atw - International Journal for Nuclear Power | 06/07.2019

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2019
6/7
The Economic
Potential of SMRs
SMRs – Overview on
International Developments
and Safety Features
iMAGINE – A Disruptive
Change to Nuclear
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atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
Crux of the Matter – Innovation
Dear reader, The current debate on the topic of energy in many European countries is a lot of things: colourful,
shrill, on Fridays, but certainly not one thing: fact-based. Not that every decision in our lives has to follow a quasi
technocratic decision-making process. But it is enough if such an important topic for our society, indeed for the world as
a whole, how the future energy supply is to be decided is to appear with colourful hair on web-television or to
demonstratively go out onto the streets on Fridays? Where is the debate on the content of the question of what the future
of our energy supply could look like? Where are the theses and antitheses to the individual energy sources? Where is the
“discourse” that has been repeatedly demanded for decades by today's demonstrations – at least the discourse on
“­conventional” energy supply, which has been pushed into an ongoing justification loop by clever public influence, in
which facts can hardly be placed?
315
EDITORIAL
In short, there is no discernible will today, neither in the
discussion nor in the public debate, to shape the future of
energy supply with laws largely given by nature. It
may sound almost absurd, but the transformation of
energy systems, which has been praised as ecologically
unobtainable in Germany, is currently failing because of
nature itself. Politicians may think about changing
Kirchhoff's laws of electrical engineering by decree or even
repealing them in order to solve electricity transport
problems, but it is becoming ever clearer that nature's
originally restrictive requirements for industrial development,
laid down in the well-known work “The Limits to
Growth”, will limit the technologies of energy system
transformation. Donella and Dennis Meadows and their
colleagues at the Jay Wright Forresters Institute of
Systems Dynamics had presented the results of their
studies in 1972. The basis was a system analysis and
computer simulations of various scenarios of a “world
model”. The five sub-areas examined were industrialisation,
population growth, malnutrition, exploitation
of raw material reserves and destruction of habitats.
­Essentially, the exponential form of the progressions for
these central factors of our present time were and are the
basis of predicted collapse scenarios that cast doubt on the
industrial societies and even on the survival of mankind.
However, although it was computer models that certainly
calculated correctly, their functional relationships and
boundary conditions were ultimately determined by
­humans. It is almost paradoxical that for decades the
environmental movement based its argumentation on the
results of what was actually high-tech electronics, which it
vehemently rejected elsewhere or even questioned in
principle. Looking back, it is of course always easy to refer
to errors in studies with predictions. These appear in
science. Even in today's world of high-performance
computers, science is not free of errors and science must
not end with irreversible statements even today, especially
when doubts are justified and central questions of our lives
are concerned. Nor can science be done by voting. Galileo
Galilei certainly had more than 97% of the science of that
time statistically against himself during his lifetime, but he
was right; the sun is in the centre and the earth moves
around it.
The main mistake for the “world models” of the limits of
growth was that the authors had forgotten one thing: man
and his ability to adapt and, above all, to be innovative,
especially when faced with important challenges.
And if the protagonists here see nuclear energy at the
end of its development, it must be said that nuclear energy
is actually only at the beginning of its development.
Nuclear energy today, with its 450 nuclear power plants
and a share of around 11 % of electricity generation worldwide,
is dominated by light water reactor technology.
These techniques are mature, both in terms of reliable
operation and economic viability. The latter may seem
doubtful in view of the some considerable delays in
the construction of several current new plants, but will
cerntainly not apply to future projects. In this respect, one
can consider the “old” countries that used nuclear energy,
for ­example the last nuclear power plants of the “convoy
line” to go into operation in Germany. This proven
technology will certainly continue to dominate in the
coming decades with its so-called Generation III+ systems.
In view of current studies on the technical service life and
safety assessment of plants of the II. and III. generation
in operation over 60 years, these plants will certainly
contribute to providing energy well into this century.
The future potential of nuclear energy then lies in its
ability to innovate. This is due to their energy density.
In view of the essential factor of the world's borders, the
consumption of resources as a whole, nuclear energy is
the first choice, especially in view of the concept of
sustainability, which is overused in some places. And
nuclear energy can do much more than just contribute
to the supply of electricity. If sector coupling is to succeed
in the context of an “energy turnaround”, the plant
­engineering expenditure for primary energies must not
grow immeasurably. Power-2-X, hydrogen or methanol
supply, low-emission steel or basic material production
require a reliable basic supply – e.g. by nuclear energy in
plants with high capacities such as today predominantly or
perhaps rather plants of smaller capacity at many locations.
Whoever wants to advance our future energy supply
will fail with bold and simple demands – the world is
simply too big and too different, innovations will prevail,
not irreversible bans.
Christopher Weßelmann
– Editor in Chief –
Editorial
Crux of the Matter – Innovation

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
EDITORIAL 316
Des Pudels Kern – Innovation
Liebe Leserin, lieber Leser, die aktuell in vielen europäischen Staaten zu beobachtende Auseinandersetzung
mit dem Thema Energie ist vieles: bunt, schrill, freitags, aber eines sicherlich nicht: Faktenbasiert. Nicht, dass jede
Entscheidung in unserem Leben einer quasi technokratischen Entscheidungskette folgen muss. Aber reicht es, wenn
über ein so wichtiges Thema für unsere Gesellschaft, ja für die Welt insgesamt, wie über die zukünftige Energieversorgung
entschieden werden soll, mit bunten Haaren im Ersatzfernsehen aufzutreten oder freitags demonstrierend
auf die Straße zu gehen? Wo ist noch die inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung mit der Frage, wie die Zukunft unserer
Energieversorgung aussehen kann? Wo sind die Thesen und Antithesen zu den einzelnen Energieträgern? Wo ist der
über Jahrzehnte auf Demonstrationen immer wieder geforderte „Diskurs“ – zumindest der zur „konventionellen“
Energieversorgung, die durch geschickte Lenkung in der Öffentlichkeit in eine andauernde Rechtfertigungsschleife
gedrängt ist, in der sich Fakten kaum platzieren lassen?
Kurzum, es gibt heute weder die Diskussion noch in der
öffentlichen Auseinandersetzung einen erkennbaren
Willen, mit weitgehend von der Natur her gegebenen
Gesetzmäßigkeiten die Zukunft der Energieversorgung zu
gestalten. Es mag fast absurd klingen, aber die als ökologisch
nicht zur Disposition stehende und in Deutschland
gepriesene Energiewende scheitert derzeit an eben dieser
Natur selbst. Politiker mögen darüber nachdenken, zur
Lösung von Stromtransportproblemen die Kirchhoffschen
Gesetze der Elektrotechnik per Dekret zu ändern oder gar
außer Kraft zu setzen, aber immer deut licher wird, dass die
ursprünglich die industrielle Ent wicklung beschrän kenden
Vorgaben der Natur, nieder gelegt im bekannten Werk „Die
Grenzen des Wachstums“, auch die Technologien der
Energiewende begrenzen werden. Donella und Dennis
Meadows sowie deren Mitarbeiter am Jay Wright Forresters
Institut für Systemdynamik hatten die Ergeb nisse ihrer
Studien im Jahr 1972 vorgestellt. Grundlage waren eine
Systemanalyse und Computersimulationen verschiedener
Szenarien eines „Weltmodells“. Untersucht wurden die fünf
Teilbereiche Industrialisierung, Bevöl kerungswachstum,
Unterernährung, Ausbeutung von Rohstoffreserven und
Zerstörung von Lebensraum. ­Wesentlich die exponentielle
Form der Verläufe für diese zentralen Faktoren unserer
Gegenwart waren und sind Grundlage von prognostizierten
Zusammenbruch-Szenarien, die die Industriegesellschaften
und sogar ein Überleben der Menschheit in Zweifel stellten.
Doch es waren nur Computermodelle – sicherlich korrekt
berechnet, aber letztendlich wurden ihre funk tionalen
Zusammenhänge sowie Randbedingungen durch Menschen
bestimmt. Fast ist es schon paradox, dass die Umweltbewegung
über Jahrzehnte ihre Argumentation auf Ergebnisse
einer hochtechnisierten Elek tronik gestützt hat, die sie
andernorts vehement ablehnte oder auch grundsätzlich in
Zweifel zog. Natürlich ist es rück blickend immer einfach,
auf Fehler von Studien mit Vorhersagen zu ver weisen. Diese
treten in der Wissenschaft naturgemäß auf. Wissenschaft ist
auch in der heutigen Zeit der Hoch leistungscomputer nicht
frei von Fehlern und Wissenschaft darf auch heute nicht mit
unumkehrbaren Aussagen enden, insbesondere dann, wenn
Zweifel angebracht sind und zentrale Fragen unseres Lebens
betroffen sind. Auch kann Wissenschaft nicht durch
Abstimmungen erfolgen. Galileo Galilei hatte zeit seines
Lebens sicherlich mehr als 97 % der damaligen Wissenschaft
gegen sich und doch recht; die Sonne steht im
Mittelpunkt und die Erde bewegt sich um diese herum.
Der wesentliche Fehler für die „Weltmodelle“ der
Grenzen des Wachstums war, dass die Autoren eines
vergessen hatten: den Menschen und seine Fähigkeit,
sich anzupassen und vor allem innovativ zu sein, vor
allem dann, wenn er sich drängenden Herausforderungen
stellen muss.
Und wenn hier einige Protagonisten die Kernenergie
am Ende ihrer Entwicklung sehen, so ist dem entgegenzuhalten,
dass sich die Kernenergie tatsächlich erst am Anfang
ihrer Entwicklung befindet.
Die Kernenergie heute mit ihren 450 Kernkraftwerken
und einem Anteil an der Stromerzeugung weltweit von
rund 11 % wird dominiert von der Leichtwasserreaktortechnik.
Diese Technik ist ausgereift, sowohl was ihren zuverlässigen
Betrieb betrifft, als auch was ihre Wirtschaftlichkeit
angeht. Letzteres mag angesichts teils erheblicher
Verzögerungen beim Bau einzelner Neuanlagen zweifelhaft
erscheinen, ist aber nicht die Regel. Es war auch nicht
die Regel in den „alten“ Kernenergie nutzenden Ländern,
schaut man beispielsweise auf die letzten in Deutschland in
Betrieb gegangenen Kernkraftwerke der „Konvoi-Linie“.
Diese bewährte Technologie wird sicherlich in den
kommenden Jahrzehnten mit ihren sogenannten Generation-III+-Anlagen
weiterhin dominierend sein. Angesichts
aktueller Studien zur technischen Lebensdauer und
sicherheitstechnischen Bewertung von in Betrieb befindlichen
Anlagen der II. und III. Generation über 60 Jahre hinaus,
werden diese Anlagen sicherlich dazu beitragen,
Energie bis weit in dieses Jahrhundert hinein zur Verfügung
zu stellen.
Das Zukunftspotenzial der Kernenergie liegt darüber
hinaus noch in ihrer Innovationsfähigkeit, begründet in
ihrer hohen Energiedichte. Mit Blick auf den wesentlichen
Faktor der Grenzen des Wachstums, dem Ressourcenverbrauch
insgesamt, ist die Kernenergie eine gute Wahl.
Und die Kernenergie kann noch viel mehr als nur zur
Stromversorgung beizutragen. Wenn Sektorkoppelung im
Rahmen einer „Energiewende“ gelingen soll, darf der
anlagen technische Aufwand für die Primärenergien nicht
ins Unermessliche wachsen. Power-2-X, Wasserstoff- oder
Methanolbereitstellung, emissionsarme Stahl- oder Grundstoffproduktion
benötigen eine verlässliche energetische
Grundver sorgung – z.B. durch die Kernenergie aus
leistungs starken zentralen Anlagen wie heute vorwiegend
oder vielleicht künftig aus Anlagen kleinerer Leistung an
vielen Standorten.
Wer unsere zukünftige Energieversorgung voranbringen
will, der wird mit plakativen und einfachen
Forderungen scheitern – dafür ist die Welt einfach zu groß
und zu verschieden. Innovationen werden sich durchsetzen,
nicht unumkehrbare Verbote.
Christopher Weßelmann
– Chefredakteur –
Editorial
Crux of the Matter – Innovation

Kommunikation und
Training für Kerntechnik
Suchen Sie die passende Weiter bildungs maßnahme im Bereich Kerntechnik?
Wählen Sie aus folgenden Themen: Dozent/in Termin/e Ort
3 Atom-, Vertrags- und Exportrecht
Atomrecht – Das Recht der radioaktiven Abfälle RA Dr. Christian Raetzke 17.09.2019
10.03.2020
Berlin
Atomrecht – Ihr Weg durch Genehmigungs- und
Aufsichtsverfahren
Atomrecht – Was Sie wissen müssen
RA Dr. Christian Raetzke 22.10.2019
18.02.2020
RA Dr. Christian Raetzke
Akos Frank LL. M.
Berlin
07.11.2019 Berlin
3 Kommunikation und Politik
Public Hearing Workshop –
Öffentliche Anhörungen erfolgreich meistern
Kerntechnik und Energiepolitik im gesellschaftlichen Diskurs –
Themen und Formate
Dr. Nikolai A. Behr 05.11. - 06.11.2019 Berlin
13.11. - 14.11.2019 Salzgitter
3 Rückbau und Strahlenschutz
In Kooperation mit dem TÜV SÜD Energietechnik GmbH Baden-Württemberg:
3 Nuclear English
Das neue Strahlenschutzgesetz –
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Stilllegung und Rückbau in Recht und Praxis
Dr. Maria Poetsch
RA Dr. Christian Raetzke
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RA Dr. Christian Raetzke
10.09. - 11.09.2019
15.10. - 16.10.2019
13.11. - 14.11.2019
Berlin
24.09. - 25.09.2019 Berlin
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3 Wissenstransfer und Veränderungsmanagement
Veränderungsprozesse gestalten – Heraus forderungen
meistern, Beteiligte gewinnen
Erfolgreicher Wissenstransfer in der Kerntechnik –
Methoden und praktische Anwendung
Dr. Tanja-Vera Herking
Dr. Christien Zedler
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26.11. - 27.11.2019 Berlin
24.03. - 25.03.2020 Berlin
Haben wir Ihr Interesse geweckt? 3 Rufen Sie uns an: +49 30 498555-30
Kontakt
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Petra Dinter-Tumtzak ı Fon +49 30 498555-30 ı Fax +49 30 498555-18 ı seminare@kernenergie.de
Die INFORUM-Seminare können je nach
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der Fachkunde geeignet sein.

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
318
Issue 6/7 | 2019
June/July
CONTENTS
Contents
Crux of the Matter – Innovation E/G 315
Inside Nuclear with NucNet
Study Shows ‘Widespread Economic Benefits’
of Europe’s Nuclear Energy Industry 320
Did you know...? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Calendar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
AMNT 2019
Opening Address 323
Key Note Speech 324
Best Paper: Simulation of Multi-compartment
Hydrogen Deflagration Test HD-36 with COCOSYS 327
Impressions 330
Spotlight on Nuclear Law
The New Radiation Protection Law (III) –
Supervisor and Commissioner G 332
Feature | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
The Economic Potential of SMRs 333
Serial | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
SMRs – Overview on International Developments
and Safety Features 336
Targeting Innovation at Cost Drivers – How the UK Can Deliver
Low Cost, Low Carbon, Commercially Investable Power 348
Akademik Lomonosov: Pending Countdown 351
Research and Innovation
iMAGINE – A Disruptive Change to Nuclear or How Can We Make
More Out of the Existing Spent Nuclear Fuel and What Has to be
Done to Make it Possible in the UK? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
Decommissioning and Waste Management
A World’s Dilemma ‘Upon Which the Sun Never Sets’:
The Nuclear Waste Management Strategy: Japan and China
Part 3 360
Special Topic | A Journey Through 50 Years AMNT
Make Policy With Prudence and Consideration of Assets G 365
KTG Inside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Cover:
Artist´s view of the Rolls-Royce 440-MWe SMR
concept. Courtesy: Rolls-Royce Power Systems
Contents:
Courtesy of Idaho National Laboratory,
Nuclear Reactor Systems, USA.
News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
Nuclear Today
EV Revolution Could be Running on Empty Without Nuclear 378
Imprint 374
G
E/G
= German
= English/German
Insert: AMNT 2020 Call for Paper
Contents

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
319
Feature
333 The Economic Potential of SMRs
CONTENTS
Helmut Engelbrecht
AMNT 2019 | Best Paper
327 Simulation of Multi-compartment Hydrogen Deflagration Test HD-36
with COCOSYS
Tobias Jankowski and Marco K. Koch
Serial | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
336 SMRs – Overview on International Developments and Safety Features
Andreas Schaffrath and Sebastian Buchholz
348 Targeting Innovation at Cost Drivers – How the UK Can Deliver
Low Cost, Low Carbon, Commercially Investable Power
Benjamin Todd
Research and Innovation
353 iMAGINE – A Disruptive Change to Nuclear or How Can We Make
More Out of the Existing Spent Nuclear Fuel and What Has to be Done
to Make it Possible in the UK?
Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Aiden Peakman and Mark Bankhead
Decommissioning and Waste Management
360 A World’s Dilemma ‘Upon Which the Sun Never Sets’:
The Nuclear Waste Management Strategy: Japan and China | Part 3
Mark Callis Sanders and Charlotta E. Sanders
Contents

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
320
INSIDE NUCLEAR WITH NUCNET
Study Shows ‘Widespread Economic
Benefits’ of Europe’s Nuclear Energy
Industry
A high nuclear power capacity of 150 GW by 2050 – up from about 118 GW today – would result in
­widespread economic benefits throughout the EU, sustaining more than one million jobs and hundreds of
billions of euros in additional GDP growth, tax revenues and household income, a study has concluded.
The aim of the study, carried out by Deloitte for
the Brussels-based nuclear industry Foratom, was to assess
the contribution of the nuclear sector to the overall
economy of the EU28 both today and until 2050.
It said the European nuclear industry sustains in 2019
more than 1.1 million full-time jobs in the EU and generates
more than half a trillion euros in GDP.
The report also concluded that in 2019 the nuclear
industry:
pp
Generates € 124.2 bn in state revenues;
pp
Generates € 383.1 bn in household income;
pp
Generates € 507.4 bn in EU GDP;
pp
Generates € 1,092.3 bn volume of investment and an
€ 18.1 bn trade surplus in the EU economy.
Each GW of installed nuclear capacity in the EU triggers
€ 9.3 bn in annual investments both in the nuclear and
connected economic sectors. Each GW provides permanent
and local employment to just under 10,000 people
and generates € 4.3 bn in GDP for the bloc.
Looking ahead to 2050, the study said that if nuclear
were to continue to account for one quarter of the
­electricity mix in 2050 – or about 150 GW of installed
capacity – the industry would on average support more
than 1.3 million jobs a year, generate € 576 bn a year in
GDP, boost tax revenues by € 110.2 bn a year and provide
households with € 490.9 bn in disposable income.
To meet this high scenario almost 130,000 MW of new
capacity would have to be built by 2050, the study said.
More than 20,000 MW would need to be added in the form
of operating extensions. Adding 130,000 MW of capacity
would mean building about 81 new 1,600 MW EPR plants
like those under construction at Flamanville in France and
Olkiluoto in Finland.
However, the study warned that if installed capacity
falls to 36 GW by 2050 – about 5 % of the electricity mix –
the impact on GDP would fall from € 507.4 bn to about
€ 281 bn. The number of jobs in the industry would fall
from 1.1 million to about 650,400.
In this low scenario most of the bloc’s existing ­nuclear
plants will close without further operating ­extensions and
new plant projects will fail to materialise.
Foratom director-general Yves Desbazeille said if
Europe is serious about decarbonising its economy by
2050, then one quarter of the electricity produced in the
EU will need to continue to come from nuclear.
“Not only will this enable the EU to achieve its
carbon-free targets, whilst at the same time ensuring it has
access to the energy it needs when it needs it, it will also
provide a significant contribution in terms of ­economic
growth and job creation,” he said.
The EU is working on a strategy which will allow
the bloc to be “climate-neutral” by 2050 in line with the
2015 Paris Agreement. In November 2018, the European
Commission presented a policy document, ‘A Clean Planet
for All’, in which it recognised the role nuclear energy can
play and described it as “the backbone of a carbon-free Europe”
together with renewables.
Mr Desbazeille said the Commission’s strategy also
addresses the importance of each technology’s economic
impact during the decarbonisation process. But he said
nuclear’s impact on employment and the economy is not
well understood by policy makers and is not part of the
main policy debate at EU level.
“The nuclear sector is one of the largest in terms of
­contribution to EU GDP. With a share of 3.3%, it is ­second
only to the construction sector,” Mr Desbazeille said.
There would be other economic benefits to ­maintaining
a strong, European nuclear supply chain, the study says.
Those employed in the coal industry could be retrained to
fill the skills gap in the nuclear ­industry and nuclear could
help maintain a European industrial base by providing a
steady supply of low- carbon power at an affordable cost.
According to the Deloitte-Foratom study there are 126
commercial nuclear reactors in operation in 14 EU
countries. The European commission says these plants
generate almost 30% of the electricity produced in the EU
although today’s report puts that figure at 25 % for 2019.
The study says new reactors are being built in France,
Finland, Slovakia and the UK, while 13 EU member states
with nuclear capacity are either analysing the potential
long-term operation of existing units or ­planning to build
new plants. Germany, however, is phasing out nuclear
with 10 out of 17 reactors already shut down. The are 11
reactors in the process of decommissioning in the EU.
However, Mr Desbazeille said this is not enough. “We
need new-build and we need to start today to be able to
maintain today’s share of nuclear and its economic impact
in the long run up to 2050,” he said.
The report noted that in 2016 the EU reaffirmed its
commitment to decarbonising the bloc’s energy mix with a
45 % reduction in emissions from 2005 levels by 2030 and
zero emissions by 2050. The role of electricity in the bloc’s
energy mix is expected to grow, with its share in final
­energy consumption increasing from 20 % in 2015 to more
than 40 % by 2050. The EU wants ­electricity to contribute
to the decarbonisation of transport, heating and cooling at
the expense of fossil fuel energy products However, the
additional electrical power needed to achieve these goals
will have to be generated from low-carbon sources.
The nuclear industry argues that nuclear is a lowcarbon
energy technology that offers increased security
of supply and has positive impact on affiliated ­industries
and the economy as a whole. But it says a stable regulatory
environment and market design are crucial for triggering
investment decisions and successful ­execution of new
nuclear projects.
Earlier this month Foratom said adequate financing
and investment is needed in all low-carbon technologies if
Inside Nuclear with NucNet
Study Shows ‘Widespread Economic Benefits’ of Europe’s Nuclear Energy Industry

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
Europe is to achieve full-decarbonisation of its economy.
Foratom called for “coherence across EU legislation and
for policies to be in line with the objective of achieving a
carbon-free Europe by 2050.
EU legislation must support all low-carbon technologies,
rather than cherry-picking one technology over another,
the group said. “Basing decisions on political acceptance
rather than objective criteria will make it much harder for
Europe to achieve goals.”
The study is online: http://bit.ly/2vmIigo
Author
NucNet
The Independent Global Nuclear News Agency
Editor responsible for this story: David Dalton
Editor in Chief, NucNet
Avenue des Arts 56
1000 Brussels, Belgium
www.nucnet.org
DID YOU EDITORIAL KNOW...?
321
Did you know...?
Press Release of Kerntechnik Deutschland
Berlin, 7 May 2019
KernD – New Association for
Nuclear Technology in Germany
DAtF (German Atomic Forum) and WKK (Trade Association for the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Technology) become Kerntechnik
Deutschland e. V. (KernD = Nuclear Technology Germany). The
merged association of the nuclear industry in Germany offers
members, politicians, public authorities and social stakeholders a
platform for expertise and dialogue.
In connection with this, Dr. Ralf Güldner, long-time President of
the German Atomic Forum (DAtF), will hand over the baton to the
newly elected Chairman of the Board, Dr. Joachim Ohnemus.
Dr. Güldner will remain on the board as Deputy Chairman.
“In the tangible sense, we are concerned with maintaining added
value and in the intangible sense with maintaining expertise,
innovation and the ability of a modern industrial nation to participate,
including in nuclear technology,” Mr. Ohnemus continued.
The merger and the election to the new board took place in
connection with the AMNT (Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology)
which is being held this year for the fiftieth time. The AMNT is the
most prestigious meeting of the nuclear industry in Germany. It also
welcomes a large number of international experts and decisionmakers
to exchange ideas and opinions.
Mr. Güldner, “I am pleased to be handing over a well-established
association to Mr. Ohnemus and I am confident that he will lead
the association into a successful future.” Dr. Ohnemus thanked
Dr. Güldner for his excellent and dedicated work.
Mr. Ohnemus said, “The primary objective is to preserve and promote
the skills and expertise involved in the peaceful use of nuclear
technology and in related disciplines in Germany.”
For further details
please contact:
Nicolas Wendler
KernD
Robert-Koch-Platz 4
10115 Berlin
Germany
E-mail: presse@
KernD.de
www.KernD.eu
Did you know...?

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322
Calendar
2019
CALENDAR
21.07.-24.07.2019
14 th International Conference on CANDU Fuel.
Mississauga, Ontario, Canada, Canadian Nuclear
Society (CNS), www.cns-snc.ca
28.07.-01.08.2019
Radiation Protection Forum. Memphis TN, USA,
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), www.nei.org
07.10.-11.10.2019
International Conference on Climate Change
and the Role of Nuclear Power. Vienna, Austria,
IAEA, www.iaea.org
07.10.-18.10.2019
ICTP-IAEA Nuclear Energy Management
School. Trieste, Italy, IAEA, www.iaea.org
25.11.-29.11.2019
International Conference on Research
Reactors: Addressing Challenges and
Opportunities to Ensure Effectiveness
and Sustainability. Buenos Aires, Argentina,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
www.iaea.org/events/conference-on-researchreactors-2019
29.07.-02.08.2019
27 th International Nuclear Physics Conference
(INPC). Glasgow, Scotland, inpc2019.iopconfs.org
04.08.-09.08.2019
PATRAM 2019 – Packaging and Transportation
of Radioactive Materials Symposium.
New Orleans, LA, USA. www.patram.org
21.08.-30.08.2019
Frédéric Joliot/Otto Hahn (FJOH) Summer
School FJOH-2019 – Innovative Reactors:
Matching the Design to Future Deployment
and Energy Needs. Karlsruhe, Germany, Nuclear
Energy Division of Commissariat à l’énergie
atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA)
and Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT),
www.fjohss.eu
04.09.-06.09.2019
World Nuclear Association Symposium 2019.
London, UK, World Nuclear Association (WNA),
www.wna-symposium.org
04.09.-05.09.2019
VGB Congress 2019 – Innovation in Power
Generation. Salzburg, Austria, VGB PowerTech e.V.,
www.vgb.org
08.09.-11.09.2019
4 th Nuclear Waste Management, Decommissioning
and Environmental Restoration
(NWMDER). Ottawa, Canada, Canadian Nuclear
Society (CNS), www.cns-snc.ca
09.09.-12.09.2019
24 th World Energy Congress. Abu Dhabi, UAE,
www.wec24.org
09.09.-12.09.2019
Jahrestagung 2019 – Fachverband
für Strahlenschutz | Strahlenschutz und
Medizin. Würzburg, Germany,
www.fs-ev.org/jahrestagung-2019
15.09.-21.09.2019
13 th International Conference on WWER Fuel
Performance, Modelling and Experimental
Support. Nessebar, Bulgaria, INRNE-BAS
in cooperation with IAEA,
www.inrne.bas.bg/wwerfuel2019
16.09.-20.09.2019
63 rd Annual Conference of the IAEA. Vienna,
Austria, International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), www.iaea.org/about/governance/
general-conference
22.09.-27.09.2019
ISFNT-14 – International Symposium on Fusion
Nuclear Technology. Budapest, Hungary, Wigner
Research Centre for Physics, www.isfnt-14.org
15.10.-18.10.2019
Technical Meeting on Siting for Nuclear Power
Plants. Vienna, Austria, IAEA, www.iaea.org
22.10.-25.10.2019
SWINTH-2019 Specialists Workshop on
Advanced Instrumentation and Measurement
Techniques for Experiments Related to
Nuclear Reactor Thermal Hydraulics and
Severe Accidents. Livorno, Italy,
www.nineeng.org/swinth2019/
23.10.-24.10.2019
Chemistry in Power Plants. Würzburg, Germany,
VGB PowerTech e.V., www.vgb.org/en/
chemie_im_kraftwerk_2019.html
27.10.-30.10.2019
FSEP CNS International Meeting on Fire Safety
and Emergency Preparedness for the Nuclear
Industry. Ottawa, Canada, Canadian Nuclear
Society (CNS), www.cns-snc.ca
04.11.-06.11.2019
11. Freigabesymposium: Entlassung von
radio aktiven Stoffen aus dem Geltungsbereich
des StrlSchG. Hamburg, Germany, TÜV Nord
Akademie, www.tuev-nord.de
04.11.-07.11.2019
International Conference on Effective Regulatory
Systems 2019. The Hague, Netherlands,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
www.iaea.org/events/conference-on-effectiveregulatory-systems-2019
12.11.-14.11.2019
International Conference on Nuclear
Decommissioning – ICOND 2019. Eurogress
Aachen, Aachen Institute for Nuclear Training
GmbH, www.icond.de
2020
10.02.-14.02.2020
37 th Short Courses on Multiphase Flow. Zurich,
Switzerland, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
ETH, www.lke.mavt.ethz.ch
10.02.-14.02.2020
ICONS2020: International Conference on
Nuclear Security. Vienna, Austria,
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
www.iaea.org
08.03.-12.03.2020
WM Symposia – WM2019. Phoenix, AZ, USA,
www.wmsym.org
08.03.-13.03.2020
IYNC2020 – The International Youth Nuclear
Congress. Sydney, Australia, IYNC,
www.iync2020.org
18.03.-20.03.2020
12. Expertentreffen Strahlenschutz. Bayreuth,
Germany, TÜV SÜD, www.tuev-sued.de
05.05.-06.05.2020
51 st Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology
AMNT 2020 | 51. Jahrestagung Kerntechnik.
Berlin, Germany, KernD and KTG,
www.amnt2020.com
09.2020
Jahrestagung 2020 – Fachverband für
Strahlenschutz I Strahlenschutz und Medizin.
Aachen, Germany,
www.fs-ev.org/jahrestagung-2020
27.09.-02.10.2020
NPC 2020 – International Conference on Water
Chemistry in Nuclear Reactor Systems. Antibes,
France, Société Francaise d’Energie Nucléaire
(SFEN), www.sfen-npc2020.org
This is not a full list and may be subject to change.
Calendar

