EU Elections

EUOBSERVER
in the latest two French presidential
elections, increasing support from 33
percent in 2017 to 41 percent in 2022; or
Alternative für Deutschland [Alternative
for Germany, AfD], which won its first
mayoral election in December in the city
of Pirna, in Saxony, and shows constant
improvements in the polls.
The somewhat less eurosceptic but still
anti-federalist European Conservatives
and Reformists (ECR) political family
also seems to be gaining traction: the
Sweden Democrats are supporting the
coalition in government in Sweden
since 2022; Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of
Italy is the senior partner in the Italian
coalition; and though the Polish Prawo
i Sprawiedliwość [Law and Justice, PiS]
recently lost power to a coalition headed
by Donald Tusk, it was still the most voted-for
party in the October 2023 general
election in Poland.
With just weeks to go to the June European
elections, polls show that all political
families but ID and ECR would see
their number of MEPs decrease.
According to a recent poll, ID would see
their MEPs increase from 62 to 85 and
ECR from 66 to 76. If these two parties
were to merge, they would become the
second-largest party in the European
Parliament, just behind the centre-right
European People’s Party (EPP, 174 seats)
and leaving the Socialists & Democrats
(S&D) in the third position (137 seats).
Nevertheless, a merger seems unlikely,
given ideological differences between
the two. But irrespective of whether
they merge or not, something seems to
be changing in the European political
landscape, with increasing fragmentation
and rising euroscepticism: let’s not
forget that only 10 years ago, in 2014, the
EPP and S&D had a majority.
In light of this scenario, the question is
straightforward: what are the reasons for
the rise in support of euroscepticism?
According to academics, there are two
explanations: on the one hand, the emergence
of identity issues and cultural wars
in increasingly progressive societies; on
the other hand, austerity and economic
decline. Let’s focus on the second possible
explanation.
Show me the money
To some, the imposition of austerity
measures on some member states during
the sovereign debt crisis was at the heart
of the emergence of euroscepticism.
However, in none of the five member
states that received a financial assistance
programme (Greece, Ireland, Portugal,
Spain and Cyprus) there is at this moment
a eurosceptic party in power or significantly
gaining in popularity.
Indeed, empirical evidence shows that
euroscepticism decreased in those member
states that received loans as a consequence
of the crisis.
The most acute times of the sovereign
debt crisis gave place to the relevance of
parties such as Syriza [Coalition of the
Radical Left - Progressive Alliance] in
Greece or Podemos [We Can] in Spain,
but none of them could be classified as
eurosceptic in the traditional sense.
Moreover, the response to the Covid-19
and energy crises has significantly differed
from the past, with the de facto
suspension of the fiscal rules and the
massive injection of mutualised funds
based on reforms and investments suggested
by the recipient member state, instead
of strict conditionality embedded
in memoranda of understanding.
A new set of fiscal rules, more adapted
to the new times where massive investments
will be needed for the digital and
green transitions as well as for boosting
defence capabilities, have been recently
approved. Thus, austerity is no longer
an issue, but still, support for euroscepticism
is rising.
Empirical evidence shows
that euroscepticism
decreased in those member
states that received loans as
a consequence of the crisis.
So what about the economic decline
explanation? There is abundant literature
linking the rise in support for eurosceptic
parties to long-term economic
and industrial decline, low employment
rates and demographic decline. There
is even evidence that refers to a rise in
euroscepticism in regions subject to a
‘development trap’, i.e. regions that have
stagnated in terms of GDP-per-capita,
employment and productivity. Moreover,
the intensity and length of the time
spent in the ‘development trap’ lead to an
increase in euroscepticism to the extent
that EU institutions are perceived to be