BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP 45 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New ...

10-04285-brl Doc 127 Filed 08/17/12 Entered 08/17/12 14:29:55 Main Document
Pg 71 of 133
� Ralf Schroeter
o Served as director of Luxalpha from January 2008 through liquidation in April 2009
(Am. Compl. 37.) Served as the Chief Operating Officer of UBS SA during this time
(Schroeter Decl. 4 [Bankr. S.D.N.Y. ECF No. 110.])
o Authorized transfer of portfolio management responsibility over Luxalpha from
UBSTPM to AML subsequent to audit on Luxalpha performed by UBS (Pergament Decl.
Ex. 13 at 3; see also Pergament Decl. Ex. 3.)
o Authorized Luxalpha’s sales prospectuses that concealed BLMIS’s role as actual
custodian and asset manager (Pergament Decl. Exs. 13 at 3; 11.)
o Authorized Luxalpha board resolution confirming that Luxalpha was in conformity with
the determined investment policy and the investment restrictions mentioned in the
prospectus (Pergament Decl. Ex. 15.)
o Participated in post-BLMIS collapse board meetings and decisions regarding Luxalpha
(Pergament Decl. Exs. 83-85.)
o Signed two customer claims on behalf of Luxalpha (Pergament Decl. Exs. 20 at 4; 21 at
4.)
Each of the Moving Luxalpha Director Defendants took repeated, purposeful action
directed towards New York such that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court here.
The Trustee’s causes of action, which seek the recovery of fees transferred to these defendants in
connection with their service on Luxalpha’s board, arise out of or relate to these contacts, such
that jurisdiction over these individual directors is proper. See Bickerton v. Bozel S.A. (In re Bozel
S.A.), 434 B.R. 86, 99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 790).
The Moving Luxalpha Director Defendants’ contention that they “had no direct
involvement in the day-to-day management and operations of Luxalpha” is unavailing. (UBS
Mot. at 22.) Even if this were true (which it is not, as demonstrated by the facts set forth above),
there is no requirement that a director must be in charge of day-to-day operations in order to be
subject to personal jurisdiction. “Even a single purposeful contact may be sufficient to meet the
minimum contacts standard when the underlying proceeding is directly related to that contact,”
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