EU Elections

MAGAZINE 

01 

24 

Europe votes, as 

two neighbourhood 

wars rage 

The European far-right: 

reasons to be pessimistic 

– and optimistic 

Will June elections 

change ‘Brussels So 

White’? – don’t bet on it 

‘The government is 

hearing us, but not 

listening to us’ 

EU 

ELECTIONS 

2024

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EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 

An introduction by 

the editor 

BY ELENA SÁNCHEZ NICOLÁS 

When we first floated the idea of publishing 

a magazine in the first half of 

2024, it was immediately obvious that it 

had to be about elections. 

Worldwide, this year probably more 

voters than ever before in human history 

are heading to the polls — not just 

across Europe, but also in India, the US, 

and already (sort of) in Russia — amid 

an ever-evolving geopolitical landscape, 

marked by the war in Ukraine, the unprecedented 

Hamas attack on Israel and 

the dramatic mass killing of Palestinians 

in Gaza. 

But the contributors to this magazine 

do not intend to present a comprehensive 

overview of the unprecedented 

number of elections globally, involving 

over 70 countries. Instead, this publication 

provides insights into June’s 

elections for the European Parliament, 

while examining a huge election in one 

of the key global players and its potential 

to reshape international dynamics. 

Although you are likely thinking about 

the US, the risks are already wellknown 

there. That’s why this magazine 

examines how the election results in a 

country of 1.3 billion people could shape 

EU-India relations, trade and geopolitical 

alliances. 

Despite the looming risks of escalation 

in both Ukraine and the Middle East, 

EU voters will head to the polls in June 

with a keen focus on domestic issues, 

ranging from the cost-of-living crisis 

and migration to security and climate. 

With migration consistently a focal 

point in EU elections, we look at narrative 

efforts undertaken by the European 

Commission during the past few years 

to offshore migration to North Africa — 

through pacts widely viewed as ‘cash for 

migrant control’ arrangements. 

In a frank behind-the-scenes interview, 

EU commissioner Věra Jourová warns 

against underestimating the impact that 

Russian disinformation and AI fakery 

could have on European public opinion. 

She worries this could create a red carpet 

for Vladimir Putin, who desperately 

needs to introduce an anti-Ukraine 

narrative disguised behind peace calls. 

While the EU has put forward legislative 

proposals to tackle disinformation 

campaigns, these elections will test the 

teeth of such laws. 

As seen with the sudden eruption of 

farmers’ protests, the EU 2024 elections 

will take place in a very polarised 

political climate, reflecting deep-seated 

divisions which are being exploited by 

extremist parties. 

While the rise of the far-right seems to 

be on everyone’s lips, we take an overview, 

with both reasons to be concerned 

and reasons to be hopeful. There is also 

an attempt to explain how the rise of 

culture wars alongside government-enforced 

austerity and economic downturns 

are driving the growing anti-EU 

sentiment. Here too, there is good news 

and bad news, as well as deep differences 

among EU member states. 

Notably, we also raise the issue of 

diversity and inclusion as one of the 

pending tasks facing Europe, spotlighting 

the obstacles that millions of 

people with disabilities face across the 

EU-27 when it comes to exercising their 

right to vote. And while the disconnect 

between the EU and its citizens is big, 

the disconnect between the EU and its 

black and brown citizens is even bigger. 

Will June’s elections finally purge the 

‘Brussels So White’ hashtag? 

And with the shadow of the Qatargate 

corruption scandal falling heavily on 

Brussels, we examine how the European 

Parliament has failed to really seize 

the opportunity to carry out meaningful 

reforms to ensure a higher level 

of transparency in the institutions. 

Likewise, we also explore how co-legislators 

overlooked the need to increase 

transparency in political advertising for 

voters already for this electoral period. 

Ultimately, the success of this election 

hinges not only on who wins the most 

seats, and how those MEPs elected exercise 

their power — but also on the level 

of turnout and citizen engagement in 

this democratic process. Despite European 

elections being often regarded as 

secondary to national politics by many 

citizens, a new wave of teen voters in 

countries such as Germany, Belgium, 

Austria, and Greece is expected to have 

a say — what will they choose for their 

future, and how will their participation 

shape the political landscape for years 

to come? ◄ 

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

In this issue 

6 

10 

14 

Europe votes, as two 

neighbourhood wars 

rage 

‘Qatargate’ – a missed 

opportunity to clean up 

the European Parliament 

How Brussels hopes to 

‘shield’ June’s election 

against Moscow’s 

propaganda 

20 

24 

26 

The European far-right: 

reasons to be pessimistic 

– and optimistic 

Is there an alternative 

to ‘business as usual’ or 

the rise of the far-right 

in the EU? 

EU eyes teen turnout as 

next generation votes


30 

34 

38 

Migration – how the EU 

sought to offshore the 

problem ahead of the 

elections 

To fight euroscepticism, 

Europe’s economies 

need a boost 

Farm-to-fork, to 

protestors with 

pitchforks: the death of 

the EU’s sustainable food 

policy 

42 

46 

50 

Will June elections 

change ‘Brussels So 

White’? – don’t bet on it 

100 million disabled EU 

voters deserve better 

‘The government is 

hearing us, but not 

listening to us’ 

54 

Turnout: the highs, 

the lows, and the outliers 

5

EUOBSERVER 

Europe votes, 

as two 

neighbourhood 

wars rage 

Both the war in Ukraine and the Israeli-Gaza conflict 

could escalate before the June elections — but outside 

of the Baltics and Poland, most EU voters seem more 

attuned to domestic concerns. 

By ANDREW RETTMAN 

Two major wars have broken out in the EU neighbourhood 

since the last European Parliament elections in 

2019 — but voters are more likely to be swayed by domestic 

issues than high tension on the international 

front. 

The Ukraine war had already begun long before the 

2019 EU vote, when Russia first invaded Ukraine in 

2014. And the Arab-Israeli conflict goes back to the 

last century. 

But Russian president Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion 

of Ukraine in 2022 shocked Europe, bringing 

artillery and tank battles on a scale not seen since 

World War Two, and Kremlin threats of nuclear 

strikes against Nato. And a new Gaza war broke out 

on 7 October 2023 with the biggest pogrom since the 

Holocaust, prompting Israel to kill tens of thousands 

One of hundreds of pro-Palestinian 

demonstrations across Europe, 

this time in Frankfurt, Germany 

in February 

Source: Conceptphoto.info


7


The Berlaymont HQ of the 

European Commission illuminated 

by the Ukrainian flag, 

on 23 February 2024, to mark 

the two-year anniversary of 

the Russian invasion. 

Source: European Commission 

of Palestinian children and women in 

return, amid legal accusations of a literal 

genocide. Both wars threaten to escalate 

before the EU vote in June. 

Russian battlefield gains saw France suggest 

sending Nato troops to Ukraine in 

February. EU diplomats fear Russia could 

also attack Moldova or cause clashes 

in the Western Balkans to frighten the 

West. Meanwhile, Israel’s mass-killing 

of Palestinians could ignite a wider Middle 

East war with Lebanon and Iran, 

prompting ever-angrier pro-Palestinian 

protests in EU capitals, and raising the 

risk of anti-Western terrorist attacks. 

But for Kevin Cunningham, a politics 

lecturer at the Technological University 

in Dublin, EU voters are still more likely 

to care about kitchen-sink issues, such as 

the economy or immigration. “Matters 

pertaining to domestic politics, such as 

the relative popularity of the government 

… would overwhelm any signal pertaining 

to international events,” he said. 

Pan-EU voting trends are more visible 

since 2019 on migration and climate 

change, but not on foreign policy, he noted. 

And only a few individual countries, 

such as those EU member states near the 

Russian frontline in the Baltics or eastern 

Europe, or those with histories of strong 

Even if you 

have Russia 

escalating 

with some 

new event, 

I don’t think 

it’ll have a 

true impact 

on EU 

elections.” 

Nicolas Tenzer 

pro-Palestinian feeling, such as Ireland, 

might be affected, said Cunningham. 

“Party positioning and responses might 

be influenced in eastern and north-eastern 

European states,” he said. Middle 

East escalation would be most felt in 

Irish and Spanish politics, he said. 

Looking at the EU heartland of France, 

Nicolas Tenzer from the Paris School of 

International Affairs, echoed Cunningham’s 

analysis. French far-right leader 

Marine Le Pen has deep Russia ties, but 

her voters don’t care even if Putin has become 

more toxic since 2019, Tenzer said. 

“If we ask a Le Pen voter, ‘do you support 

Ukraine’? he or she will say: ‘Of course’. 

If you ask if Russia is a threat, most will 

say OK. But if you ask what’s the main 

problem for you, they’ll say ‘migration, 

security, purchasing power, the elites,’ 

and probably the question of Russia will 

come 10th. So, even if Le Pen voters disagree 

with her on Russia, they agree with 

her on all that matters for them.” Tenzer 

said. 

“Even if you have Russia escalating with 

some new event … I don’t think it’ll have 

a true impact on EU elections,” he added. 

A Gaza-escalation would be felt even 

less, he predicted, even though it might


The Berlaymont HQ again 

illuminated, this time by the 

Israeli flag, on 8 October 2023. 

Splits on solidarity with Israel 

have since emerged within 

the EU, due to the enormous 

death toll of Gaza civilians. 


affect the outcome of the subsequent 

EU race for senior posts, Tenzer said - 

giving France and Spain more leverage 

in objecting to a second term for European 

Commission president Ursula von 

der Leyen, a German politician, who is 

campaigning to keep her post despite her 

hardline pro-Israeli views. 

Looking at a Russia-frontline country, 

such as Poland, Polish expert Piotr Maciej 

Kaczyński from the Europeum Institute 

for European Policy in Prague, also 

said the Russian threat was “pulling political 

forces together”, instead of inflaming 

tension, because it was the one thing 

that the main governing Civic Platform 

and the opposition Law and Justice (PiS) 

parties could agree on. 

“Any potential escalation in Ukraine 

won’t determine preference for any of the 

political forces,” he said. The “off-topic” 

issue of Polish farmers’ protests against 

Ukrainian food imports could see a 

swing by some PiS voters to the far-right 

Confederacy party, he added. 

But even leftwing voters in Warsaw were 

more concerned about repealing PiS-era 

anti-abortion laws than the Middle East, 

which was a “marginal” issue in Poland, 

Kaczyński said. 

And if the Gaza war was to prompt a new 

wave of Palestinian refugees, then migration-frontline 

states, such as Italy, would 

be unlikely to feel that extra pressure by 

June. 

Egypt has sealed the border with Gaza, 

preventing potential sea-crossings to Italy, 

and forcing any new refugees to go 

via Jordan, Syria, Turkey and the tortuous 

Western Balkan route to the EU, 

said Francesco Galietti, from the Romebased 

political consultancy firm Policy 

Sonar. 

Pro-Palestinian protests in Italy could 

test Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni’s 

political skills, however. 

“Meloni fears riots in the streets, as they 

increase the risk of violence and she does 

not want to be seen as heavy-handed, 

quasi-fascist,” said Galietti, referring to 

her Fratelli d’Italia [Brothers of Italy] party’s 

efforts to appeal to mainstream voters, 

forgetting its fascist roots. 

But unlike with Le Pen, if Russia/Ukraine 

escalated before June, Meloni’s “balancing 

exercise - staunch Atlanticism, despite 

a substantial portion of Russophile 

electorate in her rightwing camp - would 

become extremely complicated,” Galietti 

said. 

“Meloni’s calculus is probably that 

Putin will want to wait and see whether 

[Putin-friendly Donald] Trump wins 

the US presidential elections [in November],” 

before launching any game-changers 

in Ukraine, Galietti added. “Whether 

this expectation is realistic remains to be 

seen,” he said. ◄ 

About 

Andrew Rettman 

Andrew Rettman writes about foreign 

relations for EUobserver. He 

joined the site in 2005 and specialises 

in Israel, Russia, the EU foreign 

service and security issues. He was 

born in Warsaw, Poland. 

9


‘Qatargate’ 

— a missed 

opportunity 

to clean up 

the European 

Parliament 

The Qatargate corruption scandal, which saw a 

handful of MEPs arrested by the Belgian police, and 

the seizure of €1.5m in cash, could have injected 

momentum into the EU’s transparency agenda — 

but despite promises of radical reform, including a 

14-point plan by parliament president Roberta Metsola 

to tackle corruption, the results are less impressive 

than the rhetoric. 

By BENJAMIN FOX 

Inside the corridors of power 

at the Strasbourg European 

Parliament building. Source: 

European Parliament 

11


MEP and then European Parliament vice-president Eva Kaili had praised Qatar’s human rights record — before being arrested by Belgian police 

in December 2022. More than a year later, the case has still to come to trial. Source: European Parliament 

Fighting disinformation lies at the heart 

of keeping European democracy “safe 

and secure” — so said EU Commission 

president Ursula von der Leyen after she 

was formally unveiled as the European 

People’s Party candidate for the EU executive’s 

top job. 