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
50 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2019)
7 to 8 May 2019, Berlin
Opening Address
Ralf Güldner
Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of the German Atomic Forum and the German Nuclear Society, please allow
me to welcome you to our 50 th AMNT. Our first meeting, called the Reaktortagung took place in Frankfurt in 1969,
the same year, by the way, in which the German Nuclear Society was founded. So, happy birthday KTG. Ever since,
this meeting has been the most important meeting of its kind in Germany, addressing the widest range of topics and
attracting international speakers and visitors.
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AMNT 2019
The fiftieth meeting after 50 years also provides us with
the opportunity to look back at the varied and eventful
history of nuclear technology in Germany. So, in our
­traditional companies’ exhibition, we have prepared a
­historic display for you with photos and exhibits from five
decades of nuclear technology. At this point, I would
sincerely like to thank all partners who have supported
us with their exhibits and thus made this exhibition
possible.
Our meeting this year is not only the fiftieth, it is also
forward-looking. After 60 years of the German Atomic
­Forum and 43 years of the Trade Association for the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle, the two associations have decided to
merge and to go forward into the future as Kern technik
Deutschland or KernD for short. The process was not
always particularly easy and has taken time. However, it
was successful and so now, after the approval of both
general meetings yesterday, we have a joint representation
for the entire industry as contacts for the public, politics
and public authorities as well as the media.
The “new association” also goes hand in hand with a
change in leadership and so, after nine intensive years
at the head of the German Atomic Forum, I am handing
the baton to the new chairman of the board of KernD,
Dr. ­Joachim Ohnemus, who was unanimously elected by
the general meeting of KernD.
Mr. Carsten Haferkamp will continue as treasurer with
the new managing board. Dr. Hannes Wimmer and I will
join the new managing board as deputy chairmen.
Ladies and Gentlemen, please allow me to look back
briefly on these nine years during which a great deal has
been imposed on our industry. It all began in 2010 on a
positive note when lifetime extensions, ­corresponding
­retrofits, the climate protector media campaign were the
topics that occupied us. I was convinced that, following the
adoption of the energy concept in autumn 2010, we would
be able to shape the future of nuclear energy in Germany
together with the utility companies, manufacturers and
suppliers as well as research and teaching.
Everything changed on March 11, 2011. Initially the
shock on seeing the images from Fukushima and then
the political reaction in Germany which pulled the rug
from under out feet, so to speak. A reaction, ladies and
gentlemen, which even today I consider was overhasty and
exclusively politically motivated. Particularly now when
the discussion about climate change and the phase-out of
coal-fired power generation is intensifying, we could well
use the additional operating years of CO 2 -free nuclear
power plants. I experienced the ­reaction of our foreign
colleagues at WNA and Foratom at close quarters and
there was not much understanding there for the German
way.
For me personally, Fukushima ushered in a phase of
my professional career that I would have gladly foregone.
For several months I was suddenly a sought-after guest in
various television studios. Whether every performance
was successful is for others to judge but I believe that it was
important to show our colors.
This was followed by a phase during which we had
to deal with the consequences of the exit decision.
Decommissioning and dismantling were suddenly the
topics, garnished with the labor of various commissions
that were working on a reorganization of the search for a
final repository and on the financing of interim and final
disposal. The German Atomic Forum was allowed to
support this in the media too and it ultimately led the
nuclear community in Germany to the situation in which it
finds itself today. The description of this situation also
includes the fact that our member companies suffered
massive economic losses and therefore demanded
­significant reductions in membership fees or even ­resigned.
This too is a serious reason for merging the German Atomic
Forum and the Trade Association for the Nuclear Fuel
Cycle into KernD.
Despite these difficult phases, I have always enjoyed
working for the German Atomic Forum. I would like to
thank all the employees in the office for the dedicated and
professional work they have put in and I would like to
thank all of you too and your companies for your
con structive collaboration and support in turbulent times.
I wish Dr. Ohnemus every success in his new, extended
task and I promise that I will be happy to support him if he
so wishes.
Before handing over the microphone to Dr. Ohnemus,
I would just like to announce our anniversary film “KernD
– For Expertise and Dialogue”. It gives us the chance to
­experience a time-lapse history of nuclear technology in
Germany together. I hope you enjoy it!
Dr. Ralf Güldner
Deputy Chairman of the Board of Kerntechnik Deutschland e. V. (KernD)
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50 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2019)
7 to 8 May 2019, Berlin
Key Note Speech
Joachim Ohnemus
Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of KernD and the German Nuclear Society I would also like to welcome you
to our 50 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology in Berlin.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my predecessor
and, at the same time, last president of our association
under the founding name of the German Atomic
Forum, Dr. Ralf Güldner, for his many years of dedication
to our industry. In the last nine years, Dr. Güldner
was president of the German Atomic Forum and during
this time he first supported and then successfully
shaped the discussion about a longer lifetime for the
­German nuclear power plants only to experience, like all of
us a few months later, the Fukushima accident with all its
political consequences in Germany. I would particularly
like to thank him for his commitment during this
period when he represented our industry with steady
determination. In the years that followed, he actively
participated in the many profound structural changes
that took place in the field of nuclear energy: for example,
the relaunch of the search for a final repository for highly
active waste, the restructuring of all the institutions in
the field of waste management and the reorganization
of waste management financing.
Prior to this, Dr. Güldner was also the Chairman of the
German Nuclear Society, the World Nuclear Association
and President of the European nuclear industry association
FORATOM. This experience, gained over many years of
dedication to our industry, is extremely important and
therefore I am particularly pleased that we will continue to
have him as deputy chairman of KernD.
Dr. Güldner, thank you very much indeed for your
dedication, your commitment and, in advance, for your
cooperation in the KernD association, a project that we
have promoted together and guided to success.
Why the merger?
Ladies and Gentlemen, Respected Colleagues,
At the 50 th AMNT we are looking back together at the
past, at what has been achieved in nuclear technology
in Germany and at the history of our meeting and
our associations, the German Atomic Forum (DAtF), the
Trade Association for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (WKK)
and the German Nuclear Society (KTG). But even more
importantly we are looking forward and preparing for
the future.
This is the goal of the merger: to amalgamate both
associations, the DAtF and the WKK, into the KernD
Association. Following a long process with many
discussions, initially between the two chairmen, then the
managing boards and then the members of the associations,
it was clear that the merger was the best solution to
representing nuclear technology in Germany powerfully,
purposefully and efficiently. An association for the whole
industry, a voice to the outside world and a constitution
that also allows government bodies to cooperate, this was
the goal and it was finally resolved yesterday at the two
general meetings of DAtF and WKK.
What is the self-image of KernD,
what are its tasks?
KernD sees itself above all as a skills and expertise
­platform for public and regulatory dialogue as defined by
our association’s purpose: to preserve and promote the
skills and expertise involved in the peaceful use of nuclear
technology and in related disciplines. Under the heading,
“For expertise and dialogue”, our aim is to bring our
­expertise to bear in regulatory processes and legislative
procedures on nuclear technology as well as in social
dialogue.
We want to continue to attract and support schoolchildren,
apprentices and students, who are the next
generation that we urgently need, in addition to research
and teaching. This is a task that we can fulfill more successfully
if “a fascination for nuclear technology” is the
approach as we are using it.
KernD’s other content-related goals are to develop
the expertise and economic contribution of nuclear
­technology in industry, research and in the area of experts
and appraisers. In short, in the tangible sense, we are
concerned with maintaining added value, and in the
­intangible sense with maintaining expertise, innovation
and the ability of a modern industrial nation to participate,
including in nuclear technology.
In a manner of speaking, our association and also its
members live in two worlds: in the shrinking world of
nuclear energy in Germany, where dismantling and
disposal are the dominating topics. On the other hand,
from a global point of view, we live in a world where
nuclear energy continues to play an important role as a
future option, where the construction of new plants,
increased performance and the development of new
concepts and technologies are relevant topics. One
important task for the association is to support the
constructive participation of Germany, i.e. of German
nuclear industry sites, in global development in the future
and to further strengthen the understanding for this
among the population.
A word about Germany’s role
in nuclear energy and climate policy
When we look at the world of power generation, we find
that the renewable energies, wind power, photovoltaics,
biomass, geothermal energy, tidal power and solar thermal
energy only produce about 20 percent of the low-carbon
electricity. 80 percent of the low-carbon electricity is
­obtained from hydropower and nuclear power, 31 percent
from nuclear energy and almost half from hydropower.
In recent weeks, during discussions about phasing
out coal for electricity generation, surveys have shown
that the population is already aware or is now becoming
increasingly aware that nuclear energy has a thoroughly
positive role in preventing CO 2 . On this basis, we can
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­expect that there will be long-term understanding for the
fact that Germany is phasing out the use of nuclear power
in its own country but that it can remain a supplier for
those who want to continue to use nuclear power and it
can also continue to develop the technology. This is also
the position of the Federal Government in the coalition
agreement.
Therefore, it can’t be about completely phasing out
nuclear energy as a whole, it can’t be about closing the
facilities in Gronau and Lingen and it can’t be about
­refusing export credit guarantees for supplying German
safety control technology to foreign nuclear power plants.
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AMNT 2019
Innovation Made in Germany
Nuclear technology in and from Germany is still
at the forefront and is very powerful in research and
development. Take the topic of accident tolerant fuel, for
example. This is being developed worldwide and will offer
greater reserves of robustness in the event of major
accidents. Here, Germany is involved in the PROtect
program which is the most advanced of all comparable
programs. The irradiation tests with Swiss partners
started in 2016; the first test assemblies were loaded into
the Vogtle 2 nuclear power plant in the USA in April. This
is also an example of the international collaboration ­
within our industry.
In the USA, Urenco is preparing to enrich uranium to
19.75 percent for new applications. There, the Department
of Energy itself is in charge of a pilot project aimed at
new types of reactors. The Euratom Supply Agency is
supporting a facility such as this for the EU with a view to
the security of supply for research reactors. It is not even
possible to discuss such a thing in Germany.
We also need extensive safety research in the future
so that companies can continue to innovate and so that
the State has access to the necessary skills and expertise
for the safety assessment of nuclear installations and
for the further development of safety standards. This
research must include both new reactor concepts and
innovative fuel assembly and fuel concepts. The companies
of the nuclear industry are indispensable because, without
practical application, it is impossible to maintain or further
develop expertise. In view of the phase-out in Germany,
the international market is vital if we are to apply our
­expertise in practice. Visible political support for our
companies in international business would be highly
desirable. This would help not only the German divisions
of international nuclear technology companies but in
particular the many medium-sized suppliers in German
nuclear technology. Perhaps Mr. Bareiß, the Parliamentary
State Secretary, will comment on this later.
Dismantling is well on the way
Our companies dismantling the nuclear power plants are
working through the program according to schedule and
are making good progress. Applications have already been
made for decommissioning and dismantling licenses for
most of the plants still in operation. Our working
relationship with the authorities is good and professional.
It must also stay this way.
One topic that will occupy us for a long time to come is
the acceptance of waste from nuclear power plants, which
is subject to landfill regulations and has been released for
disposal, at the responsible landfill sites. Support at ­federal
state level is not always able to stop awkward situations
from arising with landfill operators or local government.
Continuous education is required to reassure them that
these residual materials do not pose a radiological hazard,
even if they come from the controlled area of nuclear
power plants.
In spite of all the decommissioning and dismantling,
we should not forget that there are still seven nuclear
power plants producing electricity in Germany and their
flexibility largely supports the stability of our electricity
generation. With the 10,000 MW of currently installed
nuclear power plant output, 76 billion kilowatt hours of
electricity were produced in 2018, 11.8 percent of gross
electricity generation. Reliable plant operation made
Germany the second largest nuclear energy country in the
EU in 2018 and resulted in the Isar 2 nuclear power plant
taking second place in the generation rankings of all
nuclear power plants worldwide.
The transition of operator responsibility at the sitebased
interim storage facilities for high active waste from
the power plant operators to the BGZ [Gesellschaft für
Zwischenlagerung = Company for Interim Storage]
on January 1, 2019 went smoothly and inconspicuously.
On January 1, 2020, the BGZ will also take over
responsibility for site-based low and medium active waste
storage facilities. This will conclude the new allocation
of responsibilities for waste management. As is already the
case with the central interim storage facilities, the
­government will take over a field that our industry has left
in great shape.
What about the final repositories?
Commissioning of the Konrad final repository remains a
common concern of the power plant operators, the BGZ
and all those with obligations to deliver, including the
public sector and in the private sector. In the meantime,
we have another completion date, though not until 2027,
and with the ongoing review of state of the art compliance
with the safety requirements, it appears that we will be
worrying about the project over and over again.
When it comes to the site selection process for high
active waste, all we can do is wait and see what happens.
For the coming year, we are expecting the first report of
the BGE [Bundesgesellschaft für Endlagerung = Federal
Company for Radioactive Waste Disposal] about subareas
which are supposed to remain in the selection process.
At present, for now we are discussing the publication
of geological data in connection with the disclosure of the
subareas. I am sure that Mr. Steffen Kanitz, member of
the board of the BGE, will bring us up to speed on this later.
Challenge Europe
Despite all the enthusiasm for the opportunities in
emerging countries such as China and India, we should
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AMNT 2019
not forget that the home markets in Europe and North
America still play the key role for western nuclear
companies. Europe is also the scene of the attempt to
­export the German nuclear power phase-out. This is a
dangerous path which could bring new controversy into
the European Union. It is with good reason that the decision
regarding the energy mix is reserved for the ­Member
States.
There is nothing wrong with constructively and
competently bringing a German position, on safety issues
for example, into the discussion. The key, however,
is to convince others with objective arguments and,
as mentioned before, for this we will need sound, practical
expertise in nuclear technology in the future as well.
In contrast, ritualized demands for the shutdown of
installations close to the borders do not open doors but
close them.
In the Commission’s considerations regarding the
reform of Euratom, it is also necessary to pay attention to
the Doctrine of the Mean. Those who want to make the
safety-focused Euratom Treaty into a phase-out treaty, as
two opposition parties have been demanding for years
now, will only drive a new wedge into the EU and generate
strong opposition from those who want to continue using
nuclear energy in the energy mix.
Environmental Progress, Energy for Humanity and the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation which, along
with many others and together with the nuclear societies,
stand up for and promote nuclear energy.
We must adopt this optimism with our new KernD
association. Above all, we must plant the idea into the
minds of the younger generation that it is worth being
involved in this technology, that it offers huge potential
and a wide range of development opportunities. In
­Germany we still have the network, the expertise and
the industrial as well as scientific substance to cooperate
in development and to advance nuclear technology.
In the challenging situation in Germany, we must
work together as an industry and act in concert. Our
joint association is an important step towards this goal and
it deserves our full support.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Your commitment is essential to our meeting, making it
into the forum for sharing ideas and maintaining contacts
that we both know and love. I would like to thank you very
much for all your contributions to the program planning,
for the preparation and acquisition of specialist lectures
and for your lively participation in all the discussions.
I would also like to thank our many partners in the
­industry exhibition and all those who have contributed to
our joint review of the past on the occasion of the 50 th
anniversary of our meeting. Of course, I am particularly
pleased to welcome our British and Czech partners with
their national pavilions and also our other international
exhibitors.
The KernD reception, to which you are all cordially
­invited, will be held in the exhibition space immediately
after the plenary session. Following this, we can look
forward to the traditional social evening which our
­exhibitors and sponsors warmly invite you to attend.
I wish everybody a successful meeting, fruitful
­discussions and exceptional insights into our common
passion, nuclear technology. Thank you.
Dr. Joachim Ohnemus
Chairman of the Board of Kerntechnik Deutschland e.V. (KernD)
Is there a global upheaval
in nuclear technology?
Globally, it is possible to speak of an upheaval in nuclear
technology. This is particularly evident in an increasingly
dynamic landscape of innovation. The interest in SMRs
is having a positive impact on the development of new
­reactor types. The financial risks are smaller than
embarking directly on large-scale projects. And as a
result, SMR projects are being driven forward in the
United States, Canada, Russia, China, India, Argentina
and the United Kingdom. Partly with proven light water
reactor technology, partly with alternative designs such
as molten salt or gas-cooled reactors, partly with new
designs such as closed heat pipe microreactors or the
uranium battery for remote areas or mobile use. The
developments offer new opportunities for companies in
the fuel cycle, including the North American subsidiaries
of European companies.
The increasing social commitment to nuclear energy
is somewhat new and unaccustomed for Germany.
Discussions on climate policy and the possibilities
for effectively reducing CO 2 emissions play the main
role here. We should mention organizations such as
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Simulation of Multi-compartment
Hydrogen Deflagration Test HD-36
with COCOSYS
Tobias Jankowski and Marco K. Koch
1 Introduction In case of postulated severe
accident scenario in a nuclear power plant with reactor
core dry-out, a huge amount of hydrogen might be
­generated by oxidation of the cladding tubes. For example,
in a 1,300 MW KONVOI type power plant up to 1,350 kg
hydrogen can be generated [1]. The generated hydrogen
might be released to the containment atmosphere in the
frame of the postulated severe accident scenario and
might reach ignitable concentrations. Those can also
be achieved by use of other safety systems for example
due to spray systems, which on the one hand lead to a
depressurization due to steam condensation and might
enhance the mixing and homogenization of the containment
atmosphere, but on the other hand increase the
volumetric hydrogen fraction by reducing the steam
| | AMNT 2019: Best Paper Award, awarded by Dr. Joachim Ohnemus (left)
and Frank Apel (right) to Tobias Jankowski (middle).
content in the vessels’ atmosphere [2]. Hydrogen combustion in a test vessel has been investigated among others in the
frame of the OECD/NEA-THAI and OECD/NEA-THAI-2 program [3]. The national THAI-V program investigates beside
other topics hydrogen deflagration in a multi- compartment geometry, the THAI+ test facility.
Best Paper
Award
The paper “Simulation
of multi-compartment
hydrogen deflagration
test HD-36 with
COCOSYS” by Tobias
Jankowski and Marco
K. Koch has been
awarded as Best
Paper of the
50 th Annual Meeting
on Nuclear Technology
(AMNT 2019), Berlin,
7 and 8 May 2019.
327
AMNT 2019
2 Experiment
The THAI+ test facility consists mainly of two test vessels
and two DN 500 connection pipes. Those components have
an inner volume of approximately 79.2 m 3 [4]. The THAI+
test facility is shown in Figure 1.
The bigger vessel called THAI test vessel (TTV) has a
height of 9.2 m and in its largest part an inner diameter of
3.156 m. The thinner vessel on the right, called parallel
­attachable drum (PAD) has a height of approximately
9.73 m due to deeper vessel bottom compared to the TTV.
The inner diameter of the PAD is 1.556 m [4]. The vessel is
mainly made of stainless steel and is enveloped with a rock
wool layer for insulation. The vessel walls can be heated by
thermal oil mantels and some lower and upper parts,
which are not covered by those oil mantles can be heated
| | Fig. 1.
THAI+ test facility [4].
by electrical heaters. The inner cylinder of the TTV and the
horizontal plates between the inner cylinder and the vessel
walls, which are shown in Figure 1, are removed for the
hydrogen deflagration (HD) test 36.
The test HD-36 investigates the hydrogen deflagration
in a pre-mixed homogenous hydrogen-steam-air vessel
atmosphere. The initial absolute vessel pressure is 1.5 bar
[3]. The homogenous vessel atmosphere consists of
10 vol.-% hydrogen and 25 vol.-% steam and has a
­temperature of 90 °C [3]. The mixture is ignited in the TTV
sump compartment at a height of 0.5 m at a problem time
of 0 s. Measurements are performed to investigate the
flame front propagation, the time depended pressure
transient, the temperature evaluation and the hydrogen
concentration in the test vessel [3].
3 Modeling
The test HD-36 is simulated with AC 2 module COCOSYS
V2.4v4. The test vessel is modelled by use of 57 zones, 79
Junctions and 39 structures, as shown in Figure 2.
The TTV as well as the PAD is horizontally divided in an
inner cylinder and an outer circular ring. A finer horizontal
nodalisation has also been investigated but did not show
any major differences in the propagation behavior of
the flame front as the used hydrogen deflagration model
considers only isotropic flame front turbulence.
The propagation mechanism of the flame front is
­simulated by use of the flame front propagation model
FRONT [5]. The initial ignition in the TTV sump
compartment is given by the user. Based on a ternary
­diagram it is checked if the mixture in an adjacent zone is
ignitable. If it is, the FRONT model calculates by use of a
correlation system the flame front velocity in the junction
between those zones. From the calculated flame front
velocity, the time of ignition of the adjacent zone is
determined.
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| | Fig. 2.
Nodalisation HD-36.
The user has to choose between an exponential or a
­linear combustion profile in the zones, what means an exponential
or a linear decrease of the reactant [6]. According
to Pelzer [6] an exponential burning profile is ­typical
for lab-scale experiments whereas a linear profile might
accord to a large scale hydrogen deflagration. The THAI+
facility is known as a large scale test facility, wherefore a
linear combustion profile might be the right choice. Nevertheless,
former investigations [6] indicate that an exponential
combustion profile might lead to a better reproduction
of the experimental data. Therefore, the test HD-36 is
simulated with both options and the results are compared
to each other.
Beside the decision on the type of combustion profile,
the user has the possibility to modify several empirical constants
of the correlation system used in the FRONT model.
However, those parameters were not modified in the present
work, because the FRONT model respectively the CO-
COSYS model basis should be validated as it is.
4 Results
The pressure transient of the test HD-36 and from the
­COCOSYS V2.4v4 simulations by use of an exponential as
well as a linear combustion profile as input value of the
FRONT model is shown in Figure 3.
The experimental pressure transient shows a fast
pressure increase in the test vessel in the time between one
and three seconds after the initial ignition in the TTV sump
compartment. The pressure increase is underestimated
in both COCOSYS simulations. The simulation with
­exponential com­bustion profile reaches the pressure peak
approximately half a second later as the experiment.
By use of a linear combustion profile the pressure peak
is reached more than one second later than in the
­experiment. In both cases the pressure peak is slightly
over estimated. The pressure decrease after reaching the
pressure peak is in both simulations qualitatively in a good
agreement with the ­experiment as the heat removal
behaviour of the test facility is well given by the developed
COCOSYS input deck. In the beginning of the experiment,
the pressure peak is very exactly reproduced by the simulation
with ­linear combustion profile. In the simulation
with exponential combustion profile the initial pressure
increase is slightly overestimated.
In Figure 4 the flame front propagation in the test
­HD-36 and the zone ignition in the COCOSYS simulation
by use of an exponential combustion profile are shown.
In the experiment, the flame front propagates from the
TTV-sump-compartment through the lower connection
pipe into the PAD. The flame front is accelerated to
­approximately 8.1 m/s. Thereafter, the flame front
propagates mainly close to the vessel wall opposite to the
flange of the lower connection pipe and in the vessel
centreline upwards in the PAD. In the TTV the flame front
propagates mainly in the vessel centreline upwards, goes
through the upper connection pipe, where the flame front
is accelerated to approximately 47 m/s and enters the
upper part of the PAD, whereby a jet ignition is observed,
which leads to a very fast downward directed propagation
in the upper part of the PAD. The flame fronts going
through the upper and through the lower connection pipes
meet in the PAD at a height of about 5.6 m.
The zone ignition in the COCOSYS simulation differs
from the experimental flame front propagation. In the
­simulation, the flame front is also accelerated in the lower
connection pipe due to the smaller cross section. By use of
an exponential combustion profile the flame speed through
the lower connection pipe is 6.3 m/s and in the simulation
with linear combustion profile 6.5 m/s. In the simulation
with an exponential combustion profile, the flame front
arrives nearly at the same time at the TTVs’ and PADs’ top.
The flame front propagates from both sides into the upper
connection pipe. In the simulation with linear combustion
profile, the top zone of the PAD is ignited at
3.12 s and the TTVs’ top zone at 3.51 s. Therefore, the
flame front goes through the upper connection pipe from
the top of the PAD and meets the flame front coming from
the TTV at the right top of the upper connection pipe.
In both simulations the first ignition of an elevation
level in both vessels takes place in the vessel centreline.
None of the simulations reproduces the high flame front
acceleration in the upper connection pipe of 47 m/s.
­Nevertheless, the highest flame front velocity is in both
simulations given at the inlet of the upper connection pipe.
In the simulation with exponential combustion profile the
flame front velocity at the upper pipes’ inlet is 12.5 m/s
and in the simulation with linear combustion profile
| | Fig. 3.
HD-36 Pressure Transient.
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| | Fig. 4.
HD-36 Flame front propagation [3] and zone ignition (exponential combustion profile).
16.67 m/s. In the experiment the flame front had a velocity
of 20 m/s at the inlet of the upper connection pipe.
5 Conclusions
The hydrogen deflagration test HD-36 in a multi-compartment
geometry has been simulated with COCOSYS
V2.4v4 by use of the FRONT model by considering an
­exponential combustion profile as well as a linear one.
The flame front behavior in the experiment is highly
momentum driven due to the flame front acceleration in
the lower and upper connection pipes between the two
vessels. The acceleration in the lower connection pipe
leads to a flame front that mainly moves upwards in some
parts close to the vessel wall and in the centerline of the
PAD. In the TTV the flame front moves straight upwards
and is highly accelerated to 47 m/s in the upper connection
pipe, wherefore a downward directed jet-ignition takes
place in the upper part of the PAD so that the flame fronts
going through the lower and upper connection pipes meet
at a height of 5.6 m in the PAD. The very high flame front
velocity in the upper connection pipe might result from a
displacement of unburnt gas that is moved from the TTV to
the connection pipe according to Freitag et al. [3].
The overall flame front behavior is reproduced in both
simulations: The flame front is accelerated in the lower
connection pipe and moves upwards in both vessels. Other
than in the experiment, first zone ignition of an elevation
level always occurs in the vessel centerline, also in the
PAD. The faster upwards traveling flame front in the TTV
and the following acceleration in the upper connection
pipe, leading to flame fronts meeting in the middle of the
PAD, is not reproduced by the simulations. In the simulation
with an exponential combustion profile the upper
vessel zone of the TTV and PAD are ignited at nearly the
same instant. In the simulation with linear combustion
profile a completely different situation is observed.
­Opposite to the experiment, the zone ignition in the PAD is
faster than in the TTV, wherefore the top of the PAD is
ignited 0.4 s early than the TTVs’ top. Furthermore, the
vertical propagation out of the sump compartment of the
TTV in both simulations takes significantly longer than in
the experiment, what might has a huge influence on the
whole simulation and the order of the zone ignition in the
whole test facility. Nevertheless, the pressure transient is
well predicted in the simulation with an exponential
­combustion profile leading to a slightly higher pressure
peak than in the experiment and a reaching of the pressure
peak about half a second later.
Acknowledgement
This work is sponsored by the German Federal Ministry for
Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) under the contract
numbers 150 1512 and 150 1568.
Simulations are performed with AC 2 module COCOSYS
developed by GRS.
References
[1] T. Hollands: Modellierung der Stickstoffreaktion in Störfallanalysecodes zur Simulation des
Lufteinbruchs in kerntechnischen Anlagen. ISBN: 978-3-934951-27-3, Dissertation,
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2010.
[2] S. Gupta, G. Langer, M. Colombet: Hydrogen Combustion During Spray Operation: Tests HD-30,
HD-31 and HD-32. Report No. 1501420-TR-HD-30-32, Technical Report, Becker Technologies
GmbH, Eschborn, 2014.
[3] M. Freitag, B. von Laufenberg, E. Schmidt: Hydrogen Deflagration Tests in a Two-Vessel Test Facility:
Test series HD-36 – HD-39. Report No. 1501455 – TR – HD36-39, Technical Report, Becker
Technologies GmbH, Eschborn, 2017.
[4] M. Freitag, A. Kühnel, G. Langer: Extension of the THAI test facility by a second vessel: THAI+. Report
No. 1501455 – FB/TR – THAIPLUS, Technical Report, Becker Technologies GmbH, Eschborn, 2016.
[5] W. Klein-Heßling et al.: COCOSYS V2.4v5 Users’ Manual. GRS – P – 3/1, Revision 29, Gesellschaft für
Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH, Köln, 2018.
[6] M. Pelzer: Validation of ASTEC CPA: FRONT Module Parameter Study on Hydrogen Deflagration
Experiments. ASTEC/DOC/12-04, Rev 0, Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS)
gGmbH, 2012.
Authors
Tobias Jankowski and Marco K. Koch
ORCID: 0000-0001-5506-0498 and 0000-0001-7260-5250
Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Fakultät Maschinenbau,
Plant Simulation and Safety (PSS)
Email: Tobias.Jankowski@pss.rub.de
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Impressions
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50 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2019) ı Impressions

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50 th Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology (AMNT 2019) ı Impressions

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SPOTLIGHT ON NUCLEAR LAW
Das neue Strahlenschutzrecht (III) –
SSV und SSB
Die bewährten Funktionen des Strahlenschutzverantwortlichen (SSV) und des Strahlenschutzbeauftragten (SSB)
sind vom neuen Strahlenschutzrecht übernommen worden. Regelungen dazu finden sich sowohl im Strahlenschutzgesetz
(StrlSchG), dort in den §§ 69-72, als auch in der Strahlenschutzverordnung (StrlSchV) vom 29.11.2018, dort in
den §§ 43 und 44 und an weiteren Stellen.
SSV ist bekanntlich u.a. derjenige, der einer der atom- oder
strahlenschutzrechtlichen Genehmigungen bedarf, wie sie
in der relevanten Norm (früher § 31 Abs. 1 StrlSchV a.F.,
jetzt § 69 Abs. 1 StrlSchG) aufgezählt werden. Zu diesen
Genehmigungen zählen jetzt auch solche zur Beförderung
radioaktiver Stoffe. Das hat zur Folge, dass man hier jetzt
auch einen SSB mit entsprechender Fachkunde braucht;
§ 204 StrlSchG bringt eine Übergangsregelung hierzu mit
einer Frist bis Ende 2021. Von der Ausweitung des Kreises
der Strahlenschutzverantwortlichen sind ferner diejenigen
Aktivitäten betroffen, die nach dem alten Recht “Arbeiten”
darstellten, jetzt aber im erweiterten Begriff der
“ Tätigkeiten” aufgehen. Das betrifft etwa Airlines sowie
Unternehmen mit Arbeitsplätzen, an denen relevante
­Exposition durch natürliche Strahlenquellen stattfindet.
§ 33 Abs. 1 der alten StrlSchV enthielt einen Katalog der
Vorschriften, für deren Einhaltung der SSV verantwortlich
ist. Die lange Liste von Paragraphen war zwar sperrig, aber
immerhin vollständig. In dieser Form gibt es sie jetzt nicht
mehr. Das liegt an der Aufspaltung der Materie in Gesetz
und Verordnung. Das StrlSchG bringt in § 72 Abs. 1 einen in
der Anlage ähnlichen Katalog, der aber nur die relevanten
Vorschriften des StrlSchG selbst aufzählt – die Verordnung
gab es ja noch gar nicht. Die StrlSchV vom 29.11.2018
wiederum enthält ihrerseits keinen zusammenfassenden
Katalog. Stattdessen werden alle Einzelvorschriften, für
deren Einhaltung der SSV verantwortlich sein soll, jeweils
mit den Worten einge leitet: “Der Strahlenschutzverantwortliche
hat dafür zu sorgen, dass…” (In der alten
StrlSchV gab es an dieser Stelle immer eine unpersönliche
Partizipialkonstruktion, etwa: “Strahlenschutzbereiche …
sind einzurichten”). Um sich einen Überblick über die
Pflichten des SSV zu verschaffen, muss man also die
StrlSchV durchlesen und sich alle Vorschriften, auch
einzelne Absätze oder Sätze, notieren, die so anfangen.
Angabegemäß sind es über 100.
Zu Diskussionen gab § 43 Abs. 2 StrlSchV Anlass. Die
Norm lautet: “Die Pflichten der folgenden Vorschriften
dürfen dem Strahlenschutzbeauftragten nicht übertragen
werden: …”. Die in Bezug genommenen Vorschriften enthalten
Grundlegendes wie z. B. die Einhaltung der Grenzwerte
für Ableitungen und für Störfallplanung, aber auch
eher Bürokratisches wie die Aufbewahrung von ärztlichen
Bescheinigungen. Muss der Geschäftsführer also künftig
solche Bescheinigungen auf seinem Schreibtisch stapeln,
neben der Cognac-Karaffe und dem Zigarrenkästchen? Bei
Lichte besehen, war die Regelung aber schon in der alten
StrlSchV angelegt: in § 33 Abs. 2 der alten StrlSchV stand,
dass dem SSB ein bestimmter Teil des Pflichtenkatalogs des
SSV aus Abs. 1 der Norm übertragen werden konnte, aber
eben nicht alles. Was bedeutet das nun? Der SSV konnte
natürlich schon immer, und kann auch jetzt, die operative
Wahrnehmung dieser Pflichten delegieren. Er muss nicht
eigenhändig rechnen oder aufbewahren. Das Übertragungsverbot
des § 43 Abs. 2 StrlSchV kann nur den Sinn haben,
ihm eine gesteigerte Verantwortung zuzuweisen, dass das
auch funktioniert. Da der SSV aber ohnehin immer verantwortlich
bleibt, auch nach ­Delegation von Pflichten an den
SSB (siehe § 70 Abs. 1 S. 2 StrlSchG), bleibt der Unterschied
zwischen “übertrag baren” und “nicht übertragbaren”
Pflichten insgesamt schwer fasslich.
Die in der Praxis entwickelte Funktion des
“Strahlenschutz bevollmächtigten”, auf den der SSV seine
eigenen Aufgaben delegiert, hat es wieder einmal nicht in
den Text des Gesetzes oder der Verordnung geschafft. Sie
wird aber in der amtlichen Begründung des Gesetzes
ausdrücklich erwähnt und gutgeheißen, sodass sie fortgeführt
werden kann.
Interessant sind auch einige Neuregelungen im Gesetz
zum Verhältnis von SSV und SSB. Das Verbot der alten
StrlSchV (§ 32 Abs. 5), den SSB zu behindern oder zu
benachteiligen, ist (selbstverständlich) in das Gesetz übernommen
worden. § 70 Abs. 6 S. 2 StrlSchG gibt dem SSB
nunmehr zusätzlich einen Kündigungsschutz – sofern der
Arbeitgeber, also letztlich der SSV, nicht zur fristlosen
Kündigung aus wichtigem Grund berechtigt ist. Goldene
Löffel darf der SSB also weiterhin nicht klauen.
Wenn der SSV einen Vorschlag ablehnt, den der SSB
“zur Behebung von aufgetretenen Mängeln” macht, dann
hat der SSB weiterhin einen Anspruch darauf, dass der
SSV ihm die Ablehnung schriftlich mit Begründung mitteilt,
mit Kopie an den Betriebsrat und an die zuständige
Behörde. Die Neuregelung des § 71 Abs. 2 S. 3 StrlSchG
gibt dem SSB jetzt das Recht, sich unmittelbar an die
Behörde zu wenden, wenn die Mitteilung des SSV insgesamt,
oder wenigstens die Übermittlung einer Kopie an
die Behörde, unterbleibt. Das erinnert zunächst an die
spannende Thematik des sog. Whistleblowers, also eines
Arbeitnehmers, der Missstände in seinem Unternehmen
oder seiner Institution der Öffentlichkeit oder den Behörden
bekannt macht; gegenwärtig wird ja ganz allgemein
diskutiert, ob eine solche Person eines besonderen gesetzlichen
Schutzes bedarf. Die neue Regelung im StrlSchG
ist aber, wenn man genau hinschaut, doch sehr begrenzt.
Sie greift nur, wenn der Arbeitgeber/SSV seine ohnehin
­ausdrücklich bestehende Pflicht zur Unterrichtung der
Behörde verletzt. Außerdem muss der SSB abwägend vorgehen:
Da das StrlSchG für die Mitteilung des SSV wie
bisher keine Frist setzt, muss der SSB sicherlich eine angemessene
Zeit abwarten und erforderlichenfalls noch
einmal nachhaken, bevor er als ultima ratio selbst die
Behörde informiert.
Insgesamt kann man feststellen: Der SSV wird durch
das neue Recht an seine Pflichten erinnert; die Rolle des
SSB wird gestärkt. Nach dem (sicherlich subjektiven)
Eindruck des Verfassers wäre das in der Kernenergie mit
ihrer hoch entwickelten Sicherheitskultur nicht unbedingt
nötig gewesen. In anderen Bereichen dagegen, etwa in
Kliniken oder in Unternehmen, in denen der Umgang mit
Radioaktivität nur einen Randaspekt darstellt, könnte das
neue Recht durchaus dazu führen, dem SSB in praxisrelevanter
Weise den Rücken zu stärken.
Author
Rechtsanwalt Dr. Christian Raetzke
Beethovenstr. 19, 04107 Leipzig, Deutschland
Spotlight on Nuclear Law
The New Radiation Protection Law (III) – Supervisor and Commissioner ı Dr. Christian Raetzke

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Feature | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
The Economic Potential of SMRs
Helmut Engelbrecht
Electricity is essential for human well being; its reliable availability is a key success factor for any human
development. Accordingly, the supply of electricity was organised everywhere as “infrastructure”, characterised by an
obligation to supply for the utility, but no competition or price risks. Security of supply was the key success criteria.
In this economic environment nuclear industry has
developed successfully. In times of high demand growth
for electricity, (10 to 15 % annual increase in electricity
consumption was not unusual), it was essential to achieve
a rapid growth of the electricity generation capacity. So
building big nuclear units at a fast pace helped to service
the needs.
But independent of the increase in demand the
economic boundary conditions of a regulated market
allowed for all the investments needed to build and support
the nuclear infrastructure. Many industrial countries
created independent national nuclear industries. They
also created independent national nuclear regulators to
supervise their national reactor build programs. As they
were competing to supply their technologies to interested
third parties there was hardly any international cooperation
amongst the global nuclear industries.
This changed in the 1980s. The well-developed
industrial nations saw a decline in electricity demand
growth. High energy prices triggered technology advances
that reduced the electricity demand in industrial applications.
Only the private consumption kept increasing but
on a reduced level. Electricity supply security for everybody
was a given.
In this market condition many countries decided to
“ liberalise” their electricity markets. They introduced
competition to the electricity supply system. This was
meant to increase the efficiency of the operation and to
allow smaller entities to participate in the market.
It worked out. The different stages of the electricity
supply were organised independently of each other.
Electricity trading saw small sales companies entering the
market, introducing price pressure that ultimately forced
market participants to work as efficient as possible.
Unfortunately this was valid only to parts of the
electricity supply services, mainly generation. Electricity
transport and distribution, even so organised independently
of each other, remained regulated as nobody saw a
reason to duplicate the grids.
Price competition in electricity generation increased
the effectiveness of operation, but unfortunately also
reduced the willingness to invest. Without price certainty
any expenditure for power generation becomes a major
investment risk. If you invest at all, you want to minimise
your exposure, so you decide for the generation with the
lowest upfront investment and the highest variable costs,
namely gas based electricity generation. Nuclear power,
where the investment cost determines up to almost 80 %
of the ultimate electricity price is not well positioned to
be considered favourable in such market conditions.
Negative public sentiment, complex licensing and other
big project related issues add to the financial risks, which
ultimately make investments in big power generation units
impossible for private entities. This is not only true
for nuclear but also effects coal and gas-based power
generation investments. Whereas in a non competitive
market with long term price certainty for your product you
will try to build as big as possible to achieve the economy
of size, in a competitive market it is quite the opposite, you
build as small as reasonable to minimise your investment
risk and the economic effects of a potential failure.
So small is interesting. Accordingly competitive power
markets saw a lot of interest in small generation devices
like solar panels, wind generators and bio gas plants.
Subsidies to support their market introduction helped
tremendously to boost customer’s interest.
Ultimately this changed the electricity generation
market from being a regulated national infrastructure
market to a commodity mass market, driven by consumer’s
needs and perceptions, similar to IT, telecommunication
and mobility.
So how do you react as a supplier to this market? To be
successful you need to convince your customers. But who
is your customer? The big utility that used to dominate in
the regulated market has been replaced by a lot of smaller
players from different industries, local municipalities and
even down to individuals, who take an interest in power
generation. They are all driven by different needs and
ambitions. Security and quality of electricity supply,
­ecological considerations or tax optimisation might be
their mayor interest to name just a few.
You should also learn from your competition. So has the
nuclear industry really investigated and understood why
solar panels, why wind generation has become so popular?
What does nuclear industry need to do to adjust to the
changed market conditions?
What does the individual electricity consumer want?
What are his or her concerns related to power generation?
I believe you should ask the consumers what they want.
I am not aware of any big scale investigation into this
question. But when putting this question to a small group
of young nuclear professionals at the WNU Summer
Institute 2018 the result was eye-opening.
They differentiated the overall view into three market
segments: mature electricity markets, industrial electricity
needs and developing electricity markets. Based on their
anticipation of consumers needs, they saw the demand
for small, flexible units. Favourite solution was gas or
wind-based power generation. Nuclear was nowhere the
preferred choice but managed to achieve a close second
rank for industrial needs and in developing electricity
markets. Interesting to notice was the fact that the smaller
(capacity wise) the nuclear unit used was; the more
favourable was its anticipated ranking. So, assuming the
nuclear unit was easy to transport and operate, inherently
safe, flexible to generate heat and power and did not
require frequent refuelling; these nuclear units did have
one advantage on the alternatives. Compared to gas
generation it does not require a supply infrastructure and
in comparison to wind generation its advantage is to be
reliably available on demand. Both facts certainly have
economic implication in favour of nuclear.
Does a nuclear unit like this exist? No, but all the
required technical features to build such a reactor are
FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 333
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FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 334
High temp gas reactor
known and have been used successfully in the past. Several
international developments are aiming to bring these so
called “micro reactors” to market within the next decade.
There is for example the Uranium Battery promoted by a
consortium under the leadership of Urenco, a 4 MWe gas
cooled, graphite moderated high temperature reactor. Or
another one is the eVinci reactor, designed and developed
by Westinghouse to produce up to 5 MWe. I mention just 2
of several solutions promoted right now, but a Canadian
programme to support this development found more
than 15 international applications from interested parties.
In my mind, all these reactor developments have the
potential to serve the customers’ needs, and at least serve
them better than the nuclear technologies being offered by
our industry today.
| | Westinghouse‘s vision of its eVinci micro reactor.
Source: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-More-SMR-vendordesign-reviews-for-CNSC-2002187.html
Now if you reflect on the consequences of such a
customer interest driven approach towards nuclear
generation, the required changes for the industry are vast.
The big reactors build today will only be needed in
regulated markets. The big demand will be for this
­inherently safe, simple, flexible, easy to operate, small
device.
Key success factor for such a new micro reactor will be
its manufacturing as a mass product, similar to a wind
generator. To be affordable it will have to be build and sold
in big numbers.
Such a micro reactor is a technical device that is
comparable to a car or an airplane. We consider nuclear
always as something special, but I believe it is technically
less complex than an airplane or a car. The only unique
feature in a nuclear reactors operation is the decay heat,
which can be as much as 30 % of the power generation
before shut down. This has to be removed, which needs to
happen systematically, without any need for external
human involvement. In my opinion an inherently safe
system achieves that. Hence you can really compare this
kind of reactor to a car, an airplane or a wind generator.
So it should be possible to achieve this reactor development
in a similar manner as development happen in those
industries.
Car or airplanes are developed with sales of big
numbers in mind. As this is not the prevailing idea in
­nuclear industry so far, financing such a development
might be harder to achieve for this micro reactors.
Ultimately some kind of state support might be required to
launch the process. This could also be in the form of state
backed purchases of these micro reactors. For example
Westinghouse’s development of the eVinci micro reactor
is believed to happen with US military needs in mind,
who is considering buying these in big numbers (200 is
contemplated on the internet) for their needs. This would,
should it become true, assure the market introduction of
this micro reactor.
Similar to car or airplane developments new reactors
will have to be designed to meet consumers needs.
Also similar to those developments the design and the
operation of such a micro reactor will have to be based on
internationally accepted, common licensing requirements.
Here certainly further advances in the international
regulatory framework for nuclear are required. But this is
not something totally new, as for example transport casks
for nuclear material are licensed in one country, and then
these regulations are agreed to and accepted to permit the
use of these casks in other countries.
Customers of micro reactors will want cradle to grave
services: delivery on short notice, easy operation fulfilling
their energy needs, repair and maintenance when required,
and take back services when the energy is spend.
Similar to what you do today with a battery.
This sounds like an obstacle, but again there are
precedents. All micro reactors will want to use enriched
4 MW power,
10 MW heat
Simple design,
proven technology
Inherently safe
TRISO fuel
Embedded
at point of use
Modular
manufactured
Primary markets –
off-grid
Micro – distinct
from SMR
| | U-Battery – Micro Modular Technology.
Source: https://www.u-battery.com/
Feature | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
The Economic Potential of SMRs ı Helmut Engelbrecht

