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10-04285-brl Doc 127 Filed 08/17/12 Entered 08/17/12 14:29:55 Main Document<br />

Pg 75 of 133<br />

Moving Luxalpha Director Defendants knew of and consented to Luxalpha’s <strong>New</strong> <strong>York</strong><br />

activities, as they each authorized Luxalpha’s ongoing investment with BLMIS. A plaintiff is<br />

not required to show that an officer expressly requested or consented to the corporation’s actions,<br />

as activities of an agent will be attributed to the principal if they authorized the agent to act in the<br />

state. See Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. BP Amoco P.L.C., 319 F. Supp. 2d 352,<br />

360 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). A party “cannot deputize another to take certain actions on its behalf and<br />

then disclaim knowledge or interest when those actions give rise to a legal dispute.” Id.<br />

Additionally, and notwithstanding the Moving Luxalpha Director Defendants’<br />

protestations that they received no compensation as a result of their service on Luxalpha’s Board<br />

(Hondequin Decl. 16 [Bankr. S.D.N.Y. ECF No. 115]; Kranz Decl. 15 [Bankr. S.D.N.Y. ECF<br />

No. 113]; Egger Decl. 16 [Bankr. S.D.N.Y. ECF No. 109]; Schroeter Decl. 16 [Bankr.<br />

S.D.N.Y. ECF No. 110,]) they each did benefit from their Board service. The Moving Luxalpha<br />

Director Defendants undoubtedly received substantial compensation from their employer, UBS<br />

SA, during the time they served on Luxalpha’s board, and it is possible they received other<br />

benefits as well—such as career advancement at UBS SA, undisclosed bonuses, or other<br />

consideration. See Retail Software, 854 F.2d at 23.<br />

Finally, each of the Moving Luxalpha Director Defendants certainly exercised “some<br />

control” over Luxalpha’s investment activity. “The required control need not rise to the level of<br />

absolute control over the acts or decisions of the putative agent; rather, it may involve the ability<br />

of the principal to influence such acts or decisions by virtue of the parties’ respective roles.”<br />

Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, No. 99 Civ. 11480 (AGS), 2000 WL 1154252, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.<br />

14, 2000) (citing CutCo Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 366 (2d Cir. 1986)). As<br />

described above, and among other actions, Hondequin and Egger authorized the opening of<br />

55

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