Yet four years after commission 

vice-president Věra Jourová promised 

that a European Democracy Action Plan 

would tackle the lack of transparency in 

political advertising and online disinformation, 

and crack down on malign foreign 

interference in European elections 

and public life, progress has been largely 

piecemeal. 

Instead, delays in the commission when 

drafting new laws, and then among 

MEPs and ministers in approving them, 

have stymied the EU’s progress. 

In February 2024, EU lawmakers passed 

legislation on political advertising, one 

Plans for a 

proposed 

independent 

EU ethics 

body have 

been scaled 

down to an 

advisory 

body with 

a skeleton 

staff and no 

powers of 

investigation. 

of a series of EU laws aimed at combating 

foreign interference from the likes of 

Russia and China, and tackling disinformation 

and increasing transparency in 

political campaigns, 

However, although the commission had 

wanted to be in place before the June European 

Parliament elections, most of its 

major provisions, including a ban on foreign 

adverts in the three months ahead 

of elections of referendums across the 

bloc, will only come into effect in September 

2025. 

One law that is on the statute book 

ahead of the election campaign is the 

Digital Services Act. The law requires 

companies that have at least 45 million 

monthly users to set up systems to control 

the spread of misinformation, hate 

speech and terrorist propaganda, or risk 

penalties of up to six percent of their 

global annual revenue or even a ban in 

EU countries.


Momentum 

The Qatargate corruption scandal, 

which saw a handful of MEPs arrested by 

the Belgian police, including parliament 

vice-president Eva Kaili, and the seizure 

of €1.5m in cash, could have injected 

momentum into the EU’s transparency 

agenda. 

The revelations that Qatar, Morocco and 

Mauritania had allegedly bought off a 

handful of MEPs and officials for influence 

in the parliament to push their interests, 

among them to try to water down 

EU criticism of Qatar’s record on labour 

rights ahead of the 2022 World Cup, and 

of Morocco’s human rights record, shone 

a light on the easy access to EU lawmakers 

enjoyed by foreign governments and 

lobby groups, not to mention the importance 

such countries attach to boosting 

their image in Brussels. 

But despite the promises of radical reform, 

including a 14-point plan by parliament 

president Roberta Metsola to 

tackle corruption, the results are less impressive 

than the rhetoric. 

In 2023, the parliament reformed its 

own internal rules of procedure to prevent 

special interest groups from hosting 

events on the parliament’s premises, a 

six-month ban on former MEPs lobbying 

their old colleagues, and requirements 

for MEPs to record any gifts received or 

side incomes above €5,000. By a narrow 

majority, MEPs appear to favour banning 

themselves from holding second jobs, 

though no rules have been adopted to 

put this in place. 

That may reduce the access of foreign 

interests to the EU institutions, but it is 

hard to imagine that these rules would 

have prevented Qatargate had they been 

in place. 

Indeed, the fact that none of the MEPs 

and officials arrested and charged since 

December 2022 are likely to go to trial 

before polling day in June suggests that 

the Belgian police investigation has also 

lost momentum. 

Meanwhile, plans for a proposed independent 

EU ethics body – demanded by 

MEPs in the wake of the Qatargate probe 

- have been scaled down to an advisory 

body with a skeleton staff and no powers 

of investigation. 

“The proposal lacks the teeth to apply the 

same ethics standards across all EU institutions,” 

said Gaby Bischoff, vice president 

of the S&D group, describing it as “a 

missed opportunity”. 

Missed opportunity 

It is a similar story when it comes to the 

Foreign Agents Law which was finally 

unveiled by the European Commission 

on 12 December 2023. 

Commission officials argue that the draft 

law is designed to protect European democracy 

by imposing transparency obligations 

on funds or links to third countries 

on organisations that seek to impact 

public opinion and politics. 

It would require lobbyists and diplomats 

carrying out interest representation activities 

on behalf of a third country to 

register in a transparency register, with 

any payments received and details of 

the activities carried out on behalf of the 

client to be disclosed on registers that 

would be publicly accessible. 

Commissioner Jourová insisted that the 

directive “is not a foreign agent law”. But 

MEPs were largely underwhelmed by its 

contents and by the fact that by landing 

in December, just six months before the 

European elections, the chances of the 

file getting approved by both parliament 

and Council of Ministers before the EU 

institutions go into the pre-election purdah 

period were very slim. 

Civil society groups, for their part, see 

the draft law as a political mistake and 

a missed opportunity. They point out 

that Georgia and Hungary were urged to 

scrap their own foreign agents’ laws by 

the EU commission, and that the draft 

law, which would give member states 

significant room for interpretation when 

transposing it into national law, is similar 

to Hungary’s law on foreign funding 

of NGOs which Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz 

government has used to crack down on 

critical NGOs and groups promoting LG- 

BTQI+ rights. 

The law “will not only be ineffective, 

but it will also be dangerous,” according 

to Transparency International’s Vitor 

Teixeira. 

“If the commission really wanted to protect 

democracy, it would cast the net 

wide and raise transparency standards 

for all interest representatives — foreign-funded 

or not,” he added. 

Instead, activists say, the commission 

should have proposed a more modest 

pan-European lobby register via an ‘EU 

Lobby Act’, which would also cover national 

lobbying on EU matters. ◄ 

About 

Benjamin Fox 

Benjamin Fox is EUobserver’s 

Africa correspondent in Nairobi. 

13

Interestingly, whether people believe false 

information doesn’t rely solely on how realistic 

it appears. Instead, factors such as repetition, 

narrative appeal, perceived authority, group 

identification, and the viewer’s state of mind 

can matter more. 

Source: Mika Baumestier


How Brussels hopes 

to ‘shield’ June’s 

election against 

Moscow’s propaganda 

With people spending an average of seven hours online per day and social media 

being the main source of information globally, many voters in Europe are likely to 

encounter disinformation campaigns — ranging from the Russian war in Ukraine 

and migration to euroscepticism. That risks creating “a red carpet for Putin,” according 

to EU commission vice-president Věra Jourová. 

By ELENA SÁNCHEZ NICOLÁS 

In the run-up to June’s Europe-wide voting, 

both politicians and IT experts have 

been sounding the alarm over the impact 

of disinformation and the challenges 

posed by artificial intelligence (AI) on the 

electoral campaign — and democracy itself. 

But what can be done to tackle these 

threats? Are people ready to discern facts 

from fiction, and are authorities taking 

enough action to uphold electoral integrity? 

The simple answer is that there is no easy 

fix. The EU has opted for a holistic approach 

involving collaboration between 

governments, tech companies, media, 

and civil society — under the umbrella of 

a new law which still has to prove itself 

in the battle against misinformation and 

manipulation by artificial intelligence. 

The impact of disinformation and AI fakery 

is “much bigger” today than the previous 

2019 European elections, prompting 

“stronger vigilance” and proactive preparation 

for the campaign, EU commission 

vice-president Věra Jourová told EUobserver 

in an interview. “We believe that 

more than ever before the elections people 

should have access to the facts.” 

With people spending an average of seven 

hours online per day and social media 

being the main source of information 

globally, many voters in Europe are likely 

to encounter online disinformation 

campaigns ranging from the Russian war 

in Ukraine and migration to euroscepticism. 

Russia, Jourová said, has always been 

“the master of brainwashing” and the 

European Parliament elections offer an 

opportunity for the Kremlin to put forward 

its anti-Ukraine narrative. “Putin 

desperately needs us to betray Ukraine” 

15


EU commission vice-president Vera Jourová says Russia has always been ‘the master of brainwashing’. 


— but Russia needs a “European mouth” 

to spread its disinformation campaign, 

she said. 

By “European mouth,” Jourová was referring 

to political forces and parties both 

outside and inside national parliaments, 

including those in government, such 

as in Slovakia or Hungary, who are advocating 

for a peace agreement against 

Ukraine’s interest. “This is the reality 

that we need to work with. We cannot 

undo it overnight”. But if Europe underestimates 

the power of influence of the 

Kremlin on public opinion, then it risks 

creating “a red carpet for Putin” before 

the election, she warned. 

The Czech commissioner has been 

touring EU capitals in recent weeks to 

discuss with governments, national authorities, 

online platforms, civil society 

and other actors about the best practices 

to counteract disinformation during the 

campaign period. “Only if we are able to 

cooperate and join forces will we be able 

to create some kind of shield against 

Russian propaganda,” Jourová said. 

Even though some fake news can be 

easily spotted by the average voter, the 

well-prepared, coordinated, disinformation 

campaigns, that can spread rapidly 

online, and catch fact-checkers and online 

platforms off-guard, are the ones 

concerning policymakers. The main issue 

however is that there is no silver bullet 

to tackle this problem. 

Understanding the nature of these offensives 

can help. Tech solutions, such as social 

media labels and fact-checks tagged 

on to posts, can help. Legislative efforts 

can help. But concerns remain, especially 

regarding the exponential growth and 

power of AI — a tool able to produce millions 

of messages, instantly amplifying 

what Jourová calls “verifiable lies”. 

The Digital Service Act (DSA), one of 

the flagship EU Commission tech legislations, 

aims to tackle disinformation 

by setting specific obligations on online 

platforms to identify and mitigate risks 

linked to elections. But these June European 

elections will be a key test for the 

effectiveness of the DSA. And whether or 

not the new rules have enough teeth will 

depend on their enforcement. 

Hot-button subjects 

Disinformation narratives — often simply 

referred to by the shorthand ‘fake news’ 

— usually vary from country-to-country, 

as they are highly dependent on the national 

or even local public debate. Nevertheless, 

there are some cross-border 

hot-button themes expected to be at the 

core of false narratives in the run-up to 

June’s election. Most prominently, climate 

change, particularly the impact of


A ‘deepfake’ video purportedly of 

Ukrainian president Volodymyr 

Zelensky telling Ukrainians to lay down 

their arms, from March 2022. In just 12 

months, the AI technology has 

advanced enormously since then. 

Source: Twitter 

the Green Deal, migration, and Europe’s 

support for Ukraine. 

“It will notably be the usual suspects 

— and yes, I mean Russia — that will 

try to propagate disinformation with 

the help of AI and deep fakes on those 

issues which are currently the biggest 

bones of contention in Europe: migration 

and climate change,” the president 

of Eindhoven University of Technology, 

Robert-Jan Smits, told EUobserver. He 

argues the main goals are also to create 

“unrest and polarisation” in society from 

which extremist parties can then benefit. 

“Given the enormous tensions in society, 

as can be seen from this year’s farmers’ 

protests, it will not take much to light a 

fire”. 

Key patterns which can help citizens spot 

disinformation campaigns include emotionally-charged 

language, and framing 

complex topics in black-and-white. Plus, 

trying to attribute false claims to authorities 

and using conspiracy theories to explain 

complicated events. 

When asked about narratives likely to 

surface during the EU election campaign, 

Jourová explained she tends to 

look back to previous narratives, and assessing 

whether they were predictable or 

not is key. “We have a tendency just to 

look into the dark future, [but] we should 

look at the dark past.” 

Experts point out that 

certain demographic groups 

are more likely to be targeted 

by disinformation 

campaigns than others. 

As a US cultural and political import now 

gaining ground in Europe, disinformation 

campaigns at elections also target 

the legitimacy of polling, by spreading 

unfounded allegations of voter fraud, 

foreign interference, and unfair practices, 

according to Giovanni Zagni, a member 

of the European Digital Media Observatory 

(EDMO). But other key areas 

recently identified by EDMO as targets 

for disinformation campaigns are minority 

groups, the Israel-Gaza war and the 

recent farmers’ protests. Finally, euroscepticism 

is also expected to be a source 

of propaganda efforts. 

The targets 

Experts point out that certain demographic 

groups are more likely to be 

targeted by disinformation campaigns 

than others. “The more vulnerable parts 

of society, for example, people at risk of 

poverty or losing their jobs due to economic 

changes and environmental regulations, 

are easy targets for cheap, crude 

and sometimes outlandish false stories,” 

Zagni told EUobserver. He said a typical 

example is to make people afraid and angry 

towards groups seen as competition 

for public services — like migrants. 

But farmers have also been the target 

for fake news. In France, a recent disinformation 

campaign saw the creation of 

a fabricated Euronews TV programme, 

plus a fabricated letter from Vadym 

Omelchenko, Ukrainian ambassador 

in Paris, suggesting Ukraine was asking 

farmers to halt ongoing protests. 

Social media platforms use algorithms to 

target specific demographic groups with 

tailored content, including propaganda 

and sometimes disinformation. By ana-


lysing users’ data such as location, age, 

gender, education level, employment status, 

family status, and online behaviour, 

platforms can target those more likely to 

accept and share a particular message. 