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| | NASA mini-nuclear reactor.
Source: https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/kilopower_media_event_charts_16x9_final.pdf
uranium at a level higher than in today’s Light Water
Reactors. In order to minimise the refuelling requirement
most the micro reactor developments consider 19.5 %
enrichment. High enriched material would be even more
efficient, but thanks to expected political concern most
­developers seem to go for fuel with less than 20 % enrichment.
But reactors, that did use high enriched material in
the past (research reactors), have had offers from the
countries, which delivered the fuel, to take the used
enriched material back. Why should this be impossible for
SMRs, in particular as it would certainly be seen to enhance
nuclear security?
Last not least let’s reflect on the economics of these
micro reactors. Ultimately the electricity generation costs
of these devices while mainly depend on the numbers
build. The first of a kind as usually will be extremely
­expensive, but when you build the 1000 th of a kind your
costs will fall towards the cost of material required. Even at
that level it might be hard to match the generation costs of
big nuclear reactors.
But the end customers’ real concern is the overall
energy cost as delivered. And here small machines have a
real advantage as you can easily adjust the capacity to your
requirements.
Today in countries like Germany the electricity generation
costs only are app. one third of the overall charge for
the kilowatt-hour consumed. The rest is for electricity
transport, ­distribution, taxes and Germany specific
subsidies for renewable sources. Even in well established
electricity markets long term established grids still make
up app. 20 % of the consumers electricity bill. Imagine
what this would be in developing countries, where this
infrastructure needs to be built in parallel to investing in
big electricity generation. So similar to the developments
seen in telecommunication or information technology, one
could imagine this small electricity generation devices
could change the markets for electricity to become much
more distributed, requiring less grid infrastructure. For
remote areas local operation in island mode seems feasible.
The overall price for this is potentially quite competitive.
But with this it will be an individuals’ choice how to organise
one’s electricity and energy supply. So the customer is
free to do establish what he or she considers best.
I sketched here the potential development that could
happen if SMR (small micro reactors) are successfully
developed and established in the electricity business. I am
sure it can be done, but it requires massive changes to
nuclear industry and the way it is used to operate.
On the other hand the industrial and economic
potential is vast. Small distributed generation on this basis
will change the electricity markets.
Small decentralised electricity generation could reduce
the cost for the end user, as transport- and distribution
costs should be reduced. It also will improve supply
security as local disturbances no longer impact national/
international grids.
The economic potential for SMR’s (small, micro
reactors) looks promising. Who will dare to tackle this
market first?
Author
Dr. Helmut Engelbrecht I Nuclear Professional
(CEO Urenco 2005-2015, Chairman World Nuclear
Association 2016-2018)
helmutengelbrecht@web.de
FEATURE | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 335
Feature | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
The Economic Potential of SMRs ı Helmut Engelbrecht

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Serial | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
SMRs – Overview on International
Developments and Safety Features
Andreas Schaffrath and Sebastian Buchholz
1 Introduction
In the last years, several well-developed Small Modular
Reactor (SMR) designs from different international
vendors were announced. SMRs are mainly designated
for deployment not only in sparsely populated remote
areas but also near heavily populated cities and may
provide electricity, district heating and potable water. The
construction and deployment of SMRs is also being
promoted in various European countries (e.g. the UK or
Russia) [BUS-16, WNA-19].
SMRs can satisfy the need for low carbon generation
energy sources and especially the need for new capacities,
since significant (conventional and nuclear) power plant
capacities have to be retired and replaced in the coming
decades. Additionally, many countries see nuclear energy
alongside renewables as a possibility for sustainable
development and a reliable energy system [OZA-19].
Especially for strongly growing developing countries,
SMRs can provide the possibility to establish a nuclear
industry with a fraction of the costs of currently operating
nuclear power plants. These savings result mainly due to
complete prefabrication of modules fully equipped in
factories. This results in high qualities, shorter production
times, lower capital costs, standardization and therefore
lower costs due to mass production, simplification of safety
systems by primarily use of passive systems, lower number
of employees for deploying and removal, the opportunity
to deploy one module after another and higher plant availability
due to modular character. SMRs may also replace
older fossil plants and lead consequently to savings of gas,
oil and other fossil resources [BUS-15, WNA-19].
In chapter 2 of this contribution an overview on current
SMR developments is given. Due to the large number of
designs currently in operation, in construction or under
development, the focus is on identifying general construction
und safety trends. These are discussed in chapter
3. The description of individual details is given below for
illustrative purposes only. For the sake of completeness,
issues such as competitiveness, licensing, position of
selected European decision makers are addressed
additionally. Finally, in chapter 4 an overview of necessary
improvements and validation of the nuclear simulation
chain applied in nuclear licensing procedures is provided.
The improved simulation chain will be used for safety
assessments of SMRs according to the current state of the
art in science and technology.
2 Definitions, history and
current developments
After a compilation of different SMR definitions in section
2.1, a short overview on the history (section 2.2) and
­current projects (section 2.3) is provided. This publication
deals exclusively with SMRs for energy and/or power
generation. Engines for nuclear icebreakers, merchant
vessels and submarines, studies of mobile SMRs, propulsion
systems for outer space, as well as military applications
are not considered here, as this would go far
beyond the scope.
2.1 Definitions
There are two different definitions for SMR in literature.
The first one is widely used in North America (e.g. the USA
and Canada). Here, the abbreviation SMR stands for Small
Modular Reactor. The emphasis of this definition is on the
term modular, which characterises, that a (larger) production
unit can consist of different modules, which may
be added one by one. Also, it is possible to refuel one
module, while the others continue operation. The term
small in the definition SMR characterises an electrical
power output of less than 300 MW e . In this scale the
primary coolant system, selected parts of the secondary
and, where necessary, intermediate circuit and auxiliary
systems can be arranged in an integral reactor pressure
vessel (RPV). An SMR module may be transported to the
construction site in one piece or in few parts [WNA-19].
On the contrary, the IAEA defines SMR as Small
and Medium Sized Reactors. These reactors can have
capacities up to 700 MWe. The modular character is not
met by this definition but is also not excluded [BUS-15].
According to this definition, all reactors ever built in this
power range – even the VVER440s – are SMRs [SCA-19].
Therefore, in the following the focus is on modular SMRs
2.2 History
The idea of small (modular) reactors is not a new one.
Since the mid of the last century the former USSR and the
USA have used SMRs for
pp
energy and heat production of remote areas (e.g. Arctic,
the Antarctica or Greenland) and
pp
engines for their submarines, merchant vessels and ice
breakers [BUS-15].
One well-known example is e.g. the Army Nuclear Power
Program (ANPP) [SUL-90]. Numerous information and
pictures about the ANPP are published on the website
Army Engineer History of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
[ARH-171]. The ANPP was supervised by the U.S. Army
Engineer Reactors Group and had it headquarters in Fort
Belvoir (Virginia). Eight nuclear power plants (NPPs) were
built and operated in remote areas. The program ran
from 1954 to 1977, when the last nuclear reactor was
decommissioned. The main tasks were
pp
to carry out research and development in the field of
nuclear power plants together with the Atomic Energy
Commission,
pp
to operate the nuclear power plants of the Corps of
Engineers,
pp
to carry out training measures for the operation of
these nuclear power plants,
pp
to provide technical assistance to other authorities as
needed and
pp
to develop programs for the application of nuclear reactors
for military use.
One peculiarity was the naming of the SMRs. The name
consists of two letters followed by a number and in some
cases a third letter. The first letter indicates whether the
installation is stationary (S), mobile (M) or portable (P),
the second letter whether the power is high (H), medium
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(M) or low (L). Then the sequence number of the reactor
follows. Last the character A is added in case of site installation.
The sites and names of the SMRs of the ANPP are:
Fort Belvoir (SM-1), National Reactor Testing Station in
Idaho (SL-1 and ML-1), Camp Century, Greenland (PM-
2A), Sundance United Air Station, Wyoming (PM-1),
McMurdo Station, Antarctica (PM-3A), Fort Greely, Alaska
(SM-1A), Liberty Ship Sturgis anchored in Gatún Lake
(MH-1A) [ARH-172]. Selected SMRs of the ANPP are
shown in Figure 1.
The ANPP has achieved numerous pioneering
successes:
pp
detailed designs for pressurized water, boiling water,
gas-cooled and liquid metal reactors (all ANPP NPPs),
pp
first nuclear power plant with a containment (SM-1),
pp
first use of stainless steel for fuel element assemblies
(SM-1),
pp
first nuclear power plant in the United States to supply
electricity to a commercial grid (SM-1),
SM-1, Fort Belvoir (Virginia)
pp
first nuclear district heating source in the United States
(SM-1A),
pp
first replacement of a steam generator in the United
States (SM-1A),
pp
first containment with pressure suppression (SM-1A),
pp
first operational nuclear power plant with boiling water
reactor (SL-1),
pp
first portable, prefabricated, modular nuclear power
plant to be built, operated and dismantled (PM-2A),
pp
first use of nuclear energy for seawater desalination
(PM-3A),
pp
first mobile, land transportable nuclear power plant
(ML-1),
pp
first nuclear-powered gas turbine with closed Brayton
circuit (ML-1) and
pp
first (on a ship) floating nuclear power plant
(MH-1A).
Nuclear ship propulsion is mainly used by the military (e.g.
nuclear submarines). For this purpose, pressurized water
PM-1, Sundance (Wyoming)
SERIAL | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 337
SL-1, Nat. Reactor Test. Station (Idaho)
PM-3A, McMurdo Station (Antarctica)
PM-2A, Camp Century (Greenland)
SM-1A, Fort Greely (Alaska)
| | Fig. 1.
Selected reactors and sites of the Army Nuclear Power Program (all pictures were published by the U.S. Army on [ARH-172]).
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| | Fig. 2.
Nuclear cargo vessels (left: NS Savannah, first commercial nuclear cargo vessel (picture: U.S. Government), right: NS Otto Hahn, third civil nuclear cargo vessel
(picture: Jens Bludau)).
reactors (PWRs) with an output of around 100 mega-watts
are usually used. Nuclear propulsion has also been tested
for the civilian sector. Examples are or were the Soviet
icebreakers Lenin, Arktika and Sibir [ARV-17] and the
cargo ships Savannah (USA), Otto Hahn (Germany), Mutsu
(Japan) and Sevmorput (USSR). The NS Savannah and NS
Otto Hahn are shown in Figure 2. The Russian icebreakers
Rossiya, Tajmyr, Sovetskiy Soyuz, Waigatsch, Yamal and 50
Let Pobedy are still in operation today [ARV-17].
2.3 Current SMR developments
Currently, there are numerous as well as comprehensive
activities in the operation, construction and development
of SMRs. Apart from nuclear ship engines in icebreakers
and submarines, which are not subject of this article,
currently four SMR designs are operating, two in
China and one in India and Russia each (see Table 1 and
Figure 3).
The CEFR (China Experimental Fast Reactor) is China’s
first fast neutron reactor (see upper left photography of
Figure 3). It is located in the vicinity of Beijing and aims
to provide China with fast-reactor design, construction
and operational experience. The CEFR is a 65 MW th
respectively 20 MW e sodium-cooled, pool-type reactor
with a 30-year design lifetime and a target burn-up of
100 ­MWd/kg and will be a key facility for testing and
researching components and materials to be used in subsequent
fast reactors. The CEFR is the basis for the development
of the CDFR (China Demonstration Fast Reactor),
which shall have a capacity of 1000-1200 MW e at present
[POW-11].
The CNP-300 is the first own development of a nuclear
power plant in China and was built between 1985 and
1991 at the Quinshan site [IAEA-12]. This design was
­exported to Pakistan, where two reactors were constructed
at Chasman site in 1999 and 2012. The CNP-300 is a
CEFR, Tuoli [POW-11]
4 EGP-6 units, Bilibino NPP [INSP-99]
CNP-300, Quinchan [MPS-14]
4 PHWR-200, Kaiga NPP [NS-19]
| | Fig. 3.
SMRs currently in operation.
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Name Type Manufacturer Country P [MW e ] Status Site
| | Tab. 1.
SMRs in operation.
| | Tab. 2.
SMRs in construction.
pressurized water reactor and has a capacity of 999 MW th
respectively 325 MW e .
The EGP-6, a scaled down version of the RBMK reactor
design, is currently the world’s smallest and northernmost
nuclear reactor in operation [INSP-99]. The only four units
of this type are operating at Bilibino NPP. Plans for
shutdown have been announced. The Bilibino NPP shall be
­replaced by the floating nuclear power station Akademic
Lomonosov (see below).
The PHWR-220 is an indigenously in India built
­pressurized heavy-water reactor. Sixteen units of this
series were constructed at 5 different sites. The PHWR-220
have an output of roughly 800 MW th and 220 MW e .
6 SMR designs (see Table 2 and Figure 4) are currently
under construction. These are the ACPR50S in China
(PWR), the CAREM in Argentina (PWR), 2 CNP-300 in
Pakistan (LWR), 2 KLT-40S in Russia (PWR), 2 HTR-PM
in China (GCR) and a PFBR-500 in India (LMR). In
the ­following these SMRs are briefly described with
­exception of the CNP-300, which has already been
introduced above.
In 2015, China has decided to build an indigenously
modular floating nuclear power plant. This SMR is called
ACPR50S and has an electrical power output of 60 MW.
The reactor is designed to supply energy to islands or
remote coastal areas or offshore oil and gas production
facilities [NFS-162]. The ACPR50S can also be applied for
seawater desalination. For instance, approx. 20 planned
floating nuclear power plants could ensure the supply of
fresh water to islands in the South China Sea [EGN-19]. In
January 2016, China General Nuclear Power Corporation
(CGN) and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
(CSIC), China’s largest shipbuilding company, signed a
strategic cooperation agreement for the development of
offshore reactors [NFS-161]. On November 4, 2016, CGN
also announced the start of construction on the first
demonstration unit of a floating nuclear power plant
Currently operating
CEFR LMR CNEIC CN 20 Operating, Prototype for CDFR-1000 Tuoli (CN)
CNP-300 PWR CNNC CN 325 Operating, additional planned Qinshan 1 (CN), Chashma (PK)
EGP-6 RBMK OMZ Group Ru 12 4 operating Bilinino Nuclear Power Plant (RU)
PHWR-220 HWR BARC IN 236 16 operating, additional planned Rajasthan, Madras, Narora, Kakrapar, Kaiga
(all IN)
Name Type Manufacturer Country P [MW e ] Status Site
Currently under construction
ACPR50S PWR CGNPC CN 60 Start of construction November 2016 Demonstration offshore Nuclear Reactor (CN)
CAREM PWR CNEA AR 27 Start of construction: February 2014 Atucha (AR)
CNP-300 PWR CNNC CN 325 2 blocks under construction Chashm (PK)
HTR-PM GCR INET CN 105 Demonstration plant under
construction since 2012 Bau (2 modules)
KLT-40S PWR OKBM
Afrikantov
RU 35 2 reactors in Akademik Lomonosov,
deployment: 2016
PFBR-500 LMR IGCAR IN 500 Under construction, first criticality
planned in September 2014
Shidaowan (CN)
Barge Akademik Lomonosov (RU)
Madras (IN)
with the signing of the purchase contract for the first
ACPR50S reactor.
In Argentina a CAREM-25 [MAC-14] is currently built by
CNEA at the Atucha site northwest of Buenos Aires. A
special feature is the integral design of the primary circuit,
where pressurizer, steam generator and control rod drives
are integrated within the reactor pressure vessel. Since the
core is cooled with natural convection even in operation,
no pumps are necessary [WNN-141]. First tests of the
CAREM started in 2016.
The construction of the HTR-PM started in December
2012 in Shidao Bay Nuclear Power Plant. It consists of two
high-temperature gas-cooled pebble-bed reactors with an
electrical output of 105 MW each. Both reactors are
connected to a single steam turbine. The HTR-PM is partly
based on the HTR-10 prototype reactor and expected to be
the first Gen IV reactor to enter operation [ZUZ-16].
In Russia the floating NPP Akademic Lomonosov has
been built in a shipyard in St. Petersburg since 2007. It
contains two KLT-40S reactors with a thermal power of
150 MW each. These reactors are derivatives of the KLT-40
[IAEA-00], which were used in icebreakers of the
Sevmorput class and the KLT-40M used in icebreakers of
the Taymyr class [OKB-13]. The Akademic Lomonosov shall
be deployed to Pevek at the East Siberian Sea in order to
provide electricity district heating and potable water to the
region.
The PFBR-500 [CHE-06] is a fast breeder developed
by the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research and is
under construction at the Madras Atomic Power Station in
Kalpakkam (India). First criticality is planned to achieve in
2020 [WNN-19]. The PFBR-500 has an electrical output of
500 MW and will burn MOX fuel with expected burn-up
of up to 100 GWd/t. It is is a pool type reactor with 1750
tonnes of sodium.
There are plans for the construction of 11 more SMR
concepts (see Table 3). In addition, roughly 50 SMR
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­concepts are at a design state without explicit deployment
plans.
3 GRS study on safety and international
development of small modular reactors
In the last years, several well-developed SMR designs from
different international vendors were announced. For
creating an overview about current SMR designs to identify
essential issues for reactor safety research, GRS performed
a study of safety and international development of SMR.
This is the basis to specify needs of adaptation of system
codes used at GRS for reactor safety research. The large
number of SMR designs in operation, under construction
CAREM, Atucha NPP [EN-17]
Barge Akademik Lomonosov [POW-18]
| | Fig. 4.
Selected SMRs currently under construction.
and under development at an advanced state of planning
requires a generic approach and the identification of
general trends.
In section 3.1 the changed political framework in
­Germany and in section 3.2 the motivation of GRS to
­investigate SMRs are described. Afterwards in section 3.3
selected results of the SMR study such as technical trends on
factory fabrication and transport, compactness and modularity,
core design, improved core cooling and ­exclusion of
accidents and features for preventing and limiting the impact
of severe accidents are presented. ­Afterwards first estimations
concerning economic viability and competitiveness
(section 3.4) and licensing (section 3.5) are summarized.
HTR-PM, Sidaowan NPP [WNN-16]
PFBR-500, Madras [COI-18]
Name Type Manufacturer Country P [MW e ] Status Site
Concepts with planned deployment
ACP-100 LWR CNNC CN 100 Planned construction
(Start 06/2014)
Zhangzhou, later: Jiangxi,
Hunan, Jilin (CN)
ARC-100 SFR ARC USA 100 Well advanced development (CA)
BREST LMR RDIPE RU 300 Planned construction Beloyarsk (RU)
Integral MSR MSR Terrestrial Energy CA 192 Well advanced development (CA)
NuScale PWR NuScale Power
and Flour
USA 60 Well advanced development (US)
PRISM SFR GE Hitachi USA 311 Well advanced development –
SMART PWR KAERI KR 100 Well advanced development (SA)
SMR-160 PWR Holtec
SNC-Lavalin
USA 160 Well advanced development (US, CA)
SVBR-100 LMR RDIPE RU 250 Planned construction RIAR in Dimitrovgrad (RU)
VBER-300 PWR OKBM RU 300 Well advanced development (KZ, RU)
| | Tab. 3.
SMRs at an advanced state of planning.
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Finally, in section 3.6 a sound overview on the position of
selected European countries is given.
3.1 Changed political framework in Germany
After the Fukushima nuclear disaster [GRS-16], the
German Federal government decided to terminate the
use of nuclear energy latest in 2022. The thirteenth
amendment of the Atomic Energy Act [ATG-11] came into
force on August 6, 2011. It regulates that the licenses of the
seven oldest and the Krümmel NPP expired and that the
remaining nine NPPs are to be shut down by 2022.
Consequently, the pressurized water reactor (PWR)
Grafenrheinfeld was shut down in 2015 and the boiling
water reactor (BWR) Gundremmingen Unit B in 2017
[BFE-18].
Worldwide, national government policies differ on the
further use of nuclear energy for electricity generation.
Many countries (e.g. China, Finland, France, Hungary,
Turkey, UK, USA, Russia) are planning to build new NPPs
or at least maintain and/or extend their operating time. In
Europe, currently 27 % of all electricity consumed in the
European Union (EU) is generated by NPPs. The projection
in the latest European Nuclear Illustrative Programme
(PINC) forecasts a stable nuclear capacity in Europe
between 95 and 105 GW e from 2030 onwards. At this time,
roughly 80 to 90 % of the installed capacity would be
new builds [EC-16].
Currently SMRs are discussed worldwide as one
interesting option for new builds in almost all countries,
which continue to use nuclear energy for commercial
power generation. For asserting of legitimate nuclear
safety and/or security interests, German authorities
­require in this context, own and independent expertise for
the safety assessments of NPPs and other nuclear facilities
in our neighborhood on an international level of the state
of the art in science and technology. This position, for
which a cross-party consensus exists, is e.g. stipulated in
the coalition agreement of the current Federal Government
[BR-18]. For this reason, the German Federal
Government continues to fund reactor safety research
which is in line with national and international framework
conditions and obligations.
The technical expertise in Germany for promoting
comprehensive safety reviews and ambitious binding
targets, is essentially built-up and provided by the
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS)
gGmbH [GRS-19]. GRS is an independent non-profit
organization and entirely funded by projects. The main
shareholders are the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Technical Inspection Agencies, each with a share of
46.15 %. GRS is the
pp
main technical support organization (TSO) in nuclear
safety for the German Federal Government (especially
the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) and the
­Federal Foreign Office (AA)),
pp
a major research organization in nuclear safety (e.g. for
the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
(BMWi), BMU and the Federal Ministry for Education
and Research (BMBF)) and
pp
traditionally involved in numerous international
activities (e.g. of the European Commission (EC), the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the
Nuclear Energy Agency of Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD-NEA)).
As a first step, in this direction GRS performed a study on
Safety and International development of Small Modular
Reactors (SMR) [GRS-15], from which selected results are
presented in the following sections.
3.2 GRS study on safety and international
development of small modular reactors
The aims of the GRS study on Safety and International
Development of Small Modular Reactors [GRS-15],
published in 2015, were
pp
to set-up a sound overview on current SMR,
pp
to identify essential issues of SMR reactor safety
research and future R&D projects and
pp
to identify needs for adaption of system codes of GRS
used in this field of activity.
In the following, selected results (e.g. general trends and
safety features) are specifically described for the first
working point. For this it was advantageous to assign the
SMRs compiled in the Tables 1, 2 and 3 into groups.
Criteria for this were:
pp
the coolant (light-water, heavy-water, liquid metals,
gases and molten salts),
pp
the place of construction (onshore, offshore, subseabased)
and
pp
the state of deployment (in operation, construction,
­development with / without specific construction
intention).
3.3 Selected technical trends
In the following the selected trends of the SMRs are
summarized. Some of these trends apply for all SMRs
(­section 3.3.1 up to section 3.3.2), while others (section
3.3.3 up to section 3.3.5) are only valid for light-water
cooled SMRs. These SMRs have best chances of realization
in large numbers because they are based on a long-term
­operational proven technology and an already existing fuel
cycle. Furthermore, all nuclear stakeholder (especially of
the regulators) have collected the greatest experiences
with this technology by far.
3.3.1 Factory fabrication and transport
The definition SMR contains the two terms small and
modular. The term small characterises that SMR are small
(electrical output of less than 300 MW) in comparison to
currently operated NPP, which currently have an electrical
output of roughly 1000 to 1750 MW. Modular means
that these SMR have a modular construction and major
com ponents of a SMR are small enough to be built on a
production line in a factory and assembled on-site
[GAD-19]. Factory production allows to produce several
units simultaneously and not as present assembling one
item at a time [BAJ-18]. Standardisation increases quality
and reduces training [HUK-13].
The components of all current power reactors (for
­example in a PWR the reactor pressure vessel, the steam
generators, the main coolant pumps, the pressurizer and
the blow-off tank) are so large and heavy, so that these must
be manufactured, transported individually to the construction
site and connected here to each other by piping.
However, site construction has a higher risk of sub- standards
and/or rejects. The crafts are e.g. exposed to strongly
varying weather conditions, dirt and grime. Further more,
assembly and mounting devices are only available to a
­limited extend compared to a factory pro­duction [HUK-13].
On-site technical inspection is more ­difficult and is also
more expensive. The same is valid for the costs of on-site
production due to higher ancillary costs [SCA-19].
The advantage of SMR design with ship, truck or even
railway delivering in mind is that the size of modules
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allows their transports from the factory to the construction
site as one unit. Unlike conventional large power plants,
which have huge components that are difficult to ­transport,
SMRs do not require huge custom transporters, highway
closures, or reinforcement of bridges along the transportation
route. With SMRs, getting all the equipment to the
construction site is a lot easier [NGR-11, WNN-18]. This
context is e.g. addressed in [POW-17] and by several SMR
designer. In [POW-17] a picture is shown in which current
construction (e.g. of Olkiluoto 3) is compared to a factory
build module, transported by a truck (see Figure 5).
| | Fig. 5.
Comparison of site construction (here Olkiluoto 3) and a factory-built module delivered by truck
(taken over from [POW-17]).
SMRs are much less demanding in terms of siting. Large
reactors need low population zones, and a relatively large
sites with access to large volumes of cooling water. Therefore,
the number of suitable construction sites for SMRs is
far larger than the number of construction sites for large
reactors. At the same time several of these locations
( especially the site far away from large rivers) are more
difficult to reach [WNN-18]. This is now possible e.g. with
the trucks.
3.3.2 Compactness and modularity
The SMR designs are mainly characterized by high
compactness, which supports the modularity. Modularity
in turn leads to large savings of space. Consequently, the
modules can be factory produced and deployed to the site
by truck, barge or train (see section 3.3.1).
Many of the SMRs are proposed as an integral design
[GRS-15]. Integral means, that the components of the
primary coolant circuit (e.g. core, pressurizer, steam
generators, main coolant pumps (if the respective SMR has
a forced convection cooling)) are arranged within the
­reactor pressure vessel. This construction excludes large
break loss of coolant accidents (LBLOCA) by design, since
no large connection lines are needed (see section 3.3.4). In
some cases, also the control rod drives are integrated into
the reactor pressure vessel [SUH-16].
Beside the integral design, also loop designs with very
short coaxial connection nozzles can be found (e.g.
KLT-40S). Here the hot legs are located in the inner pipe
while the cold legs are in the outer part of the coaxial pipe
in order to minimize temperature losses [IAEA-00].
However, the compact SMR designs require new types
of extremely powerful steam generators able to transfer
large heat quantities at a low overall height at the same
time [SCA-19]. For this purpose, bayonet, helical coil or
plate heat exchangers were adapted from conventional
energy technology. In addition, new arrangements of the
heat exchangers have also been developed (e.g. the steam
generator of the SCOR is placed on the top of the RPV (see
Figure 6 taken from publication [SCA-18]).
The arrangement of the helical coil steam generators
could be either several steam generators in the downcomer
(e.g. in CAREM) or one steam generator around the riser
(e.g. NuScale). Common in all designs is that the efficiency
is increased by thin walls and highly turbulent flow fields,
which makes the steam generators susceptible to flow-­
induced vibrations. Experiments for verification of the
­performance e.g. for the helical coil heat exchangers were
performed for example for the NuScale and the IRIS
concepts at the full-length Helical Coil Steam Generator
(HCSG) tests at SIET in Piacenza (Italy) [WNN-142]. CFD
calculations mentioned in [DEA-14] show a strong
­secondary flow inside the helical tubes, which depends
strongly on the torsion rate (fraction of pitch to diameter of
the helix) and may have an impact on heat transfer.
3.3.3 Core design
The reactor cores of light-water cooled SMRs consist of 40
up to 80 shortened standard fuel assemblies arranged according
to optimized loading patterns. The cores have an
active length between 2 and 2.5 m. The fuel (UO 2 as
well MOX) is higher enriched and shall be burned-up
­significantly higher. The SMR cores are designed for fuel
cycles between two and ten years [SCA-19]. All light-water
cooled SMRs have a negative temperature coefficient for
both primary coolant and fuel. Some concepts spare a
boron acid system in order to safe space and lower the
­temperature coefficient. Instead of a boron system,
burnable absorbers like Gd 2 O 3 , IFBA, Er or B 4 C are used.
Compensation of the excess reactivity is also achieved by
the use of the control rods which are also be used for short
time control of the core. Used materials here are Ag In-Cd,
B 4 C and Dy 2 Ti 2 O 7 [BUS-15, GRS-15].
In NPPs with several modules one module can be
refueled, while the others continue operation. The output
of the multi-module production NPP is reduced only in this
time span; but the plant is not entirely powered down. The
outage can be planned and carried out at times of low
energy demand. At the end of their lives the modules are
returned to the factories for disassembling [SCA-19].
3.3.4 Improved core cooling and exclusion
of accidents
The core cooling of the SMR was improved compared to
the currently operated LWR. For this similar design
principles as for the advanced Gen III / III+ reactors are
applied [WNN-18]. Concerning [SCA-19] these are e.g.:
pp
the reduction of the power density of the core (up to
-50% compared to currently operated Gen II LWR),
pp
a low positioning of the core inside the RPV,
pp
a high-water coverage of the core so that even for a
break of the largest line connected at RPV no core
­exposure occurs during blowdown,
pp
large water inventors in – respectively outside the RPV
to ensure excellent slow-acting accident control
capabilities,
pp
large heat storage inside the containment as a result of
large water inventories
pp
passive equipment for heat removal from the RPV and
the containment,
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pp
passive cooling of the RPV exterior in the event of core
melt scenarios to ensure retention of the core melt
inside the RPV.
There is a scientific consensus, that up to an electrical
power output of roughly 200 MW decay heat can be safely
removed from the RPV and core melt can be excluded. The
improved heat removal features result on the one hand
from the larger surface to volume ration of the RPV. This
again results from the diameter to length ratio of the vessel.
Compared to Gen II LWR, the reactor core has a smaller
distance to the RPV wall, which leads to a better heat conduction.
Additionally, the heat transfer resistance of an
SMR RPV wall is lower than the RPV wall of a Gen II LWR,
because the wall thickness decreases with the curvature of
the vessel [SCA-19].
Several SMRs exclude accidents by design. Many of the
light-water cooled SMR are operating under natural
circulation without the use of main coolant pumps (e.g.
CAREM, NuScale, etc.). Consequently, in these concepts,
no pump trips have to be considered. But especially during
the start-up phase this may lead to flow instabilities like
geysering or density wave oscillations, the designers have
to deal with. Descriptions of such phenomena for the
integrated modular reactor (IMR) design can be found in
[DIX-13]. Boron dilution accidents can be excluded for
SMR with boron free cores. When using integral control
rod drives (e.g. CAREM) the threat of an unprotected
control rod ejection is essentially eliminated, since the
pressure difference between top and lower edge of the
control rod is not formed out of ambient and primary
pressure anymore but level difference in the reactor
pressure vessel only [MAC-14]. Finally, the integral
design can exclude large break loss-of-coolant accidents
(LBLOCA) [HUK-13].
SMR concepts consider three main design principles for
a save control of postulated LOCA: First, the number of
lines connected to the RPV is minimised. Second, the
connections of the pipe are far above the core and third,
lines with radioactive coolant outside shall be avoided.
Since the maximum break sizes of a Gen II LWR (a double
ended break leads to a break area of roughly 1 m²) and a
SMR vary by up to 3 orders of magnitude, LOCA in SMR
can be easier controlled and leads to lower loads on RPV
internal and on the containment [SCA-19].
As mentioned above, in many SMRs decay heat removal
relies on passive safety systems. The operation mode
of these systems is based on laws of nature (e.g. free
convection, condensation, evaporation). The decay heat is
removed by natural circulation to large water inventories
arranged in large heights in- or outside the containment.
However, at present there are neither uniform definitions
of passive safety systems nor requirements for experimental
and/or analytical evidences [SCA-19]. While the
definitions of IAEA [IAEA-91] and EPRI [EPRI-99] allow an
active initiation of the operation of a passive safety system,
German Safety Requirements for NPP [BMU-15] do not
allow this. Systems with an active initiation of operation
would, according to [BMU-15], be an active system, for
which a n+2 degree of redundancy is required. Due to a
current existing lack of operation experience there
are, however concerns regarding the performance and
reliability of passive safety systems [SCA-19].
The light-water cooled SMRs’ containment have a
passive cooling of at least 72 h. Some SMR even have an
infinite passive containment cooling to an ultimate heat
sink which could be either air or water. Four different
­design approaches exist for this issue: These are
| | Fig. 6.
New types of extremely powerful steam generators for SMRs (left: steam generator is placed on the top
of the RPV (SCOR [THC-15]), middle: 12 helical coil type heat exchangers arranged in the downcomer
(CAREM [MAC-14]), right: one helical coil type SG is arranged around the rizer (NuScale [IND-14]).
– Figure 6 was taken from [SCA-18].
horizontally or vertically containments arranged in large
water pools, subsea-based containments, floating containments
and containment cooled by heat pipes [SCA-18].
3.3.5 Features for preventing and limiting
the impact of severe accidents
In general, the smaller amount of nuclear fuel in the SMR
cores, the improved core cooling features and the ­exclusion
of accidents (both described in section 3.3.4) lead to a
reduction of the probability and consequences of core
melting. As a result, the off-site emergency planning
requirements can be scaled down to be proportionate to
those reduced risks. This includes inter alia emergency
planning zones (EPZ), which do not have to be extended
beyond the plant side boundary [WNN-18].
SMRs contain new ideas to increase the resilience
against external events (e.g. earthquakes, explosion
pressure waves, air plane crashes). This includes among
others the arrangement of SMR modules in (water filled)
caverns partially or completely below the ground level or
at the ground of on ocean in a water depth of up to roughly
100 meters. Figure 7 shows the reactor building of the
French SMR I-150, which shall be buried under an earth
wall [CHJ-17].
| | Fig. 7.
The reactor building of the I-150 with 4 modules shall be buried under an earth wall [CHJ-17].
3.4 Economic viability and competitiveness
In principle, questions of economic viability and competitiveness
are not included in the working fields of GRS,
which are exclusively safety aspects. Since both issues are
the ultimately basis for a positive construction decision,
GRS has roughly dealt with these aspects for estimating
whether SMR can be an option for new builds in the direct
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neighborhood of Germany. These are the prerequisite for
the development of additional competences as well as the
necessary extension and validation of the evidence tools
developed by GRS and which have been successfully
applied for these issues in the last decades. Unfortunately,
many countries planning to build SMRs have not yet
­committed themselves to specific designs. Therefore, only
fundamental estimations can be performed, of which
selected aspects are discussed in the following.
The evaluation of various studies (e.g. [LOG-14]), and
publications (e.g. [ENH-19]) as well as qualitative considerations
e.g. by [HUK-13] in this regard indicates that
SMRs can be (under certain assumptions) competitive
compared to Gen II, III and III+ LWR as well as in the
­medium term to gas powered plants. However, the extend
of costs considered vary from study to study.
For SMRs it is the key to offset the economies of
scale, which seemed to be in favor of large reactors, with
economies of numbers, provided by the concept of modules
or entire plants built in factories and shipped to the site
[ENH-19].
Since, at this stage no valid data are publicly available,
only some qualitative considerations are made in the
following: SMRs have a large application spectrum and
can be used for many purposes such as electricity, heat
production and desalination. They require lower capital
costs for construction. A production unit can be extended
module by module, already after connecting the first
module, electricity and / or heat can be generated and
sold. The risks of delays can be eliminated by factory
production of the nuclear island. After transportation to
the site the modules can be immediately connected to grid.
The SMRs have been designed for longer operating cycles
and require less maintenance. Finally, SMRs can be
disposed easier, since the complete modules can be transported
back to the factory and could be dismantled there.
But however, it must be mentioned that the different
studies indicating the economic feasibility as well as a
­significant market potential base on the assumptions, that
pp
all entry barriers have been overcome,
pp
SMRs are produced in series in factories, which have to
be built first,
pp
efficient transnational licensing procedures have been
established (see section 3.5).
With regard to the second bullet, it should be pointed out,
that it is not clear which company respectively economy is
willing and able to realize the necessary investments.
Furthermore, approvals should be recognized internationally.
For example, the construction surveillance
could be carried out by a TSO in the country, in which the
SMR factory is located. All aspects discussed above require
a harmonization of definitions (e.g. for passive safety
­systems – see section 3.3.4), rules and regulations (e.g. for
experimental and analytical evidence).
As already mentioned in the introduction of section 3.3
SMRs based on LWR technology offer currently advantages,
due to the experiences of the nuclear regulators collected
with light-water reactor technology in the last decades.
Since a licensing process lasts several years, SMRs in
operation or even under construction are in advance.
Licenses have been granted for light-water cooled SMRs
e.g. for CAREM in 2010 and SMART in 2012.
3.6 Position of Selected European Countries
In the following, the position on SMRs of selected European
countries (Germany, United Kingdom, Russia) and the
European Commission is summarized.
According to the 13 th amendment of the Atomic Energy
Act [ATG-11] in Germany neither an SMR will be built or
operated. The European Commission on the other hand
proposes a licensed SMR by 2025 and operation of a SMR
by 2030 as an important strategic target/priority.
In the United Kingdom (UK) the National Nuclear
Laboratories have published a report on SMR concepts,
feasibility and potential in 2014 [NNL-14]. Subsequently
the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC)
called for expression of interests in a SMR competition to
identify the best value for the UK (2016).
Russia, where 70 % of Russia’s territory and 20 % of
population cannot use the services of centralized energy
providing, has a high potential and interest for SMR
application. The base for civil SMR development are e.g.
SMRs of the Russian Navy (with an operational experience
of approx. 6000 reactor years) and the civil icebreakers
and cargo ships (with an additional operational ­experience
of approx. 370 reactor years) [ARV-17].
One example for the respective extensive Russian
activities are the replacement of the the Bilibino NPP by the
floating nuclear power station Akademik Lomonosov (see
section 2.3 and Figure 4). But Russia is also increasingly
developing SMR for export. The target markets are Asia,
Africa and Latin America, where countries are facing
challenges related to the supply of fossil fuels and grid
development [PEJ-18].
3.5 Licensing
The following section describes necessary global harmonization
of rules and regulations and changes in current licensing
procedures, which are prerequisites for SMRs being successful
in the market. The decisions necessary for the implementation
are taken by respective national governments and
regulators. In this sense, the following remarks are only brief
summaries of the current discussion in the nuclear community,
which may differ from the GRS view.
The studies concerning the economic viability and
­competitiveness indicate that a cost efficiency of SMR
requires the construction of minimum 80 up to 100
identical units worldwide. The phrase identical means,
that the same design has to be deployed in all target
markets. Currently the SMR vendors desire to reduce the
number, the time and financial effort for the nuclear
­licensing procedure. This includes, for example, that if
identical modules are added to a production unit, no new
licensing procedure is required for the nuclear island.
4 GRS simulation chain, identification of
modelling gaps and priorities for closure
The focus of this publication is to provide an overview on
international developments and safety features on SMRs,
which are in several countries of our neighborhood an
interesting option for nuclear new builds. The Gesellschaft
für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH, is the
main German technical support organization in nuclear
safety. It supports the German Federal government e.g.
in asserting legitimate nuclear safety and/or security
interests (e.g. by promoting comprehensive safety reviews
and ambitious binding targets). This require the necessarily
know-how as well as qualified numerical simulation tools.
However, these tools must be suitable extended and
­validated at first. Necessary items are summarized below
briefly and concisely. However, the following list does not
claim to be complete.
Today, a comprehensive, historically grown scientific
code system is available at GRS. An overview of this
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| | Fig. 8.
The Nuclear Simulation Chain of GRS taken over from [SCA-15, SCA-17] and Negligible Modified.
simulation chain was e.g. presented at the 1 st Sino-German
Symposium on Fundamentals of Advanced Nuclear Safety
Technology in March 2015 [SCA-15] and published in
[SCA-17] in 2017. In general, GRS develops, as far as
possible, its own codes, because this approach leads
to an improved understanding of the relevant physical
phenomena. This approach allows GRS to be independent
of the interests of commercial software developers and
therefore to improve selected codes to respond faster and
more flexible to current events. The identification of work
required for this was one main result of the GRS SMR
study. The following remarks shall give a brief overview of
what is still to be done.
The structure of this nuclear simulation chain is
depicted in Figure 8 [SCA-15, SCA-17]. It consists of GRS’
own developments (deep blue boxes) and third-party
codes (white boxes). Many codes can be coupled simply for
data transfer (indicated by the dotted lines) or in a more
complex way through interfaces (indicated by red lines) in
Figure 8. The latter option requires the development of
appropriate interfaces. The advantages of coupling will be
discussed more detailed later in this section.
The codes are assigned to the following main thematic
areas: reactor physics, thermal-hydraulics/severe core
damage and structural mechanics (columns in Figure 8).
The systems/components: reactor core, reactor coolant
system (RCS), containment which can be simulated with
the codes are arranged in rows and correspond to the
respective fundamental safety functions control of reactivity,
core cooling and enclosure of radioactivity. In addition,
there is a fourth row, which contains other codes (e.g. for
visualization, sensitivity, uncertainty and probabilistic
dynamic analysis).
From GRS’ point of view at least short and medium-term
proofs for SMRs introduced by vendors and operators in
nuclear procedures will be assessed by independent
recalculations of regulators and/or TSOs with the simulation
tools already developed, validated and successfully
applied for Gen II LWR. These are e.g. the GRS developments
QUABOX/CUBBOX (a 3-D neutron kinetics core
model) and the code system AC 2 consisting of the codes
ATHLET (a lumped parameter code for analysis of leaks
and transients in the reactor coolant circuit), ATHLET-CD
(the extension of ATHLET for severe accident analyses in
the RCS including core meltdown and fission product
release) and COCOSYS (a lumped parameter code for
analysis of conditions within the containment and
buildings of NPP in case of accidents and severe accidents).
The neutron kinetics core QUABOX/CUBBOX requires
further model improvements and validation e.g. for:
pp
long fuel cycle length (> 24 month),
pp
cores with higher burn-up (> 50 MWd/kg) and/or
higher fuel enrichment,
pp
advanced loading pattern,
pp
boron free cores under consideration of the behavior of
burnable absorber at the beginning of new cycles,
pp
moveable reflectors for long-term compensation of
­excess reactivity.
The code system AC 2 requires e.g. further model improvements
and validation for:
pp
innovative, high performance heat exchangers
(­bayonet, helical coiled and plate heat exchanger),
pp
the assessment of occurrence of flow induced ­vibrations
and their effects,
pp
the operation mode and operation boundaries of heat
pipes (viscous, sonic, entrainment, capillary and boiling
limits), enhancement of the parameter range of
correlations towards low pressures, improvement and
validation of the semi-empirical closure correlations
for interphase friction, heat and mass transfer and
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if necessary implementation of properties for new heat
pipe working fluids,
pp
single/two phase flow natural convection, flow
instabilities and transition range between single and
two natural convection,
pp
passive safety systems (special components, start-up
behavior, mutual interaction of different passive safety
systems or trains of one passive safety system, ­extension
of the scope of correlations for containment heat
transfer)
pp
check-valves, in which the opening cross section and
the associated form loss is calculated dependent on the
pressure difference up- and downstream the valve,
pp
3D models for water pools/environment (ultimate
containment heat sink), temperature and velocity
fields, stratification,
pp
heat transfer at bundle surfaces at free convection,
subcooled or saturated boiling conditions,
pp
steam condensation at containment walls, structures
and internals especially for the case of small break
LOCA, inertised containments or containments
operated at near vacuum conditions,
pp
new coupling (strategy) between ATHLET and COCOSYS,
pp
infinite passive containment cooling to an ultimate heat
sink in ocean environment (influence of seawater,
mussel growth, etc.),
pp
heat transfers of horizontally arranged containment
in large water pools or the ocean at RA-numbers of
approx. 1015.
The above mentioned, open issues shall be processed and
closed with national and international research alliances.
One example is the EU project ELSMOR (Towards European
Licensing of Small Modular Reactors), which has received
approval for grant agreement preparations under the
European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation Literature
programme. Scheduled to be launched in the summer of
2019, a total of 15 organisations from 8 countries will
participate in ELSMOR, to which the EU has granted EUR
3.5 million. GRS leads in ELSMOR two important work
packages. The consortium consists of support organisations
of European TSOs, universities, power companies,
and some of the developers of a French SMR design I-150
[CHJ-17]. ELSMOR is developing systematic methods for
the safety assessments of new and innovative reactors
(here especially SMRs). The project shall contribute that
European experimental infrastructures and modelling/­
evidence tools will be ready for use in nuclear licensing
procedures [VTT-19].
5 Summary
Small modular reactors are one interesting option for new
builds in almost all countries worldwide continuing to use
nuclear energy for commercial electricity production.
­Currently four SMRs are in operation, further six SMRs are
under construction and eleven at an advanced stage of
planning. Different European countries (e.g. the United
Kingdem, Russia, Poland) are planning to build and
operate SMRs. Even after nuclear phase-out the German
Federal government would like to assert legitimate nuclear
safety and/or security interests, e.g. by promoting comprehensive
safety reviews and ambitious binding targets
for the new builds (including SMRs) in our neighborhood.
The Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit
(GRS) gGmbH as the main German technical support
organization in nuclear safety for the German government,
has performed a Study on Safety an International
Development on SMR published in 2015 (GRS-376). In this,
numerous trends of current SMR development were
­identified. They are presented in this publication. The
modelling gaps of the GRS simulation chain were compiled
and a strategy for their closure was developed. The main
findings are: The safety level was increased e.g. by an
advanced, conservative design, implementation of new
safety features (e.g. passive safety systems) and the
­exclusion of accidents (e.g. LBLOCA, control rod ejection).
Therefore, SMR could be – if proven by safety analyses –
among the safest nuclear equipment ever made. Factory
fabrication minimizes the (financial) risk of delay in
construction. Competitiveness e.g. with gas power plants
requires the construction of a large number of identical
SMR units worldwide. Prerequisites for this are that all
entry barriers have been overcome like series production
in factories, which are currently not existing, and a
worldwide harmonization of rules and regulations and
recognition of licenses of foreign nuclear regulators.
­However, currently published figures are fraught with
large uncertainties and not yet reliable. Independently of
the previously mentioned open points, which are irrelevant
from TSO’s point of view, GRS will further develop and
validate its nuclear simulation chain. This allows to
successfully apply the GRS simulation chain in nuclear
licenses procedures and independent safety analyses also
for SMRs.
Acknowledgement
This article contains results of the research project Study
of Safety and International Development of SMR (grant
number RS1521), which was funded by the German
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi).
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Small Modular Reactors: a major Element of the Future of Nuclear?, Annual Meeting on Nuclear
Technology, Mai 07-08, 2019, Berlin.
ıı
EPRI-99 Electric Power Institute (EPRI). Advanced Light Water Reactor Requirements, Volume 3,
Revision 8, ALWR Passive Plant, March 1999.
ıı
GAD-19 D.W. Gandy. Factory Fabrication of Small Modular Reactor Vessel Assemblies, NUC RIC:
Use of Advanced Manufacturing Technology for Power Reactors, Electrical Power Institute (EPRI),
March 2019.
ıı
GRS-15 Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH. Studie zur Sicherheit und zu
internationalen Entwicklungen von Small Modular Reactors, Bericht GRS-376, Mai 2015.
ıı
GRS-16 Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH. Fukushima Daiichi 11. März
2011 – Unfallablauf, Radiologische Folgen, Technischer Bericht GRS-S-56, 5. Auflage, März 2016.
ıı
GRS-19 Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) gGmbH. Unternehmen, Arbeitsfelder,
Forschung und Entwicklung, etc., 2019. https://www.grs.de/, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
HUK-13 K.-D. Humpich. SMR Teil 1 – nur eine Mode. 11.12.2013. http://www.nukeklaus.net/
2013/12/11/smr-teil-1-nur-eine-neue-mode/ad-minklaus/, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
IAEA-91 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safety related Terms for Advanced Nuclear
Plants, IAEA-TECDOC-626, September 1991.
ıı
IAEA-00 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Advisory group meeting on small power and
heat generation systems on the basis of propulsion and innovative reactor technologies, Obninsk ( Russian
Federation), July 20-24, 1998, published in IAEA-TECDOC-1172, September 2000, Vienna (Austria).
contribution: V. Beliaev, V. Polinichev. Basic Safety Principles of KLT-40C Reactor Plants, OKB Mechanical
Engineering, pp. 29 – 39.
ıı
IAEA-12 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Status of Small and Medium sized Reactor
design, Report, September 2012.
ıı
IND-14 D. T. Ingersoll, Z.J. Houghton, R. Bromm, C. Desportes. NuScale Small Modular Reactor for
Co-Generation of Electricity and Water, Desalination, Vol. 340 (2014), pp. 84 – 93.
ıı
INSP-99 International Nuclear Security. Bilibino Nuclear Power Plant, 22.02.1999.
https://insp.pnnl.gov/-profiles-bilibino-bi.htm
ıı
LOG-14 G. Locatelli, C. Bingham, N. Mancini. Small Modular reactors: A Comprehensive Overview of
their Economics and Strategic Aspects, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 73 (2014), pp. 75 – 85.
ıı
MAC-14 C. Marcel, D. Delmastro, M. Celeste Magni, O. Calzetta. CAREM: Argentina’s innovative
SMR, Nuclear Engineering International, May 14, 2014. https://www.neimagazine.com/features/
featurecarem-argentinas-innova-tive-smr-4266787/, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
MPS-14 Modern Power Systems. Design Evolution: Chinese Reactors, 20.08.2014.
http://www.growthmarkets-power.com/features/featuredesign-evolution-chinese-reactors-
4348218/, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
NFS-161 Nuklearforum Schweiz. CGN arbeitet mit Schiffbauer zusammen, 01.02.2016.
https://www.nuklearforum.ch/de/aktuell/e-bulletin/cgn-arbeitet-mit-schiffbauer-zusammen,
last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
NFS-162 Nuklearforum Schweiz. China: Baubeginn für schwimmendes Kernkraftwerk, 10.11.2016.
https://www.nuklearforum.ch/de/aktuell/e-bulletin/china-baubeginn-fuer-schwimmendeskernkraftwerk,
last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
NGR-11 C. Barton. Transporting Small Factory Built Reactors and Modular Components, 29.09.2011.
https://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011/09/transporting-small-factory-built.html,
last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
NNL-14 National Nuclear Laboratory. Small Modular Reactors (SMR) Feasibility Study, December 2014.
http://www.nnl.co.uk/media/1627/smr-feasibility-study-december-2014.pdf, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
NS-19 Nuclear Street. Kaiga Unit 1 Sets NPP Continuous Run Record, 04.01.2019.
https://nuclearstreet.com/nuclear_power_industry_news/b/nuclear_power_news/archive/2019/
01/04/kaiga-unit-1-sets-npp-continuous-run-record-010401#.XOGYdOSP4kc, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
OKB-13 OKBM Afrikantov. RITM-200 Reactor Plant for the new Generation Universal Icebreakers,
Brochure, 2013.
ıı
OZA-19 A. Ozeretzko. Current SMR Developments and Key Enablers for Deployment, Focus Session
International Innovation: Small Modular Reactors: a major Element of the Future of Nuclear?, Annual
Meeting on Nuclear Technology, May 07-08, 2019, Berlin (Germany).
ıı
PEJ-18 J. Perera. Russia: Keeping the SMR Dream Afloat, Nuclear Enginering International,
03.10.2018. https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurerussia-keeping-the-smr-dreamafloat-
6782084/, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
POW-11 Power. China begins Operation of Experimental Fast Reactor, 09.01.2011. https://www.
powermag.com/china-begins-operation-of-experimental-fast-reactor/, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
POW-17 Power-Technology. Small Modular Reactors: a Nu Design, 01.05.2017. https://www.
power-technology.com/features/featuresmall-modular-reactors-a-nu-design-5809591/
ıı
POW-18 Power. Rosatom’s Floating NPP: On a Wave for future Energy, 21.11.2018.
https://www.utilities-me.com/power/12137-knowledge-partner-rosatoms-floating-nppon-a-wave-for-future-energy,
last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
SCA-15 A. Schaffrath, A. The Nuclear Simulation of GRS, 1 st Chinese/German Symposium on
Fundamentals of Advanced Nuclear Safety Technology, Shanghai, March 2015
ıı
SCA-17 A. Schaffrath, M. Sonnenkalb, W. Luther, K. Velkov. The Nuclear Simulation Chain of GRS,
Independent Journal for Nuclear Engineering Kerntechnik Vol. 81 (2016), Issue 2, pp. 105 – 116.
ıı
SCA-18 A. Schaffrath, A.-K. Krüssenberg, S. Buchholz, A. Wielenberg. Necessary improvements of
the GRS simulation chain for the simulation of light-water-cooled SMRs, Independent Journal for
Nuclear Engineering Kerntechnik Vol. 83 (2018), Issue 3, pp. 169 – 176.
ıı
SCA-19 A. Schaffrath. SMRs – Overview on international Developments and Safety Features, Focus
Session International Innovation: Small Modular Reactors: a major Element of the Future of Nuclear?,
Annual Meeting on Nuclear Technology, May 07-08, 2019, Berlin (Germany).
ıı
SUH-16 H. Subki. Advances in Development and Deployment of Small Modular Reactor Design and
Technology, ANNuR – IAEA – U.S. NRC Workshop on Small Modular Reactor Safety and Licensing,
January 12-15, 2016, Vienna (Austria).
ıı
SUL-90 L.H. Suid. The Army’s Nuclear Power Program: The Evolution of a Support Agency,
Greenwood Press 1990.
ıı
THC-15 C. Thevenot, G.-M. Gautier, P. Marsault, J.-F. Pignatel. Workshop on Innovations in Water-
Cooled Reactor Technologies, OECD/NEA, Session II-2, February 11-12, 2015, Issy-les-Moulineaux
(France).
ıı
VTT-19 VTT Technical research Centre of Finland Ldt. VTT coordinates an EU project that paves the
way for small modular reactors in Europe, 28.03.2019. https://www.vttresearch.com/media/news/
the-small-modular-reactors-in-europe, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
WNA-19 World Nuclear Association. Small Modular Power Reactors, 19.05.2019.
http://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-power-reactors/
small-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx2, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
WNN-141 World Nuclear News. Construction of CAREM underway, 18.03.2014. http://www.worldnuclear-news.org/NN-Construction-of-CAREM-underway-1002144.html,
last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
WNN-142 World Nuclear News. Helical steam generator passes test, 25.06.2014. http://www.worldnuclear-news.org/NN-Helical-steam-generator-passes-test-2702147.html,
last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
WNN-16 World Nuclear News. First vessel installed in China’s HTR-PM Unit, 21.02.2016.
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-First-vessel-installed-in-Chinas-HTR-PM-unit-
2103164.html, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
WNN-18 World Nuclear News. Viewpoint: The advantages of Small Modular Reactors, 29.10.2018.
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Viewpoint-The-advantages-of-Small-Modular-
Reactors, last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
WNN-19 World Nuclear News. Indian Government takes steps to get back on track, 11.02.2019.
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Indian-government-takes-steps-to-get-nuclear-back,
last visit: 23.05.2019
ıı
ZUZ-16 Z. Zhang, Y. Dong, et al. The Shandong Shidao Bay 200 MWe High-Temperature Gas-Cooled
Reactor Pebble-Bed Module (HTR-PM) Demonstration Power Plant, An Engineering and Technological
Innovation, Engineering, Volume 2 (2016), pp. 112 – 118.
Authors
Andreas Schaffrath
Sebastian Buchholz
Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit
(GRS) gGmbH
Boltzmannstrasse 14
85748 Garching bei München, Germany
E-mail: Andreas.Schaffrath@grs.de
SERIAL | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 347
Serial | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
SMRs – Overview on International Developments and Safety Features ı Andreas Schaffrath and Sebastian Buchholz

