been initiated by the MI6, but once the CIA discovered it was underway, they stepped in to do everything they could to assist. A March 23, 2004 fax from the CIA to Libyan intelligence, found in the folder marked “USA,” states that the CIA has “become aware” that Saadi and his family were being held in detention in Hong Kong and that the Libyans have been working with the British to “effect [his] removal to Tripoli” on a Libyan plane that was in the Maldives. 334 In the fax, the CIA said that it was aware that the Hong Kong special wing had 332 Human Rights Watch interview with Kadija al-Saadi, Tripoli, Libya, March 25, 2012. 333 Ibid. 334 Tripoli Documents 2162-2163. 105 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | SEPTEMBER 2012
denied permission for the Libyan airplane to land. It went on to explain, “However, we believe that the reason for the refusal was based on international concerns over having a Libyan-registered aircraft land in Hong Kong. Accordingly, if your government were to charter a foreign aircraft from a third country, the Hong Kong government may be able to coordinate with you to render Abu Munthir [Saadi] and his family into your custody.” 335 The CIA even offered to pay for the non-Libyan-registered charter aircraft. “If payment of a charter aircraft is an issue, our service would be willing to assist financially to help under- write those costs.” 336 The CIA requested perfunctory diplomatic assurances that Saadi and his family would not be harmed if they provided assistance: “Please be advised if we pursue that option [providing assistance], we must have assurances from your government that Abu Munthir [Saadi] and his family will be treated humanely and that his human rights will be respected.” 337 In the same fax, the CIA also provided suggestions as to how the Libyans might expedite the process and convince the Hong Kong authorities to cooperate. 338 “[W]e believe that you will need to provide significant detail on Abu Munthir (e.g. his terrorist/criminal acts, why he is wanted, perhaps proof of citizenship)…. Specifically, the Hong Kong government must have a stipulation … that he will not be subject to the death penalty.” 339 The next day, on March 24, 2004, the Libyan authorities sent a 32-page fax to Hong Kong authorities containing, among other things, a birth certificate, information on why Saadi was wanted, and details on the “crimes and the terrorist activities that [Saadi] committed.” They also promised that the “maximum penalty” for what he had done was “life imprisonment.” 340 (Though later, after being in Libyan custody for five years without charge, Saadi 335 Tripoli Documents 2162-2163. 336 Ibid. 337 Ibid. 338 Ibid. 339 Ibid. 340 Tripoli Documents 2280-2283, 2300-2311 (only relevant pages, with the exception of the birth certificate which is not included, of the 32 page fax are contained herein). The document seems to have been sent to the Hong Kong Authorities by the Libyan government, given that the letter is signed by “NCB Tripoli” (see Document2281). It was contained in the folder marked UK. Perhaps the Libyans faxed a copy of what had been sent to the Hong Kong authorities to the UK government in order to show they had complied with Hong Kong’s demands. DELIVERED INTO ENEMY HANDS 106
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H U M A N R I G H T S W A T C H Del
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Copyright © 2012 Human Rights Watc
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Mustafa Jawda al-Mehdi ............
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This report is based mostly on Huma
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These stories provide new details a
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Gaddafi opponents in Libya. Ten of
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treatment. Nor did they protect det
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two more the following April. Commu
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esponsibilities. Mehdi and Shoroiey
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identified in this report to Libya,
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of compiling the names of those who
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Libya from the 1970s to the 1990s I
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Gaddafi also made major changes to
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Abu Salim massacre, in which prison
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insurgency, mainly in eastern Libya
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In late autumn of 2007, these repor
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econciled with Gaddafi and a number
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PLACES OF ARREST, DATES OF TRANSFER
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Shoroeiya and Sharif said that once
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Arrest and Detention Shoroeiya and
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CIA Rendition Transportation Proced
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Both were detained in this first lo
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Abu Yasser al Jazairi, from Algeria
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Sharif also said he learned the nam
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Afghanistan on April 25, 2004. Both
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Shoroeiya and Sharif both alleged t
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The Interrogators Shoroeiya said th
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He said there were doctors present.
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Mohammed Shoroeiya said his interro
Page 59 and 60: stan.” 191 Both thought they migh
Page 61 and 62: Shoroeiya said there were intrusive
Page 63 and 64: “The biggest suffering for any pr
Page 65 and 66: Majid Mokhtar Sasy al-Maghrebi Maji
Page 67 and 68: him in Pashto, they spoke to him in
Page 69 and 70: Loud music was blaring constantly.
Page 71 and 72: On various occasions while detained
Page 73 and 74: he was in Karachi, Pakistan. After
Page 75 and 76: faces. He said he saw from the eyeh
Page 77 and 78: His interrogators would come to him
Page 79 and 80: He again went on hunger strike, ask
Page 81 and 82: Di’iki was detained in solitary c
Page 83 and 84: Mustafa Salim Ali el-Madaghi Mustaf
Page 85 and 86: took photos of him; put him in diap
Page 87 and 88: flight plan to go into Nouakchott,
Page 89 and 90: Mehdi said he first went to Saudi A
Page 91 and 92: Pakistanis responded in Pashto. He
Page 93 and 94: There were about 12 interpreters, p
Page 95 and 96: know what’s going to happen to yo
Page 97 and 98: Departure from Libya Belhadj was bo
Page 99 and 100: ‘This is it.’ I thought I would
Page 101 and 102: information with you [Libyan securi
Page 103 and 104: equests for information from Abu
Page 105 and 106: subsequently was able to receive vi
Page 107 and 108: Sami Mostefa al-Saadi © 2012 Human
Page 109: making harsh statements against the
Page 113 and 114: Saadi said he was held without char
Page 115 and 116: complicity in his transfer back to
Page 117 and 118: Abu Farsan spent the next decade at
Page 119 and 120: They noted in the fax that they und
Page 121 and 122: On June 7, 2006, Abu Farsan was tra
Page 123 and 124: Safrani in Afghanistan, said that t
Page 125 and 126: V. The Case of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Lib
Page 127 and 128: In late 2001, Pakistani authorities
Page 129 and 130: 2004, al-Libi recanted the informat
Page 131 and 132: held until December 2006, when the
Page 133 and 134: It is not clear when Ibn al-Sheikh
Page 135 and 136: Mostafa al-Mehdi (see above) saw al
Page 137 and 138: VI. Detainees Rendered From Other A
Page 139 and 140: appointed a lawyer who he said did
Page 141 and 142: In early 2008 he was charged with b
Page 143 and 144: government. After 1992, when the go
Page 145 and 146: governments during the Gaddafi gove
Page 147 and 148: conflict or emergency, may “opt o
Page 149 and 150: them to Libya in violation of their
Page 151 and 152: each country to which the agency de
Page 153 and 154: shelving the Gibson Inquiry and wou
Page 155 and 156: To the US Congress • Create an in
Page 157 and 158: To the Government of the Netherland
Page 159 and 160: Acknowledgments This report was wri
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Recreation of Document 2144 SUBJECT
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Translation of Documents 2164-65 Al
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Delivered Into Enemy Hands US-Led A
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