However, this lucrative business behind 

disinformation has prompted a ban under 

the DSA on analysing users’ political 

opinions, sexual orientation or health for 

advertising purposes. 

Tactics used by disinformation dark actors 

include creating and disseminating 

false stories or conspiracy theories, 

fabricating fake experts and websites to 

increase the credibility of the narrative, 

flooding social media with the same message 

from different fake accounts created 

by automated bots, and most recently, 

creating AI-generated deep fakes. 

Deep fakes are AI-generated videos, or 

voice recordings, that convincingly portray 

people (usually famous, or politicians) 

saying or doing things they never 

did. And even though deep fakes thus 

far make up only a fraction of disinformation 

campaigns, they are a worrying 

trend due to their potential to rapidly 

spread online and take both electoral 

candidates and fact-checkers by surprise. 

And, conversely, generative AI can be 

seen as a potential tool in combating disinformation 

— by assisting fact-checkers 

in rapidly sorting and categorising 

claims, finding relevant accurate information, 

and conducting comparisons 

between claims and verified facts. ◄ 

In 2024, 

we see daily 

deepfake 

scams and 

it’s rising 

fast.” 

MEP Bart Groothuis 

“The platforms now have clear responsibilities,” 

said EU commissioner for the 

internal market Thierry Breton during 

a plenary debate in February. “Platforms 

can no longer monetise the virality of 

disinformation and hate content”. 

This was the case during last October’s 

parliamentary election campaign in Slovakia 

when a deepfake audio circulated 

where a presidential candidate and an 

investigative journalist were supposedly 

talking about rigging the elections. The 

fake recording was shared on Facebook 

during the 48-hour pre-election moratorium 

period, during which media and 

politicians were meant to stay silent. Before 

the vote, Juorová had warned that 

elections in Slovakia were “fertile soil” to 

advance Kremlin pro-war narratives. 

Dutch MEP Bart Groothuis warned: “In 

2024, we see daily deepfake scams and 

it’s rising fast”. Groothuis said the EU 

should be better prepared, obliging online 

companies to detect deepfakes and 

label them as such. While not an obligation, 

the comission has urged online 

platforms to adopt algorithmic systems 

to detect watermarks and other indicators 

of AI-generated content and label 

them as such. 

About 

Elena Sánchez Nicolás 

Watch out for deep fakes 

Interestingly, whether people believe 

false information doesn’t rely solely on 

how realistic it appears. Instead, factors 

such as repetition, narrative appeal, perceived 

authority, group identification, 

and the viewer’s state of mind can matter 

more, according to a report recently published 

by the Carnegie think-tank. 

Elena is the managing editor of 

EUobserver. She joined the site in 

2019 and specialises in institutional 

affairs, climate change and tech 

policy. 

19


The European 

far-right: 

reasons to be 

pessimistic — 

and optimistic 

Here are five reasons why and how the far-right will shape 

the next half decade of European integration, and five 

reasons to remain (cautiously) optimistic 

By KAI ARZHEIMER 

From June 6 to 9, citizens of the European Union's 

27 member states will elect the 720 members of the 

world's most powerful supranational parliament. 

Many political analysts anticipate that the recent farright 

mobilisation in member states will now more 

directly influence the European Union's policies and 

politics 

Here are five reasons why and how the far-right will 

shape the next half decade of European integration, 

and five reasons to remain (cautiously) optimistic. 

The far-right is on the rise across Europe 

Over the past three decades, 'cultural' issues (often 

with significant economic implications) have gained 

Fuck AfD [Alternative for Germany]’ 

reads a placard at a German demo 

against the far-right party, which in 

2023 secretly advocated for ‘remigrating’ 

millions of German citizens. 

Source: Christian Lui/Unsplash


21


Across 31 European 

countries surveyed by the 

PopuList project, (populist) 

far-right parties have 

approximately doubled their 

vote share since the 1990s. 

In Italy, the far-right already leads the government, 

in the form of Georgia Meloni and her 

Brothers of Italy party. 

Source:Wikimedia 

prominence across Europe. Among 

these, immigration and multiculturalism 

are the most important. Other examples 

include gender equality and diversity, 

perceptions of climate change, attitudes 

towards European integration, and even 

views on vaccination and Russia. Despite 

the seemingly disparate nature of these 

issues, they are connected to underlying 

values and identities, which are increasingly 

influential in European societies. 

The primary beneficiaries of this trend 

are far-right parties, which try to keep 

political debates centred on these questions. 

The far-right is branching out 

'Far-right' serves as a convenient shorthand 

encompassing three distinct 

groups of parties, united by nativism — a 

paranoid form of nationalism rooted in 

(perceived) ethnicity that views non-native 

persons and ideas as a threat to the 

nation. This ideology often merges with 

a populist worldview, pitting the (ethnically) 

'pure people' against allegedly corrupt 

elites. 

Extreme-right parties openly reject 

democracy, while more modern radical-right 

parties target its liberal and 

deliberative aspects, such as minority 

rights, the court system, and the media. 

The latter approach often yields greater 

success, inspiring (or infecting) a third 

group of formerly centre-right parties to 

adopt radical-right policies and rhetoric. 

A prominent example is Viktor Orbán's 

Hungarian Fidesz party, which started as 

a liberal-conservative party in the 1990s. 

Across 31 European countries surveyed 

by the PopuList project, (populist) farright 

parties have approximately doubled 

their vote share since the 1990s. 

The far-right is coming for the 

big(ish) member states 

Under the principle of degressive proportionality, 

the four most populous EU 

member states — Germany, France, Italy, 

and Spain — collectively hold nearly 

45 percent of the seats in the European 

Parliament. Recent polls indicate the farright 

as the leading party in France and 

Italy (where Georgia Meloni's Fratelli 

d'Italia [Brothers of Italy] governs alongside 

Matteo Salvini's Lega [League]), 

and securing second place in Germany. 

Although far-right support in Spain has 

waned since its peak in 2022, Vox still remains 

tied for third place in most polls. 

Additionally, the far-right is making 

significant strides in states with slightly 

smaller populations but substantial delegations, 

ranking second in Poland and 

Romania, and first in the Netherlands. 

Social media (and malign actors) make 

everything worse. 

Many citizens still perceive EP elections 

as second-order contests with seemingly 

low stakes, making them vulnerable to 

disinformation campaigns by far-right 

parties, affiliated organisations, and their 

supporters outside the EU. While major 

players like Google and Meta have 

stepped up their efforts to combat disinformation, 

Twitter's new leadership disbanded 

many moderation teams and reinstated 

some formerly banned far-right 

actors. Other platforms like Telegram, a 

key channel for the far-right, lack effective 

content moderation. Additionally, 

the availability of affordable generative 

AI allows the mass production of propaganda 

and disinformation on a scale unimaginable 

just three or four years ago. 

The pro-integration core will 

(somewhat) erode 

For decades, the European project has 

been shaped by an informal coalition of 

centre-right and centre-left parties. In 

2019, this coalition lost its majority in the 

European Parliament for the first time. 

However, robust performances by Green 

and liberal parties, coupled with low party 

cohesion, maintained support for further 

integration. In this cycle, however, 

centre-left, green, and liberal parties are


expected to lose seats, resulting in a reduction 

of the core of MEPs supporting 

integrationist and progressive legislation. 

And now for the good news. 

Due to their 

inherent 

xenophobia, 

collaboration 

among 

far-right 

parties in 

the European 

Parliament 

is often 

fractious. 

The projected gains of far-right 

parties are relatively modest 

Models from Europe Elects and the European 

Council on Foreign Relations 

(ECFR) suggest that the combined 

seat share of the rightwing European 

Conservatives & Reformists (ECR) and 

far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) 

groups may increase from 18 percent in 

the current parliament to 24-25 percent 

in the next. While this would be an impressive 

feat, it's hardly a far-right takeover 

of the EP. The centre-right European 

People’s Party (EPP) is poised to maintain 

its status as the largest group, holding 

around 25 percent of the seats, followed 

by the centre-left Socialists & Democrats 

(S&D) group, which is expected to suffer 

some moderate losses. 

The centre will (mostly) hold 

(but there is a catch) 

Collectively, the centre-left, centre-right, 

and liberal parties are projected to still 

hold more than 50 percent of the seats in 

the parliament. Despite anticipated losses, 

the Greens are likely to retain most 

of their seats, too, ensuring the continuation 

of a broad pro-European majority. 

However, legislative behaviour in the EP 

is characterised by fluidity, and less cohesion, 

than in many national parliaments, 

with coalitions forming on a per-issue basis. 

As the left-of-centre camp shrinks, the 

EPP and the liberals may align more frequently 

with the rightwing and far-right, 

bringing about a marked rightward shift 

in certain policy fields (e.g. environment). 

The far-right remains 

politically divided 

Due to their inherent xenophobia, collaboration 

among far-right parties in the 

European Parliament is often fractious. 

Currently, some eight far-right MEPs are 

unaffiliated, while far-right parties form 

the (nationalist and eurosceptic) Identity 

and Democracy (ID) group, and 20 ideologically 

more-diverse parties sit as the 

European Conservatives and Reformists 

(ECR). Orbán's Fidesz is considering 

joining either group, but potential disagreements 

over Orbán's stance towards 

Russia may lead some current ECR members 

to leave in that scenario. And there 

is even speculation that the (mainstream 

right) European People's Party (EPP) 

could offer membership in the club to 

Meloni's Brothers of Italy. 

The presence of far-right MEPs 

in the chamber shows that 

European democracy actually 

works 

For four decades, spanning from the 

early 1950s to the early 1990s, "Europe" 

operated as an elite project with minimal 

public involvement. Paradoxically, the 

increasing levels of far-right mobilisation 

against and within the EU can be viewed 

as evidence that European integration 

has become so politicised that it can no 

longer proceed by stealth. In any case, it 

forces the pro-European parties to take a 

stand and effectively campaign for their 

vision of Europe. 

The rise of the far-right is not 

unstoppable 

Three decades of research indicate that 

the gradual decline of the centre-left and 

centre-right, coupled with the ascent 

of the far-right, is structurally rooted in 

the transformation of European societies 

and economies. Nevertheless, this 

research also underscores that the voter 

potential of the far-right is not limitless, 

and that mainstream parties retain substantial 

agency to influence the political 

process to their advantage. ◄ 

About 

Kai Arzheimer 

Kai is a professor of politics and 

political sociology at Johannes 

Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany. 

His primary focus lies in the 

study of far-right extremism and 

radicalism in Europe. 

23


Raül Romeva and Maylis Rossberg are the Spitzenkandidaten of the European 

Free Alliance for the European elections. EFA is the European Political Party 

that defends democracy and diversity in Europe. 

Stakeholder Article 

Is there an alternative to 

‘business as usual’ or the rise 

of the far-right in the EU? 

By Maylis Roßberg and Raül Romeva, lead candidates [Spitzenkandidaten] 

for the European Free Alliance (EFA).


Europe has been through a whirlwind 

of changes in the past five years, from 

Brexit to Covid-19 and the Russian invasion 

of Ukraine. These events have reshaped 

our continent in ways we could 

never have imagined before. The Europe 

of 2019 is almost unrecognisable 

now. We cannot even envisage what it 

might look like after another five years 

of constant disruption. But one thing 

is clear: Europe needs capable leaders 

now more than ever, and ‘business as 

usual’ is not the answer anymore. 

The rise of far-right parties in 

Europe is a serious concern that 

threatens the progress we have 

made in the last decades. It is 

undeniable that their populist 

rhetoric is succeeding in gathering 

support, but their policy 

proposals — if any — seem to 

take us back to a time when diversity 

was seen as a problem 

and difference as a threat, not 

a strength. We can’t afford to sit 

back and watch this happen. 

Is the only answer for Europe 

just to go backwards, or is there 

any chance that we can move 

forward, towards a more democratic 

future? The upcoming 2024 EU elections 

will be a crucial moment. They are 

our chance to put the EU on a different 

path. One where it will work more 

effectively, better represent its peoples, 

and be ready to tackle a changing world 

without fear. Either we come up with 

real answers, or we risk our continent 

falling back into authoritarianism. 

But there are many democratic questions 

that are not even being asked 

by the mainstream parties. There are 

many voices that are excluded and not 

heard. Minorities, stateless nations and 

peoples who are not represented in the 

mainstream European debate. People 

like us: like EFA. 

Incorporating all the voices of peoples 

from around Europe is key to understanding 

what we really need to see 

from the EU in these coming five years. 

We need a pro-European, pro-democratic 

majority in the next European Parliament. 

But a pro-democratic majority 

also needs to be a diverse one. The big 

parties have failed to halt the rise of the 

far-right. They have failed to bring the 

necessary ambition to imagine a better, 

more inclusive EU. 

We need a Europe that is more democratic, 

more diverse. And we need a 

Europe that is for all. Not just for the 

The rise of far-right 

parties in Europe is a 

serious concern that 

threatens the progress 

we have made in the 

last decades. 

established interests, the states or the 

majorities. 