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
SERIAL | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 348
Targeting Innovation at Cost Drivers –
How the UK Can Deliver Low Cost, Low
Carbon, Commercially Investable Power
Benjamin Todd
When it comes to creating affordable, reliable, low carbon energy, the UK consortium led by Rolls-Royce, is bringing
a modern, holistic approach to small nuclear power station design.
The design concept is driven by
improving the economics and market
requirements of nuclear power; targeting
cost drivers such as schedule
uncertainty; and focusing innovation
efforts to reduce or remove those cost
drivers entirely.
The result is a compelling, commercially
investible design for a
whole power station, not just a small
modular reactor, that can help the
world meet its low carbon energy
challenges.
Why now?
Satisfying the growing global demand
for electricity generation is about
achieving more with less. With more
people leading more electricitydependent
lives, the global energy
sector is under pressure to produce
more power in more places with more
certainty over availability, cost,
­capacity and flexibility.
At the same time, there also has
to be less – less capital investment,
less environmental impact, less time
spent in build, less pressure on
infrastructure and less challenging
delivery and commissioning phases.
The solution to bridging that
­energy gap lies in a ­re-examination
of existing means of generation; innovative
thinking with the power to
repackage the best of what is already
proven in a new innovative way, so
that more really can be delivered with
less.
The UK consortium’s powers
station offers a convincing alternative
to reduce the complexity of financing
and constructing large scale reactors
around the world.
How is cost measured?
The metric of levelised cost of electricity
(LCoE) in £/MWehr is a key
driver for the power station design
( Figure 1). It’s also the metric by
which all current electricity costs are
measured and offers a single point
of competitiveness for new concepts,
such as the small modular reactor
power station design.
In the case of this power station
design, the consortium has assessed
Regulatory/Safety Proliferation Resistant Market Timing Code Compliance
Reduce capital: Manage Investment: Reduce O&M:
• commoditised • reduce overnight financing • minimise maintenance / outages
• standardised • maximise return on investment • standardised parts
• factory built
• transportable
• ease of assembly / reassembly
• minimise manning
each factor driving the cost of LCoE
and targeted its innovation at those
areas, avoiding innovation for innovation’s
sake.
Creating certainty
to reduce cost
Creating certainty in order to encourage
cheaper financing is the
dominant consideration of the case
for this power station design, looking
across the entire nuclear and nonnuclear
elements of the power station
(Figure 2).
Financing cost comprises capital
cost, perceived risk profile and construction
time, so the design targets its
innovation at each of those areas.
The factors considered in the
economics of the utility case are
dominated by the degree of certainty
that can be achieved, because that can
bring cheaper financing. Each of these
costs drivers has a different level
of sensitivity to overall LCoE. For
­example, the highest impact on LCoE
on nuclear power station projects is
the weighted average cost of capital
Capital
Cost
*
Cost of Electricity
(£/MWhr)
(capital + total O&M + decom + fuel costs + financing cost)
Power generating potential x Capacity factor
Cost of
Borrowing
Perceived
Risk Profile
Construcon
Time
Maximise power: Maximise power/ Reduce Fuel cost:
• max power density reliability: • maximise fuel life
• max output • high reliability • minimise refuel time
• maximise generating life
• enable rapid • simplify fuel/waste handling,
maintenance / refuel.
• use existing infrastructure
and capability
-20 % -10 % 0 % +10 % +20 %
WACC (+/-2%) -18 % 20 %
Construcon delay (+ 2 years)
10 %
Compatibility with
Support Infrastructure
and Sites
Public
Perception
Utility Familiarisation
/ Selection of
Technology
Global
Market
Delivery
Partnership
Potential
Capital (+/- 10%)
-7 % 6 %
Impact on LCOE
| | Fig. 1.
Factors driving levelised cost of electricity (LCoE).
| | Fig. 2.
reating certainty to reduce cost.
Serial | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
Targeting Innovation at Cost Drivers – How the UK Can Deliver Low Cost, Low Carbon, Commercially Investable Power ı Benjamin Todd

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
LCOE sensivity assessment
WACC (+/-2 %)
Construcon
delay (+ 2
years)
Capital (+/-
10 %)
Power Output
(+10 %)
Ulisaon (+/-
5 %)
Op cost (+/-
10 %)
Development
Budget (-20 % /
+20 %)
-20% 0% 20% 40%
-18 % 20 %
-7 % 6 %
-9 %
-5 % 5 %
-4 % 3 %
-2 % 2 %
| | Fig. 3.
LCoE sensitivity assessment.
10 %
(WACC), so something that has
nothing to do with physical elements
of building a nuclear power station
(Figure 3).
Capital costs for the power station
elements are ­approximately 20 % on
the nuclear elements, referred to as
the nuclear island; 40 % on civil
structures such as foundations, piling
and building fabric; and 40 % on
the non-nuclear systems and turbine
island.
While the physical size and power
output of this small modular reactorbased
power station is much smaller
than a large-scale plant (440 MWe v
1200 to 1600 MWe), there are opportunities
for economies of volume, as
opposed to scale. When considered
as a fleet of power stations, with the
application of advanced manufacturing
technologies, factory modular
construction of the whole power plant
reduces construction costs, risk and
schedule overruns.
For example, optimising, simplifying
and standardising production
­processes and logistics; maximising
off-site build and assembly, the use of
digital design processes and the
optimisation of logistics through the
supply chain all the way to site.
The use of digital technologies
in manufacturing, construction and
operation are also an important part
of the power station concept, such
as creating a digital twin at the
design stage to support prototyping,
to reducing manufacturing time,
improving construction sequencing,
all the way through to digitally
connected facilities so operations are
optimised and maintenance periods
reduced. The application of digital
technologies touch every part of the
concept and operation and each can
contribute to greater certainty.
Other forms of uncertainty could
include regulatory approvals, which
could have an impact on investor
­confidence, schedule certainty and
development costs, so from the outset
this has been built into the design,
with an expectation that it matures in
line with the regulatory process
initially in the UK, but also to international
standards also.
Modularisation’s impact
on certainty
The term modularisation is often used
as a solution but the view of the
consortium is that it’s a solution to a
specific set of cost driver challenges,
not a design in itself. (Figure 4)
Just like digital technologies,
­modularisation as a ­principle flows
through the whole concept of
this power station design including
factory manufactured road-transportable
modules ready for assembly
on site. It ­then extends to site construction
elements from the
installation of steel structures, concrete
components and the use of
standardised interfaces, advanced
joining techniques and overall a
reduction in the level of activity
required on site.
In addition, the overall footprint of
the plant is small, with a reduced
weight and shallower ground preparation
required. And the use of
| | Fig. 4.
Some artist´s views of the power station
design.
Fact box – the UK SMR in a nutshell
pp
400 to 450 MWe three-loop pressurised water
reactor
pp
Standard uranium fuel
pp
Modular settle containment
pp
Prefabricated structures
pp
Compatible with existing infrastructure
pp
Designed for road transport
pp
Passive safety systems
pp
Simplified maintenance and operations access
­excavated material on site is planned
into the design of the power station.
Even controlling the weather
Another cornerstone of creating certainty
and reducing cost is controlling
the conditions in which those civil and
assembly activities take place, which
is where the site assembly facility
helps greatly. Analysis of previous
nuclear projects puts construction
delays, often due to inclement
weather, as the second largest contributor
to cost overruns.
So, the site assembly facility, a
large covered arena over the entire
site, creates perfect weather 24 hours
a day in which to perform all assembly
activity. This gives certainty on a
baseline plan that feeds in to lower
premiums on the cost of borrowing
and ultimately lower LCoE. It also
creates a far safer and more productive
working environment for
workers.
The reduction in capital and risk
resulting in substantially reduced
­financing costs, opens up a broader
customer base including potentially
non-state backed utility companies
and beyond, for example companies
operating large-scale industrial sites.
A fleet approach
SMRs should not be considered as
single power plants, rather they are
designed and intended to operate as
part of a broader fleet. This fleet
deployment order book provides confidence
to the supply chain, allowing
companies in the sector to make
longer term strategic investment in
capability and capacity. A key role for
Government is to ­enable this fleet
approach through enhanced energy
policy.
Fleet deployment enables the level
of investment required in the civil
engineering and construction sectors
to affordably realise modular design
benefits (Figure 5). Further, the infrastructure
required by SMRs in the civil
and construction industry are likely
to have significant ­additional benefits
SERIAL | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 349
Serial | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
Targeting Innovation at Cost Drivers – How the UK Can Deliver Low Cost, Low Carbon, Commercially Investable Power ı Benjamin Todd

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
SERIAL | MAJOR TRENDS IN ENERGY POLICY AND NUCLEAR POWER 350
| | Fig. 5.
Artist´s view of civil engineering and construction sectors to affordably
realise modular design benefits.
to other major infrastructure programmes
in the UK over the coming
years.
Companies in these sectors will be
able to amortise infrastructure and
capability investment over multiple
­projects. The result will be significant
cost and delivery improvements to a
raft of broader UK infrastructure
programmes such as High-Speed Rail,
increased airport capacity, house
building and urban regeneration.
Nuclear plants contain many high
value components that are fabricated
using a range of complex technical
processes. According to research
carried out by the Nuclear Industry
Association (NIA), in theory the UK
supply chain has the capability to
manufacture nearly all of the components
for the large new build
nuclear programme, with the main
constraint being the capability to
manufacture the largest components
(NIA, 2012)15.
In practice however, capacity is a
pressing issue given that the 30-year
hiatus between the construction of
Sizewell B in the late 1980s and the
present day new build programme has
eroded much of the UK’s nuclear
­industry experience.
Fleet deployment of a UK SMR
­design would provide significant
­confidence to the UK nuclear supply
chain, allowing for the rapid development
of capacity to meet the needs of
an SMR programme. In turn, this new
manu facturing capacity could be
enhanced by the latest in manufacturing
technology already being
developed by world-leading researchers
in the UK – notable examples being
the High-Value Manufacturing (HVM)
Catapult centres like the Nuclear
Advanced Manufacturing Research
Centre (Nuclear AMRC) and the
Advanced Forming Research Centre
(AFRC) and the Manufacturing Technology
Centre (MTC).
Possible timings
For a first power station the consortium
envisages a seven-year period
for proving the manufacturing and
construction sequence of civil works
and then assembly. Lessons learned
would then be applied to standardised
processes from then on with vision
of reducing time and costs overall,
following a lean manufacturing
approach.
The UK designed an SMR during
the late 1980s and early 1990s so
the concept for a small output
reactor is not new. However,
large reactors have remained
central to baseload in many
markets, including the UK.
Climate change imperatives have
come into play since then too,
particularly driving wind and
solar, while reducing fossil fuels.
Fact: Who is in the consortium
led by Rolls-Royce
The consortium brings together the
most respected and innovative
engineering organisations in the
world and blend them with Rolls-
Royce nuclear knowledge.
Rolls-Royce has a global pedigree
of more than 50 years in the nuclear
industry as technical authority and
nuclear reactor plant designer. It’s
also the supplier of safety-critical
nuclear products, systems and
through-life services to almost half
the world’s nuclear reactors.
Rolls-Royce, ARUP, Laing O’Rourke,
Nuvia Wood, SNC Lavalin; BAM;
Assystem; Na tional Nuclear Laboratory,
Nuclear Advanced Manufacturing
Research Centre, Siemens;
all have a successful track record of
­delivering large-scale, complex
engineering and infrastructure programmes.
Rolls-Royce already has 32 patents
and patent applications on SMR
technology, and has decades of
design, manufacture, delivery and
­operations ­experience. Using this
already-proven technology and
nuclear capability, we are developing
a modular concept for nuclear technology
that can be installed and
commissioned quickly on site because
it will be factory built and tested.
Adoption of our modular approach
will reduce cost and project risk by
being faster to build. It will be a new
way to generate electricity that will be
available to the world.
A design for life
Overall the power station design
­offers a series of cost ­benefits in terms
of the achievable LCoE: reduced
­financing, off-site modular construction
using standard components
and advanced manufacturing and
imple mentation of digital through-life
management.
It is not just a reactor technology
programme, the consortium has
applied its broad nuclear and nonnuclear
skills to drive modularisation
and standardisation across the whole
power plant.
The entire design philosophy for
this power station is driven to deliver
electricity at the lowest cost, with
modularisation and standardisation
being applied to every aspect of the
design, from how it can be licensed,
manu factured, constructed, operated,
maintained and decommissioned. It’s
a design for life.
Author
Benjamin Todd
Rolls-Royce Civil Nuclear
Jubilee House,
4 St Christopher´s Way,
Derby, DE24 8JY
United Kingdom
Serial | Major Trends in Energy Policy and Nuclear Power
Targeting Innovation at Cost Drivers – How the UK Can Deliver Low Cost, Low Carbon, Commercially Investable Power ı Benjamin Todd

