Leadership in Local Politics of Cambodia: A Study of ... - CDRI

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provide us the boundary information. So we do not know which parts belong to the
company and which to the villagers. (Ming Rina, commune chief, commune A, interview,
24/4/2008)
Councils’ lack of power is even more strongly demonstrated in the resource-rich communes,
where political and economic interests overwhelm them. Politicians and their networks’ close
control over councils blurs the lines between public and private domains and fosters the latter’s
dominance over the former. Such constraints provide little room for councils to be accountable
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In our case studies, it was seen that the resource-rich communes A and B both suffer from higher
authorities’ decisions about natural resource use and allocation, which bypass and ignore the
councils’ role. In this case, villagers feel that they do not have leadership in their communes
and cannot depend on their councils to represent them. Councillors in both communes are
desperate and out of their depth. They cannot depend on their institutional power, and they
cannot ask for help from a higher level.
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push it up to a higher level [district], but involving higher levels takes lots of time and
they won’t help, so eventually my councillors and I are blamed. The district has become
unhelpful; they tend to say things like, “You communes now have decentralisation and
your own money, so take care of your own work and don’t come to us”. (Pou Nov,
commune chief, commune B, interview, 30/5/2008)
I have many ideas about what the council should do to help develop the commune. But
I feel I am not in control of what is going on in my commune, and most of the time I am
the last person to know any news. (Ming Rina, commune chief, commune A, interview,
24/4/2008)
Commune C is quite distinct from the other two in that much respect is given to the councillors
for their achievements due to the assistance provided by the party patron. There are the
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councillors, who have to look to the patron or higher authorities for decisions.
The three communes offer insight into local leaders’ institutional constraints and how much
or little room they have to claim legitimacy and exercise authority. The three communes have
different enabling and constraining factors and a variety of leadership styles developed in each.
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climate put the leaders in a strong position to exercise authority and carry out their role, and
villagers’ comments about their leadership were more favourable than in communes A and B.
The latter suffer from an uncontrollable environment tangled with a complex mix of actors and
a resource crunch, where money and politics take over the authority of the elected councils,
which have no capacity or have already given up standing for their villagers. Fitzgerald and So
(2007: 144) similarly found that in resource-reliant communes, authorities basically have no
institutional power or capacity to respond to the challenges they face. Instead of being blessed,
communes and villages with rich resources suffer.
The village administrations are employed by the MoI. Practically, they have to assist the
commune authorities, and in theory they are to serve the people. Such different directions
tear them apart when it comes to understanding their accountability. Moreover, because they
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