We want to see a serious process of 

EU reform. The European Parliament 

needs to have the right to legislative 

initiative. It is absurd to have a directly 

elected Parliament that can only approve, 

reject or protest; it must also be 

able to propose. And all the European 

institutions must be much, much more 

transparent and accountable. Above all, 

we need a Europe that recognises the 

democratic right to self-determination. 

We cannot pretend that the existing 

state structures are unchangeable, or 

that they cannot be questioned. The EU 

in which we live is still too dominated 

by the member states, with their veto 

powers and selfish interests. We need 

to start the conversation for a reformed 

EU now. 

The EU itself needs to change to reflect 

the people it represents. We should get 

rid of barriers that stop smaller groups 

from being heard, such as electoral 

thresholds. Europe is far more than its 

27 member states: it is all the diversity 

within those states. Linguistic, cultural, 

and historical minorities; stateless nations 

that have not yet achieved their 

independence; historical regions with 

unique identities, and so much more. 

It is also all the different people who 

make up our societies. Of all ethnicities, 

genders, sexualities and 

social origins. If European politics 

does not include all these 

different voices, it is not truly a 

reflection of the communities 

in which we live. 

And just as the EU is so much 

more than its member states, 

it is also much more than its 

official languages. We stand for 

the right to use many more languages 

in the European Parliament. 

Because how can we say 

European democracy is for the 

people, if we can’t even use our 

own language? 

There are many states in Europe that 

actively discriminate against their minorities. 

We believe it is possible for the 

EU to step in and ensure that European 

values – which include freedom from 

discrimination – are properly applied 

within its borders. That’s why we call 

on the next European Commission to 

appoint a Commissioner for Minority 

Rights. 

We are here to show that minority 

rights and self-determination are not 

a fringe concern for a few small groups 

in remote places. They are matters of 

European importance. And the Europe 

that we want to see – the Europe that 

we have just described – is a symbol of 

hope for the future. Just as it has been 

a symbol of hope for so many of us 

throughout history. ◄ 

25

‘If as a young person, you are never approached by a political party and their proposals do not speak to you, why would you go out and vote?’ 

said a member of the European Youth Forum. Source: Creative Christians 

In a novel experiment, around 270,000 

teenagers in Belgium will be able to vote 

for the first time in the EU elections in 

June, in an innovative attempt by one 

of the 27 member states to give 16- and 

17-year-olds a say. 

At the most recent 2019 elections, the 

bloc saw a historically impressive turnout, 

with 50.6 percent of eligible citizens 

going to the polls. 

And that increase was mainly driven by 

the under-25s — although paradoxically 

they were also the age group with the 

lowest overall turnout. 

Now, the EU is hoping for a new youth 

surge in turnout for the 2024 election, 

If you don’t 

defend it, the 

EU is there 

today — and 

who knows 

tomorrow? 

Jaume Duch 

and wants the idealism of the younger 

generation to act as a barrier against populism, 

as the far-right is expected to gain 

ground across Europe. 

“Young Europeans will become a wall of 

democracy next June against this wave 

of populism and hate that threatens to 

attack Europe,” said EU Commission 

vice-president Margaritis Schinas back 

in January, when he publicly asked US 

singer Taylor Swift to help get young Europeans 

out to vote. 

The general voting age in the EU is 18 — 

but Belgium is not the only member state 

that will allow people that age to vote. 

Austria has done so since 2007, Malta 

since 2018 and Germany adapted its elec-


EU eyes teen 

turnout as next 

generation votes 

Lowering the voting age is a way of making mid-to-late teenagers 

feel listened to — but it is also a way of creating a habit, increasing 

the likelihood of them voting throughout their lives. And also possibly 

a youthful and idealistic ‘shield’ against more reactionary and 

right-wing middle-aged voters? 

By PAULA SOLER 

toral law in early 2023, while in Greece, 

teenage citizens can go to the polls as 

soon as they turn 17. 

The 2019 European parliamentary elections 

took place against a backdrop 

where climate change was one of the 

main concerns of young Europeans, 

who organised themselves to protest for 

change in the ‘Fridays for Future’ movement. 

“In 2019, there was also a Brexit effect, 

because many young people realised 

what happens when you stay at home,” 

said Jaume Duch, director general for 

communication at the European Parliament, 

in an interview with EUobserver. 

But the 2024 elections will be even more 

political, Duch said, citing the multiple 

crises that followed 2019: not least, 

the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in 

Ukraine — so the parliament wants to 

reinforce some messages to young people 

before polling day. 

“If you don’t defend it, the EU is there 

today and who knows tomorrow,” he 

argued. “And also, the European Union 

goes hand-in-hand with democracy, and 

democracy has to be defended when the 

elections come”. 

According to the latest Eurobarometer, 

57 percent of Europeans are interested in 

the EP elections. That is six percentage 

points more than five years ago, but will 

this interest translate into votes? 

How does the EU want to engage with 

the youth vote? What do European youth 

organisations think is wrong with existing 

ways of engaging with young people? 

And, most importantly, what do these 

young people themselves have to say? 

The view from youth 

organisations 

Europe has made very little progress 

since 2011 on young people’s well-being, 

freedoms and rights (and no progress at 

all in the past six years), according to data 

published in late 2023 by the European 

Youth Forum (EYF) — an umbrella group 

27


representing over 100 youth organisations. 

“I’m afraid that because of this lack of 

progress, the motivation to engage in 

this kind of democratic process might 

have gone down,” said Rareș Voicu, an 

EYF board member. 

National youth councils and organisations 

are actively working to campaign 

and inform young people about the June 

elections, but they cannot do it alone, 

Voicu stressed. 

“At the end of the day, it’s up to political 

parties to include issues which matter 

to them in their manifestos,” he commented. 

“If as a young person, you are 

never approached by a political party and 

their proposals do not speak to you, why 

would you go out and vote?” 

Earlier this year, the commission announced 

the introduction of so-called 

‘youth checks’ — a tool to analyse how 

draft policies impact the lives of young 

people now and in the future. 

“Young people will not participate in 

spaces where they don’t feel that it 

makes sense for them to participate or 

that something will come out of it” Voicu 

highlighted. 

However, a major problem also lies in 

the lack of political representation by the 

young, says the EYF, with only 2.6 percent 

of MPs worldwide under 30 — and 

just 37 out of 705 existing MEPs under 35. 

What EU Parliament plans 

Part of the European parliament’s campaign 

in the run-up to the elections will 

focus on the importance of intergenerational 

dialogue. 

“We are going to highlight the fact that the 

older generations are passing the baton to 

the younger people,” explained Duch. 

“The baton, precisely in the sense of defending 

the democratic principles, values 

and rights that make up the European 

Union beyond the single market.” 

A message that the institution plans to 

adapt to the language of the younger 

generations and to spread through the 

channels most used by them, such as 

social networks like TikTok, as well as 

through content creators and celebrities. 

EU commissioner Margaritis Schinas asked US 

singer Taylor Swift to help get young Europeans 

out to vote. Source: Wikimedia 

“All stakeholders in society need to be 

very present on social media, not just the 

parliament,” Duch warned. 

“We should not be afraid of using them, 

(...) because the percentage of people who 

receive information or disinformation 

through these channels is increasing, 

and so are the negative consequences,” 

he said, when asked whether the parliament 

fears that the predicted rise of anti-EU 

parties could be fuelled by young 

voters who are unaware of how the EU 

really affects their daily lives. 

What (some) young people say 

Every young generation has its own 

concerns, but this one in particular, the 

so-called ‘Generation Z’ (those born between 

1996 and 2012), is more difficult 

to see as a unified generation, given the 

growing ideological gender-divide, as a 

recent analysis shows. 

To take one example, in Germany, the 

so-called ideological gap is as high as 30 

percentage points — between increasingly 

conservative young men, and their 

progressive female counterparts. 

A similar gap was seen in Poland in 2023, 

when almost half of male voters aged 

18-21 backed the far-right Confederation 

party. Only one-sixth of their female 

counterparts did. 

So what do some of these teenagers 

themselves have to say about an EU that 

they might not know much about, or often 

feel is distant? Is voting at 16 a mature 

enough age to have a democratic say? 

Manolis, a 17-year-old Greek, is not really 

familiar with how the EU works, nor 

with its legislative powers and initiatives, 

so he will not vote for any candidate, 

even though he feels his concerns are 

not being adequately addressed by politicians. 

“What upsets me most is unemployment,” 

Manolis told EUobserver. 

“I consider myself a well-educated teenager, 

and I am outraged by the prospect 

of either having to move to another 

country to find a job, or having to tolerate 

the reality of low wages and long 

working hours in Greece,” he said. 

For Youssef, the problem is that he feels 

politicians are doing nothing to give him 

more opportunities in life. He is also 

a 17-year-old Belgian citizen from the 

Brussels commune of Saint-Josse-ten- 

Noode, where his family has lived since


People like Greta 

Thunberg have 

been listened to 

about climate 

change by older 

generations since 

she was my age.” 

Juliane, 16 

Greta Thunberg has been a significant political figure since 

she was 15 years old — before she was old enough to vote. 

Source: Wikimedia 

they moved from Morocco for work 

more than 20 years ago. 

“If we want to vote because we feel involved 

and informed, why not let us?” argues 

Juliane, a 16-year-old German, who 

finds this an interesting idea. 

“I know that European decisions are 

made here, in the same city as me, but I 

don’t feel that they are addressed to me, 

so what difference would this vote make 

in my life?” he said. 

Anastasia is 20, from a Slovakian family, 

but also living in Brussels and plans to 

cast a blank ballot as she does not truly 

follow politics. 

“I don’t think it’s smart to let 16 and 

17-year-olds vote because they’re still 

young, innocent,” she told EUobserver 

via a text. “Even adults sometimes aren’t 

educated enough to vote”. 

“People like Greta Thunberg have been 

listened to about climate change by older 

generations since she was my age or so,” 

Juliane pointed out. 

Lowering the voting age is a way of making 

mid-late teenagers feel listened to, 

says EYF board member Voicu — but it is 

also a way of creating a habit, increasing 

the likelihood of them voting throughout 

their lives and breaking down the barrier 

between young people and democratic 

processes earlier. 

“So who knows, [if you vote earlier] maybe 

you’re going to be more motivated to 

run for office in your twenties?” Voicu 

concluded. ◄ 

About 

Paula Soler 

Paula Soler is EUobserver’s social 

affairs correspondent. She previously 

worked covering economic 

and financial affairs at Spanish 

newspaper El Confidencial. 

29


Migration — 

how the EU 

sought to 

offshore the 

problem ahead 

of the elections 

Migration is always a major theme at EU elections — not least 

because the far-right and nationalist parties help make it so, 

campaigning on little else, despite the cost-of-living crisis and 

Ukraine war. Here EUobserver takes a deep dive into the recent deals 

Brussels has done to ‘offshore’ the issue beyond the EU’s borders. 

BY WESTER VAN GAAL AND NIKOLAJ NIELSEN 

EU Commission president Ursula 

von der Leyen with Egyptian 

president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. 


31

HOW OTHERS SEE THE EU 

Recent EU agreements with Tunisia, 

Egypt and Mauritania come with promises 

of reforms, economic stability, and a 

mix of programmes that span education 

to energy. 

But at their core is the EU’s prerogative 

to stem irregular migration primarily 

towards frontline Mediterranean ‘arrival’ 

states such as Italy and Spain, amid 

budgetary concessions to foreign governments 

with their own motives and 

agendas. 

“Most countries consider that they’re already 

doing enough. They have no inclination 

to assist the EU,” said Catherine 

Woollard, director of the Brussels-based 

European Council on Refugees and Exiles. 

“It doesn’t mean that they won’t play a 

game on this and try to extract benefits 

and concessions and other advantages 

from offering or pretending to offer support 

and hosting of people that Europe 

doesn’t want,” she said. 

In June 2023, one senior European Commission 

official made similar off-record 

comments on Tunisia. “My feeling at this 

point is that, especially countries in the 

neighbourhood, will not sign up to any 

purely migration-flow arrangements,” he 

told journalists. 

So, when the European Commission 

published its blueprint agreement with 

Tunis two weeks later, it listed migration 

at the bottom of issues — which ranged 

from agriculture to the green energy 

transition. 

First, it promised €900m in macro-financial 

assistance, following a reform 

programme from the International Monetary 

Fund, as well as direct budgetary 

support. 

And it cited an agreement on renewable 

energy production, as well as a roadmap 

on energy market reforms, and a 220km 

Six weeks 

after the 

Tunisia 

agreement 

was signed, 

irregular 

migrant 

arrivals in 

Italy were 

almost 70 

percent 

higher than 

six weeks 

prior. 

submarine power line to Italy (that had 

already been planned for years). 