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
Akademik Lomonosov:
Pending Countdown
Roman Martinek
The world’s only floating nuclear power plant (FNPP) is ready for operation. In April, this information was confirmed
by Rosatom, which is responsible for the Akademik Lomonosov project. Thus, the final stage of preparations is ­underway
now – which means that very soon the world will witness operating nuclear reactors on a floating platform – something
not seen for over 40 years that followed the shutdown of the US FNPP Sturgis.
| | The “Akademik Lomonosov” leaves St. Petersburg under tow.
Just over a year ago, the Russian Arctic
port of Murmansk welcomed the
Akademik Lomonosov, the floating
nuclear power unit (FPU). The ship
that has no propulsion system of its
own was towed from the Baltic Shipyard
in St. Petersburg, where it had
been built, over 4,000 km through the
waters of four seas – the Baltic Sea,
the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea
and the Barents Sea. Since then, the
project has passed a number of key
milestones, now inching the commercial
start-up.
In late April, Rosenergoatom (Electric
Power Division of Rosatom State
Corporation) announced the successful
completion of integrated tests of
the nuclear power facility. The tests’
main goal was to verify that the facility
achieved the technological parameters
stipulated in the floating power
unit’s design and make sure that it is
fully ready for operation.
Shortly before, on March 31, both
FPU’s reactors were brought up to
100 % capacity confirming the
operational stability of the main and
auxiliary equipment of the FPU, as
well as the automatic process control
systems.
“Completing the trials successfully
is a huge accomplishment for the big
team of specialists at Rosatom”, commented
on the occasion Rosenergoatom’s
CEO Andrey Petrov. He also
explained that the results of all trials
will be reported in the floating power
unit acceptance certificate of the
governmental commission stating
that the unit is ready for operation, a
license is scheduled for July.
The FPU is planned to be towed to
the port of Pevek in North-East Russia
(on the Chukchi Peninsula) during
the 2019 summer shipping, where it
will operate as part of a floating
nuclear power plant, replacing the
outgoing capacities of the Bilibino
NPP and the Chaunskaya CHPP. It is
expected to be connected to the power
grid in December 2019.
By that time, onshore and hydraulic
structures for the FNPP, as well as
infrastructure ensuring the transmission
of electricity to the local grid
and heating for the city’s network, are
scheduled to be completed in Pevek.
Current engineering works are running
to plan, according to Rosatom.
The Akademik Lomonosov is the
pioneer project in the series of mobile
transportable small-capacity power
units (20870). This floating unit
represents the new class of power
sources based on Russian nuclear
shipbuilding technology. It is designed
for operation in the areas of the
­Extreme North and the Russian Far
East, its main task being to provide
remote industrial plants, port cities, as
well as offshore gas and oil platforms
with electric energy.
Rosatom actively supports the idea
of deploying floating power units in
other Arctic subregions as well to
replace diesel generation and facilitate
resources development on the
shelf. The Akademik Lomonosov is
one of the key projects on this track –
the company is also developing the
second generation of FNPPs – an optimized
floating power unit (OFPU)
that will be smaller in size and at
the same time more powerful than its
predecessor – it is supposed to have
two RITM-200M reactors with a
capacity of 50 MW each. At present,
Rosatom is negotiating with polar
regions to probe local demand.
In its turn, the Akademik Lomonosov
is equipped with two KLT-40S
reactor units that are capable of
generating up to 70 MW of electric
energy and 50 Gcal/h of heat energy in
the normal operation mode – which is
enough to maintain the activity of a
town with a population of 100,000
people. Furthermore, the unit can also
be converted into a desalination plant.
The innovative Russian concept has
already aroused interest among quite a
number of foreign partners including,
for instance, island states in South-
East Asia and in the Middle East.
| | Docking of the Floating Power Unit Akademik Lomonosov in Murmansk.
Prof. Thomas Walter Tromm, who
heads the Nuclear Waste Management,
Safety and Radiation Research
Program (NUSAFE) at the Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology (KIT) Energy
Centre, notes the high export potential
of small modular reactors. While
the prospects for the emergence of a
global market for such power plants
are uncertain as yet, a growing
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| | View of the upper reactor pressure vessel head.
| | Starting to the final place of operation.
demand for floating NPPs may be conceivable
in the foreseeable future,
with the market responding to the pinpoint
demand of isolated regions.
This is particularly the case with
developing countries that have yet
no nuclear infrastructure, the expert
thinks. “The most convincing argument
in favor of SMR technologies is
the lack of centralized energy distribution
system in most developing states,
which virtually excludes the possibility
of building large-sized multi-gigawatt
power plants”, believes Prof. Tromm.
Meanwhile, just as in the case with
typical large NPPs, safety infrastructure
is of primary importance here,
too. “Of course, you can manufacture
SMRs on a much larger scale at the
factory, thus reducing the amount of
construction works immediately on
the ground, but there still has to be an
adequate structure of competent control
bodies and technical supervision
authorities”, the expert argues.
As regards such plants’ own safety,
Prof. Tromm assumes that passive
safety systems are easier to implement
than in large reactor plants thanks to
smaller reactor capacity and better
­external cooling: “Provided this safety
barrier remains intact, the probability
of a major radioactivity leak into the
environment is practically excluded.
In parallel, this ensures a higher safety
margin”.
After being moored, a floating NPP
is connected to the onshore energy
infrastructure, making it possible to
provide small regions with power in
the long term. Fuel elements can be
replaced immediately at the operating
site or reactors can be transported
to a special facility to be loaded with
fresh fuel there. After fuel reloading,
the facility can be returned to its
destination point and continue to
generate electricity and heat for many
years.
Rosatom assures that the Akademik
Lomonosov is designed with a great
safety margin that exceeds all possible
threats and makes nuclear reactors
invincible for tsunamis and other
natural disasters. For instance, the
FPU vessel should be able to withstand
a collision with an iceberg, a 7-meter
tsunami wave and hurricane wind up
to 200 km/h.
The FPU rooms are isolated from
the external environment with a
double vessel hull, while reactor
facilities are equipped with special
biological barriers that do not let
radioactivity spread beyond the compartments
where the reactors are
installed – even in case of a hypothetical
accident.
The FPU design also takes into
account the climatic conditions where
it is to be operated. The main vessel
and load-carrying structures are made
of steel resistant to brittle fracture
under low temperatures. Further, the
FPU is provided with ice strengthening
– additional constructive elements
that ensure the vessel’s strength when
moving through ice – as well as with
all means necessary for towing by a
nuclear icebreaker. In addition, Rosatom
emphasizes that all nuclear processes
on board the FPU comply with
all the highest requirements of the
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), posing no threat to the environment.
It is of interest to note that despite
the guarantees expressed by the
Russian side, the project has been a
regular subject of concern for international
environment NGOs. One of
such organizations, the Oslo-based
Bellona Foundation, was invited
by Rosatom to visit the Akademik
Lomonosov in late September 2018.
The special technical tour took place
within the XI Regional Public Dialogue
Forum “Cooperation for Sustainable
Development of the Arctic”.
The outcomes were hailed by Bellona:
according to its CEO Nils Bøhmer,
Rosatom demonstrates transparency
in implementing the FNPP project.
At the same time, he stressed that
Bellona would closely follow further
implementation of the project: “This is
our first visit on board the floating
power unit. We are still concerned
over all issues relative to the operation
of this floating nuclear power plant. In
the first place, we are currently concerned
about the fueling process and
subsequent tests after the reactors are
started”.
The first reactor unit was launched
on October 31, around a month
after the environmentalists’ visit.
­Specialists of Atomflot, subsidiary of
Rosatom, conducted all necessary
preparatory operations, and the starboard
reactor was brought to a
minimum controlled power level with
taking all measurements needed. In a
short time, it was followed by the
second reactor unit.
Back then, the physical launch
marked the start of a new extensive
stage of works involving comprehensive
tests of the floating power unit
(which, as mentioned above, were
concluded this fall). Commenting on
this significant event, Vitaly Trutnev,
Head of Directorate for the Construction
and Operation of Floating
Nuclear Thermal Power Plants, put
it figuratively: “Physical start-up is
an essential stage for any reactor.
With the launch of the first nuclear
chain reaction, it transforms from a
piece of metal into a full-fledged
nuclear facility”.
Now it only remains to wait until
the Akademik Lomonosov arrives at
its destination point where it will then
significantly contribute to the energy
supply and industrial development of
the strategically important Russian
Arctic. It might well be expected that
in a few years, when a number of new
concepts of floating reactors have
been presented, the reactors in Pevek
have proved reliable suppliers of
electricity and heat, and, possibly, the
first international supply contracts for
such facilities have been concluded –
it will be possible to draw a clearer
­picture of what place floating reactors
will occupy in the global nuclear
power industry and in the energy
balance of the future.
Authors
Roman Martinek
Expert for Communication
Czech Republic
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iMAGINE – A Disruptive Change to Nuclear
or How Can We Make More Out of the
Existing Spent Nuclear Fuel and What Has
to be Done to Make it Possible in the UK?
Bruno Merk, Dzianis Litskevich, Aiden Peakman and Mark Bankhead
Background The energy trilemma (e. g. by the world energy council [1], an UN-accredited global energy body or
the scientific community [2]) and the United Nations sustainable development goals (UN Sustainable Development
Goal 7: “Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all as one piece of sustainable
development of the future world”[3]) form the key drivers for the future of all kinds of energy research. These goals
lead to a strong, urgent demand for reliable as well as controllable low carbon electricity production technologies to
address the low carbon strategies following the commitments of the COP 21 agreement in Paris [4]. For the United
Kingdom, Nuclear technologies are recognized to have the potential to become the key technology to meet the CO 2
reduction targets, but only if the development targets for nuclear will be met. However, the Emissions Gap Report 2017
of United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) [5] identified that the Contributions set in Paris 2015 will even not
be sufficient to hold global warming to well below 2 °C. In 2007, the UK formally re-introduced nuclear power into its
overall energy policy followed by a long-term Nuclear Energy Strategy in 2013 [6], leading to subsequent plans to build
new reactors. These plans are now starting to materialize at the Hinckley Point C site [7] with the construction of two
pressurized water reactors and the Wylfa project [8], which is foreseen to lead to two advanced boiling water reactors,
even if ­currently on indefinite hold. However, these projects rely on commercially existing technologies, delivered by
worldwide acting companies, and are essentially based on technology developments of the 50ies and 60ies. In addition,
the decision for the new build programme, along with the closing down of reprocessing in 2018 [11], creates a demand
for developing novel, innovative technologies to deal with spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of existing and upcoming reactors.
The case for recycling (reprocessing) is driven by factors such as closing the fuel cycle and the costs of disposal/burning
of transuranic, with various scenarios proposed [16, 17].
353
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION
In general, two different approaches
for research and development (R&D)
of new technologies can be distinguished:
the demand or user driven
innovation vs the technology driven.
Historically, nuclear industry has been
mostly applying the technology driven
approach to create novel solutions
and technologies in an evolutionary
manner. A typical example is the
development of the closed nuclear
fuel cycle based on applying reprocessing
technologies (PUREX process)
which have been developed to
separate Plutonium from irradiated
fuel. The cycle can be closed using
fast reactor technology which has
­existed since 1951, when the first
power-generating nuclear reactor,
the liquid metal-cooled fast reactor
EBR1, was put into operation [9].
­Another example is the nuclear
waste management using the technology
of partitioning and transmutation
(P&T), separating longlived
TRUs and burning them in reactors
[10]. The partitioning is based
on the existing PUREX process with
additional downstream processes for
minor actinide separation and the
transmutation uses liquid metal
cooled fast reactors.
We propose a much more strategic
approach applying demand driven
innovation and strategic development
procedures to direct nuclear technologies
into a brighter future [18,
19]. In our view, the technology
driven approach has not been successful
in re- creating the strongly required
belief in nuclear technologies, which
has been lost in the 1980ies. However,
belief in a technology is the key
to get the urgently needed public,
private and political support. The key
points for the strategic development
process are combined in the questions:
pp
What technologies are currently
existing and where does these
come from?
pp
What is the demand we are
currently facing and what is
­expected for the future?
This information will be used to
develop a vision for the future to
provide a direction for the researchers
and a mission to come as close as
possible to this vision or dream.
Demand Driven Strategic
Development
Based on the demand of sustainable
power production, see “energy trilemma”
and UN SDG7, the next,
disruptive development step should
be driven by an ultimate, holistic
vision for any kind of energy production.
This vision needs to be by
definition much more advanced than
the development goals of the first
nuclear reactors, and broader than the
goals of the Generation IV international
Forum – a co-operative international
endeavour, set up to carry out
the R&D ­needed to establish the next
generation nuclear energy systems
[12]. This vision (call it a dream or the
end of the rainbow) can be given with
one simple, old phrase – “perpetuum
mobile” or by the old promise of
nuclear, “too cheap to meter” (nowadays
economically as well as environmentally),
whilst recognising that
this represents as a conclusion an
unattainable goal. Fredmund Malik
characterizes the function of vision
and mission as follows: “A mission is
definitely necessary… It often follows
from a very broad and far-reaching
idea which could be called a vision or
a dream. That dream, however, has to
be transformed into a viable mission:
this is the only way to distinguish
useful from useless visions” [13], see
Figure 1.
When translating the vision into
the mission some realistic limitations
have to come into play to create a
solvable challenge. It is fairly obvious
why the vision is unattainable, the
first and second laws of thermodynamics
prevent the “perpetuum
mobile” from operation outside of the
hypothetical. Harsh economic lessons
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 354
we have learned over the last four
decades have shown that “too cheap
to meter” is equally unobtainable in a
modern world. Thus we should call
both a dream or “the end of the
rainbow”. However, this dream
provides a far-reaching development
goal which should give R&D the right
direction. The key words for our vision
and the goals of our mission are given
below:
| | Fig. 2.
Expected improvements by the proposed disruptive demand driven, innovative development.
| | Fig. 1.
The steps of the strategic development process
for future nuclear reactor systems.
The very general vision has to be
developed into a mission, which is
­demand specific. It reflects a weighting
of the different attributes forming
the vision. Our mission could be, to
develop a reactor that can breed and
burn its own fuel using existing SNF
stockpiles. This mission for a disruptive
nuclear energy system forms the
basis for creating an economically as
well as environmentally sustainable
approach to deliver a solution for the
future massive demand on low carbon
energy production. Besides the discussed
sustainability, the ideal disruptive
nuclear system has to deliver a
solution for historically created problems
of nuclear reactor operation,
the nuclear waste accumulation while
avoiding the creation of additional
proliferation issues. “Nuclear proliferation,
[is] the spread of nuclear
weapons, nuclear weapons technology,
or fissile material to countries
that do not already possess them”
[24]. Our mission leads to a fast
molten salt reactor and the related,
significantly reduced fuel cycle with
the potential for massively improved
sustainability indices, see Figure 2.
The approach is based on a system
­operating on existing SNF without
prior reprocessing.
Assembling all given arguments,
the aim is to harvest the fruits of the
closed fuel cycle, while avoiding the
massive upfront investment which has
always been associated with liquid
metal cooled fast reactors (like the
French PHENIX/SUPERPHENIX reactors)
and aqueous reprocessing
(like THORP in Sellafield/UK).
Today, almost all nuclear reactors
are operated in open fuel cycle mode,
see Figure 3. This terminus describes,
the process when fuel is produced,
only once inserted into a reactor and
then stored/disposed in the form of
fuel assemblies without further treatment
of the SNF. For a future nuclear
system with improved sustainability
indices, it has always been envisaged
to achieve closed fuel cycle operation
and the feasibility has been demonstrated,
applying fast reactor technology
[16]. The UK has followed this
approach too, which led to the industrial
reprocessing of SNF at Sellafield
and the demonstration of fast reactor
technology in the Dounreay fast
reactor (DFR) and the prototype fast
reactor (PFR). However, closure of the
fuel cycle has never been achieved on
an industrial scale leading to a stockpile
of separated Pu as leftover of
the successful reprocessing without
having the required fast reactor technology
established. The driver for
the closure of the fuel cycle had
dis appeared after the oil crisis had
been resolved, the uranium prices
decreased, and the growth rate of the
nuclear reactor programmes slowed
worldwide after the Three Mile Island
accident. Fast reactor technology as
well as the required fuel cycle technologies,
specifically the production
of the required Pu bearing mixed
­oxide fuel, has been shown, to be
much more complex to be operated
than expected.
With the view on long term
sustainability, the challenges of the
­final disposal, and the demand for a
massive growth of the nuclear power
as one of the most attractive low
carbon technologies, we propose to
revive closing the fuel cycle but in
contrast to the historic approaches
now by applying new, demand driven,
tailored technologies.
We will consider the idea of closing
the nuclear fuel cycle using a molten
salt fast reactor operating on SNF
which will neither require a supply
with new, fresh fuel nor create additional
waste to the already existing
SNF. In comparison to today’s strategy,
see Figure 3, there are significantly
fewer steps and fewer specific
­demands. The most significant of
which is that a fast reactor demands a
significantly higher amount of fissile
material in the core than in a thermal
reactor. This forms the need for
some additional fissile material
for the start-up, either by enriched
Uranium or by Plutonium originating
from historic reprocessing operation
like it is avail able in the UK. The
additional fissile material is only
required for the start-up phase,
during operation sufficient new fissile
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| | Fig. 3.
Todays fuel cycle and fuel cycle options for the future closing of the fuel cycle.
material will be bred from the fertile
U-238.
The feasibility of operating purely
on SNF has been demonstrated using
advanced modelling & simulation
(M&S) [18, 19]. The inserted SNF
(~95 % Uranium, ~1 % Plutonium
and ~4 % fission products) will be
transformed into vast amounts of
­energy and a clean stream of fission
products, partly out of the salt cleanup
system, partly appearing in the
off-gas scrubbing system. Both
streams have to be conditioned in an
appropriate way to limit the source
term under accidental conditions.
Compared to the existing process,
considering spent nuclear fuel as
waste, the mass of waste will remain
the same, while the short term activity
will clearly increase due to the proportionality
between the amount of
­fission products and the amount of
energy produced out of the fuel. The
energy ‘squeezed out’ from the SNF
will be increased by a factor of 20
which will lead to the increase of short
term activity (up to 500 years) while
the long term activity will be significantly
reduced due the burning of all
TRUs.
This proposed innovative nuclear
system will require a complete redesign
of the nuclear chemistry
applied in the salt clean-up based on
the principles described in [19] using
the inter- disciplinary optimization
potential described in “Demand
driven salt clean-up in a molten salt
fast reactor – Defining a priority list”
[20]. There are further challenges to
be con sidered on the development
path. Challenges on plant structural
inte grity will need to be addressed
either through clever design or operational
procedures. Control systems
will also need to be developed to
manage plant throughput against the
strong thermal feedback effects that
would occur in such a reactor system
which is an essential part of the
general safety approach which has to
be developed among the other challenges
[21]. We would be expect to be
able to exploit a range of technical
inno vations drawn from outside of the
nuclear sector. Digitalisation and
industry 4.0 are delivering digital
twin solutions that create a high
­degree of confidence in our ability to
effectively operate such a plant.
The consequences of the proposed
approach on the fuel cycle, see Figure
3, are massive since the whole concept
of the complex closed fuel cycle will
be replaced by a really slick process
with promised lower complexity, less
proliferation concern, and because of
this reason, cost reductions can be realised
across the industry.
Based on the calculations that have
been performed to date the overall
performance indicators of a closed
fuel cycle based on the molten salt fast
reactor are impressive. The neutronic
feasibility study indicated that a
­classical 3 GWth reactor (roughly
equivalent in scale to Sizewell B)
could be operated for 60 years on
130 tons of SNF and ~ 17 tons of
plutonium [18, 19] for the start-up.
Thus the UK Pu stockpile of 140 tons
in 2020 [22] would be sufficient to
start 8 reactors and the currently
stored 8000 tons of SNF (6000 t AGR
fuel, 2000 t LWR fuel [23]) would be
sufficient to operate these 8 reactors
for more than 930 years each.
Taking a view into the UK approach
to build several new light water
reactors and the opportunity of
increasing the number of reactors by
splitting the salt of operating reactors,
it gets clear that this reactor system
could be a long term available,
reliable, and sustainable low carbon
electricity source.
The process of developing
a new, innovative nuclear
energy system
This journey will be started with a
glance into the historic steps and time
scales of, at that time, new reactor
developments. It will be followed by a
short description of each process step
for a state of the art development plan
to get a deeper understanding what
would have to be done to make a new,
disruptive nuclear energy system real.
This will lead at the end to a short
closing remark on the role of the
government required for success.
A glance into history
The analysis of the historic development
of UKs MAGNOX technology
gives insight into the time scale as well
as the process of a new reactor development,
even when it has taken place
in the middle of the last century.
Figure 4 shows the timeline of the
development with several zero power
facilities GLEEP (Graphite Low Energy
Experimental Pile) in 1947 to Windscale-1
in 1952 [26], which have
been used to get first insight into the
considered technology and to create
the skilled workforce for the next
steps. This first phase was followed by
a small scale experimental reactor
Calder Hall (180 MWth), and after
several intermediate steps the full
scale demonstrator, with the Hinckley
Point power stations achieving
almost 1000 MWth. The application
of modern, digital M&S technologies
will not avoid all real world experiments,
but has definitively the
| | Fig. 4.
Magnox development timeline as described by the Electric Power Research
Institute [26].
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 355
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 356
potential to reduce the number of
steps as well as to improve the confidence
in choosing the right/ideal
settings for the still required experiments.
It seems essential to operate
at least in a three step approach producing
real life facilities as marked in
Figure 4 above by the red circles.
There is the argument that the
MAGONX development is from a time
that is too distant to be relevant today
(1947 to 1956). Instead, let’s compare
it with a more modern case, one of
the last developments of a really new
nuclear power technology in the west,
the pebble bed high temperature
reactor technology in Germany (see
Figure 5). Even then, this was over
3 decades ago (1966 to 1983). The
process still indicates the three major
steps, even if the order seems surprising
– the small scale technology
demonstrator AVR before the zero
power experiment. This approach was
the ­result of a very efficient planning
based on the experience with the
graphite moderated reactor technology
in the 60ies, specifically our
previous case the MAGNOX programme,
and the follow up AGR
programme which was an evolution of
the MAGNOX technology. Even with
this experience of graphite technology,
a skilled workforce, and
­experience with building reactors, the
developers came back to the zero
power experiment (the KAHTER
facility) to gain a deeper insight into
the mode of operation and the optimization
potential before taking the
step to the industrial demonstrator
THTR-300.
In the development of the indus trial
demonstrator, the major arguments for
the zero power experiment are the
comparably low cost and the opportunity
of rapid, flexible, very well
instrumented tests to demonstrate and
improve understanding of the system
behaviour as well as to support licensing
code validation, for example
forthe pebble flow [27]. The benefits of
the zero power experiment are an almost
immediate accessibility after shut
down, the significantly ­reduced shielding
requirements during operation
and the flexible ­operational envelop,
allow signifi­cantly faster take up of a
relevant set of experimental results.
Experiments of this kind are almost
impossible to implement in power producing
systems (in this case the AVR)
with high operational temperature,
high neutron flux, and a high radiation
level due to fission products and
material activation.
pp
How can we use this experience
for the planning of a new, disruptive
system? What are the arguments
for the initial step, an own
zero or low power experiment in
the UK for new developments?
pp
Many arguments have been given
in the last paragraph why a zero
­power experimental facility is of
high importance for the development
of a dis ruptive, new reactor
technology. However, there are
two questions remaining: Could
we make progress relying on M&S
without an experiment at this
stage? Can we just go and ‘order’
some experiments for validation in
another facility?
The massive use of M&S will help to
create a much better overview of
the opportunities and thus to optimize
the nuclear system but it cannot
­replace the experience in experiments
­completely. Experimental data is
at a minimum required to establish
model credibility through a process of
validation, especially since the performance
characteristics of any novel
system are to an extent unknown.
M&S will help to get the best possible
outcome and reduce the number of
costly experiments via a down selection
process.
There are clear reasons why the
start of a nuclear programme is often
associated for with the first significant
reactor experiment, see the GLEEP
­experiment in the MAGNOX process
given in Figure 4. The decision for a
low power experiment requires:
pp
a real commitment to kick off a
serious programme for building
and operating the facility and the
formation of a team of specialists
which is able to develop the project
pp
development and production of
the first key components, e. g. the
fuel with governmental agency
support needed to cover licensing
and proliferation of nuclear
materials
pp
the establishment of a supply
chain, bringing in Small and
Medium Sized enterprises and
cross organisation agile delivery
pp
the close interaction with the regulator
to get the experiment licensed
pp
strong links to nuclear innovation
programmes, which will supply the
innovative methods and partnerships
to undertake our mission
Thus, the zero power experiment will
help the UK to create/re-create the
essential skills basis in designing,
licensing, building, commissioning,
and operating an innovative reactor
of a completely new type. In addition,
an experiment will
pp
help creating international recognition
as basis for future collaboration
pp
give an opportunity for necessary
safety demonstrations in the regulatory
process of the next step
pp
leverage cost saving opportunities
by reducing the uncertainty margins
in the following design steps
pp
create a business opportunity by
providing financed reactor experiments
for other MSR developers
with their own designs who cannot
collaborate due to sensitivities over
sharing of IP.
pp
serve as a case study and collaborative
R&D platform for linking
with international partners who
want to access the UK market.
| | Fig. 5.
Timeline of the pebble bed reactor development in Germany.
| | Fig. 6.
Time and investment scales for the development
of a disruptive nuclear system
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The 4 steps in the process
Based on the already proposed reduction
of the number experimental facilities
a 4 step process will be developed
with a rough description what should
be achieved in each step. The 4 steps
will have different time requirements
and will be interlinked. The given
timescales are based on the future
plan of the BEIS (Department
for Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy) nuclear innovation programme
with the aim to have a
market ready, in industrial application
demonstrated product in 2050.
Figure 6 gives a qualitative overview
on the time scales (construction and
operation) and the required investment
for the different steps. From the
figure it already gets clear, that the
development of a new, disruptive
nuclear system does not require large
investments in the first years (step 1
and 2, see red mark), which opens
the opportunity to work on different
systems in the early stages to down
­select the options before the first large
investment for the small scale demonstrator
is to be made. Current UK
strategy for AMR’s could provide a
route to kick-start the necessary R&D.
Basic studies
The basic studies of a new nuclear
technology is the time to form a first
consortium with academic partners,
national laboratories, and industrial
players to exploit the proposed disruptive
approach and demonstrate its
feasibility. It will provide attraction to
the industry due to new long term IP
creation, and provide scientific underpinning
to their own proprietory
designs and ideally create public
belief and trust in the innovative
capacities of nuclear research, ‘we are
solving the problems of the future’.
The necessary modern digital M&S
tools will be created and a pool of
­experts will be formed. They will
­identify possible deficiencies on M&S
basis to work out the challenges and
shape the future requirements in more
detail. Basic studies will make use of
the traditional strength of the country
to leverage from recent governmental
investments. New capabilities will
be built up in subject areas where
currently strength is missing by
leveraging from international networking,
working with supra-national
institutions, and attracting specialists
from abroad.
Experiments can be used in order
to establish fact (validation) or to
understand the characteristics of
critical components/processes of the
system – proof of principle as well as
to validate models using basic
­experiments that examine separate
effects [25]. In general, large scale
modelling does not by definition mean
fewer experiments as the number of
experiments could increase. But these
will be smaller in scale – separate
effects – and more numerous, and
can be delivered at a lower cost per
­experiment.
The basic studies step will create
the first interaction with the regulator
to develop an understanding of a
reasonable safety approach and the
definition of supporting experiments
required for licensing. It will lead to
international recognition which can
be supported by establishing international
research collaborations. This
step will support the UK strategic
vision for the nuclear 2020 target to
establish the capabilities & collaborations
necessary for a collaborative
research programme across industry
and research organizations.
Advanced studies
In this stage new technology
approaches (e. g. salt clean-up) have
to be developed and demonstrated
­using existing infrastructure leveraging
past investments. For the scale
up a hot salt laboratory for thermalfluid
dynamics and material interaction
studies as well as a fuel lab for
salt clean-up studies and fuel production
(for the zero power experiment)
has to be established. Advanced
studies will leverage the traditional
strength to create innovative approaches
and can foster the development
of IP within the industry support
base. Within this step, the zero power
reactor will be a key stage to form a
consortium and develop the skilled
workers for the next step. Ideally, the
zero power reactor can be based on
refurbishment of a recently shutdown
facility like it has been shown in the
GUINEVERE experiments in Belgium.
This approach has shown to create
­significant cost and time savings. As
already mentioned a zero power
reactor will create the international
collaboration opportunities and can
serve with experiments for money for
industrial players. A comparable
approach is offered, e. g. by the IPPE
in Russia using the BFS facility for
fast reactor technology.
Experimental reactor
The experimental reactor is typically
the small scale technology demon strator
and the first step into a power producing
unit. However, it could be used
later on as demonstrator for a small
size reactor for remote siting. However,
this dual approach will require a
disruptive development in the process
of establishing a reactor system. In
our case, the experimental reactor
could be initially designed without
salt clean-up, operating on enriched
uranium (smaller and cheaper)
serving a market niche like the
Akademik Lomonosov for remote site
electricity production [28] or for propulsion.
The system will be of small
size with a power of 10 to 50 MWth
even if the demonstration of the
self-sustained operation on SNF will
not be achievable in a such small size
system. To limit and stretch the initial
investment requirement the salt
clean-up step could be added offline
in a second development stage to
demonstrate the new technologies.
Detailed design, licensing, construction,
and commissioning will create
the future skilled workforce for the
full scale industrial demonstrator.
Close technological and financial
collaboration with industrial partners
will be a key to create innovative
solutions in the supply chain as well
as possibly a system integrator for
the next step. At this point two approaches
are possible, a collaboration
driven approach for international
innovative reactor development, or a
more commercially driven approach.
The historic boiling water reactor
development shows that both approaches
can even be followed in
parallel [26].
In our case, the experimental reactor
will deliver the first operational
experience with a liquid fuelled
system since the molten salt reactor
experiment at Oak Ridge National
laboratory in 1965 to 1969 [29]. A key
point for a rapid application of the
disruptive innovation will be starting
with a conservative approach with
reduced temperature level and low
power density followed by a successive
process of stretching the operational
envelop to improve the economy
performance based on the operational
experience and detailed observation
of the material behaviour. The experimental
reactor is the first opportunity
for material testing under real
operational con ditions involving high
temperature, corrosive environment
and high radiation level. Taking the
step into the experimental reactor
early will provide the developer with a
steeper learning curve in a new
technology and thus an earlier success,
but sure on the cost of taking a
higher risk. Taking leadership will
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RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 358
give the developers the early lead in
an innovative technology resulting in
excellent ­market opportunities.
Full scale industrial system
demonstration
In this stage industrial demonstration
of economic, reliable, sustainable,
and safe power production using a
new technology for the national as
well as the international market is the
essential function. The functionality
of the entire nuclear system from fuel
production over reactor operation as
well as salt clean-up and off-gas
treatment as one unit has to be
demonstrated, thus the application of
a new highly sustainable low carbon
technology. By providing the first
industrial demonstrator since generations,
the UK will demonstrate industrial
leadership and create the
related market opportunities required
to achieve a significant market share.
The industrial demonstrator can/
should already be owned by a commercial
operator and should be supported
by the government in critical
components like the nuclear island
and the fuel as well as in the licensing.
In the UK currently, this approach is
consistent with current policy of
supporting industry through the
Advanced Modular Reactor programme
and is in-line with recent
NIRAB recommendations to the UK
government.
The IP generated during the development
and operation of an industrial
scale demonstrator will serve the
­specific purpose of lowering the technical
and commercial risk of licensing
and operating a novel reactor technology.
Commercial solutions will
share some of the underlying technologies,
though with additional privately
held IP in order to differentiate
one commercial design from its competitor.
By no means, the full scale demonstrator
need to be a short term
operating prototype. Based on massive
use of M&S it should be a welldeveloped,
M&S supported, ideal experiment
which will be a first of class
and thus go into full production for a
significant time. There is history for this
– the Calder Hall reactor, see Figure 4,
operated for decades but it was also
the full scale demonstrator. It powered
Sellafield site (a large town in scale)
[30], and was com parable to EBR-II at
the Argonne-West site in US [31].
Closing remark
The link between the proposed 4
stages of the process, the required
| | Fig. 7.
Interlinked development processes required for establishing an innovative.
­information exchange between the
stages, and a proposed time scale is
given in Figure 7, supported by a
qualitative sketch for the national
skills base and the requested shares of
governmental investment.
The governmental share of the
required investment is proportionally
higher in earlier phases of the project
where the driver is to develop the
wider skills base. Later in the programme,
the share of government
investment is lower due to the fact
that industry will be more able to
attract the investment needed to
commercialise the tech nology when
it is demonstrated as an attractive
investment opportunity.
Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) has analysed the historic
development of 4 different reactor
types [26]. In all cases, the development
activities have been carried out
and financed by different partners in
government and industry. The topic of
the zero power reactor is typically in
the hand of the government (not
shown in Figure 8 since the study was
based on power producing systems),
while the next steps are shared with
increasing level of industry involvement
correlated with the increasing
maturity of the technology, see
Figure 8 [26]. A detailed analysis
indicates that the nuclear island as
well as the fuel fabrication and supply
for the demonstrators are mainly
in the hand of the government
while other com ponents are already
delivered by the industrial partners.
The main reason is that a new, innovative
fuel supply has to be handled
on governmental level due to proliferation
concerns while the nuclear
island is subject to supervision of the
IAEA and the regulator.
Based on the given arguments
highly innovative reactor technologies
without a planning for zero power
­reactor experiment lacks the seriousness
which is required to start such an
important endeavour. Thus, investing
into a reactor physics experiment on
an innovative technology will immediately
give the UK a high profile in
research and the connected international
recognition.
Cost estimations given by insiders
of the Indian fast reactor programme
and the lead cooled fast reactor programme
in Russia indicate an overall
investment volume of ~10 bn $ and
10 bn € respectively to achieve the
level of the industrial demonstrator.
Within the analysed historic US Programme
the investment shares for the
first of a kind reactor ranged between
8 % and 86 % governmental contribution
with an average of ~40 % with
higher industrial contribution for
mature technologies. In some promising
technologies industry has
­already taken a significant share in the
small scale demonstrator (e. g. BWR
technology)while in other high risk
approaches even the industrial
demonstrator has been supported by
national governments.
Typically significant teams within a
strong leadership in national programmes
and research centres have
been operated creating the required
number of qualified experts and the
essential skills level for designing,
licensing, constructing, commissioning,
as well as operating the ‘new
nuclear reactors’ at that time.
Conclusions
The energy trilemma and the UN
development goals form the key
driving forces for all kind of energy
research. Based on these requirements
a universal vision for strictly
demand driven strategic development
has been worked out based on the key
words: no resources requested, no
waste produced while being highly
economic, reliable, safe, and secure.
Following this vision a mission for a
future disruptive, demand driven
nuclear energy system with the
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| | Fig. 8.
Visualization of evolving government and industry roles in the design, construction and operation
of test, demonstration and first commercial reactors as described by the Electric Power Research
Institute [26].
additional aim of solving the long
term nuclear waste problem is developed.
Key point for the massively
improved sustainability indices is
the operation in closed fuel cycle
mode based on already existing spent
nuclear fuel. Even if the advantages of
closed fuel cycle operation are well
known, the technology has never been
established successfully due to the
prohibitively high development cost
and high commercial risk.
In the first part, we describe the
requirement for a disruptive technology,
an innovative molten salt
­reactor operating on already exiting
SNF without extensive and expensive
pre-processing. The side requirement
is on developing an online salt cleanup,
for online removing elements
which prevent the reactor from long
term operation. This approach will
significantly ­reduce the proliferation
risk, the radiation to human in fuel
manu facturing, as well as the high
reprocessing cost and the even higher
cost of solid fuel production, while
opening a massive optimization potential
due to online linking of reactor
and fuel cycle.
In a second part, we developed an
innovative process to establish a new,
disruptive nuclear system. In contrast
to historic approaches, the new process
consist only of 4 major stages
supported by the massive application
of modelling and simulation to reduce
the number of required experimental
facilities. The process is characterized
by: basic studies, advanced studies
and zero power experiment, small
scale demonstrator, and finally the
industrial demonstrator. The process
gives a clear structure for innovative
nuclear development with specific
roles which have to be taken over by
the government and industrial players
with different shares. It indicates
the requirement to involve different
partners, but the reward of the successful
development has the potential
to give the world one of the most
promising, sustainable, and reliable
low carbon technologies.
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Authors
Bruno Merk
Dzianis Litskevich
University of Liverpool,
School of Engineering, L69 3GH,
United Kingdom
Bruno Merk
Dzianis Litskevich
Aiden Peakman
Mark Bankhead
National Nuclear Laboratory,
Chadwick House, Warrington,
WA3 6AE, United Kingdom
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION 359
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360
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT
Due to the length
of the article it is
published in some
different parts. The
authors and editor
hope you will enjoy
and look forward to
reading the entire
article, as each
portion is published.
This republication is a
shortened version of
an article originally
published in the
journal Progress in
Nuclear Energy. The
full-length version of
the article may be
found at: Sanders, M,
& Sanders, C 2019
“A world’s dilemma
‘upon which the sun
never sets’ – The
nuclear waste
management strategy
(part II): Russia, Asia
and the Southern
Hemisphere”, Progress
in Nuclear Energy
110, 148-169.
A World’s Dilemma ‘Upon Which
the Sun Never Sets’: The Nuclear Waste
Management Strategy: Japan and China
Part 3
Mark Callis Sanders and Charlotta E. Sanders
5 Asian Continent
5.1 State of Japan or 日 本 国
Nippon-koku or
Nihon-koku (Japan)
5.1.1 Historical Overview & Law
Unfortunately, Japan’s story with
“ nuclear” suddenly and sadly began
on August 06, 1945 when the world’s
first atom bomb fell on the beautiful
city of Hiroshima. On March 11, 2011,
Japan was struck with a tsunami
(­resulting in approximately 19,000
deaths) that crippled the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant causing a
release of radiation into the environment
of surrounding communities
[38]. Japan is unique in that it is
the only nation state to date to have
experienced the use of atomic
weapons during wartime, resulting in
approximately 100,000 deaths [39].
Despite Japan’s horrendous experiences
with nuclear during the Second
World War; in the years post ceding
the end of the Second World War
(1939-1945), Japan shortly thereafter
embarked on establishing a civilian
nuclear power program.
The paradigm of Japan having
few natural resources and limited
land surface for its population has
­resulted in a spate of complex and
awkward politically sensitive situations
through out recent Japanese
history. During the 20 th Century, this
need for access to raw materials saw
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria
(1933), as well as the attack on Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii, USA (December 07,
1941), to name a few. These two
acts, and others, were intended to
secure supplies and provide vital raw
materials needed for the Japanese
homeland and its growing industry. It
should be observed, that aggressive
behavior to secure access to natural
resources is certainly not unique to
Japan and is a reoccurring theme
among nation states since the beginning
of human history. Certainly, one
of the potential benefits of nuclear
power generation is that nation states
may have access to an abundant,
secure, and stable supply of energy,
thereby theoretically resulting in a
downward spiral of aggressive behavior
among nation states as they
engage for access of energy supplies.
Similarly, to other western nation
states, Japan imported much of its
energy, especially its oil supplies from
the Middle East. This dependence on
foreign imports was made bare during
the 1973 oil shock that shook all
western industrialized nation states.
One important consequence for
Japanese energy policy was the
­impetus to expand its nuclear power
generating program. Since this time,
“ensuring a stable supply of energy at
a low cost” [40] has formed a cornerstone
of Japanese political persuasion.
5.1.2 Government and
legislative regime
As a democratic system of government
with open and fair elections, the
citizens of Japan are warmly involved
with affairs of state through its
government structure. Therefore,
politicians are concerned with issues
surrounding the cost of energy and its
relation to the national economy. Thus,
Japan’s nuclear power program is a
political football at the forefront of Japanese
politics. As a constitutional monarchy,
the government system is based
on a separation of power between three
branches of government (executive,
legislative and judicial), with the
Japanese emperor maintaining mostly
a ceremonial role. The cabinet houses
the powers of the ­executive and formulates
national policy and direction for a
nuclear program in Japan. In practice,
the prime minister of Japan is
appointed by the emperor, having been
first nominated by the parliament and
is usually a member of the House of
Represen tatives. Japan’s constitution,
which arose from the ashes of the
Second World War, became operative
on May 3, 1947, and consists of 103
articles [41].
5.1.2.1 Corruption
The country of Japan holds the
distinction of being one of the world’s
least corrupt nations. Japan’s Penal
Code, and Unfair Competition Prevention
Act 1 , which was promulgated
in 1993 2 , forms the centerpiece of
anti- corruption legislation and enforcement
mechanisms in the country
and are largely well imposed. In the
latest Transparency International
­Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
Japan ranked 20 out of 180 countries
in 2017. Japan does perform relatively
excellent work in the enforcement of
its penal codes and legislation in this
area. However, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development
3 (OECD) pointed out in 2014
that it is worried there is not enough
attention being paid to the potential
bribing of foreign public officials
by Japanese companies. At the end
of 2013, it recommended that the
country take steps to develop all
necessary resources “to proactively
detect, investigate, and prosecute
cases of foreign bribery by Japanese
companies” [42].
5.1.2.2 Legislative Framework
In light of Japan’s terrifying ending to
the Second World War, Japan sought
to establish a solely civilian nuclear
1 See: Unfair Competition Prevention Act (Act No. 47 of May 19, 1993, as amended up to April 23, 1999)
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128372, viewed April 19, 2018.
2 It was last amended almost 20 years ago in 1999.
3 For information about the OECD, See: http://www.oecd.org/about/, viewed July 12, 2018.
Decommissioning and Waste Management
A World’s Dilemma ‘Upon Which the Sun Never Sets’: The Nuclear Waste Management Strategy: Japan and China Part 3
ı Mark Callis Sanders and Charlotta E. Sanders

