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BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP 45 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New ...

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10-04285-brl Doc 127 Filed 08/17/12 Entered 08/17/12 14:29:55 Main Document<br />

Pg 90 of 133<br />

Access’s <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> office. 31 Each of the other factors of the mere department test is also<br />

satisfied as to AIA Ltd., because of its lack of independent operations as well as its domination<br />

by Access’s <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> office, without which AIA Ltd. would not have survived. See Van<br />

Egeraat, 2009 WL 1209020, at *2–4; Motown Record Co., L.P. v. iMesh.com, Inc., No. 03 Civ.<br />

7339 (PKC), 2004 WL 503720, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2004) (“Factually, the last three<br />

elements meld together in this case because the entities do not treat themselves as separate. The<br />

blur between [the parent and subsidiary] is pervasive.”). By serving as a financially dependent<br />

“money box,” and having no employees of its own to perform any of its purported duties, which<br />

were performed by other Access employees, AIA Ltd. was in fact a mere department of Access’s<br />

<strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> office.<br />

6. AML Is Further Subject to Jurisdiction Because of Its Agency and<br />

Mere Department Relationships with Access’s <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> Office<br />

AML is also subject to this Court’s jurisdiction because Access’s <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong> office acted<br />

as AML’s agent, and because of AML’s mere department relationship with Access’s <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong><br />

office. Like AIA Ltd., AML had no employees of its own to conduct the activities it purported<br />

to perform on behalf of Luxalpha and Groupement. AML appears to have been a shell entity<br />

established in Luxembourg and subject to the control of majority owners Littaye and Villehuchet<br />

for the purpose of facilitating the administration of Luxalpha and Groupement. 32 To the extent<br />

31 In May 2003, AIA Ltd. was 51% owned by EarthStreet (which was ultimately owned by Littaye) and 49% by<br />

AIA Inc. (which was ultimately owned by Littaye and Villehuchet). (Pergament Decl. Exs. 136; 139 at 2.) By<br />

2005, AIA Ltd. was <strong>45</strong>% owned by AIA Inc., 24% owned by Villehuchet, 24% owned by Pause Group (which was<br />

ultimately owned by Littaye through Dalestrong), and 7% owned by Access principal Philippe Junot. (Pergament<br />

Decl. Exs. 137; 139 at 2.) And according to Access’s July 2011 Corporate Ownership Statement filed in this<br />

proceeding, AIA Inc., Littaye-controlled entity Dalestrong, and Ms. Villehuchet each own a 33% interest in AIA<br />

Ltd. [S.D.N.Y. ECF No. 5.] Thus, at all relevant times, AIA Ltd. appears to have been at least 93% ultimately<br />

owned by Littaye and Villehuchet, satisfying the threshold common ownership prong of the mere department test.<br />

See, e.g., ESI, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d at 52 (90% common ownership sufficient).<br />

32 A September 2004 questionnaire states that AIA (Lux) has “no regular employees” and that the directors and/or<br />

officers carry out its responsibilities. (Pergament Decl. Ex. 152 at 7–8.) The areas of trading, research and<br />

development, IT/Programming, administration, marketing and business development are all “outsourced,” with only<br />

70

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