EU officials claim that the production 

of green electricity in Tunisia could take 

place at a cost of about two cents per 

kilowatt-hour, compared to around 10 

cents for industry in Europe. 

They also say green hydrogen could be 

transported to the EU through four existing 

gas pipelines, amid future plans to 

link Tunisia to the EU electricity market. 

Another EU official, again speaking off 

the record, said other states with migratory 

challenges also presented opportunities 

in terms of trade and intensified 

economic ties. 

“This is clearly true for Egypt and Morocco,” 

he had said, last summer. 

Cracks appear 

Six weeks after the Tunisia agreement 

was signed, irregular migrant arrivals in 

Italy were almost 70 percent higher than 

six weeks prior. 

Yet EU officials and leaders continued to 

spin the Brussels-Tunis ‘memorandum of 

understanding’ as one that encapsulates 

the pressing issues important to Tunisia, 

whose economy is largely wrecked. 

At an event in late September 2023, 

Nicole de Moor, Belgian state secretary 

for asylum and migration, praised the 

deal as a template for similar agreements 

elsewhere. 

“What the deal is really about is to help 

Tunisia — a country with major problems 

to build a full-fledged state with 

economic opportunities,” she said. 

Within a week of de Moor’s comments, 

the first serious cracks began to appear. 

In October, Tunisia’s autocratic president, 

Kais Saied, would chide the European 

Commission over its “charity” and 

“derisory” aid, putting the deal in jeopardy 

when the EU executive attempted 

to send funds to curb irregular migration. 

And in December, Saied got his €150m 

in direct budgetary support from the EU 

despite repeated alarms from Amnesty 

International over widespread rights 

abuses in the small north African country. 

“We have also seen that this has not led 

to decreasing the number of arrivals to 

Europe, or deaths at sea,” said Hussein 

Baoumi, foreign policy advocacy officer 

at Amnesty International. 

Blueprint applied elsewhere 

Around the same time the the European 

Commission was pressuring Morocco to 

take back foreign nationals.


But there have been reports of forced 

displacements and draconian repression 

of peaceful resistance. The UN Working 

Group on Arbitrary Detention recently 

demanded the release of Saharawi activists 

who were imprisoned 13 years ago in 

retribution for their activism against economic 

plunder. 

‘Golden age’ 

Then, in January 2024, the EU announced 

the dawn of a “golden age” 

with Egypt, a country already hosting 

some nine million refugees, followed by 

a deal a few months later. The proclamation 

builds on an association agreement 

signed two years ago, including a proposal 

to increase gas supplies to the EU. 

specific projects remain sparse, and 80 

African civil society organisations have 

since criticised the Italian plan, saying it 

“perpetuates a cycle of inequality”. 

“Egypt desperately needs to raise foreign 

revenues,” Riccardo Fabiani, the north 

Africa expert at International Crisis 

Group, a not-for-profit conflict prevention 

organisation based in Brussels, told 

EUobserver. “The reality is that the EU 

doesn’t have a big vision for Egypt.” ◄ 

Far-right Italian prime minister Georgia Meloni 

is also cooking up some energy-migration deals 

for northern Africa. Source: Wikimedia 

At the time, it was announced imports 

from Israel would involve gas being processed 

at Egypt’s liquefaction plants before 

being shipped to Europe as liquefied 

natural gas. 

Rabat refused, despite having received 

over €1bn from the EU between 2014- 

2022. Instead, Morocco wants recognition 

over its bogus territorial claims on 

the Western Sahara, where it is increasingly 

building wind and solar farms as 

demand for renewable power grows. 

Western Sahara Resource Watch, a Brussels-based 

NGO, estimates that by 2030 

the occupied Western Sahara could be 

supplying half of all Moroccan wind energy 

and a third of its solar energy. 

However, Morocco has mostly evaded 

scrutiny by leveraging migration to help 

secure disputed EU trade deals that include 

the Western Sahara. The European 

Commission has in the past complied, 

only to see such deals shredded by the 

European Court of Justice, which says all 

investment there must be with the consent 

of the local Saharawi people. 

“The EU has developed itself to 

be the first investor in Egypt,” said 

Olivér Várhelyi, the EU commissioner 

for neighbourhood and enlargement, 

and so responsible for relations with 

countries such as Egypt. 

“Egypt can become not only a reliable 

supplier of gas but also a reliable source 

of renewable energy,” he told journalists 

in January. 

But his statements also came sweetened 

with the deployment of €50m as a financial 

incentive for Egypt to prevent migration 

into Europe. In addition, there were 

new coast guard vessels, following alarm 

that Palestinians fleeing the Gaza Strip 

could attempt to seek refuge in the EU 

— as highlighted by Margaritis Schinas, 

the vice-president of the European Commission, 

only three days after Hamas attacked 

Israel. 

Italy’s far-right prime minister Giorgia 

Meloni has also announced a vaguely-defined 

plan to invest up to €5.5bn 

in energy in return for migrant deals 

in northern Africa, which includes potential 

deals with Egypt. But details of 

About 

Nikolaj Nielsen & 

Wester van Gaal 

Nikolaj Nielsen is migration and 

home affairs correspondent at EUobserver. 

Wester van Gaal is green economy 

reporter with EUobserver. He 

was previously climate economy 

journalist for The Correspondent, 

and editor-in-chief of VICE, Motherboard. 

33


To fight 

euroscepticism, 

Europe’s 

economies 

need a boost 

There are two explanations for growing anti-EU sentiment: the 

emergence of identity issues and culture wars, plus austerity and 

economic decline. 

By JUDITH ARNAL 

Euroscepticism is of increasing relevance in the context of a 

‘permacrisis’ (sovereign debt crisis, Brexit, Covid-19, invasion of 

Ukraine, among others) affecting the EU. 

Political parties that integrate into the far-right Identity and 

Democracy (ID) political family, i.e. the most eurosceptic party 

in the European Parliament and subject to a cordon sanitaire, 

have recently made it to power in some member states — or are 

gaining ground. 

These are the cases, for instance, of the Lega [League] in Italy, 

which is at present a coalition partner in the government 

of Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia [Brothers of Italy]; Geert 

Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid [Party for Freedom, PVV] in 

the Netherlands, which won national elections in November 

2023 but has not at the time of writing succeeded in forming a 

government; Rassemblement National [National Rally], which 

under Marine Le Pen’s leadership made it to the second round 

Interestingly, euroscepticism does 

not seem to be an issue in the 

member states — Greece, Ireland, 

Portugal, Spain and Cyprus — that 

suffered austerity measures.

There is a 

question as 

to whether 

Europe is 

actually 

using Africa 

as a guinea 

pig.” 

Faten Aggad 

35


in the latest two French presidential 

elections, increasing support from 33 

percent in 2017 to 41 percent in 2022; or 

Alternative für Deutschland [Alternative 

for Germany, AfD], which won its first 

mayoral election in December in the city 

of Pirna, in Saxony, and shows constant 

improvements in the polls. 

The somewhat less eurosceptic but still 

anti-federalist European Conservatives 

and Reformists (ECR) political family 

also seems to be gaining traction: the 

Sweden Democrats are supporting the 

coalition in government in Sweden 

since 2022; Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of 

Italy is the senior partner in the Italian 

coalition; and though the Polish Prawo 

i Sprawiedliwość [Law and Justice, PiS] 

recently lost power to a coalition headed 

by Donald Tusk, it was still the most voted-for 

party in the October 2023 general 

election in Poland. 

With just weeks to go to the June European 

elections, polls show that all political 

families but ID and ECR would see 

their number of MEPs decrease. 

According to a recent poll, ID would see 

their MEPs increase from 62 to 85 and 

ECR from 66 to 76. If these two parties 

were to merge, they would become the 

second-largest party in the European 

Parliament, just behind the centre-right 

European People’s Party (EPP, 174 seats) 

and leaving the Socialists & Democrats 

(S&D) in the third position (137 seats). 

Nevertheless, a merger seems unlikely, 

given ideological differences between 

the two. But irrespective of whether 

they merge or not, something seems to 

be changing in the European political 

landscape, with increasing fragmentation 

and rising euroscepticism: let’s not 

forget that only 10 years ago, in 2014, the 

EPP and S&D had a majority. 

In light of this scenario, the question is 

straightforward: what are the reasons for 

the rise in support of euroscepticism? 

According to academics, there are two 

explanations: on the one hand, the emergence 

of identity issues and cultural wars 

in increasingly progressive societies; on 

the other hand, austerity and economic 

decline. Let’s focus on the second possible 

explanation. 

Show me the money 

To some, the imposition of austerity 

measures on some member states during 

the sovereign debt crisis was at the heart 

of the emergence of euroscepticism. 

However, in none of the five member 

states that received a financial assistance 

programme (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 

Spain and Cyprus) there is at this moment 

a eurosceptic party in power or significantly 

gaining in popularity. 

Indeed, empirical evidence shows that 

euroscepticism decreased in those member 

states that received loans as a consequence 

of the crisis. 

The most acute times of the sovereign 

debt crisis gave place to the relevance of 

parties such as Syriza [Coalition of the 

Radical Left - Progressive Alliance] in 

Greece or Podemos [We Can] in Spain, 

but none of them could be classified as 

eurosceptic in the traditional sense. 

Moreover, the response to the Covid-19 

and energy crises has significantly differed 

from the past, with the de facto 

suspension of the fiscal rules and the 

massive injection of mutualised funds 

based on reforms and investments suggested 

by the recipient member state, instead 

of strict conditionality embedded 

in memoranda of understanding. 

A new set of fiscal rules, more adapted 

to the new times where massive investments 

will be needed for the digital and 

green transitions as well as for boosting 

defence capabilities, have been recently 

approved. Thus, austerity is no longer 

an issue, but still, support for euroscepticism 

is rising. 

Empirical evidence shows 

that euroscepticism 

decreased in those member 

states that received loans as 

a consequence of the crisis. 

So what about the economic decline 

explanation? There is abundant literature 

linking the rise in support for eurosceptic 

parties to long-term economic 

and industrial decline, low employment 

rates and demographic decline. There 

is even evidence that refers to a rise in 

euroscepticism in regions subject to a 

‘development trap’, i.e. regions that have 

stagnated in terms of GDP-per-capita, 

employment and productivity. Moreover, 

the intensity and length of the time 

spent in the ‘development trap’ lead to an 

increase in euroscepticism to the extent 

that EU institutions are perceived to be


distant from the problems afflicting local 

economies. 

And though the cultural and economic 

reasons have been presented separately, 

they tend to reinforce each other, as the 

most dynamic economic regions, such as 

metropolitan areas, are the ones where 

progressive ideas are better accepted. 

In a nutshell, the EU seems to have successfully 

left austerity behind, reacting to 

the latest crises in a mutualised manner, 

respecting member states’ ownership. 

Furthermore, euroscepticism does not 

seem to be an issue in those member 

states that suffered from austerity measures 

years ago. 

So on top of cultural issues, in the economic 

field, euroscepticism appears to 

be linked mostly to economic, industrial, 

competitiveness and demographic 

decline and linked to this, to the lack of 

capacity by the EU to be perceived by citizens 

as problem solvers. 

The EU seems to have 

successfully left austerity 

behind, reacting to the 

latest crises in a mutualised 

manner, respecting member 

states’ ownership. 

This stresses the importance that the 

coming Draghi and Letta Reports on 

competitiveness and the single market, 

respectively, will have. Let’s hope for the 

reports to bring forward game-changing 

measures and for the political equilibria 

in the next institutional cycle to allow for 

the adoption of the suggested reforms 

and investments. The EU needs to be 

perceived as a competent problem-solver 

of social and economic issues. The best 

way to fight euroscepticism is by boosting 

our economies and for this, we need 

a good functioning and problem-solving 

EU, perceived as a close ally to citizens. ◄ 

Euroscepticism is of 

increasing relevance 

in the context of 

a ‘permacrisis’ 

(sovereign debt crisis, 

Brexit, Covid-19, 

invasion of Ukraine, 

among others) 

affecting the EU. 

About 

Judith Arnal 

Judith Arnal is a columnist for 

EUobserver and a Spanish economist 

with the Real Instituto Elcano 

think-tank in Madrid and the Centre 

for European Policy Studies. 

37


Farm-to-fork, 

to protestors 

with pitchforks: 

the death 

of the EU’s 

sustainable 

food policy 

The 2019-2024 European Parliament and Commission gave birth 

to Europe’s Green Deal. Then watched as the key Farm-to-Fork 

component was watered-down — before going up in smoke in the 

streets of Brussels. 

By PIET RUIG


Pitched battles between farmers and police outside the European Parliament. Source: Paula Soler 

The European Commission’s Farm-to- 

Fork Strategy was originally hailed as a 

highly-ambitious initiative that would 

transform European agriculture. Four 

years on, weeks out from the next European 

Parliament elections, little is left 

of this ambition, as farmers’ protests and 

industry pressures have forced the commission 

to drop most of the proposals. 