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| | Japan, nuclear power, again a vital source for a reliable energy supply.
Inside view of a pressurised water reactor.
program dedicated to the promotion
of peaceful economic application in
passing The Atomic Energy Basic Law
(AEBL) in 1955. The AEBL enshrines
into law that as a nation Japan is
dedicated to upholding three overriding
philosophies of: (1) democratic
methods, (2) independent management,
and (3) transparency. These
three philosophies establish the starting
point for any nuclear activities at
home and for Japanese cooperation
internationally [43]. Subsequently,
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
was created to promote nuclear power
development and utilization. To
further provide a nuclear regulating
infrastructure in Japan, a number of
other organizations were set up in the
year following the promulgation of
the AEBL including, the Nuclear
Safety Commission (NSC), and the
Japan Atomic Energy Research
Institute, to name two [44].
where it restated its commitment to
solving the high-level nuclear waste
disposal dilemma 5 . More recently
(2016), the Diet agreed on legislation
to “tak[e] measures necessary for
the steady implementation of the reprocessing
of used nuclear fuel” [45]
by forming a new organization, the
Spent Fuel Reprocessing Organization
6 (SFRO).
Japan classifies its radioactive
waste dependent on the waste’s
activity and/or source of origination
as either high- or low-level waste.
Additionally, low-level waste may
also be further sub-classified depending
on its origin, such as
waste containing transuranic radionuclides,
with a further category of
very-low-level waste from reactors
sites being acknowledged. The setting
of upper limits on the concentrations
of radionuclides for wastes authorized
for disposal in Japan are delineated
per the Reactor Regulation Law 7 . The
­scientific basis for the setting of
these limits originate from published
reports by the Nuclear Safety Commission
of Japan (NCS), which are
then used for preparation of license
applications.
The legislative framework for the
final disposal of radioactive waste in
Japan is outlined in the Specified
Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act,
Law No. 117 (Final Disposal Act)
which was passed by the Diet on June
7, 2000. This law contains provisions
governing the definition and implementation
of policy in what may be
called the final disposal plan. This law
also provides for the funds necessary
to finance such disposal activity, for
the entity responsible in carrying out
this mandate, and the procedures to
be used for site selection. The law
mandates that high-level waste is only
disposed of in deep geological constructed
sites (i.e., only vitrified waste
resulting from the reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuel) [46].
5.1.3.1 Permanent disposal
The Japanese program for high-level
nuclear waste management envisages
that such vitrified high-level waste
will be stored in “a stable host rock
formation more than 300 meters
under ground, using a multi-barrier
system [comprising both] engineered
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 361
5.1.3 Nuclear waste
management
Currently, government policy for
shepherding its nuclear waste
manage ment program is to conduct
all the obligatory reviews for needed
sites “for the final disposal of high-­
level radioactive waste, without
postponing the issue” [40]. On June
14, 2013, the Japanese cabinet agreed
on its yearly report relating any
measures it has taken regarding
energy supplies and demand, as
required by Article 11 of the Basic Act
on Energy Policy 4 (Act No. 71 of 2002)
| | Japan: remediation work at the Fukushima site.
4 See: http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?printID=&ky=payment&page=10&vm=02&re=02, viewed July 12, 2018
5 See: FY2013 Annual Report on Energy (Energy White Paper 2014) Outline,
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/2014_outline.pdf, viewed July 12, 2018.
6 See: http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/energy_environment/law/index.html, viewed July 12, 2018.
7 See: https://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislation/jpn-material-reactors.pdf, viewed July 12, 2018.
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A World’s Dilemma ‘Upon Which the Sun Never Sets’: The Nuclear Waste Management Strategy: Japan and China Part 3 ı Mark Callis Sanders and Charlotta E. Sanders

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DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 362
and natural barriers” in order to provide
sufficient isolation of this waste
to the outside environment [47]. The
current plan is to begin operation of a
final disposal facility sometime in
the 2030’s. These efforts are to be
conducted under the purview of the
Nuclear Waste Management Organization
of Japan (NUMO) and as
sanctioned by the Final Disposal Act.
In April 2014, the newly adopted
‘ Basic Energy Plan’ considers matters
surrounding high-level waste disposal,
and in 2016 Japan’s cabinet
endorsed taking a more active
approach on this issue by working
with local governments. In conjunction
with these efforts, the Geological
Disposal Working Group issued
a report titled “Summary of
Requirements and Criteria for a
Nation­wide Map of Scientific Features
for Geological Disposal”. 8
The siting of a geological storage
facility involves the investigation of
many complex variables. To help
­facilitate this process, METI identified
pertinent criteria based on scientific
characteristics publishing a map
allowing it to differentiate areas of
interest nationwide for possible locations
for the siting of a national nuclear
geologic storage facility [48]. The map
allows for readily identifi­able regions
having the suitable geological requirements
for hosting a repository and provides
a working platform as Japan
­begins any site ­selection examination.
Locations that are located within a
close proximity to volcanoes, active
fault zones, or areas containing
mineral resources, and more especially
the Fukushima prefecture, are
considered to be disqualified when
conducting any site search. This is to
ensure that the chosen area is seismically
stable, that mineral reserves are
protected, and that a greater burden is
not placed on specified regions already
hosting other aspects of Japan’s
nuclear fuel cycle [49].
Previously, Japan has engaged in
investigation and experimentation of
appropriate media for the disposing
of high-level nuclear waste. It has
considered the use of sedimentary
rock at a depth of 500 meters, undertaking
tests at the Horonobe Underground
Research Centre, as well as at
a depth of 1000 meters in igneous
rock at the Tona Geoscience Centre,
as part of Mizunami Underground
Research Laboratory. The current
concept that Japan is investigating is
to store approximately “20 high-level
waste canisters in a massive steel cask
or over pack and surrounding this by
bentonite clay” [49].
5.2 People’s Republic of China
or 中 华 人 民 共 和 国 (China)
5.2.1 Historical Overview & Law
China’s continued rapid economic
­expansion is creating numerous challenges
in meeting its ever-increasing
energy demands, and is placing an
ever-greater burden on its energy
­infrastructure. Therefore, experts
recommend and believe China should
continue developing nuclear power
[50]. In the first quarter of 2018,
power production increased by
10 ­percent from the same period
in 2017, with dramatic increases seen
in power production from wind,
solar, and nuclear (37.9 %, 58.7 %,
and 12.7 %, respectively) [51].
Extremely high levels of air pollution
in China has led to diminishing
crop yields, as well as an increase in
respiratory disease, with this now
becoming the leading cause of death
[52]. Due to the environmental
impact and health risks of pollution,
current government policy considers
nuclear power as a clean energy
source, and forms part of the government’s
commitment to tackle climate
change, and secure its energy supply
[52].
China’s nuclear power program
began its initial development in 1970.
Construction began on China’s first
self-designed nuclear power plant 9 in
March 1985, with start of commercial
operation taking place six years later
[53]. From this initial foray into
nuclear power production, China has
witnessed the construction of 38
nuclear power reactors with about 20
more under construction [54].
5.2.2 Government and
legislative regime
China is a socialist state that is
based on a dictatorship comprising
its working class, combined with an
alliance between the workers and
peasants 10 . This system forms the basis
of the working interaction between
the government and the people, with
any disruption of this system
“by any organization or individual
[being] prohibited”. 11
Though the
State considers it has three main
obligations towards its citizenry of
“equality, unity and mutual assistance”,
12
with discrimination or oppression
of any nationality prohibited,
­tension exists within this ‘class’ system
as Chinese society has evolved from
Mao’s ideology to a more market
based economic system, leading to
sometimes “unequal treatment before
the law for a certain segment of
the population” [55].
Mao Zedong’s version of the ideal
society was one in which the citizen is
totally committed to societal goals as
set forth by the ruling class. In this
effort, he viewed it as the State’s duty
to ensure that all powers associated
with the functioning and governing
of the State over the individual be
employed to ensure that this vision is
achieved [56]. Following the conclusion
of the Second World War, the
Communist Party of China under Mao
established strict controls and policies
at the time costing the lives of tens of
millions of people [57]. From the
1970’s, China has loosened policies in
certain areas as it seeks to strike a
balance in the government-market
relationship. Pivotal issues in its
continued economic structural reform
include a streamlining of administration
and an increased delegation of
8 Recommended: Matsumoto, et. al., Scientific Basis for Nationwide Screening of Geological Disposal Sites in Japan, Nuclear Waste Management
Organization of Japan, http://eaform2017.aesj.or.jp/file/PapersList/Session1/(1C-2)_T.Matsumoto%20(NUMO).pdf, viewed July 12, 2018.
9 A 300 MG prototype reactor.
10 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, amendment on March 14, 2004, Art. 1,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm, viewed June 15, 2018.
11 Id. art. 1
12 Id. art. 4; Kellogg states that though an authoritarian constitutional document may contain within its text many lofty ideals, which are not
generally put into practice, this should not denote that those same concepts are false and have little value in the political framework of that
nation state. Additionally, one may not automatically assume that the state will not attempt to acquiesce to exert its actions in relation to the
underpinning argument. He notes that because many authoritarian rules mandate an allocation of authority between various internal state
actors; it is this division/separation of powers that can still be beneficial as these powers are spread over the purview of various agencies and
departments. See: Kellogg, Thomas E. "Arguing Chinese Constitutionalism: The 2013 Constitutional Debate and the 'Urgency' of Political
Reform," University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review vol. 11, no. 3 (Spring 2016): p. 337-408.
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ı Mark Callis Sanders and Charlotta E. Sanders

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power, as well as improved regulation
and services. 13
China’s chief of state (President) is
indirectly elected for a five-year term
by the National People’s Congress,
which also appoints members to the
State Council (Cabinet). Legislative
power is centered in a unicameral
chamber, the National People’s Congress.
However, its 2,987 members
typically only meet about once every
five years, which provides limits on its
spheres of influence as powers to act
on its behalf are mostly subsumed into
various standing committees [57].
China’s judicial system consists of its
high court (the Supreme People’s
Court), with other subordinate courts.
Though considered in many areas to
be effective, it faces such challenges as
a lack of qualified personnel, as well
as concerns that such personnel are
unable to fully divest the separation
between judicial and political decision
making [58].
5.2.2.1 Corruption
During the 1950’s and 1960’s, corruption
in China was largely driven
underground, but from the “post-Mao
reform period in 1978-79,” China has
experienced an exponential upward
growth of corruption, as more light is
shed on these incidents [59]. In the
latest Transparency International
­Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
China ranked 77 out of 180 countries
in 2017, 14
and Chinese President Xi
­Jinping has made fighting corruption
a cornerstone of his legacy to “fundamentally
improve the political ecosystem
of the Party” [60]. Since
launching a campaign against corruption
in 2012, the Communist Party
has disciplined well over one million
persons [61].
Guanxi (pronounced gwon-she)
symbolizes the process through which
networks or connections are able to
open closed doors and through which
the axel of the wheel of business is
greased. Li explains the most fundamental
definition synonymous with
“guanxi”: “is used as an entity which
an agent can act upon, such as ‘gao
(to make/play) guanxi’” [62]. Zhan
indicates that “guanxi” has at times
been used to influence the decision-­
making process of a court, but that
this has now become more difficult
due judicial reform and the anti-corruption
movement [63]. Corruption
can lead to a number of social challenges
in a nation state, as a person’s
feelings of self-worth from engaging
in corruption reflect negatively on
their happiness as a result of feelings
of “guilt when paying or accepting
bribes” [64]. The greatest impacts on
a nation state and its society are economic
in that:
“Corruption takes much needed
resources from economic development
and diverts them into the
­pockets of corrupt officials... [and]
politically, corruption undermines the
trust of citizens in public officials and
the government” [65].
5.2.2.2 Legislative framework
China is a party to the Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management, with
its submission of accession submitted
on September 13, 2006. The Legislation
Law of the People’s Republic of
China 15 (LLRPC) institutes the necessary
and proper framework for spent
fuel and radioactive waste management
in China. This embodies the
incorporation of a comprehensive set
of relevant national laws, administrative
regulations, departmental rules,
management guides, as well as reference
documents. The China Atomic
Energy Authority is charged with the
developing of plans and projects
related to the disposal of high-level
radioactive wastes, while The Ministry
of Environment Protection and its
­affiliated institute (the National
Nuclear Safety Administration), make
up the relevant regulatory bodies. The
China National Nuclear Corporation is
the current agent charged with the
implementation of activities for radioactive
waste disposal [66].
China’s hierarchy for its legislative
framework consists (from highest to
| | China: new build of a NPP.
lowest): (1) law; (2) State Council
Regulations; (3) Departmental Rules;
(4) Guides; and, (5) Reference documents.
Laws governing safe disposal
or storage of spent fuel and radioactive
wastes are promulgated by the
National People’s Congress Standing
Committee 16 (NPCSC), and are:
1. Law of the People’s Republic of
China on Prevention and Control
of Radioactive Pollution (LPCRP),
enacted by the NPCSC in 2003.
2. Regulations of the People’s Republic
of China on Safety Control
of Civilian Nuclear Installations
(HAF001), issued by the State
Council in 1986.
3. Regulations on Safety and Protection
of Radioisotope and Raygenerating
Installations (RSPRRI),
issued by the State Council executive
meeting in 2004.
4. Regulations on Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management
(RSRWM), issued by the State
Council executive meeting in 2011.
Due to China having embarked on
such an ambitious nuclear power program,
within a short time span, this
has resulted in many potential challenges.
Hou et. al. (2011) 17 highlighted
a number of areas of concern,
which has a direct effect towards the
legitimacy and sustainability of the
Chinese nuclear power program.
Challenges include: (1) having access
to a limited pool of educated and
trained nuclear professionals; (2)
governmental departments working
DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 363
13 Report on the Work of the Government delivered by Premier Li Keqiang at the Fifth Session of the 12th National People's Congress on March 5,
2017 and adopted on March 15, 2017, http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Special_13_1/2018-03/04/content_2041364.htm, viewed June 15,
2018.
14 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017,
viewed April 19, 2018.
15 The Legislation Law of the People's Republic of China is designed to “standardize lawmaking activities” in the country ensuring that good
governance is achieved through the establishment of legal mechanisms, so that the rule of law is more comprehensively developed.
See: Article 1 – http://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/legislation-law-chinese-and-english-text, viewed July 24, 2018.
16 A standing committee of the National People's Congress with about 150 members.
17 Hou, J, Tan, Z, Wang, J, & Xie, P 2011, 'Government Policy and Future Projection for Nuclear Power in China', Journal Of Energy Engineering,
137, 3, pp. 151-158, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 19 February 2014.
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DECOMMISSIONING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 364
| | China: four nuclear power plants at one site,
a common picture form Chinas nuclear power programme.
under different ministries, with different
interests in developing nuclear
power, leading to overlap of effort;
and, (3) a con­tinuing developing
nuclear legal framework, that is not
yet as effective as it should be.
The Chinese government has yet to
adequately address the role of private
investment in its civilian nuclear
power program, and currently manages
its operations through state owned
enterprises. 18
5.2.3 Nuclear waste
management
To maximize resources and reduce the
amount of high-level waste requiring
long-term disposal, China intends to
engage in the reprocessing of spent
fuel. Currently, spent fuel generated
from nuclear power plants and research
reactors are stored at the reactor
site. Necessary funding for the
storage and treatment of spent fuel, as
well as the disposal of high-level
waste, is conducted under the purview
of the ‘Projects Management
Methods of the Funds for Treatment
and Disposal of Spent Fuel from
Nuclear Power Plants’ [67]. To meet
the cost of the back end of the nuclear
fuel cycle, a “levy of CNY 2.6 cents/
kWh [is imposed] from the fifth year
of commercial operation of each
reactor” [68].
5.2.3.1 Permanent disposal
As previously mentioned, spent
nuclear fuel management in China is
to be conducted in a series of three
stages: (Stage 1) the reprocessing of
the spent nuclear fuel, (Stage 2)
­vitrification, and (Stage 3) permanent
disposal in a suitable geologic repository.
The concept for storing this
­vitrified high-level waste “is a shaft-­
tunnel model, located in saturated
zones in granite” [66]. China’s highlevel
waste program is to be conducted
in three phases: “(Phase 1) laboratory
studies and site selection for a
[high- level waste] repository to be
com pleted by 2020; (Phase 2) underground
in-situ tests (2021–2040); and
(Phase 3) repository construction
(2041–2050) followed by operation”
[66].
Three types of radioactive waste
management facilities currently exist
in China: (1) the on-site nuclear
facility’s waste management system;
(2) storage facilities for radioactive
waste arising from nuclear technology
applications; and, (3) Low and Intermediate
Level Waste (LILW) disposal
sites. There are currently two solid
LILW disposal sites in operation,
which are the Guangdong Beilong
disposal site and Northwest China
disposal site. Both Sites began commercial
operation following the
granting of operation licenses by the
Ministry of Environmental Protection,
National Nuclear Safety Administration
in 2011. China’s legacy radioactive
wastes generated in past practices
are retrievable. Where these are
unable to meet current storage and
disposal requirements, this radioactive
waste is required to be retrieved
and re-conditioned to meet any new
acceptance requirements [67, 68].
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Authors
Mark Callis Sanders
Sanders Engineering
1350 E. Flamingo Road
Ste. 13B #290
Las Vegas NV 89119
USA
Charlotta E. Sanders
Department of Mechanical
Engineering
University of Nevada
Las Vegas (UNLV)
4505 S. Maryland Pwky
Las Vegas, NV 89154
USA
18 Includes: China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Co., Ltd. (CGNPC),
and China Power Investment Corporation (CPI).
Decommissioning and Waste Management
A World’s Dilemma ‘Upon Which the Sun Never Sets’: The Nuclear Waste Management Strategy: Japan and China Part 3
ı Mark Callis Sanders and Charlotta E. Sanders

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
Special Topic | A Journey Through 50 Years AMNT
Politik mit Vernunft und
Güterabwägung betreiben
Norbert Blüm
In den sechziger Jahren hatten wir eine Kernenergie-Euphorie. Die friedliche Nutzung der Atomkraft schien ein
Universalschlüssel für die Lösung unserer Energieprobleme weltweit zu sein. Inzwischen ist das Pendel zurückgeschlagen,
jedenfalls in Teilen der Öffentlichkeit. Wir erleben eine Ablehnung der Kernenergie, bei der das Irrationale
das Rationale überdeckt.
Exaltierte Gemütsstimmungen sind Denkblockaden.
Deshalb ist weder die Euphorie noch die Panik die
Gemüts lage für einen rationalen Diskurs über unsere
Energiepolitik. Euphorie, weil sie zur Sorglosigkeit in
Sicherheitsfragen verführt, auch zur Suche nach weitergehenden
Energieformen. Die Hysterie, weil Panik ein
schlechtes Fundament für die Entscheidung ist. Aber
auch deshalb, weil das Kolossalgemälde der atomaren
Gefahren, Gefahren, die bei anderen Energiegewinnungen
auftreten, Umweltgefahren verdrängt und so insgesamt
eine nüchterne Wertung versagt. Die Darstellung gleicht
der Darstellung im Märchen, als sei eine Energieform die
Hexe und die anderen, das seien die guten Feen. Als seien
die einen mit Gefahren überwuchert und die anderen
gefahrlos. Das trifft die eigentliche Frage der Güterabwägung,
in der wir uns befinden, nicht.
Ich stelle unsere Gesellschaft nicht als problemlos und
gefahrlos dar. Aber wenn sie tatsächlich nur noch von
Katastrophen begleitet wird, wenn in jedem Lufthauch
bereits der Tod enthalten wäre, wenn in jedem Schluck
Wasser bereits das Gift wäre – dann frage ich mich, wieso
die Leute alle älter werden, wenn das so ist. Wir wollen
Gefahren minimieren. Aber bei der Suche dürfen wir nicht
der Illusion erliegen, es gäbe ein Licht ohne Schatten,
es gäbe eine Welt ohne jedes Risiko. Aber über der
Beschreibung der Risiken dürfen wir die Chancen nicht
vergessen. Manchmal pflegen und hätscheln wir die
Risiken und vergessen darüber, die Chancen zu nutzen.
Es gilt darum, Risiken zurückzudrängen. Es gilt darum,
Gefahren zu minimieren, aber die Politik muß Güter
abwägen, muß einen Saldo von Positivem und Negativem
ziehen.
Wenn etwa die Stigmatisierung bestimmter Techniken in
gläubiger Hast denjenigen folgt, die gerade die
Meinungsführerschaft auf dem publizistischen Schadstoffmarkt
behaupten, geht politische Gestaltungskraft ver loren.
Man wird zum Spielball nicht mehr beherrschbarer
Irrationalität. Wir erleben tagtäglich, daß man –
Stimmungen folgend – abstrakte Gefährdungen bizarr überzeichnet,
während man zugleich konkrete Schädigungen
kaum wahrnimmt. Mit der Energie gewinnung aus fossilen
Rohstoffen sind auch Gefahren verbunden.
Diese Art rationaler Problembewältigung, Gefahren
nicht zu verdrängen, sie ernst zu nehmen, diese Art
vermisse ich bei der Kernenergiediskussion, weil sie nur
ihre Gefahren beschreibt und nicht die Chancen, die in ihr
liegen. Unsere Gesellschaft neigt zu einer selektiven Angstbewältigung.
Während man die Angst gewissermaßen
punktuell, und zwar manchmal völlig ungetrübt von
Kompetenz- und Beurteilungsfähigkeit, auf ausgewählte
Gefahrenpunkte konzentriert, lebt man ansonsten ein
sorgloses Leben.
Welche Therapie hat die Gesellschaft anzubieten? Die
Therapie: Aufklärung! Es ist eine große Zumutung, an die
Vernunft zu glauben. Aber wie käme denn eine aufgeklärte
Zivilisation weiter, wenn sie nur Gefühle manipulieren
wollte, wenn sie nicht geradezu vom aufklärerischen
Optimismus geprägt wäre, daß man durch Information,
durch Vernunft und Einschätzung politische Probleme
bewältigen kann. Wollten wir uns einer Stimmungs-
Demokratie anheimgeben, wäre das der Abschied von der
Tradition der Aufklärung. Das wäre der Abschied vom
Menschen als vernunftbegabtes Wesen.
Daher mein erster und wichtigster Beitrag: Laßt uns
den Versuch nicht aufgeben, Politik mit Vernunft zu
verbinden, mit rationaler Argumentation. Laßt uns den
Versuch nicht aufgeben, Politik als eine Güterabwägung zu
begreifen. Es gibt nicht die reinen Lösungen, es gibt auf
dieser Erde nicht die Patentlösungen. Es gibt auch nicht
die Lösungen ohne Risiken. Ideologen haben für solche
Politik wenig Sinn, weil ihr Geschäft die Verkürzung ist.
Kernenergie birgt Risiko, das wissen wir nicht erst seit
Tschernobyl. Mit dem Stand von Wissenschaft und Technik
verbessern wir immer wieder den Sicherheitsstandard.
Dieses ständige Streben nach verbesserter Sicherheit
darf seriöserweise nicht interpretiert werden als das
Eingeständnis, bisher sei die Sicherheit demnach vernachlässigt
worden. Nichts ist so gut, daß es nicht noch
verbessert werden könnte.
Das explosionsartige Bevölkerungswachstum und
die zunehmende Industrialisierung auch bisher wenig
entwickelter Teile der Erde lassen den weltweiten
Energiebedarf in den nächsten Jahrzehnten weiter stark
ansteigen. Auch wenn wir alle Anstrengungen zum
Energiesparen unternehmen – wofür ich bin – der
Energiebedarf steigt. Heute decken wir 90 % des Weltenergieverbrauchs
durch das Verbrennen fossiler Energiereserven.
90 %! In einem Jahr vernichten wir dadurch das
Ergebnis von 500.000 Jahren Erdgeschichte, und zwar
unwiederbringlich. Die Frage nach der Verantwortung
stellt sich hier nicht minder ernsthaft als bei der Kernenergie.
Sie beschränkt sich im übrigen nicht auf diesen
Aspekt des Ressourcenabbaus. Hier stellt sich auch die
Frage nach unserer Verantwortung für den Lebens standard
in der Zukunft, für das Schicksal in der Dritten Welt.
Wir müssen sorgsamer umgehen mit der Energie. Wir
müssen den ärmeren Staaten die leichter verfügbaren
Energiearten überlassen. Wir müssen alles tun, um
alternative Energie auch zu nutzen und zu entwickeln.
Dazu zählt auch die Kernenergie. Für sie sprechen auch
Am 7. und 8. Mai
2019 begingen wir
das 50. Jubiläum
unserer Jahrestagung
Kerntechnik. Zu
diesem Anlass öffnen
wir unser atw-Archiv
für Sie und präsentieren
Ihnen in jeder
Ausgabe einen
historischen Artikel.
Aus der Ansprache
des Bundesministers
für Arbeit und
Sozialordnung, Bonn,
Dr. Norbert Blüm,
am 9. Mai 1989 in
Düsseldorf.
365
SPECIAL TOPIC | A JOURNEY THROUGH 50 YEARS AMNT
Special Topic | A Journey Through 50 Years AMNT
Make Policy With Prudence and Consideration of Assets ı Norbert Blüm

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SPECIAL TOPIC | A JOURNEY THROUGH 50 YEARS AMNT
| | 1989: Jahrestagung Kerntechnik – JK ´89 in Düsseldorf, Eröffnungsveranstaltung.
ökologische Gründe. Klimaforscher warnen immer dringlicher
vor einem Treibhauseffekt mit einer drohenden
globalen Katastrophe, der auf das Verbrennen von Kohlenstoffen
zurückgeht. Die schleichende Schädigung durch
diese konventionelle, nicht-nukleare Energiegewinnung
ist sicher, allein ihr Ausmaß ist strittig. Ausstieg aus
der Kernenergie heißt zwingend, Verstärkung des CO 2 -
Problems und Beschleunigung der dadurch verursachten
Schäden.
In unserem selektiven Angstsyndrom nehmen wir diese
Alternative des Erduntergangs gar nicht wahr. Wollen wir
denn die Folgen in Kauf nehmen? Sind sich überhaupt
diejenigen dessen bewußt, die auf einen sofortigen
Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie drängen? Gegner und
Befürworter der Kernenergie sind sich einig, daß regenerative
Energiequellen intensiv erforscht werden müssen.
Einig ist man sich auch, daß diese Energiequellen nicht,
derzeit noch nicht, geeignet sind, in größerem Umfange
die klassischen Formen der Energiegewinnung zu
substituieren. Die Tatsache, daß alle – einschließlich der
Energiewirtschaft – die Kernenergie nicht als die einzige
Energiequelle und schon gar nicht so, als hätte sie
Ewigkeitsdauer, proklamieren, entzieht uns doch nicht der
Verantwortung, sie heute zu nutzen und mit ihr auch die
Erde zu schonen.
Wer heute die nuklearen Risiken verabsolutiert und
sie mit dem Traum von einer gefahrlosen heilen Welt
konfrontiert, vernachlässigt die nötigen Anstrengungen,
unser Wissen zu bündeln und Gefahren zu beherrschen.
Politische und wissenschaftliche Lösungen können sich
nicht an dem Kinderspiel orientieren, in unangenehmen
Situationen einfach die Bettdecke über den Kopf zu ziehen.
Eine Gesellschaft, die sich in eine permanente
­Angst­psychose flüchtet, narkotisiert ihre Fähigkeit zur
Zukunftsgestaltung. Ich sehe derzeit keine Möglichkeit,
uns einseitig aus der Kernenergie zu verabschieden. Sparsame
Energieverwendung, Ressourcenschonung, Risikominderung
und die Erschließung regenerativer Energiequellen
– das ist ein Viereck unserer Energiepolitik. Und
in unserem Land Nordrhein-Westfalen sind wir im
besonderen Maße darauf angewiesen, in der Frage einer
friedlichen Nutzung der Kernenergie zu einem Konsens
zurückzufinden. Wir in Nordrhein-Westfalen wollen das
herausragende Energieland der Bundesrepublik bleiben.
Dafür brauchen wir den Verbund Kohle – Kernenergie.
Unsere Kohle wird nur überleben in einer Mischkalkulation
mit dem billigeren Atomstrom. Wer den
Kumpels die Treue halten will, darf sich nicht um diese
Wahrheit drücken. Die Bergleute verlangen nach Klarheit.
Es muß jetzt über Anschlußregelungen, auch über den
Jahrhundertvertrag, gesprochen werden. Je schneller
Regelungen gefunden werden, um so sanfter die Lösungen.
Wir brauchen eine europäische Zusammenarbeit, auch
bei der Energieerzeugung und beim Umweltschutz. Aber
in die Europäisierung der Energiepolitik muß unser
nationales Interesse einbezogen werden, auch unser
nationales Kohleinteresse und unsere nationale Versorgungssicherheit.
Es geht nicht, Kernenergie zu europäisieren
und Kohle zu nationalisieren – das wird nicht
klappen, dieses Konzept.
Daß Unternehmen in Frankreich wiederaufarbeiten
wollen, weil sie dabei Geld sparen – jährlich 1,5 Milliarden
–, das leuchtet ein. Aber ich warne auch vor einer
Energiepolitik, die sich nur am Geld ausrichtet. Wir wissen
doch alle, daß der Atomstrom aus Frankreich billiger
ist, als der Strom bei uns. Hieße das nicht auch, dann
die Kohle zu beerdigen? Wenn man es nur unter Kostengesichtspunkten
sieht, ja dann ist das „Aus“ für die
Kohle gesprochen. Und wenn man mit Kohle und Kernenergie
einen Verbund eingehen will, dann entweder
national oder europäisch. Aber diese Fragen müssen noch
geklärt werden.
Wer überall nur die wirtschaftliche Lösung will, der
wird bald anstelle des Jahrhundertvertrags auch der
Importkohle das Wort reden. Europäische Zusammenarbeit
„ja“, aber neben der Wirtschaftlichkeit gibt es auch
für uns noch andere Kriterien: Sicherheit der Energieversorgung
und Umweltverträglichkeit.
Im übrigen, auch für Kalkar und den Hochtemperatur-
Reaktor in Hamm-Uentrop gilt immer: Sicherheit geht vor
Wirtschaftlichkeit. Sicherheit, das ist die politische Verantwortung.
Und wenn der HTR ein besonders attraktives
Modell einer Kerntechnologie ist, dann kann er auch nicht
Augenblicksüberlegungen zum Opfer fallen. Da muß
Sicherheit gewährleistet und an dieser Technologie weitergearbeitet
werden. Nordrhein-Westfalen kann doch keine
Blaupausen in die Welt exportieren. Wenn es Exporteur
von Spitzentechnologie sein will, wird es sie am eigenen
Leibe ausprobieren müssen, wenn es Absatz finden will.
Diese Dimension der Kernenergie muß viel stärker ins
öffentliche Bewußtsein. Und wir sollten auch unsere
Industriegesellschaft, die Ressourcen in unserer Industriegesellschaft
nutzen, um Umwelttechnologie als ein
Produktionsangebot der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
stärker herauszustellen.
Ich bin zu Ihnen gekommen auch aus Demonstrationsgründen.
Nicht, weil ich die Kernenergie vergöttlichen
möchte. Wer das erwartet hat, den muß ich enttäuschen.
Aber ich wehre mich auch gegen ihre Verteufelung. Und
ich weiß, daß unser Konzept einer Energieversorgung am
besten aufgehoben ist in einem Mischsystem, das aus
verschiedenen Trägern besteht, für die allerdings die
Kern energie unverzichtbar ist. Und solange niemand
etwas Besseres weiß, halte ich es für verantwortungslos,
vom Aussteigen zu sprechen und weiterhin den hohen
Lebensstandard genießen zu wollen, den unsere Industriegesellschaft
zur Verfügung stellt.
Special Topic | A Journey Through 50 Years AMNT
Politik mit Vernunft und Güterabwägung betreiben ı Norbert Blüm

