EU Elections

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EUOBSERVER in the latest two French presidential elections, increasing support from 33 percent in 2017 to 41 percent in 2022; or Alternative für Deutschland [Alternative for Germany, AfD], which won its first mayoral election in December in the city of Pirna, in Saxony, and shows constant improvements in the polls. The somewhat less eurosceptic but still anti-federalist European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) political family also seems to be gaining traction: the Sweden Democrats are supporting the coalition in government in Sweden since 2022; Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy is the senior partner in the Italian coalition; and though the Polish Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [Law and Justice, PiS] recently lost power to a coalition headed by Donald Tusk, it was still the most voted-for party in the October 2023 general election in Poland. With just weeks to go to the June European elections, polls show that all political families but ID and ECR would see their number of MEPs decrease. According to a recent poll, ID would see their MEPs increase from 62 to 85 and ECR from 66 to 76. If these two parties were to merge, they would become the second-largest party in the European Parliament, just behind the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP, 174 seats) and leaving the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) in the third position (137 seats). Nevertheless, a merger seems unlikely, given ideological differences between the two. But irrespective of whether they merge or not, something seems to be changing in the European political landscape, with increasing fragmentation and rising euroscepticism: let’s not forget that only 10 years ago, in 2014, the EPP and S&D had a majority. In light of this scenario, the question is straightforward: what are the reasons for the rise in support of euroscepticism? According to academics, there are two explanations: on the one hand, the emergence of identity issues and cultural wars in increasingly progressive societies; on the other hand, austerity and economic decline. Let’s focus on the second possible explanation. Show me the money To some, the imposition of austerity measures on some member states during the sovereign debt crisis was at the heart of the emergence of euroscepticism. However, in none of the five member states that received a financial assistance programme (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus) there is at this moment a eurosceptic party in power or significantly gaining in popularity. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that euroscepticism decreased in those member states that received loans as a consequence of the crisis. The most acute times of the sovereign debt crisis gave place to the relevance of parties such as Syriza [Coalition of the Radical Left - Progressive Alliance] in Greece or Podemos [We Can] in Spain, but none of them could be classified as eurosceptic in the traditional sense. Moreover, the response to the Covid-19 and energy crises has significantly differed from the past, with the de facto suspension of the fiscal rules and the massive injection of mutualised funds based on reforms and investments suggested by the recipient member state, instead of strict conditionality embedded in memoranda of understanding. A new set of fiscal rules, more adapted to the new times where massive investments will be needed for the digital and green transitions as well as for boosting defence capabilities, have been recently approved. Thus, austerity is no longer an issue, but still, support for euroscepticism is rising. Empirical evidence shows that euroscepticism decreased in those member states that received loans as a consequence of the crisis. So what about the economic decline explanation? There is abundant literature linking the rise in support for eurosceptic parties to long-term economic and industrial decline, low employment rates and demographic decline. There is even evidence that refers to a rise in euroscepticism in regions subject to a ‘development trap’, i.e. regions that have stagnated in terms of GDP-per-capita, employment and productivity. Moreover, the intensity and length of the time spent in the ‘development trap’ lead to an increase in euroscepticism to the extent that EU institutions are perceived to be
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS distant from the problems afflicting local economies. And though the cultural and economic reasons have been presented separately, they tend to reinforce each other, as the most dynamic economic regions, such as metropolitan areas, are the ones where progressive ideas are better accepted. In a nutshell, the EU seems to have successfully left austerity behind, reacting to the latest crises in a mutualised manner, respecting member states’ ownership. Furthermore, euroscepticism does not seem to be an issue in those member states that suffered from austerity measures years ago. So on top of cultural issues, in the economic field, euroscepticism appears to be linked mostly to economic, industrial, competitiveness and demographic decline and linked to this, to the lack of capacity by the EU to be perceived by citizens as problem solvers. The EU seems to have successfully left austerity behind, reacting to the latest crises in a mutualised manner, respecting member states’ ownership. This stresses the importance that the coming Draghi and Letta Reports on competitiveness and the single market, respectively, will have. Let’s hope for the reports to bring forward game-changing measures and for the political equilibria in the next institutional cycle to allow for the adoption of the suggested reforms and investments. The EU needs to be perceived as a competent problem-solver of social and economic issues. The best way to fight euroscepticism is by boosting our economies and for this, we need a good functioning and problem-solving EU, perceived as a close ally to citizens. ◄ Euroscepticism is of increasing relevance in the context of a ‘permacrisis’ (sovereign debt crisis, Brexit, Covid-19, invasion of Ukraine, among others) affecting the EU. About Judith Arnal Judith Arnal is a columnist for EUobserver and a Spanish economist with the Real Instituto Elcano think-tank in Madrid and the Centre for European Policy Studies. 37
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EU Elections

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