Critics and environmentalists have 

warned that this failure will dupe both 

nature and farmers, as they caution 

against agri-industry lobbying and farright 

capture of MEPs. 

The strategy, a major component of the 

Green Deal, promised to be a transformative 

push towards a more sustainable 

food system. Instead of a sectoral focus, 

the strategy took an unprecedented holistic 

view of the entire food chain, integrating 

environmental, agricultural and 

health policy into an overarching framework, 

with several directorate-generals 

working together. Moreover, it was coupled 

with ambitious and specific targets, 

like a 50-percent reduction in pesticide 

use. 

The holistic approach was crucial for 

Farm-to-Fork’s ambition, according to 

experts. “Normally, agricultural policy 

gets made by special institutions in close 

collaboration between farming interests 

and the policymakers, because food is 

such a sensitive geopolitical and cultural 

question for countries” said Nathalie 

Bolduc, senior research fellow at thinktank 

Institute for Sustainable Development 

and International Relations (ID- 

DRI). 

However, with Farm to Fork, the commission 

put the Directorate-General for 

Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE) in 

the lead, which is further removed from 

the agricultural sector. “DG AGRI (the 

Directorate-General for Agriculture and 

Rural Development) was involved, but 

wasn’t holding the pen. That’s a key difference, 

as stakeholders who are close to 

DG AGRI may have felt that they weren’t 

being heard as much,” Bolduc observed. 

And agricultural interests have now 

come back to haunt the strategy. After 

the war in Ukraine ignited concerns 

over food security and a general backlash 

against climate policy has swept Europe, 

39


the combined pressure from food industry 

groups, intensifying farmers’ protests 

and opposition by centre-right politicians 

has effectively derailed nearly all 

of Farm to Fork’s proposals. With fears 

mounting of far-right parties capitalising 

on farmers’ discontent during the European 

elections, the centre-right European 

People’s Party (EPP) has been loath to 

antagonise the agricultural sector, trying 

to burnish its image as the farmers party 

by opposing environmental legislation. 

In response, the commission omitted 

various flagship proposals from the legislative 

agenda, like the Framework For 

Sustainable Food Systems (FSFS), and 

more stringent animal welfare protection. 

But the most painful defeat came 

with the defeat of the centrepiece pesticide 

reduction regulation (SUR). After 

being voted down in the European Parliament 

at the end of 2023, Commission 

There’s an 

increased 

awareness 

of the 

importance 

of ambitious 

regulation, 

but also that 

they must be 

achievable." 

EU diplomat 

president Ursula von der Leyen moved to 

scrap the proposal altogether in February 

2024, appeasing angry farmers protesting 

in the streets of Brussels. 

Not ‘dead’, just ‘depolarising’ 

While disputing that Farm to Fork was 

dead, a commission spokesperson acknowledged 

the challenges faced by the 

strategy. “It’s undeniable that political 

polarisation has made things more difficult, 

so in that respect, we’ve had to 

slow down and restart a dialogue with 

all the stakeholders,” the spokesperson 

told EUobserver. According to a Council 

diplomat, EU officials have become more 

realistic about Farm-to-Fork. “There’s an 

increased awareness of the importance 

of ambitious regulation, but also that 

they must be achievable”, the diplomat 

said, adding that maybe the agricultural 

Tractors block Brussels streets outside the European Parliament on 14 February 2024. Source: Paula Soler


sector hadn’t been involved enough. 

The commission has shifted efforts to 

a “Strategic Dialogue” on agriculture 

involving stakeholders from across the 

food system, to “depolarise” the debate. 

But the move sparked concern, with major 

environmental NGOs protesting the 

return to a ‘narrow focus’ on agricultural 

policy, as opposed to Farm-to-Fork’s holistic 

approach. 

Moreover, critics are contesting the narrative 

that pits farmers against environmental 

legislation, blaming lobby groups 

and the far-right for exploiting farmers’ 

genuine grievances. Morgan Ody, farmer 

and general coordinator of the peasant 

organisation La Via Campesina, insisted 

that dropping environmental legislation 

only met the demands of the largest, 

richest farmers. “For most farmers, 

the main issue is a fair livelihood”, she 

said, arguing that the continued protest 

proved her point. “After the environmental 

stuff was dropped, Arnaud Rousseau 

[the head of the Copa-Cogeca agriculture 

lobby group] told us to go home. Farmers 

did not go home” Ody told the EUobserver 

on the side of a farmers’ protest in 

Brussels. 

The MEPs 

in the AGRI 

committee 

never dare to 

do anything 

that upsets 

farmer’s 

lobbies." 

MEP Michal Wiezik 

MEP’s involved with the legislation 

expressed similar sentiments. Sarah 

Wiener, Green MEP and rapporteur for 

the SUR, argued that farmers could have 

benefited from the pesticide law. “With a 

little good will, farmers could have been 

motivated and helped to understand that 

the SUR is necessary and can even support 

them in their independence,” she 

said. But resistance was driven by conservative 

politicians and lobbyists opposing 

change, according to Wiener: “The 

pesticide lobby had a business model to 

lose.” 

Michal Wiezik, MEP for Renew Europe 

and member of the environment committee, 

also felt that resistance against 

Farm-to-Fork did not originate from 

most farmers themselves, and lambasted 

the outsized influence of the large 

agri-businesses on EU policy-making. 

“The MEPs in the AGRI committee never 

dare to do anything that upsets farmer’s 

lobbies,” Wiezik lamented. 

Reports by Corporate Observatory Europe 

and investigative platform DeSmog 

have highlighted the ties between the 

agri-food industry and EU policymakers, 

documenting the intense efforts of lobby 

groups like Copa-Cogeca and CorpLife 

to derail the SUR, and constant meetings 

between various MEP’s on the AGRI 

committee and industry representatives. 

Consequently, many farmers end up acting 

against their own interests, observed 

Natalia Mamonova, a political sociologist 

specialising in rural populism. “They 

demand to be less burdened by environmental 

regulations, but that results 

in a further deterioration of the soil of 

which they will themselves be the major 

victims.” Being locked into an unsustainable 

system of competition and intensification, 

makes farmers susceptible to 

the far-right, said Mamonova. “They feel 

they’re a group that has been overlooked 

for years, in favour of urban elites and 

transnational corporations, so there’s 

overlap in the narrative.” 

In the end, Farm-to-Fork’s flaw might 

have been that it still wasn’t holistic 

enough. With many farmers pushed to 

the brink by shrinking margins, lowering 

prices, and increased competition compounded 

by imports from Ukraine, the 

crisis in agriculture exposed the strategy’s 

lack of measures for economic support. 

Though emphasising that environmental 

protection would benefit farmers 

in the long run, Wiener acknowledged 

that Farm-to-Fork was light on economic 

support. “There were too few proposals 

to combat price pressure on the market 

or the supermarkets’ monopoly on 

trade,” she said. 

Supporters of Farm-to-Fork have now 

no choice but to put their hopes on the 

strategic dialogues delivering a breakthrough. 

But even if the commission 

manages to get all the different stakeholders 

on board without watering down 

all its proposals, implementation will be 

left to the new commission. With momentum 

for climate policy waning and 

the far-right gaining in the polls, it seems 

unlikely that Farm-to-Fork’s transformative 

potential will soon materialise. ◄ 

About 

Piet Ruig 

Piet Ruig is a Brussels-based journalist, 

who previously worked for 

Dutch public broadcaster VPRO. 

41

EUOBSERVER


Will June 

elections 

change 

‘Brussels So 

White’? — 

don’t bet on it 

Black and brown members of the current European 

Parliament represent only three percent of the 

assembly’s composition — even though racial and 

ethnic minorities make up at least 10 percent of the 

EU population. 

By SHADA ISLAM 

Dutch MEP Mohammed 

Chahim: ‘How are we going to 

convince non-white Europeans 

that EU institutions are relevant, 

credible and an attractive place 

to work?’. 

Source: European Parliament 

43


“Brussels So White” is not just a hashtag 

— it’s the reality of an often inward-looking 

Eurocentric mindset. As anyone who 

has interacted with the EU institutions 

quickly realises: those working ‘for Europe’ 

are mainly white. 

That is because Europe’s definition of 

diversity is not very inclusive. It applies, 

quite correctly, to the varied geographies, 

histories, languages and cultures of the 

27 EU member states. 

Over the years, after persistent pressure, 

‘gender diversity’ has been added to the 

list, as has diversity related to sexual orientation 

and people with disabilities. In 

contrast, a strong commitment to building 

an ‘anti-racist’ Europe where black 

and brown Europeans can feel at home, 

remains just that: a nice promise. 

The EU Commission does not keep statistics 

on the ethnicity of its staff. We do 

know, however, that black and brown 

members of the current European Parliament 

represent only three percent of 

the assembly’s composition even though 

racial and ethnic minorities make up at 

least 10 percent of the EU population. 

Are the June elections to the European 

Parliament going to change – or at least 

make a dent - in the EU institution’s systemic 

problem of inadequate racial representation? 

Will they make the EU less 

navel-gazing and Eurocentric? 

The short answer to both questions is no, 

not really. The longer one: it’s going to be 

tough, painstaking and complicated – for 

several inter-connected reasons. 

First, because xenophobic and openly-racist 

far-right parties, which are expected 

to increase their number, role and 

influence in the next EU assembly – and 

possibly also send senior officials to the 

European commission – are unlikely to 

include many Europeans of colour in 

their electoral lists. Their worldview can 

therefore be expected to be similarly racist 

and Orientalist. 

Second, while they are not openly-bigoted 

in an ‘in your face’ kind of way, Europe’s 

centre-right politicians have either 

openly — or tacitly — embraced the extremists’ 

political agenda and xenophobic 

view of the world. 

We are 

reaching out 

to community 

leaders. But 

it is not easy 

to convince 

everyone to 

vote." 

Celine Febrequette 

Centre-right and far-right 

collaboration? 

They also seem set on working together. 

As the centre-right European People’s 

Party (EPP) Spitzenkandidate [lead 

candidate], EU commission president, 

Ursula von der Leyen, has already publicly 

confirmed she will work with the 

parliament’s rightwing European Conservatives 

and Reformists (ECR) group 

— whose members include the French 

far-right politician Eric Zemmour. 

Third, although they may talk-the-talk 

on making Europe more diverse, Europe’s 

progressives are not pushing — at 

least not collectively, visibly and forcefully 

enough — for a more racially-inclusive 

EU. 

There is yet another very important — 

fourth – problem: persuading black and 

brown Europeans to go out to vote, stand 

as parliamentary candidates and/or apply 

for EU jobs. 

With few role models for reference, “how 

are we going to convince non-white Europeans 

that EU institutions are relevant, 

credible and an attractive place to work?” 

asks Dutch MEP Mohammed Chahim. 

The problem is not just restricted to the 

EU. Voters are losing confidence in their 

mainstream national politicians across 

Europe. 

The disconnect seems to be particularly 

acute for black and brown people. 

Research by the Social and Cultural Planning 

Office in the Netherlands underlines 

that people with a “migration background” 

feel excluded from and have less 

confidence in national Dutch politics 

because “topics they consider important 

are downplayed or pushed aside”. 

Celine Febrequette of the Diaspora Vote 

organisation is trying to change just that 

through recently-mandated young “ambassadors”, 

tasked with getting more 

non-white Europeans to the polling 

booths. 

“We are reaching out to community 

leaders. But it is not easy to convince 

everyone to vote,” she admits. “The EU is 

just not seen as important to their daily 

lives.” 

Foreign policy 

For Europeans of colour it is not just a 

question of wanting more emphasis on 

social inequalities and systemic discrimination. 

There is also concern about European 

foreign policy. 

The EU’s belated call in March 2024 for 

a ceasefire in Gaza, sanction Israel for 

human rights violations, plus the bloc’s


EU Commission president, 

Ursula von der Leyen, has 

already publicly confirmed she 

will work with the parliament’s 

rightwing European Conservatives 

and Reformists (ECR) 

group — whose members 

include the French far-right 

politician Eric Zemmour. 

Source: Wikimedia 

hasty, ill-judged decision to stop aid to 

UNRWA are adding to the disconnect 

between EU institutions and Europeans 

of colour — but most especially Muslims. 

“There is so much to do to make Europe 

more inclusive,” she underlines. “An important 

step is to eliminate discrimination 

in education” and also to get EU institutions 

to approve the 2008 directive 

on ensuring equal treatment and ending 

discrimination in all areas, not just employment. 

There is also the fact that escaping racism 

even once inside the EU institutions 

is not easy. 

The European Commission’s first-ever 

survey on diversity, inclusion and respect 

at the workplace released last year 

warned that EU institutions had failed to 

create an inclusive culture for Europeans 

of colour and people with disabilities. 