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Inside
367
Schlussrede des Vorsitzenden der
Kerntechnischen Gesellschaft e. V.
Frank Apel
Plenarsitzung,
Dienstag,
den 7. Mai 2019
Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,
liebe Mitglieder der KTG,
Auch zur Halbzeit unserer Veranstaltung noch einmal ein
„Herzliches Willkommen“ zu unserer Jahrestagung
Kerntechnik – dem Original – seit 50 Jahren. Die kerntechnische
Branche trifft sich erneut im großen Rahmen zum
zweiten Mal in diesem Jahr, nach Dresden zur „Kontec“
jetzt in Berlin zur AMNT“.
Wir erleben gerade, dass die diesjährige Jahrestagung
ganz besonders und auch ganz besonders gut ist und auch
sicherlich noch bleibt. Ganz besonders, weil wir für diese
AMNT eine Reihe von außergewöhnlichen Highlights für
Sie vorbereitet haben:
Wir haben einen Film mit dem Titel „Die ersten
50 Jahre“ für Sie gedreht, sie konnten Ihn heute Vormittag
anschauen. Wir wollten mit dem Titel „Die ersten 50“
einen Rückblick auf relevante Meilensteine der Vergangenheit
liefern aber eben auch einen Ausblick auf die
Zukunft geben. Florian Gremme hat heute der KTG zu den
ersten 50 gratuliert. Unsere „Junge Generation“ und auch
viele andere sind von der Zukunft der KTG über zeugt.
„Der nukleare Traum“ ist der Titel eine Fotoausstellung,
in der der Fotograf – und für mich auch Künstler – Bernhard
Ludewig Motive aus dem Bereichen Forschung, Bau und
Betrieb, Rückbau und Entsorgung eindrucksvoll in Szene
gesetzt hat. Falls Sie noch nicht dort waren: es lohnt sich!
Eine Reihe unserer Aussteller präsentieren zur
50. Jahrestagung „besondere“ Exponate an ihren Ständen,
besuchen Sie auch weiter rege unsere Industrie ausstellung.
Circa 600 Besucher aus dem In- und Ausland haben den
Weg zu unserer 50. Jahrestagung Kerntechnik gefunden.
Die Anzahl unserer ausländischen Teilnehmer bleibt
erfreulicherweise konstant.
So haben wir neben dem UK und tschechischen Pavillion
auch Vertreter aus anderen Ländern auf der Jahrestagung,
unter ihnen Schweden. Schweden galt in der Vergangenheit
oft als Blaupause für Kernenergie entwicklungen in
Deutschland: Ausstieg aus der Kern energie, Wiedereinstieg,
Laufzeitverlängerung, vorzeitiges Abschalten von
Blöcken aufgrund fehlender Wirtschaft lichkeit…
Aber es gibt auch Unterschiede: die Schweden, die
Ihren Strom zu ca. 50 % aus Wasserkraft und 50 % aus
Kernenergie erzeugen, haben ein Endlager für schwach-,
mittel- und hochaktive Abfälle und sie haben Greta.
Greta Thunberg, eine 16-jährige schwedische Klimaaktivistin,
die zur Ikone einer neuen Jugendbewegung für
den Klimaschutz wurde. Sie hat eine Wahrheit ausgesprochen,
die so unbequem ist, dass sie in Deutschland
kaum jemand hören will. Sie twitterte: „Ich bin eigentlich
gegen die Kernenergie. Aber laut Weltklimarat kann
Kernenergie tatsächlich ein kleiner Teil einer großen,
neuen CO 2 -freien Energielösung sein... nämlich dann,
wenn Länder keinen Zugang zu erneuerbaren Energien
haben. Darüber sollten wir debattieren.“
Gefragt nach Lösungen zum Klimaproblem antwortet
Greta Thunberg, dass sie die Antwort nicht kenne.
„ Niemand weiß genau, was zu tun ist. Und darum geht es:
Wir können nicht einfach ein paar Steuern erhöhen oder in
ein paar grüne Fonds investieren und dann weitermachen
wie bisher. Mit unseren aktuellen Systemen gibt es keine
Lösung. Wir müssen uns das ganze Thema anschauen …
und nur durch die beste verfügbare Wissenschaft, könne
man eine Lösung finden.“ Zur Wissenschaft kommen wir
nachher noch einmal…
Lesenswert ist übrigens auch der Vortrag von Michael
Schellenberger, dem Präsidenten von „Environmental
Progress“ und Mitbegründer von „Nuclear Pride Fest“, den
er auf der diesjährigen Atomexpo hielt. Michael Schellenberger
vergleicht Frankreich und den Klimaschützer Nr. 1:
Deutschland. Er sagte: „Deutschland erzeugt im Vergleich
zu Frankreich weniger als die Hälfte seines Stroms aus
CO 2 -armen Rohstoffen und produziert pro Kraftwerk das
Zehnfache an CO 2 -Emissionen. Dazu kommt, dass der
emissionsarme Strom in Frankreich nur wenig mehr als die
Hälfte des Stromes in Deutschland kostet.“
Greta Thunberg und Michael Schellenberger sind mit
ihrer Haltung nicht allein: 446 aktive Kernkraftwerke gibt
es weltweit und noch einmal fast 150 befinden sich derzeit
in Bau oder Planung. Die deutsche Energiewende hat
weltweit wenig Nachahmer gefunden.
In Deutschland sind derzeit noch 7 Kernkraftwerke am
Netz und speisen im Mittel ca. 14 % der in Deutschland
benötigten Grundenergieversorgung in die Energieübertragungsnetze
ein. 26 Anlagen sind in der Nachbetriebs-
bzw. Stilllegungsphase, nur zwei der abgeschalteten
Anlagen haben noch keine Stilllegungsgenehmigung
erhalten; die Anträge sind gestellt, sodass
auch diese Anlagen in absehbarer Zeit mit der Stilllegung
beginnen werden. Die hohe Zahl an Projekten im Rückbau,
die gleichzeitig in Bearbeitung sind, zeigt, dass für kerntechnische
Unternehmen genügend Aufgaben anstehen.
Unsere Kerntechnische Gesellschaft wurde am 14. April
1969 zunächst als Kerntechnische Gesellschaft im
Deutschen Atomforum gegründet. Bei der Gründungsversammlung
in der Aula der Universität Frankfurt am
Main wählten die 163 Neu-Mitglieder Herrn Prof. Wolf
Häfele zu ihrem ersten Vorsitzenden.
Professor Häfele beschrieb unsere KTG als „gemeinsamen
kerntechnischen Heimathafen von Wissenschaft und
Technik“. Ein schönes Bild, das bis heute so Bestand hat.
Werner von Siemens beschrieb den Zusammenhang
von Wissenschaft und Technik übrigens wie folgt: „Die
naturwissenschaftliche Forschung bildet immer den
sicheren Boden des technischen Fortschritts, und die
Industrie eines Landes wird niemals eine internationale,
leitende Stellung erwerben und sich selbst erhalten
können, wenn das Land nicht gleichzeitig an der Spitze des
naturwissenschaftlichen Fortschritts steht.“
Betreiber, Hersteller, Behörden und Gutachter, Lehre
und Forschung verbindet nach wie vor ein zentrales
Thema: das kerntechnische Know-how muss in
Deutschland erhalten werden, um den verbleibenden
Leistungsbetrieb, den Nachbetrieb, die Stilllegung und
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KTG INSIDE
den Rückbau deutscher Anlagen sicherzustellen und die
Entsorgungsfrage nachhaltig zu lösen.
Deutschland ist ein Land der Spitzenforschung, das
Forschungsreaktoren betreibt und in internationalen
Nuklearforschungsprogrammen mitarbeitet. Deutschland
hat einzigartige wissenschaftliche und industrielle Fähigkeiten
in der Kerntechnik, zu deren langfristigen Erhalt
eine ausreichend große kritische Masse von deutschen
Herstellern, ihren Zulieferern und Dienstleistern notwendig
ist. In unserem Land wurden und werden die
verlässlichsten Kernkraftwerke und kerntechnischen
Anlagen betrieben.
Die Bundesregierung plant, auch in der Zukunft
internationale Sicherheitsbewertungen durchführen zu
können. Dieses Interesse wird sicherlich langfristig
bestehen, da die Mehrzahl der anderen Staaten, die Kernenergie
nutzen, keinen Ausstieg anstreben. Ohne eine
eigene kerntechnische Industrie und einer entsprechend
eingebetteten Forschungslandschaft, wird es schwer
möglich sein, weiter weltweit eine treibende Kraft kerntechnischer
Sicherheit zu sein.
Heute Vormittag haben wir den Vortrag von Florian
Gremme zum Thema „Selbstverständnis und Perspektive
des kerntechnischen Nachwuchses“ gehört. Ich fand die
Ausführungen von Florian als Vertreter unserer „Jungen
Generation“ sehr gelungen und hervorragend ehrlich. Da
haben wir Zuversicht gehört: „Wir sind da! Einer muss sich
um den Rückbau des ungeliebten Klimaschützers ja
kümmern.“
Der Arbeitsplatz in der Kernenergie ist zumindest bis
zum Ende des Rückbaus stabil, aber Kernenergie hat in der
Öffentlichkeit ein schlechtes Image, die Stigmatisierung
der Kernenergie muss beendet werden.“
Florian schloss seinen Vortrag wie folgt: „Es muss
daher ein integrales Konzept von Industrie, Wissenschaft
und Forschung, Ausbildung sowie Politik her, um die
Attraktivität der Kerntechnik zu erhöhen, um kerntechnischen,
ggf. lehrenden, Nachwuchs zu finden und zu
fördern und um schließlich die kerntechnischen Aufgaben
in unserem Land zu bewältigen.“
Abschließend möchte ich mich bei allen bedanken,
die diese Tagung organisiert und mitgestaltet haben.
Insbesondere gilt mein Dank dem Programmausschuss
und allen Referenten dieser Tagung. Unsere KTG hat
­erneut ein exzellentes und hochaktuelles Programm
vorbereitet. Gerade in Zeiten großer Herausforderungen
ist der Beitrag unserer KTG-Mitglieder, die sich persönlich
mit großem Engagement für Kerntechnik „made in
Germany“ im Allgemeinen und für unsere Jahrestagung
im Speziellen einbringen, nicht hoch genug zu würdigen.
Dafür möchten wir uns auch an dieser Stelle nach drücklich
noch einmal bedanken. Wir gehen auch weiterhin davon
aus, dass die Unternehmen und Organisationen, in denen
unsere ehrenamtlichen Mitglieder arbeiten, diese
KTG-Tätigkeit wertschätzen. Was die Mitglieder der KTG
verbindet, ist die „Faszination Kerntechnik“. Lassen auch
Sie sich davon anstecken…
Ihr Frank Apel
Verleihung der Ehrenmitgliedschaft
der Kerntechnischen Gesellschaft e. V.
an Dr. Ralf Güldner
Sehr geehrten Damen und Herren!
Liebe KTG-Mitglieder!
Werte Gäste!
Ich freue mich, dass Sie den Weg zurück in den Plenarsaal
gefunden haben und hoffe, dass Sie am Nachmittag
in den Focus Sessions interessante Präsentationen erleben
konnten und einen aktiven Austausch zu den Themen
hatten.
Seit Jahren ehren wir verdiente Größen unserer
Branche und es ist mir eine große Freude, Sie so zahl reich
zur diesjährigen Verleihung der KTG-Ehren mitgliedschaft
begrüßen zu dürfen.
Zum 39. Mal wird heute eine Persönlichkeit für ihre
Verdienste um die Kerntechnik ausgezeichnet und ich
freue mich ganz besonders, in diesem Jahr Dr. Ralf ­Güldner
für sein unermüdliches Engagement und seinen tatkräftigen
Einsatz für die Kerntechnik ehren zu dürfen.
Lieber Dr. Güldner, seien Sie uns auf das Herzlichste
hier im Estrel Convention Center willkommen!
Im Besonderen möchte ich an dieser Stelle auch unsere
hier anwesenden Ehrenmitglieder der KTG und auch die
ehemaligen Präsidenten des DAtF begrüßen.
Ich darf das Handelsblatt vom 15. April 2010 zitieren:
„Während die Energiekonzerne mit der Bundesregierung
über längere Laufzeiten für Kernkraftwerke verhandeln,
wechselt der Mann an der Spitze des deutschen
Atom forums. Energie-Manager Ralf Güldner soll neuer
­Cheflobbyist der Atombranche werden. Er gilt als offensiver
Verfechter der Kerntechnik.“ So die Überschrift und
dann geht es weiter: „Das Deutsche Atomforum bekommt
einen neuen Präsidenten: Ralf Güldner wird das Amt in
Kürze übernehmen, Güldner stellt sich der Aufgabe in
einer schwierigen Phase. Die Erfahrungen, die Güldner im
Umgang mit Verbänden und Politik gesammelt hat, wird er
künftig gut gebrauchen können. In den kommenden
Monaten müssen die vier deutschen Kernkraftwerksbetreiber
mit der Bundesregierung über die Verlängerung
der Laufzeiten verhandeln. Güldner ist ein offensiver Verfechter
der Kerntechnik. „Die politischen Entscheidungen
der Vergangenheit waren schädlich, Deutschland hat sich
in dieser Frage isoliert“, sagt Güldner mit Blick auf den
Atomausstieg. Technisch einwandfreie Kraftwerke vom
Netz zu nehmen, die kostengünstig und verlässlich Strom
erzeugten, ergebe keinen Sinn.“
Starke Worte. Und damals wie heute: bewegte Zeiten,
in denen es auf engagierte und beherzte Menschen
ankommt, die sich von der Kerntechnik nicht nur faszinieren
lassen sondern sich für diese auch stark machen.
Menschen wie Sie, Dr. Güldner, die sich mit tiefster Überzeugung
und unermüdlicher Hingabe für unsere Branche
einsetzen. Hierfür gilt Ihnen unser ausdrücklicher Dank!
Sie haben in Ihrem gesamten Berufsleben Ehrgeiz,
Einsatz und Engagement bewiesen, das verrät auch ein
Blick auf Ihre berufliche Vita:
Ralf Güldner studierte von 1972 bis 1978 an der
Ludwig-­Maximilians-Universität in München Chemie,
1981 promovierte er dort in Radiochemie. Ab 1981 war er
bei der Alkem GmbH, dem spätereren Brennelemente­werk
in Hanau tätig. Von 1995 bis 1999 war Dr. Güldner bei
Advanced Nuclear Fuels, der ANF zunächst als Werkleiter
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in Duisburg (heute ist übrigens die Duisburg Tubes
Production ein Unternehmen der Chinesischen Taihai-
Gruppe) und dann als Geschäftsführer in Lingen tätig.
Danach verantwortete er für zwei Jahre das europäische
Brennelement-Geschäft der Siemens AG in Erlangen. Von
2001 bis 2008 war Dr. Güldner technischer Geschäftsführer
und Arbeitsdirektor der Framatome ANP GmbH
in Erlangen, heute sind aus der damaligen Framatome
ANP drei Firmen am Standort Erlangen entstanden: die
Framatome, die Orano und die AREVA GmbH. In seinen
letzten drei Jahren bei der AREVA leitete Dr. Güldner als
Executive Vice President von Paris aus das weltweite
Brenn elementegeschäft des Nuklearunternehmens.
In 2008 wechselten Sie, lieber Dr. Güldner – leider,
denn damit hatte ich in Erlangen meinen Chef verloren –
zur E.ON.
In Hannover war Dr. Güldner von 2008 bis 2016
Mitglied der Geschäftsführung der E.ON Kernkraft GmbH
bzw. der PreussenElektra GmbH und in den Jahren 2010
bis 2015 deren Vorsitzender. Seine Zuständigkeit betraf
die Bereiche „Neubau“, „Rückbau“ und „Brennstoffkreislauf“.
Bis heute ist Dr. Ralf Güldner Mitglied des Aufsichtsrats
der PreussenElektra GmbH in Hannover.
Neben Ihrem eindrucksvollen beruflichen Werdegang
haben Sie sich – Dr. Güldner – auch in verschiedenen
Verbänden national und international für die Kerntechnik
nachhaltig eingesetzt:
Egoistisch beginne ich mit der KTG: in der Zeit von
2003 bis 2006 waren Sie unser Vorsitzender; von 2006 bis
2008 waren Sie Vorsitzender der World Nuclear
Association; von 2009 bis 2011 waren Sie Präsident des
europäischen Branchenverbandes FORATOM und das
Präsidium des Deutschen Atomforums hat Sie im April
2010 einstimmig zu seinem neuen Präsidenten gewählt,
der Sie bis gestern waren.
Ihre fachlichen Stärken auf den Gebieten des Kernbrennstoffkreislaufes,
dem KKW-Neubau und Rückbau
haben Ihre Dienstherren hervorragend erkannt und für
eine starke Kerntechnik „Made in Germany“ genutzt. Dazu
kommen Ihre einzigartigen Kommunikationsfähigkeiten.
Der Reihe nach: ich konnte Sie Ende der neunziger
Jahre im Wesentlichen bei Brennelement-Kunden in den
Nordic Countries erleben. Neben erfolgreichen Geschäftsabschlüssen
in Schweden und Finnland, deren Anlagen
übrigens partiell heute noch deutsche Brennelemente
in den Kernen haben, war für Sie der Dialog über die
Nutzung der Kernenergie als CO 2 -armer Stromlieferant
und der gesellschaftliche Energie-Dialog wichtig. Es
gelang Ihnen, internationale Kontakte zu knüpfen, die Sie
als Netzwerker heute noch nutzen.
Im Neubau haben Sie sich für die E.ON oder auch partiell
gemeinsam mit anderen Deutschen EVU’s einen
hervorragenden Ruf erarbeitet. In den Gesprächen in
Großbritannien, Finnland, Frankreich oder Italien war es
Ihr Ziel, hervorragende Anlagentechnik und Anlagenkenntnis
vereint mit einem fundierten Betreiber wissen in
KKW-Neubau-Projekten einzu bringen. Die Anlagen der
neuen Generation, die im Ausland gebaut werden sollten,
basierten auch auf deutschen Referenzen eines sicheren
Leistungs betriebes und wiederholten Weltmeistertiteln
bei Verfügbarkeit und Stromproduktion.
Bezüglich des KKW-Neubaus haben Sie – wie viele
andere auch – in der ersten Dekade dieses Jahrhunderts an
eine bevorstehende KKW-Renaissance geglaubt, so sicher,
dass Sie mit der Grünen-Politikerin Bärbel Höhn
wetteten, in Italien werde bis 2020 mindestens ein
neues Kernkraftwerk die Stromproduktion aufnehmen.
Ansonsten würden Sie Sekt auf einem Grünen- Parteitag
ausschenken. Mit dem Referendum in Italien ist es
anders gekommen…
Die im Eingangszitat erwähnten Verhandlungen über
eine Laufzeitverlängerung für deutsche Anlagen waren
erfolgreich: Betrieb der Kernkraftwerke bis zum Jahre
2036. Mit dem 11. März 2011 und den Ereignissen in
Fukushima kam dann jedoch alles ganz anders. Aber Sie
haben gekämpft und hier hat der „Kommunikator Güldner“
Großes geleistet.
Als Präsident des Atomforums waren Sie Deutschlands
begehrtester Gesprächspartner zu allen sich aufdrängenden
Fragen. Keine Talkshow, die nicht dieses
Thema aufgemacht und Sie nicht angefragt hat und kein
ZDF-Spezial- oder Morgenmagazin ohne Ralf Güldner.
Und hier ist sich die Branche einig: Sie haben einen supertollen
Job gemacht.
Ihre Präsenz in den Medien Dr. Güldner – und übrigens
nicht nur im Jahr 2011 – war und ist beein druckend, Ihre
inhaltlichen Ausführungen, Ihre verbale Überzeugungskraft
aber auch Ihre bemerkenswerte Sachlichkeit und
Ruhe selbst bei provo zierenden Frage stellungen deutscher
und inter nationaler Medienvertreter waren und sind
einzigartig.
„Rückbau können wir“ haben Sie uns oft gesagt und das
stimmt. Hier – wie auch im internationalen Neubau, bei
Nachrüstungen und im Brennelementgeschäft – setzen Sie
sich dafür ein, dass deutsche Lieferanten von Kerntechnik
auch im Ausland erfolgreich sind. Neben dem Geschäftserfolg
für die Unternehmen kann dies einen Beitrag zum
Kompetenzerhalt Kerntechnik leisten. Ob im Rahmen von
„Energie im Dialog“, Interviews oder anderen öffentlichen
Debatten fordern Sie den „Masterplan für die Weiterentwicklung
der kerntechnischen Kompetenz“. Ich zitiere
aus Ihrer Eröffnungsrede der AMNT des letzten Jahres:
„ Angesichts der Notwendigkeit der Weiterentwicklung
der kerntechnischen Kompetenz und Fähigkeiten zur
Bewältigung der anstehenden Aufgaben in Deutschland
und zum Erhalt der internationalen Mitsprache fähigkeit
ist die Frage angebracht, wann es einen Masterplan der
Bundesregierung für die Weiterent wicklung der kerntechnischen
Kompetenz geben wird. Einen Masterplan,
der es Deutschland auch in zehn, in 20 und in 30 Jahren
erlauben wird, internationale Entwicklungen sei es im
Betrieb, in der Regulierung oder in der Forschung adäquat
bewerten zu können.“
In den zurückliegenden Jahrzehnten verbanden Sie
Ihr Talent und Ihre beeindruckende Fachkenntnis mit
politischem Geschick, Beharrlichkeit, Durchsetzungsvermögen
und der charmanten und höflichen Art, die
wir so an Ihnen schätzen. Neben Fachmann, Netz werker
und Kommunikator sind Sie Dr. Güldner übrigens
immer eins geblieben: ein Mensch / ein Chef – mit
großem Herz und Empathie, einem offenen Ohr für
­berufliches und ­privates. Für mich persönlich waren und
sind Sie Vorbild. Sie sind Familienmensch, der jetzt – auch
– Zeit für die Enkel und die Hobbies hat. Obwohl
Sie im Besitz des bayerischen Jagdscheins sind, habe ich
bislang wenig Jägerlatein von Ihnen vernommen,
Geschichten vom Fischen im eigenen Gewässer gab es
schon.
Für Ihren jahrzehntelangen unermüdlichen Einsatz
für die Deutsche, aber auch Europäische und internationale
Kerntechnik möchten wir Ihnen aufrichtig
danken und Sie als Zeichen unserer hohen Wert schätzung
mit der diesjährigen Ehrenmitgliedschaft der Kerntechnischen
Gesellschaft auszeichnen.
369
KTG INSIDE
KTG Inside

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370
KTG INSIDE
Lieber Herr Dr. Güldner, willkommen als neues Ehrenmitglied
der KTG! Sie sind uns eine große Bereicherung
und ich hoffe, dass Sie uns auch noch aus Ihrem Fast-Ruhestand
in Herrsching am Ammersee mit Ihren Erfahrungen
als Ratgeber zur Verfügung stehen werden.
Dr. Ralf Güldner ist promovierter Chemiker. Lassen Sie
mich deshalb an dieser Stelle den deutschen Chemiker
Prof. Quadbeck-Seeger zitieren „Reden ist Silber, Loben ist
Gold!“. Damit schließe ich auch in der Hoffnung, dass Sie
sich in meinen Worten wieder gefunden haben. Das Motto
der KTG könnte – lieber Herr Dr. Güldner – Ihr Lebenscredo
sein: „Kerntechnik – Meine Faszination“.
Herzlichen Dank!
Frank Apel
Im Anschluss an die Verleihung und die Laudatio
bedankte sich Dr. Ralf Güldner wie folgt:
Lieber Herr Apel,
zunächst einmal herzlichen Dank für diese – natürlich
etwas übertriebene – Laudatio.
Lieber Herr Apel, liebe Mitglieder des KTG Vorstands,
liebe Mitgliederinnen und Mitglieder der KTG, Ihnen allen
einen ganz herzlichen Dank für diese Aus zeichnung. Ich
empfinde diese Ehrenmitgliedschaft als eine große Ehre.
Natürlich sehe ich persönlich darin eine Aner kennung
meines Wirkens in den verschiedenen Funktionen meiner
beruflichen Laufbahn, in den hauptamtlichen Aufgaben
bei Siemens, AREVA und EON/PreussenElektra aber auch
in den „Nebentätigkeiten“ beim DAtF, WNA, Foratom und
natürlich in der KTG. Dies gilt umso mehr als das Verhältnis
zur KTG und Teilen der Mitgliedschaft nicht
immer konfliktfrei war. Ich erinnere mich an Zeiten der
politischen Aus stiegsbeschlüsse als aus der KTG heraus –
inhaltlich berechtigt – eine klarere öffentliche Positionierung
für unsere Technologie gefordert wurde, dies aber
politisch insbesondere mit Blick auf die Interessen der EVU
nicht opportun war. Oder die Internationalisierung des
AMNT mit einer verstärkten Ausrichtung auf englische
Vorträge, die auch nicht in allen Teilen der KTG positiv
gesehen wurde. Rückblickend glaube ich, dass es richtig
war nicht auf öffentliche Konfrontation zu setzen
auch wenn mehr Investitionen in eine aufklärende Öffentlichkeitsarbeit
sinnvoll gewesen wären. Auch die internationale
Ausrichtung des AMNT hat Früchte getragen,
wie wir hier und heute wieder feststellen können.
Die besondere Wertschätzung dieser Auszeichnung
leite ich aber aus den Leistungen der KTG und Ihrer
Mitglieder ab, ohne die „Kerntechnik made in Germany“
heute nicht die internationale Wertschätzung erfahren
würde, die wir immer noch spüren.
Wenn man die Listen der KTG Vorsitzenden und der
Ehrenmitglieder durchgeht, dann liest sich das wie das
„Who is Who“ der deutschen Kerntechnik: da finden sich
herausragende Ingenieure, großartige Wissenschaftler,
Vorstände, die mutige Investitionsentscheidungen
getroffen haben, sogar der eine oder andere Politiker –
heute kaum noch denkbar – und auch ein paar ausländische
Kollegen.
In meiner Zeit als Vorsitzender durfte ich einige Ehrenmitgliedschaften
selbst überreichen und ich war bei vielen
Verleihungen dabei. In besonderer Erinnerung ist mir
aber die Verleihung an Dr. Yumi Akimoto im Jahr 2001
geblieben. Dr. Wolf-Dieter Krebs war damals der KTG
­Vorsitzende. Dr. Akimoto berichtete in seiner Dankes­rede,
dass er als Jugendlicher Augenzeuge eines der Atombombenabwürfe
in Japan war. Er sagte dann, dass er sofort
von dieser Energie fasziniert war und den Gedanken hatte,
diese für friedliche Zwecke zu nutzen. Beeindruckend,
Faszination Kerntechnik auf eine ganz besondere Art!
Meine Damen und Herren, es ist mir eine große Ehre
und ich bin stolz darauf Mitglied in diesem erlesenen Kreis
zu werden.
Meine Damen und Herren, bei einem derartigen Anlass
und zum 50. Geburtstag der KTG muss man natürlich auch
nach vorne sehen. Wie geht es weiter. Ich bin der Überzeugung,
dass wir auch in Zukunft kerntechnische
Kompetenz in Deutschland brauchen, für die restlichen
Betriebsjahre der Kernkraftwerke, den geordneten Rückbau,
die sichere Endlagerung, die kerntechnische
Forschung, den Betrieb von For schungsreaktoren, die
Teilnahme an internationalen Forschungsprojekten wie
z. B. Iter, die Anwendung von Kerntechnik in Medizin und
Technik natürlich für die Diskussion um zukünftige
Reaktorentwicklungen auf internationaler Ebene.
Dafür brauchen wir junge Menschen, die ebenfalls von
der Kerntechnik und ihren Möglichkeiten fasziniert sind
und diesen jungen Menschen sollte die KTG ein attraktives
Angebot machen, das sie nicht ausschlagen können. Das ist
in unserer heutigen Gesellschaft, in der das Engagement
für eine Sache in Organisationen oder Vereinen etwas aus
der Mode gekommen ist, nicht einfach.
Es gibt aber Hoffnung. Kürzlich gab es in Bayern unter
dem Titel „Rettet die Bienen“ ein Bürgerbegehren für
mehr Artenvielfalt. Das Bürgerbegehren wurde angenommen
und die Bayerische Staatsregierung ist dabei die
Forderungen umzusetzen. Nun wird es sicher nicht gleich
ein Bürgerbegehren für mehr Artenvielfalt in der grundlastfähigen,
CO 2 -freien Stromerzeugung geben, aber
vielleicht hat ja die Kernenergie in Deutschland doch noch
eine Zukunft.
Nehmen wir doch die Windenergie als Beispiel, die
gab es in früheren Jahrhunderten auch schon mal und
heute bewundern wir mit nostalgischem Blick die noch
­existierenden dickbäuchigen Windmühlen vergangener
Jahr hunderte. Heute ist die Windenergie wieder da, in
neuer Form, eleganter, schlanker, effizienter, ein Stützpfeiler
unserer Energiewende.
Es gibt keinen Grund, heute eine derartige Ent wicklung
für die Kernenergie auszuschließen. Das Klimaproblem
wird uns erhalten bleiben und der Bedarf an CO 2 -freier Energie
wird steigen. Bleiben wir am Ball. Welche Rolle mir
als Ehrenmitglied dabei zukommt weiß ich nicht, ich halte
es da wie Franz Beckenbauer. Als er Ehrenpräsident des FC
Bayern wurde, fragte ihn ein Journalist nach den Aufgaben
eines Ehren präsidenten. Franz antwortete, das
wisse er nicht, aber wenn er gebraucht wird, sei er da.
Herzlichen Dank!
Dr. Ralf Güldner
KTG Inside

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
Herzlichen Glückwunsch!
Die KTG gratuliert ihren Mitgliedern sehr herzlich zum Geburtstag
und wünscht ihnen weiterhin alles Gute!
371
Juli 2019
30 Jahre | 1989
10. Dirk Voß, Lingen, Ems
50 Jahre | 1969
6. Dipl.-Ing. Tadeusz Kozielewski, Düren
55 Jahre | 1964
4. Siegfried Krüger, Grevenbroich
14. Jens-Peter Seyer, Hemmingstedt
60 Jahre | 1959
10. Prof. Dr. Ulrich W. Scherer, Jülich
70 Jahre | 1949
9. Roland Gottfried, Baiersdorf
26. Kurt Wagner, Recklinghausen
75 Jahre | 1944
17. J. Krellmann, Le Puy Ste. Réparade/FR
20. Günter Langer , Rosbach
76 Jahre | 1943
10. Dipl.-Ing. Dieter Eder, Alzenau
79 Jahre | 1940
31. Dr. Peter Schneider-Kühnle, Worms
80 Jahre | 1939
10. Dr. Bernhard Steinmetz,
Bergisch Gladbach
23. Heinz Stahlschmidt, Erlangen
26. Dipl.-Ing. Ewald Passig, Bochum
81 Jahre | 1938
30. Dr. Philipp Dünner, Odenthal
82 Jahre | 1937
29. Dr. Herbert Reutler, Köln
85 Jahre | 1934
14. Prof. Dr. Walter-H. Köhler, Wien/AU
87 Jahre | 1932
24. Dipl.-Ing. Joachim May, Burgwesel
31. Dr. Theodor Dippel,
Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen
August 2019
40 Jahre | 1979
20. Dr. Chris Breuer, Gronau
60 Jahre | 1959
29. Dr. Martin Steinbrück,
Linkenheim-Hochstetten
30. Dr. Marina Sokcic-Kostic,
Eggenstein-Leopoldshafen
70 Jahre | 1949
8. Dipl.-Ing. Frank-Egbert Rubbel,
Hannover
22. Dipl.-Ing. Gerold Klein, Stadland
75 Jahre | 1944
24. Dr. Gerd Uhlmann, Dresden
29. Dipl.-Phys. Harald Scharf, AX
Goes/NL
77 Jahre | 1942
28. Dipl.-Ing. Hans-J. Fröhlich, Berzhahn
78 Jahre | 1941
17. Dipl.-Ing. Jörg-Hermann Gutena,
Emmerthal
21. Dipl.-Phys. Peter Kahlstatt, Hameln
80 Jahre | 1939
1. Dipl.-Ing. Gerhard Becker,
Neunkirchen-Seelscheid
29. Dr.-Ing. E. h. Adolf Hüttl, Monte Estoril
(Parque Palmela)/PT
81 Jahre | 1938
6. Prof. Dr. Rudolf Avenhaus, Baldham
21. Dr. Gerhard Schücktanz, Altdorf
84 Jahre | 1935
16. Dr. Dietmar Albert, Salzgitter
85 Jahre | 1934
15. Dipl.-Phys. Heinrich Glantz,
Eggenstein-Leopoldsh.
88 Jahre | 1931
11. Dipl.-Ing. Siegfried Dreyer, Overath
90 Jahre | 1929
2. Dipl.-Phys. Wolfgang Schwarzer,
Weilerswist
Wenn Sie künftig eine
Erwähnung Ihres
Geburtstages in der
atw wünschen, teilen
Sie dies bitte der KTG-
Geschäftsstelle mit.
KTG Inside
Verantwortlich
für den Inhalt:
Die Autoren.
Lektorat:
Natalija Cobanov,
Kerntechnische
Gesellschaft e. V.
(KTG)
Robert-Koch-Platz 4
10115 Berlin
T: +49 30 498555-50
F: +49 30 498555-51
E-Mail:
natalija.cobanov@
ktg.org
www.ktg.org
NEWS
Top
IEA: Steep decline in nuclear
power would threaten energy
security and climate goals
(iea) With nuclear power facing an
uncertain future in many countries,
the world risks a steep decline in
its use in advanced economies that
could result in billions of tonnes of
additional carbon emissions, according
to a new report by the International
Energy Agency.
Nuclear is the second-largest lowcarbon
power source in the world
today, accounting for 10 % of global
electricity generation. It is second
only to hydropower at 16 %. For advanced
economies – including the
United States, Canada, the European
Union and Japan – nuclear has
been the biggest low-carbon source
of electricity for more than 30 years
and remains so today. It plays an
important role in electricity security in
several countries.
However, the future of nuclear
power is uncertain as ageing plants
are beginning to close in advanced
economies, partly because of policies
to phase them out but also as a result
of economic and regulatory factors.
Without policy changes, advanced
economies could lose 25 % of their
nuclear capacity by 2025 and as much
as two-thirds of it by 2040, according
to the new report, Nuclear Power in a
Clean Energy System.
The lack of further lifetime extensions
of existing nuclear plants and
new projects could result in an
additional 4 billion tonnes of CO 2
emissions.
Some countries have opted out of
nuclear power in light of concerns
about safety and other issues. Many
others, however, still see a role for
nuclear in their energy transitions but
are not doing enough to meet their
goals, according to the report.
With its mission to cover all fuels
and technologies, the IEA hopes that
the publication of its first report
addressing nuclear power in nearly
two decades will help bring the topic
back into the global energy debate.
The report is being released during
the 10th Clean Energy Ministerial in
Vancouver, Canada.
“Without an important contribution
from nuclear power, the global
energy transition will be that much
harder,” said Dr Fatih Birol, the IEA’s
Executive Director. “Alongside renewables,
energy efficiency and other
innovative technologies, nuclear can
make a significant contribution to
achieving sustainable energy goals
and enhancing energy security. But
News