MEP Monica Semedo, one of only a 

handful of black politicians in the European 

Parliament, told me that while she 

was always “an exception” in her native 

Luxembourg, it was only when she came 

to the European Parliament as a young 

Afro-European woman that she felt 

“people were acting so differently around 

me.” 

As Europeans get ready to vote, the European 

Network Against Racism has 

warned political parties to ensure that 

their election campaigns and mandates 

are free from hate and discriminatory 

speech and acts, including at the highest 

political level. 

It is important advice. Experience shows, 

however, that hate-mongers and racists 

will continue to get media attention and 

top billing in the crucial months ahead. 

After the elections, there will be love-ins 

between far-right politicians and their 

ostensibly less extreme colleagues. Most 

dangerously, unless progressives step in 

to stop the drift, the far-right’s xenophobic 

and ethno-national discourse will 

creep even further into mainstream EU 

politics and policymaking. “Brussels So 

White” was tough enough for Europeans 

of colour. Its new iteration looks set to be 

even more challenging. ◄ 

About 

Shada Islam 

Shada Islam is a columnist for EUobserver, 

and visiting professor at 

the College of Europe. 

45


100 million 

disabled EU 

voters deserve 

better 

Persons with disabilities face problems in being allowed 

to vote, being able to cast their vote, understanding how 

to vote, knowing who to vote for and more – even being 

allowed on the ballot 

By IOANNIS VARDAKASTANIS 

This June, over 400 million voters are 

called to cast their vote in the European 

election. But for the 100 million persons 

with disabilities living in the EU, the process 

is riddled with barriers – barriers 

that lead to unequal treatment and discrimination 

in the electoral process. 

Persons with disabilities face problems in 

being allowed to vote, being able to cast 

their vote, understanding how to vote, 

knowing who to vote for and more — 

even being allowed on the ballot. And 

yet, we are disproportionately impacted 

by the results of these same ballots. 

The good news is that if there is political 

will, there are ways to demolish these 

barriers – and to get citizens with disabilities 

deeply involved in the European 

project. The European Disability movement 

has proposals in four concrete areas 

for European leaders to work on to 

ensure disabled voters are able and committed 

to the European project: first, 

ensure we can vote; second, keep us informed; 

third, propose concrete actions 

to improve our lives; and finally, give us 

an opportunity to be elected. 

First, governments need to let persons 

with disabilities exercise their right to 

vote. There are still six EU countries that 

completely deny this right to persons 

with disabilities under guardianship: 

Bulgaria, Estonia, Cyprus, Greece, Romania 

and Poland. 

If disabled voters are to believe in the 

EU — and its claim to be a champion 

of human rights and democracy — then 

these countries must change. They need 

to reform their laws. This is not unprecedented 

— we are just asking for equality. 

In fact, France, Germany and Spain 

changed their laws before the European 

elections of 2019. Since then, Luxembourg 

and Slovenia also changed their 

laws — Slovenia, the most recent, in February 

2024. 

We also need to be able to exercise our 

right to vote. For example, a wheelchair-user 

like my colleague Pirkko is 

often not able to vote in secret because 

there are no accessible booths in her 

polling station in Finland. Alejandro and 

Loredana, blind voters, struggle with the 

lack of accessible voting machines in Belgium. 

Second, persons with disabilities must 

know how to vote and be informed on

The Portuguese assembly in Lisbon illustrates 

how even government buildings 

are not equally accessible for all 

citizens. Source: Salvador Mendes 

what the parties are doing. People like 

Alexandre and Lidia are less informed 

because there is a lack of sign-language 

interpretation, or there is a lack of 

close-captioning in debates. For people 

like Tamara, the fact that the information 

is not provided in an easy-to-understand 

way constitutes a huge obstacle. 

If disabled voters are to 

believe in the EU — and 

its claim to be a champion 

of human rights and 

democracy — then these 

countries must change. 

Often, electoral authorities don’t provide 

enough accessible information on how to 

vote, or parties don’t share their electoral 

promises in easy-to-understand ways, 

leaving persons with disabilities having 

to make extra efforts to know what to 

do. The European Disability movement 

is helping with solutions, such as checklists 

to make campaigns accessible – but 

authorities, and also political parties in 

particular, need to use these solutions. 

But the right to an informed and free 

vote is only half of the solution to getting 

citizens with disabilities excited to participate 

in the European project. 

More than just casting a ballot 

For the other half, the EU must make 

good on its motto of “United in Diversity” 

and guarantee an inclusive future for 

all its citizens. 

One way is through laws and policies 

that advance disability rights. 

The EU has a good starting point on the 

European Disability Card – a recently 

agreed law that will create a method of 

mutual recognition of disability when 

persons travel within the EU. This was 

the result of paying attention to the 

movement’s longstanding demands to 

acknowledge mutual recognition of dis- 

47


The disability 

community needs to 

see themselves 

reflected in our elected 

representatives. 

A disabled woman voting in Cyprus. 

Source: Maria Trikouppi 

ability between EU countries (albeit the 

card will only work in a limited set of circumstances). 

It is a start, but persons with disabilities 

need more. We need to feel as part of the 

European project, as fully-fledged citizens 

of the European Union. This means 

having the possibility to move, work and 

live abroad and have immediate access to 

the support we need. It means being able 

to receive our disability allowances even 

if we move to another EU country. But 

more, it means knowing that the EU is 

actively working to improve our lives. 

The European disability movement has 

continuously provided answers. The 

EDF manifesto for the European Elections 

2024: “Building an inclusive future 

for persons with disabilities in the EU”, 

includes concrete demands, such as 

improving our ability to travel without 

discrimination by revamping passenger 

rights regulations, or creating a Disability 

Employment and Skills Guarantee to 

facilitate our access to quality employment. 

It also makes an essential call to 

ensure women and girls with disabilities, 

and persons with disabilities part of other 

marginalised groups, are not left behind 

in initiatives. 

The right to run 

Finally, the disability community needs 

to see themselves reflected in our elected 

representatives. But, for that, we need 

to have equal opportunities to stand as 

a candidate – and be elected. That starts 

with having the right to run. Only 10 

countries allow all persons with disabilities 

to stand as a candidate without restrictions: 

Austria, Denmark, Germany, 

Spain, Croatia, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, 

Luxembourg and Slovenia. 

And even when we can run for office, 

we not only face ‘double the challenges’ 

due to our inaccessible societies, which 

make it more difficult to campaign, but 

also ‘double the mental load’ due to bias, 

harassment and discrimination – and 

for women with disabilities running for 

elections, the cost more than doubles. 

EU citizens with disabilities deserve to 

be part and parcel of the European project. 

We deserve to fully participate in it. 

And we can. We provided the solutions. 

Now, if leaders truly want a European 

Union for all citizens, they need to turn 

our demands into reality. ◄ 

About 

Ioannis Vardakastanis 

Ioannis Vardakastanis is the president 

of the European Disability 

Forum and of the National Confederation 

of Disabled People (NCDP) 

of Greece. He is also president of 

the Economic and Monetary Union, 

Economic and Social Cohesion 

(ECO) section of the European Economic 

and Social Committee.

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With a population of 1.3 billion 

people, and nearly 987 million voters, 

India’s April-June general election 

dwarfs that of the EU-27. 

Source: Shashank Hudkar 

Despite Europe being the birthplace of 

democracy some 2,000 years ago, India 

is its largest home now — as Ursula von 

der Leyen herself said, during her first 

visit to India as president of the European 

Commission. 

Speaking at the Raisina Dialogue — 

India’s flagship geopolitical conference 

— two years ago, von der Leyen lauded 

India’s parliamentary election saying it 

is witnessed by the world “with admiration.” 

“The outcome of decisions made by 1.3 

billion people [in India] resonates around 

the globe. This is especially true for Europe,” 

she said, adding that despite the 

geographic distance and other cultural 

differences when the EU and India look 

at each other, they do so “as close friends” 

and not “as strangers.” 

Two years on, both the “close friends” 

who are also among the world’s largest 

democracies are heading to the polls, 

with over nearly 987 million people eligible 

to vote in India between 19 April to 

1 June (counting is on 4 June) — and an 

estimated 400 million people eligible to 

vote in the EU between 6-9 June. 

While both these elections are significant 

domestically, the outcome could


Another big 

2024 election? 

- India’s 

Electorates of 987 million voters (India) and 400 

million (Europe) both go to the polls in spring 2024 — 

what will the results mean for relations between New 

Delhi and Brussels? 

BY PRIYANKA SHANKAR 

also have “a crucial impact” on future 

relations between India and the EU, 

according to Idoia Villanueva Ruiz, a 

Spanish MEP of the European Parliament’s 

Left political party and member 

of the parliament’s delegation for relations 

with India. 

“If the election results strengthen parties 

that promote equality, respect human 

rights and strengthen multilateralism 

and international law, we could see more 

cooperation in the face of global challenges, 

such as the fight against climate 

change, the promotion of gender equality 

or the extension of workers’ rights between 

India and the EU,” she said. 

The general elections in India will see the 

National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led 

by the country’s ruling Bharatiya Janata 

Party (BJP) to which the current prime 

minister Narendra Modi belongs, go 

up against the newly formed Indian National 

Developmental Inclusive Alliance 

(I.N.D.I.A.), led by the Indian National 

Congress political party. 

Meanwhile, Europe’s parliamentary elections 

will see voters in every EU member 

state choose MEPs to represent them in 

Brussels and Strasbourg. There are currently 

seven groups in the European Parliament 

— the European People’s Party 

(EPP), Socialists and Democrats (S&D), 

Renew Europe, the Greens/European 

Free Alliance, the rightwing European 

Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the 

far-right Identity and Democracy (ID) 

and The Left. These MEPs are integral 

when it comes to electing top leaders of 

the 27-member bloc including the European 

Commission President, the EU’s 

foreign policy chief and the president of 

the European Council. 

Villanueva added that if citizens decide 

to support more nationalist and exclusionary 

policies and values, such as those 

of current Indian PM Modi or his allies 

in Europe, “we could see a weakening 

of multilateralism that could lead to in- 

51


Indian prime minister Narendra 

Modi meets with EU Commission 

president Ursula von der Leyen in 

New Delhi in April 2022. 


creased tensions in areas such as global 

security, trade, ecological transition, 

women’s rights or the protection of minorities.” 

Like-minded partners? 

Since the early 1960s, the European Union 

and India have been working together 

to improve trade and business relations. 

But in recent years their relations 

have evolved into a strategic partnership 

with New Delhi and Brussels seeking to 

cooperate more in addressing geopolitical 

issues. 

“EU-India relations have been on a tremendous 

upswing in recent years, not 

least due to the China factor where rude 

awakenings like the 2020 Galwan valley 

clashes in India — where Chinese and 

Indian troops engaged in violent clashes 

along the Indo-China border — and China’s 

divide-and-rule tactics and weaponisation 

of supply chains during the pandemic 

in the EU, pushed the 27 member 

bloc and India towards a closer and 

more ‘strategic’ embrace,” said Shairee 

Malhotra, associate fellow for Europe 

at the Observer Research Foundation 

(ORF). 

While both these elections 

are significant domestically, 

the outcome could also have 

“a crucial impact” on future 

relations between India 

and the EU. 

But the EU has also been wary of India’s 

relations with Russia since the onset of 

the war in Ukraine. While Indian officials 

have called for “the immediate cessation 

of violence and hostilities” between Russia 

and Ukraine, the country has not cut 

off ties with Moscow. 

“If I look at the history of India post-independence, 

Russia has never hurt our 

interests,” said India’s external affairs 

minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, 

in a recent interview with German daily 

Handelsblatt. 

“The relations of powers like Europe, the 

US, China or Japan with Russia, have all 

seen ups and downs. We have had a stable 

and always very friendly relationship 

with Russia. And our relationship with 

Russia today is based on this experience. 

For others, things were different, and 

conflicts may have shaped the relationship. 

We, on the other hand, had a politically 

and militarily much more difficult 

relationship with China, for example,” he 

added. 

With the war in Ukraine continuing to 

rage, Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, assistant 

professor at the National Dong-Hwa 

University in Taiwan, said that while 

some differences remain between India 

and the EU, they have acknowledged 

each other’s position on Russia’s invasion 

of Ukraine.


Ferenczy highlighted that the EU’s enthusiasm 

for India as a like-minded partner 

is now mainly growing in light of an 

aggressive China. 

“The two share an interest in protecting 

the Indo-Pacific as free and inclusive, and 

share a fear of China’s growing power. 

Trade diversification is a common interest 

as both seek as independent a role as 

possible in the Sino-American rivalry,” 

Ferenczy said. 

The EU is India’s largest trading partner 

in goods and services, with bilateral trade 

of over €100bn. 

But according to Malhotra, if predictions 

of a sharp shift to the right come 

true at the EU elections, trade and economics 

could be a policy area that could 

be affected — with the arrival of more 

free-trade sceptics in the European Parliament. 

“This could lead to greater protectionism 

at the EU level and adversely impact the 

chances of an EU-India FTA. Also, the 

anti-immigration nature of these parties 

makes the prospect of the EU addressing 

India’s concerns for a more liberalised 

visa regime even slimmer,” Malhotra 

said. 

Talks to sign a free trade agreement 

(FTA) with India have gained momentum 

in the EU. But in January, the European 

Parliament passed a resolution 

urging EU leaders to consider an EU-India 

FTA only if based on “comprehensive 

human rights and sustainability impact 

assessments.” 

‘Good friends do not shy away 

from criticising one another’ 

While the EU, through its delegation in 

India, has resumed a local human rights 

dialogue with New Delhi, leaders of the 

bloc have largely been muted towards 

condemning the Modi government over 

its rights violations. 

Modi has been criticised globally by 

NGOs over his treatment of minorities, 

particularly Muslims in India, and his 

government’s crackdown on media organisations 

and rights bodies, among 

other clampdowns. 

The main reason [behind the EU leaders’ 

silence] lies in trade and geopolitical concerns 

according to Claudio Francavilla, 

associate director for EU advocacy at Human 

Rights Watch. 

“The EU intends to develop close relations 

with India, a country whose economy 

and regional and global influence 

are expected to rise significantly over 

the next few years…However, silence 

on human-rights abuse-risks represents 

a serious strategic mistake,” Francavilla 

warned. 

He also noted that the EU itself also does 

not get a free pass when it comes to human 

rights issues, with Islamophobia, 

anti-semtism, anti-immigration sentiments 

and breaches in the rule of law on 

the rise across the continent. 

“But in Europe, one can at least rely 

on strong institutions, procedures and 

courts to intervene…Under Modi’s India, 

adherence to human rights and democratic 

values has been eroded, institutions 

weakened, and civil society and 

media freedom are under attack. This 

authoritarian drift risks intensifying in 

the longer term, and as that happens it 

will be harder and harder for Europe and 

India to be ‘like-minded’ partners,” Francavilla 

said. 

He added that “they should remember 

that good friends do not shy away from 

criticising one another when need be, 

and intervene when mistakes are being 

made.” 

Moreover, with leaders of both regions 

currently in campaign mode, pre-election 

issues such as AI being used to manipulate 

elections and misinformation 

are also on the rise on both continents. 

Malhotra thinks that both the EU and 

India can also learn a lesson or two from 

each other to tackle such problems. 

Highlighting how the EU passed the 

world’s first regulation on Artificial Intelligence 

through its AI Act in December 

last year, she said that “India could take 

a leaf out of the EU’s book and consider 

bringing its own law to regulate AI and 

make it more responsible.” 

“On the other hand, the EU can learn 

from India’s long-term approach — articulated 

in its Vision 2047 — instead of a 

political leadership that mainly thinks in 

terms of political cycles, up to the next 

election,” she said. ◄ 

About 

Priyanka Shankar 

Priyanka Shankar is an independent 

journalist from India currently 

shuttling between Brussels and 

South Asia, covering migration, 

human rights and Europe’s relations 

with Asia. She has written for 

Al Jazeera English, Deutsche Welle, 

The South China Morning Post, 

BBC Travel, Lighthouse Reports, 

Times UK, El Pais among others, 

and been nominated for the Daphne 

Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism. 

53

Turnout for European Parliament 

elections is lower than for national 

elections — and the share of the vote for 

extreme and protest options is higher.


Turnout: 

the highs, 

the lows, and 

the outliers 

The June 2024 election will show whether 2019’s 

boost in turnout has halted a 30-year decline — 

or was just a temporary blip. 

By LEWIS BASTON 

The turnout at the last European elections in May 

2019 was a source of satisfaction to the European Parliament 

as an institution. For the first time in the history 

of direct elections, turnout had risen compared 

with the previous elections. The 28-country turnout 

was over 50 percent, the first time the parliament had 

hit this benchmark since the election for the EU-15 

block of states back in 1994. The 2024 election will 

show whether this was a lasting reversal of the declining 

trend, or a temporary blip. 

There are two broad reasons for the continuous fall in 

turnout from 1979 to 2014. One is the decline in turnout 

in existing member states. Comparing like-withlike, 

turnout in the original nine member states that 

voted in 1979 (leaving out former East Germany and 

West Berlin which joined the European electorate in 

55


Political scientists call European Parliament 

elections ‘second-order elections’. 

This means that they are less important 

to voters than elections that determine 

the national government (domestic parliament 

or an executive presidency), and 

therefore turnout is lower and the share 

of the vote for extreme and protest options 

is higher. The increase in the power 

of the European Parliament and innovations 

such as the ‘Spitzenkandidat’ [lead 

candidate] mandate for president of the 

Commission in 2014 and 2019 have not 

altered the general voter perception of EP 

elections as being secondary to national 

elections. There are occasional exceptions 

– turnout in Greece in the May 2019 

European Parliament election was higher 

(58.7 percent) than in the July 2019 parliamentary 

general election (57.8 percent). 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 

Turnout by year 

Final results 

1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019 

Source: European Parliament in collaboration with Kantar 

1994) fell from 62 percent in 1979 to 47.8 

percent in 2014 — but rebounded somewhat 

in 2019 to 52.6 per cent. 

The other reason for lower turnout in 

recent elections has been that the EU average 

is reduced by low turnout in many 

of the states that joined in 2004 and after, 

a phenomenon that affects national 

elections as well as those for the European 

Parliament. There was a 20-point gap 

in turnout in 2014 between the first 15 

members and the 13 post-2004 accession 

states. 

Even though many voters in these countries 

have relatively high trust for European 

(compared to national) institutions, 

the general lack of faith in politics leads 

to lower participation. The turnout gap 

narrowed dramatically in the 2019 election; 

the rise in turnout in the post-2004 

joiners, particularly in the largest two of 

them, Poland and Romania, was an important 

contributor to the overall rise in 

turnout in the EU. 

Turnout is measured simply as the number 

of people voting divided by the number 

of people entitled to vote. While the 

vote count precisely reflects the number 

of people participating in the election, 

the figure for the registered electorate 

tends to be a lot vaguer, and its accuracy 

varies between member states. Turnout 

might look artificially low in some countries 

because the electorate is swollen 

by the names of people who are dead or 

have moved, and people who are on the 

register twice. 

Countries with large populations working 

overseas, such as Romania, Bulgaria 

and Poland are particularly affected. 

Conversely, the electoral register in 

countries with large resident populations 

from other EU states, such as Luxembourg 

and Belgium, often misses out 

many people who are legally entitled to 

claim a vote for the European Parliament. 

The gap in participation as a share 

of those eligible to vote between the top 

and bottom countries may therefore be 

smaller than the published turnout figures 

suggest. 

Belgium: the ‘best’ 

Election after election, Belgium has been 

the champion member state for participation, 

with an average turnout of 90.6 

percent since 1979. To some extent, this 

may reflect Brussels hosting (most) European 

institutions and awareness of 

its ideas, but a closer look at the context 

shows other factors at work. Voting is 

compulsory in Belgium, and although 

prosecutions for failing to do so are now 

rare, participation has remained very 

high. Turnout in Belgium has also been 

supported in the elections of 2014 and 

2019, and will be in 2024, by concurrent 

federal and regional general elections. 

In 2024 the European franchise, but not 

the federal, will extend to 16 and 17-yearolds, 

for the first time.


60% 

50% 

40% 

30% 

Turnout by accession date, European Parliament elections 

2014 & 2019 

The same high turnout factors apply in 

Luxembourg. Interest and knowledge 

in European institutions is high, voting 

is compulsory and, until the 2014 elections, 

European Parliament elections 

took place on the same day as those for 

the national parliament. However, Luxembourg’s 

statistics look rather less impressive 

because of the 38 percent of the 

Grand Duchy’s residents who are citizens 

of other EU states than Luxembourg, 

only around 10 percent of those are on 

the electoral register – participation of 

the eligible population is therefore in the 

mid-60 per cent range rather than the 

officially recorded 85 percent average for 

2014 and 2019. 

20% 

10% 

0% 

2014 

Pre-2004 EU 15 

Source: European Parliament in collaboration with Kantar 

Post 2004 accessions 

2019 

Election after election, 

Belgium has been the 

champion member state 

for participation, with an 

average turnout of 90.6 

percent since 1979. 

The highest turnout without compulsory 

voting is in Malta, where party allegiances 

are very strong among the electorate. 

After Malta comes Italy and Greece, both 

of which have seen large decreases in 

European Parliament turnout since the 

turn of the century; both countries have 

abandoned a ‘soft’ form of compulsory 

voting based on minor discrimination 

against non-voters in providing civic 

services – Italy in 1993, Greece in 2000. 

Turnout in the 2022 Italian parliamentary 

election was well down on any previous 

election (64 percent, compared to 

73 percent in 2018 and over 80 percent 

before 2013) so it may have further to fall 

for the European Parliament in 2024. 

The biggest rise in turnout in 2019 was 

in Poland. Participation nearly doubled, 

from 24 percent to 46 percent, reflecting 

the increased political polarisation that 

has also raised turnout in national parliamentary 

elections – from 51 percent in 

2015 to 62 percent in 2019 and 74 percent 

in 2023. 

The worst? 

The worst turnouts in EP elections have 

consistently been in Slovakia, Croatia, 

the Czech Republic and Slovenia; the 

turnout in Slovakia rose above 20 percent 

for the first time in 2019 but it is, as it has 

57


Turnout in European Parliament elections by country (%) 

100 

90 

80 

70 

60 

50 

40 

30 

20 

10 

0 

Belgium 

Luxembourg 

Malta 

Italy 

Greece 

Denmark 

Cyprus 

Ireland 

Germany 

Spain 

Austria 

Sweden 

France 

Lithuania 

Latvia 

Finalnd 

Netherlands 

Hungary 

United Kingdom 

Estonia 

Romania 

Portugal 

Bulgaria 

Poland 

Slovenia 

Czechia 

Croatia 

Slovakia 

1979-99 average 

2004-19 average 

been since 2004, the lowest in the EU. 

This is despite the fairly normal turnout 

recorded in national elections. Academic 

commentators in Slovakia have pointed 

to the failure of political parties to campaign 

properly in these elections, the lack 

of relationship between party positions 

and European policy, and the electorate’s 

sense of the EU as an economic opportunity 

rather than a political community, 

and also – paradoxically – to the lack of 

anti-EU populist protest in previous Slovak 

elections. But the Fico government 

elected in 2023 might lead to these patterns 

changing in 2024. 

Overall turnout is sensitive to the trends 

in the biggest member states. Four countries 

– Germany, France, Italy and Spain 

- accounted for 55 percent of the votes 

cast in 2019, and will be a higher proportion 

in 2024 in the absence of the UK. In 

each of these, average turnout was down 

significantly between 1979-99 and 2004- 

19, contributing to the downward trend 

across the EU, but increases in turnout 

in Germany (+13.3 percentage points) and 

Spain (+16.9 percentage points) in 2019 

helped drive overall turnout up. It may 

well be that the decisive factor that keeps 

European Parliament turnout above 50 

percent in 2024 is the mobilisation of 

voters by extreme and protest parties in 

the largest member states. ◄ 

About 

Lewis Baston 

Lewis Baston is an election analyst 

whose work has appeared in The 

Guardian, The Financial Times 

and The Times. His forthcoming 

book 'Borderlines' about border 

zones in Europe will be published 

in June.

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CONTRIBUTORS 

EXTERNAL 

INTERNAL 

Kai Arzheimer is a professor of politics and 

political sociology at Johannes Gutenberg 

University Mainz, Germany. His primary focus 

lies in the study of far-right extremism and 

radicalism in Europe. 

Lewis Baston is an election analyst whose work 

has appeared in The Guardian, The Financial 

Times and The Times. His forthcoming book 

'Borderlines' about border zones in Europe will 

be published in June. 

Piet Ruig is a Brussels-based journalist, who 

previously worked for Dutch public broadcaster 

VPRO. 

Priyanka Shankar is an independent journalist 

from India currently shuttling between Brussels 

and South Asia, covering migration, human 

rights and Europe's relations with Asia. She has 

written for Al Jazeera English, Deutsche Welle, 

The South China Morning Post, BBC Travel, 

Lighthouse Reports, Times UK, El Pais among 

others, and been nominated for the Daphne 

Caruana Galizia Prize for Journalism. 

Ioannis Vardakastanis is the president of the 

European Disability Forum and of the National 

Confederation of Disabled People (NCDP) of 

Greece. He is also president of the Economic 

and Monetary Union, Economic and Social 

Cohesion (ECO) section of the European 

Economic and Social Committee. 

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and previously was editor at VICE’s 

Motherboard, and publisher of TNW, with a 

background in science and tech reporting. 

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visiting professor at the College of Europe. 

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and a former political correspondent for The 

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