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372
NEWS
| | IEA: Steep decline in nuclear power would
threaten energy security and climate goals
unless the barriers it faces are overcome,
its role will soon be on a steep
decline worldwide, particularly in the
United States, Europe and Japan.”
The new report finds that extending
the operational life of existing
nuclear plants requires substantial
capital investment. But its cost is
competitive with other electricity
generation technologies, including
new solar and wind projects, and can
lead to a more secure, less disruptive
energy transition.
Market conditions remain unfavourable,
however, for lengthening
the lifetimes of nuclear plants. An
­extended period of low wholesale
electricity prices in most advanced
economies has sharply reduced or
eliminated profit margins for many
technologies, putting nuclear plants
at risk of shutting down early.
In the United States, for example,
some 90 reactors have 60-year operating
licenses, yet several have already
retired early and many more are at
risk. In Europe, Japan and other
­advanced economies, extensions of
plants’ lifetimes also face uncertain
prospects.
Investment in new nuclear projects
in advanced economies is even more
difficult. New projects planned in
Finland, France and the United States
are not yet in service and have faced
major cost overruns. Korea has been
an important exception, with a record
of completing construction of new
projects on time and on budget,
though government policy aims to end
new nuclear construction.
A sharp decline in nuclear power
capacity in advanced economies
would have major implications. Without
additional lifetime extensions and
new builds, achieving key sustainable
energy goals, including international
climate targets, would become more
difficult and expensive.
If other low-carbon sources,
­namely wind and solar PV, are to fill
the shortfall in nuclear, their deployment
would have to accelerate to an
unprecedented level. In the past 20
years, wind and solar PV capacity has
increased by about 580 gigawatts in
advanced economies. But over the
next 20 years, nearly five times that
amount would need to be added. Such
a drastic increase in renewable power
generation would create serious
challenges in integrating the new
sources into the broader energy
system. Clean energy transitions in
advanced economies would also
­require $1.6 trillion in additional
investment over the same period,
which would end up hurting consumers
through higher electricity
bills.
“Policy makers hold the key to
nuclear power’s future,” Dr Birol said.
“Electricity market design must value
the environmental and energy security
attributes of nuclear power and
other clean energy sources. Governments
should recognise the costcompetitiveness
of safely extending
the lifetimes of existing nuclear
plants.”
As governments and industry
address these challenges, the IEA is
ready to provide support with data,
analysis and real-world solutions.
| | www.iea.org
Deloitte study: The widespread
economic benefits
of Europe’s nuclear
energy industry
(nucnet) A high nuclear power capacity
of 150 GW by 2050 – up from
about 118 GW today – would result
in widespread economic benefits
throughout the EU, sustaining more
than one million jobs and hundreds of
billions of euros in additional GDP
growth, tax revenues and household
income, a study has concluded.
The aim of the study, carried out
by Deloitte for the Brussels-based
nuclear industry Foratom, was to
assess the contribution of the nuclear
sector to the overall economy of the
EU-28 both today and until 2050.
It said the European nuclear industry
sustains in 2019 more than
1.1 million full-time jobs in the EU and
generates more than half a trillion
euros in GDP. The report also
con cluded that in 2019 the nuclear
­industry generates € 124.2 bn in
state revenues, generates € 383.1 bn
in household income, generates
€ 507.4 bn in EU GDP, and generates
€ 1,092.3 bn volume of investment
and an € 18.1 bn trade surplus in the
EU economy.
| | www.deloitte.com
Sustainable Finance:
FORATOM calls for relevant
criteria to be applied equally
to all technologies
(foratom) FORATOM welcomes the
European Commission’s goal of
­creating a sustainable finance initiative
which supports technologies that
can help Europe decarbonise its
economy. We take note of the work
undertaken so far to develop an EU
classification ­system for environmentally
sustainable economic activities,
however, we believe that much still
needs to be done, especially as coal
and nuclear have been put on an equal
footing. In FORATOM’s opinion, the
Taxonomy ­report published yesterday
discriminates between technologies
as it does not apply the same criteria
equally to the different low-carbon
power sources.
“Both the IPCC and the IEA have
made it very clear that decarboni sation
goals cannot be achieved without
nuclear energy. On this point, we
welcome the fact that the report
recognises that nuclear is a contributor
to climate mitigation objectives”, says
Yves Desbazeille, FORATOM Director
General. “However, whilst we understand
concerns regarding nuclear
waste – despite the fact that the industry
manages it in a respon sible and
sustainable way – we question why it is
only this particular type of waste which
has been targeted. We expect that,
moving forward, the Commission will
engage with experts on this issue to
enable a fact-based debate which will
ultimately lead to nuclear being included
in this initiative”.
The ultimate goal of the sustainable
finance initiative is to decarbonise
the economy, therefore it is
important that it does not include
fossil fuel-based technologies. At the
same time, it is also essential that it
does not trigger other environmental
impacts. Indeed, all power producing
technologies have an environmental
impact at some point during their life
cycle (such as significant land use or
the generation of toxic/hazardous
waste). Whilst reducing CO 2 emissions
is important, so is using less raw
materials and minimising our impact
on biodiversity, for example.
FORATOM believes that this
­initiative should not aim to exclude
a particular technology without
News

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Operating Results February 2019
Plant name Country Nominal
capacity
Type
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated, gross
[MWh]
Month Year Since
commissioning
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability
[%] *) Energy utilisation
[%] *)
Month Year Month Year Month Year
OL1 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 672 622 312 1 302 341 262 957 549 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.39 100.66 99.97
OL2 Olkiluoto BWR FI 910 880 672 620 873 1 307 315 253 203 858 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.96 100.43 100.35
KCB Borssele 2) PWR NL 512 484 514 2 611 230 2 991 699 164 713 388 75.54 88.16 75.37 88.08 76.13 88.77
KKB 1 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 672 259 063 545 909 127 880 019 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 101.49 101.51
KKB 2 Beznau 7) PWR CH 380 365 672 257 626 542 761 134 893 168 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.88 100.87
KKG Gösgen 7) PWR CH 1060 1010 630 658 478 1 455 121 315 330 649 93.75 97.03 91.98 96.17 92.44 96.95
KKM Mühleberg BWR CH 390 373 672 259 730 544 220 127 948 535 100.00 100.00 99.95 99.51 99.10 98.55
CNT-I Trillo PWR ES 1066 1003 672 713 243 1 502 767 248 794 436 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.14 99.05
Dukovany B1 PWR CZ 500 473 665 318 249 690 302 112 919 796 98.96 99.51 98.96 99.51 94.72 97.50
Dukovany B2 PWR CZ 500 473 672 331 929 701 445 108 935 616 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 98.79 99.07
Dukovany B3 2) PWR CZ 500 473 361 168 874 168 874 106 666 915 53.72 25.49 50.28 23.86 50.26 23.85
Dukovany B4 PWR CZ 500 473 672 337 618 710 715 107 153 984 100.00 100.00 99.92 99.70 100.48 100.38
Temelin B1 PWR CZ 1080 1030 672 707 307 1 517 389 115 878 431 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 97.28 99.04
Temelin B2 PWR CZ 1080 1030 672 735 915 1 550 643 110 823 160 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 101.21 101.21
Doel 1 2) PWR BE 454 433 0 0 0 135 444 462 0 0 0 0 0 0
Doel 2 2) PWR BE 454 433 595 239 087 239 087 134 041 027 88.76 42.13 77.08 36.58 77.65 36.85
Doel 3 3) PWR BE 1056 1006 542 576 785 1 382 502 256 514 987 80.65 90.82 79.74 90.39 80.72 91.86
Doel 4 PWR BE 1084 1033 672 734 514 1 481 070 261 854 480 100.00 100.00 99.52 94.85 99.56 94.96
Tihange 1 PWR BE 1009 962 672 687 221 1 450 879 300 281 737 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 101.58 101.78
Tihange 2 2) PWR BE 1055 1008 0 0 0 254 651 930 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tihange 3 PWR BE 1089 1038 672 725 869 1 483 056 272 710 329 100.00 99.85 99.75 96.54 99.75 96.58
373
NEWS
Plant name
Type
Nominal
capacity
gross
[MW]
net
[MW]
Operating
time
generator
[h]
Energy generated, gross
[MWh]
Time availability
[%]
Energy availability
[%] *) Energy utilisation
[%] *)
Month Year Since Month Year Month Year Month Year
commissioning
KBR Brokdorf DWR 1480 1410 672 896 739 1 836 834 352 404 644 100.00 100.00 94.30 94.23 89.89 87.28
KKE Emsland DWR 1406 1335 672 936 652 1 972 463 348 791 432 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.17 99.11
KWG Grohnde DWR 1430 1360 672 918 011 1 936 645 379 510 859 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.94 95.00 95.11
KRB C Gundremmingen SWR 1344 1288 672 902 983 1 912 453 332 854 208 100.00 100.00 99.43 99.73 99.38 99.91
KKI-2 Isar DWR 1485 1410 672 987 624 2 081 475 355 807 288 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.99 98.71 98.74
GKN-II Neckarwestheim DWR 1400 1310 672 928 600 1 953 900 331 780 734 100.00 100.00 99.93 99.97 99.03 98.88
KKP-2 Philippsburg DWR 1468 1402 672 973 507 2 054 789 368 215 944 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.96 97.20 97.35
pro­viding a valid justification. In order
to identify whether an energy source
is sustainable or not, it is important to
evaluate each one on the basis of
objective criteria and using a whole
life-cycle approach. In our opinion,
the following criteria should be considered:
pp
Impact on CO 2 emissions
pp
Impact on air pollution
pp
Impact on water
pp
Impact on raw materials (volume
of raw materials required, presence
of responsible sourcing
schemes, social responsibility and
traceability of origin in front end
activities
pp
Waste generation and prevention
(volume, toxicity, traceability, responsibility
in back-end treatment/
disposal)
pp
Impact on land use
pp
Impact on habitats and biodiversity
By producing such criteria and applying
it equally, we have the chance to
achieve our CO 2 emission reduction
targets, whilst at the same time minimising
other environmental impacts.
FORATOM hopes that future discussions
on the taxonomy will remain
open and transparent, include real
­experts on the various issues and focus
on a fact-based, rather than an ideological,
debate.
| | wwwforatom.org
Reactors
South Korea’s Shin-Kori-4
reaches first criticality
(nucnet) Unit 4 at South Korea’s
Shin-Kori nuclear power station in Busan
has reached first criticality with
grid connection scheduled for the end
of April, operator Korea Hydro and
Nuclear Power said.
The company, a subsidiary of stateowned
Korea Electric Power Corporation,
said commercial operation is
scheduled for September following
seven months of commissioning tests.
In February South Korea’s Nuclear
Safety and Security Commission
­approved the start of the 1,340-MW
domestic APR-1400 pressurised water
reactor, which has been under construction
since August 2009.
The unit was initially expected to
enter commercial operation in 2018.
However, construction was delayed
several times because of seismic safety
reassessments, design changes, and
the 2017 decision by the government to
suspend construction of new nuclear
plants because of a proposed phaseout
strategy. The suspension was later
overturned due to public opposition.
*)
Net-based values
(Czech and Swiss
nuclear power
plants gross-based)
1)
Refueling
2)
Inspection
3)
Repair
4)
Stretch-out-operation
5)
Stretch-in-operation
6)
Hereof traction supply
7)
Incl. steam supply
8)
New nominal
capacity since
January 2016
9)
Data for the Leibstadt
(CH) NPP will
be published in a
further issue of atw
BWR: Boiling
Water Reactor
PWR: Pressurised
Water Reactor
Source: VGB
News

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
374
NEWS
There are three units in commercial
operation at the Shin-Kori site.
Units 1 and 2 are 996-MW OPR-1000
PWRs, while Unit 3 is an APR-1400.
Three more units – Shin-Kori-4, -5,
and -6 – are under construction and
all of the APR-1400 design.
| | www.khnp.co.kr
Novovoronezh 2-2 supplies
first electricity to grid
(nucnet) Unit 2 of the Novovoronezh 2
nuclear power station in Voronezh
oblast, western Russia, has supplied
electricity to the country’s grid
for the first time, Rosenergoatom,
the operating subsidiary of state
nuclear corporation Rosatom, has
announced.
The 1,114-MW VVER-1200 plant,
construction of which began in 2009,
was brought to minimum controlled
power level on 22 March and on 1 May
reached a level of 240 MW
The unit’s power will now be
­gradually increased to 100 % with full
commissioning scheduled by the end
of 2019, Rosenergoatom said.
Construction of Novovoronezh
2-2, a Generation III+ unit, began
in July 2009. It will be the third
unit of its type to be completed
in Russia. The others were its sister
unit, Novovoronezh 2-1, which began
commercial operation in February
2017, and Leningrad 2-1, which began
commercial operation in October
2018.
| | www.rosatom.ru
Science & Research
IAEA launches project to help
countries fight food fraud
(iaea) The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) has launched a
five-year research project with experts
from 16 countries to refine methods to
apply nuclear-derived techniques to
test for accuracy in food labels.
The outcome of the project, carried
out in cooperation with the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), will assist countries in
combatting fraud in high-value food
products, such as premium honey,
coffee and speciality rice varieties.
“Numerous foods are sold at
­premium prices because of specific
production methods, or geographical
origins,” said project coordinator and
IAEA food safety specialist Simon
Kelly. “In order to protect consumers
from fraud, and potential unintended
food safety issues, we need standardized
methods to confirm that the
product has the characteristics that
are claimed on the label.”
The project will help countries
apply stable isotope techniques to
protect and promote foods with
added- value, such as organic food or
products with specific geographical
origins like Jamaican Blue Mountain
coffee. The method works by looking
at the ratio of stable isotopes in
­elements – such as hydrogen, oxygen
and carbon – and the concentration of
elements in a sample of the product.
These can provide a unique fingerprint
that links a crop to the place
where it is cultivated.
The research project started with
a kick-off meeting last week and
will run for five years. Participating
countries include China, Costa Rica,
Denmark, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco,
Myanmar, New Zealand, Slovenia,
Spain, Thailand and Uruguay.
| | www.iaea.org
Imprint
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Prof. Dr. Marco K. Koch
Ulf Kutscher
Herbert Lenz
Jan-Christan Lewitz
Andreas Loeb
Dr. Thomas Mull
Dr. Joachim Ohnemus
Olaf Oldiges
Dr. Tatiana Salnikova
Dr. Andreas Schaffrath
Dr. Jens Schröder
Norbert Schröder
Prof. Dr. Jörg Starflinger
Dr. Brigitte Trolldenier
Dr. Walter Tromm
Dr. Hans-Georg Willschütz
Dr. Hannes Wimmer
| | Editorial Office
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News

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
German-French workshop:
How will Europe maintain
its pole position in neutron
science?
(frm) The Heinz Maier-Leibnitz
Zentrum (MLZ) and the French
Neutron Scattering Federation (2DFN)
organized a German-French workshop
on the research campus in Garching
from the 14th until the 16 May 2019.
As two national neutron sources in
Germany and France will be decommissioned
at the end of 2019, the
European neutron landscape will
change. Therefore, the workshop
served to discuss the opportunity of
an enhanced French-German cooperation
among European neutron scientists.
Scientists of the MLZ and the
2DFN (La Fédération Française de la
Diffusion Neutronique) discussed the
opportunities of an enhanced cooperation
among German and French
neutron scientists during the workshop
at the research campus in
Garching. Europe is leading neutron
science due to the Institute Laue-
Langevin (ILL), the future European
Spallation Source (ESS), and a network
of powerful national sources like
the MLZ. However, the closure of the
two national neutron sources (Orphée
in France and BER II in Germany)
together with the increasing competition
from Asia will lead to a change
in the European neutron landscape.
Neutrons for science
Neutron research is indispensable
when it comes to competition to
solve the major challenges of today’s
industrial societies. Neutrons guide us
to more efficient energy storage,
­low-loss circuits of high fluxes and
voltages, sustainable mobility, lightweight
and long-lived motors as well
as better data storage. Finally, neutron
sources are the backbone for generating
radioisotopes that are used for
medicine.
The role of the MLZ
The MLZ is a cooperation between
the Technical University of Munich
(TUM), the Forschungszentrum
Jülich, and the Helmholtz-Zentrum
Geestracht for Materials and Coastal
Research (HZG), the Max Planck
Society, and nine university groups.
The MLZ offers the scientific use of the
Research Neutron Source Heinz
Maier-Leibnitz (FRM II) to 1000
national and international research
groups per year. Considering its 30
cutting-edge instruments as well as its
high neutron flux, the FRM II is
Europe’s most modern research reactor.
Already, the demand for beamtime
at the MLZ is twice as high as the
available capacity. The decommissioning
of Orphée and BER II in 2019
as well as of several smaller European
research reactors in the upcoming
years will increase the future demand
at the MLZ drastically. Enhanced
cooperation among the national neutron
centers is the silver bullet to
­capacity expansion and, thus,
strengthens European neutron science.
“As of 2020, the MLZ will be the
German center for neutron science.
Towards the end of the decade, it
will provide the greatest research
capacity with neutrons in Europe”,
says the director of the MLZ,
Prof. Dr. Peter Müller-Buschbaum,
“The MLZ also fulfils a European
­service as 55 ­percent of our users are
international.”
German-French co-operation –
now and then
The German-French neutron community
can already look back on a
joint success story. It started with the
foundation of the ILL, which was
followed by the membership in
the League of Advanced European
Neutron Science (LENS), numerous
shared publications, the corporate
construction of four instruments at
the ESS in Lund, and the high numbers
of French users at the MLZ.
However, the changing neutron landscape
demands for an even stronger
German-French cooperation, which
was extensively discussed at the workshop.
The MLZ hopes for assistance to
provide more sophisticated and innovative
instrumentation and is looking
forward to exploring new fields of
neutron science. The 2DFN hopes
for support regarding the education
of France’s prospective neutron
scientists. “Until now, young scientists
were trained at our national source,
­Orphée”, explains Virginie Simonet,
the director of the 2DFN, “With the
closure of this research reactor, we
lose our education program and risk
losing knowledge in neutron science.”
The MLZ for its part supports over
200 PhD students per year, offers
practical courses and lectures at the
TUM and at its partner universities,
and promotes the establishment of an
international doctoral program. In
particular, young French neutron
­scientists would profit from a cooperation
with the MLZ; especially until
the full operation of the ESS. Simonet
and Müller-Buschbaum agreed that
research reactors like FRM II or ILL
will not lose their importance beyond
the commissioning of the ESS. On the
contrary: the two directors emphasized
that although the ESS would
provide new measuring qualities, it
will not contribute much to the measuring
capacity. So, there will be a high
competition for access to the ESS. The
national sources will enable scientists
to remain competitive. “We should not
feel constrained by new neutron
sources like the ESS. We should see
them as an impulse for new ideas!”,
Müller-Buschbaum concludes the
workshop.
| | www.frm2.tum.de
Company News
Switzerland: Framatome
awarded contract for
modernization of reactor
protection system at Gösgen
Nuclear Power Plant
(framatome) Framatome was awarded
a contract to modernize the reactor
protection system (RPS) of the Gösgen
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)* operated
by the Swiss utility Kernkraftwerk
Gösgen-Däniken AG. The RPS powers
down reactors safely in case of any
deviations.
“This contract marks another
important milestone in the longlasting
cooperation between Gösgen
NPP and Framatome,” said Frédéric
Lelièvre, Framatome’s senior executive
vice president in charge of Sales,
Regional Platforms and the Instrumentation
and Control Business Unit.
“It is yet another example showing
how, over the years, we have managed
the transformation from analog to
digital technology successfully together.”
The scope of the contract includes
modernization of the entire RPS using
Framatome‘s proven digital instrumentation
and control (I&C) platform,
TELEPERM XS. In addition,
important functions will be realized
with a diverse hardwired back-up
system. Installation and commissioning
of the new RPS are scheduled
for the plant’s 2022 outage. The
modernization project enhances plant
safety, supports long-term operation
and protects investments into the
future.
The signing of the contract was
preceded by the successful modernization
of the plant’s four emergency
diesel generators, including the upgrade
of the entire I&C and electrical
systems with Framatome’s digital
375
NEWS
News

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
376
NEWS
technology. In 2014, Framatome
completed the digital modernization
of the plant’s reactor control and
limitation.
* The Gösgen pressurized water
reactor was connected to the grid in
1979 and has a net electric output of
1,010 megawatts.
| | www.framatome.com
NUKEM wins decommissioning
project in Sweden
(nukem) The Uniper Anlagenservice
led consortium with NUKEM Technologies
has been awarded a contract
for the dismantling of two reactor
pressure vessels at Oskarshamn
and two reactor pressure vessels at
Barsebäck.
The consolidation of all four units
under the Cover Agreement will allow
to achieve synergy effects under the
contract.
The dismantling of the Barsebäck
reactor pressure vessels is scheduled
to begin in early 2020 after receiving
a dismantling license. The entire project
is expected to be completed at
Oskarshamn in 2024. The Nuclear
Decommissioning Programme comprises
several work packages including
fragmentation and removal of
the reactor pressure vessels and the
removal of turbine and generator
parts. The dismantling will be performed
consecutively, starting in
Barsebäck and then moving on to
Oskarshamn so as to ensure a “lead
and learn” approach. The synergy
gains arising from common planning
and investments will be used to
achieve higher efficiency within
the Programme. Transferring the
­expertise from the first unit to the
subsequent ones will contribute to the
project safety.
This contract marks an important
milestone since it is the first dismantling
contract covering the reactor
pressure vessels at both Oskarshamn
and Barsebäck. It is the result of a long
and intensive procurement work, says
Billy Slättengren, Project Manager
Decommissioning at Oskarshamn.
Åsa Carlson, CEO Barsebäck Kraft,
thanked Oskarshamns Kraftgrupp
(OKG), Barsebäck Kraft (BKAB),
Uniper Anlagenservice and NUKEM
Technologies for the good cooperation:
“For over a year, this fantastic team
has worked so hard and intensively
and made it possible for us to stand
here today and sign the contract. Now
we are up and running and we know
what we have to do!”
| | www.nukemtechnologies.de
| | Urenco makes significant investment in new UK facility for sustainable energy
Urenco makes significant
investment in new UK facility
for sustainable energy
(urenco) Urenco announces the completed
construction of a new multimillion
pound Tails Management
Facility (TMF) in Capenhurst near
Chester, UK, as part of a long standing
commitment to help provide reliable,
cost effective and sustainable power
generation.
The TMF was officially opened at a
ceremony attended by senior representatives
from Government, industry
and the local community.
Urenco’s core business is enriching
uranium to provide sustainable
energy for the world. Enriched
uranium is an integral component in
civil nuclear power generation. The
responsible management of the
by-product of the enrichment process,
known as tails, is crucial to Urenco’s
commitment to sustainability. Tails
are converted to uranium oxide,
which is stable and allows long-term
storage prior to either further enrichment
or safe disposal of the residual
uranium. To enable the conversion,
Urenco invested in the TMF, which is
operated by a subsidiary company
Urenco ChemPlants.
Boris Schucht, Chief Executive
­Officer, Urenco, said:
“The TMF is a key element in
Urenco’s commitment to sustainable
energy generation. It is a further
tangible demonstration of our responsible
management of nuclear materials.
“We are very proud of our safety
record during the construction of the
TMF. We achieved more than seven
million hours of safe working, making
the TMF one of the safest construction
sites in the UK and a credit to the
whole workforce.
“Urenco makes an important contribution
to the UK and globally – in
terms of supplier spend, salaries,
workforce and new infrastructure
and we are proud to have made this
signi­ficant addition to our organisation
and the UK economy.”
| | www.urenco.com
Market data
(All information is supplied without
guarantee.)
Nuclear Fuel Supply
Market Data
Information in current (nominal)
­U.S.-$. No inflation adjustment of
prices on a base year. Separative work
data for the formerly “secondary
­market”. Uranium prices [US-$/lb
U 3 O 8 ; 1 lb = 453.53 g; 1 lb U 3 O 8 =
0.385 kg U]. Conversion prices [US-$/
kg U], Separative work [US-$/SWU
(Separative work unit)].
2015
pp
Uranium: 35.00–39.75
pp
Conversion: 6.25–9.50
pp
Separative work: 58.00–92.00
2016
pp
Uranium: 18.75–35.25
pp
Conversion: 5.50–6.75
pp
Separative work: 47.00–62.00
2017
pp
Uranium: 19.25–26.50
pp
Conversion: 4.50–6.75
pp
Separative work: 39.00–50.00
2018
January to June 2018
pp
Uranium: 21.75–24.00
pp
Conversion: 6.00–9.50
News

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
Uranium
Prize range: Spot market [USD*/lb(US) U 3 O 8 ]
140.00
) 1
Uranium prize range: Spot market [USD*/lb(US) U 3 O 8 ]
140.00
120.00
120.00
377
100.00
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
1980
Yearly average prices in real USD, base: US prices (1982 to1984) *
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2019
Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2019
Year
* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Year
) 1 ) 1
real prices * Actual nominal USD prices, not referring to a base year. Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2019
| | Uranium spot market prices from 1980 to 2019 and from 2008 to 2019. The price range is shown.
In years with U.S. trade restrictions the unrestricted uranium spot market price is shown.
Separative work: Spot market price range [USD*/kg UTA]
Conversion: Spot conversion price range [USD*/kgU]
180.00
20.00
NEWS
140.00
120.00
100.00
80.00
) 1 Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2019
160.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
18.00
Jan. 2008
Jan. 2009
Jan. 2010
Jan. 2011
Jan. 2012
Jan. 2013
Jan. 2014
Jan. 2015
Jan. 2016
Jan. 2017
Jan. 2018
Jan. 2019
Jan. 2020
16.00
14.00
12.00
10.00
8.00
60.00
6.00
40.00
4.00
20.00
2.00
0.00
0.00
Jan. 2008
Jan. 2009
Jan. 2010
Jan. 2011
Jan. 2012
Jan. 2013
* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Year
Jan. 2014
Jan. 2015
Jan. 2016
Jan. 2017
Jan. 2018
Jan. 2019
Jan. 2020
Sources: Energy Intelligence, Nukem; Bild/Figure: atw 2019
Jan. 2008
Jan. 2009
Jan. 2010
Jan. 2011
Jan. 2012
Jan. 2013
* Actual nominal USD prices, not real prices referring to a base year. Year
Jan. 2014
Jan. 2015
Jan. 2016
Jan. 2017
Jan. 2018
Jan. 2019
Jan. 2020
| | Separative work and conversion market price ranges from 2008 to 2019. The price range is shown.
)1
In December 2009 Energy Intelligence changed the method of calculation for spot market prices. The change results in virtual price leaps.
pp
Separative work: 35.00–42.00
February 2018
pp
Uranium: 21.25–22.50
pp
Conversion: 6.25–7.25
pp
Separative work: 37.00–40.00
March 2018
pp
Uranium: 20.50–22.25
pp
Conversion: 6.50–7.50
pp
Separative work: 36.00–39.00
April 2018
pp
Uranium: 20.00–21.75
pp
Conversion: 7.50–8.50
pp
Separative work: 36.00–39.00
May 2018
pp
Uranium: 21.75–22.80
pp
Conversion: 8.00–8.75
pp
Separative work: 36.00–39.00
June 2018
pp
Uranium: 22.50–23.75
pp
Conversion: 8.50–9.50
pp
Separative work: 35.00–38.00
July 2018
pp
Uranium: 23.00–25.90
pp
Conversion: 9.00–10.50
pp
Separative work: 34.00–38.00
August 2018
pp
Uranium: 25.50–26.50
pp
Conversion: 11.00–14.00
pp
Separative work: 34.00–38.00
September 2018
pp
Uranium: 26.50–27.50
pp
Conversion: 12.00–13.00
pp
Separative work: 38.00–40.00
October 2018
pp
Uranium: 27.30–29.00
pp
Conversion: 12.00–15.00
pp
Separative work: 37.00–40.00
November 2018
pp
Uranium: 28.00–29.25
pp
Conversion: 13.50–14.50
pp
Separative work: 39.00–40.00
December 2018
pp
Uranium: 28.50–29.20
pp
Conversion: 13.50–14.50
pp
Separative work: 40.00–41.00
2019
January 2019
pp
Uranium: 28.70–29.10
pp
Conversion: 13.50–14.50
pp
Separative work: 41.00–44.00
February 2019
pp
Uranium: 27.50–29.25
pp
Conversion: 13.50–14.50
pp
Separative work: 42.00–45.00
March 2019
pp
Uranium: 24.85–28.25
pp
Conversion: 13.50–14.50
pp
Separative work: 43.00–46.00
April 2019
pp
Uranium: 25.50–25.88
pp
Conversion: 15.00–17.00
pp
Separative work: 44.00–46.00
| | Source: Energy Intelligence
www.energyintel.com
Cross-border Price
for Hard Coal
Cross-border price for hard coal in
[€/t TCE] and orders in [t TCE] for
use in power plants (TCE: tonnes of
coal equivalent, German border):
2014: 72.94, 30,591,663
2015: 67.90; 28,919,230
2016: 67.07; 29,787,178
2017: 91.28, 25,739,010
2018
I. quarter: 89.88; 5,838,003
II. quarter: 88.25; 4,341,359
III. quarter: 100.79; 5,135,198
IV. quarter: 100.91; 6,814,244
| | Source: BAFA, some data provisional
www.bafa.de
News

atw Vol. 64 (2019) | Issue 6/7 ı June/July
378
NUCLEAR TODAY
John Shepherd is a
journalist who has
covered the nuclear
industry for the past
20 years and is
currently editor-in-chief
of UK-based Energy
Storage Publishing.
References
Natural History
Museum letter –
https://bit.ly/
2ZsMF6k
European Energy
Agency report –
https://bit.ly/
2WRldgS
EV Revolution Could be Running on Empty
Without Nuclear
Hardly a day goes by when we don’t hear about another model of electric car being launched. Fully electric and
hybrid vehicles are all the craze.
There is a frantic race – encouraged by governments
around the world – to put the most electric vehicles (EVs)
onto the roads. The aim is noble enough: to make every
effort to cut greenhouse gas emissions and scrap the petrol
and diesel-guzzling internal combustion engines.
TV adverts and slick promotional videos show these
‘green’ EVs darting around cities with solar panels on every
building’s rooftop and running silently through the
country­side, where windmills are more prolific than trees.
But there is a big problem looming for this EV utopia…
where is the electricity going to come from to keep
recharging the vehicles’ batteries? And don’t forget the
grid-scale battery energy storage systems that countries
are also encouraging to be installed at a rapid pace. Solar
and wind alone, on the scale that we currently know it, will
not nearly be enough to keep these battery systems topped
up and ready to be utilised at a moment’s notice.
All this, perhaps unsurprisingly for readers of this
journal, brings me to nuclear energy. The electric revolution
in mobility is an incredible opportunity for nuclear
and policymakers and politicians need to be made aware of
that.
In a recent announcement, experts warned that
producing a new generation of electric vehicles and
supplying the electricity to keep their batteries charged
would add up to “huge implications” for the world’s natural
resources.
The UK alone would need just under twice the current
annual world cobalt production to meet its EV targets for
2050, according to a letter to government climate change
advisers co-authored by the head of earth sciences at the
UK’s Natural History Museum, Prof Richard Herrington.
In the letter, to the Committee on Climate Change,
Herrington said the world must face up to the “raw
­material cost of going green” – which he explained would
require supplies of some metals to “increase dramatically”
to fuel the desire for the “revolution in the way we travel”.
In the UK, petrol and diesel cars make up the biggest
share of the UK’s climate pollution, with an estimated
31.5 million cars currently on UK roads, covering
252.5 ­billion miles per year.
To replace all these with EVs today, “assuming they use
the most resource-frugal next-generation batteries”, the
letter said it would require: 207,900 tonnes of cobalt (just
under twice the annual global production), 264,600 tonnes
of lithium carbonate (three quarters the world’s production),
at least 7,200 tonnes of neodymium and dysprosium
(nearly the entire world production of neodymium) and
2,362,500 tonnes of copper (more than half the world’s
production in 2018).
On a global basis, for the expected 2bn cars on the
world’s roads by 2050 to be electric, the letter said experts
had calculated that the “annual production of neodymium
and dysprosium would have to increase by 70%, copper
output would need to more than double and cobalt output
would need to increase at least three and a half times
for the entire period from now until 2050 to satisfy the
demand”.
Switching to EVs for the UK fleet “comes with an energy
cost too”, the letter said. “Energy costs for cobalt production
are estimated at 7,000-8,000 kilowatt-hours
(kWh) for every tonne of metal produced and for copper
9,000 kWh/t. The rare-earth energy costs are at least
3,350 kWh/t, so for the target of all 31.5 million cars, that
requires 22.5 terawatt hours of power to produce the new
metals, amounting to 6% of the UK’s current annual
electrical usage.”
There are also challenges of using ‘green energy’ to
power electric cars, the letter said. “If wind farms are
chosen to generate the power for the projected two billion
cars, at UK average usage, this requires the equivalent of a
further years’ worth of total global copper supply and 10
years’ worth of global neodymium and dysprosium production
to build the wind farms.”
Solar power is also “problematic and resource hungry”,
according to Herrington’s letter. “All the photovoltaic
systems currently on the market are reliant on one or
more raw materials classed as critical or near critical by
the EU and/or the US Department of Energy.”
Meanwhile, a new report from the European Environment
Agency has warned that all parts of Europe’s energy
system, from availability of energy sources to energy consumption,
are potentially vulnerable to climate change and
extreme weather events. The report said Europe’s energy
system needs to adapt and become more climate resilient
to secure reliable supplies of clean energy.
Crucially, the Agency’s assessment warns that the most
important changes “include increases in mean and ­extreme
air and water temperatures, and changes in water availability,
extreme climate‐related events, and coastal and
marine hazards”. These changes will affect the availability
of primary energy sources – especially renewable energy
sources – as well as the transformation, transmission,
distribution and storage of energy, and energy demand,
the Agency said.
The facts I present here not only speak for themselves,
but they speak volumes for why nuclear energy must
remain part of the global energy equation. In terms of the
raw material on which nuclear power generation depends,
the world’s supply of uranium is more than adequate to
meet projected requirements for the foreseeable future,
according to the latest edition of the ‘Red Book’.
The evidence is clear and must be increasingly so, even
to nuclear’s critics and naysayers. Nuclear has been at the
forefront of the green, electricity-generating revolution for
decades and is a reliable and necessary technology partner
for the future.
Nuclear should not be treated as the ‘Cinderella’ of the
energy family – left working to keep the lights on and
industry running without recognition. If the EV revolution
is to prosper it needs nuclear to shine and prosper too.
Author
John Shepherd
Nuclear Today
EV Revolution Could be Running on Empty Without Nuclear ı John Shepherd

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