The Science and Statistics Behind Spanking Suggests that

11-FULLER_FINAL_AFTERPROOF.DOC 2/17/2009 8:50 AM
2009] THE SCIENCE AND STATISTICS BEHIND SPANKING 261
While states restrict the force with which a parent uses a physical or
mental discipline method, they do not abolish the method itself. For
example, states restrict the force of timeout to deter a parent from, say,
locking her child in a room for days without food; 83 but states don’t
outlaw the use of timeout entirely. They restrict excessive child labor,
like working sixteen-hour days in a coal mine; 84 but they don’t ban a
child from cleaning his room.
Likewise, most states hold that “corporal punishment by a parent is
not per se child abuse.” 85 They do say, however, that a parent cannot use
“punishment which would exceed ‘that properly required for disciplining
purposes’ or which would extend beyond the bounds of moderation.” 86
Accordingly, states do not ban parents from physically disciplining
children within the bounds of moderation and reason. 87
Yet, for decades now, America has been going down the same
gradual path toward a total spanking ban that other countries have. 88 In
1977, the Supreme Court upheld the use of corporal punishment in
schools. 89 But since then, twenty-one states and counting have outlawed
it expressly. 90 Even where physical discipline is still legal, more and
26.44.020 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6A-1 (West 1977), 49-1-1 (West 1999), 49-1-3 (West
2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.981 (West 2008), 48.01 (West 2008), 48.02 (West 2008); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-3-201 (2005), 14-3-202 (2007).
83. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 881 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming a conviction of
appellants that put a boy through extreme confinement).
84. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Virginian Ry. Co., 54 S.E.2d 204, 211 (W. Va. 1949) (quoting
“Barnes’ Code, 1923, Chapter 15H, Section 72, which provided that ‘no child under the age of
sixteen years shall be employed, permitted, or suffered to work in any mine, quarry, tunnel or
excavation’”).
85. Brown v. Brown, 68 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Ark. App. 2002). See also, e.g., In re Welfare of
Children of N.F., 749 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn. 2008) (“We are unwilling to establish a bright-line
rule that the infliction of any pain constitutes either physical injury or physical abuse, because to do
so would effectively prohibit all corporal punishment of children by their parents.”); Hildreth v.
Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 550 N.W.2d. 157, 158-59 (Iowa 1996) (reversing an administrative
ruling that a father had abused his eight-year-old by spanking her three times with a wooden spoon,
causing red marks).
86. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 389 A.2d 341, 348 (Md. 1978).
87. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Commw. 44 S.E.2d 419, 423 (Va. 1947) (recognizing that
“[c]ourts are agreed that a parent has the right to administer such reasonable and timely punishment
as may be necessary to correct faults in his growing children”); State v. Arnold, 543 N.W.2d 600,
603 (Iowa 1996) (saying “parents have a right to inflict corporal punishment on their child, but that
right is restricted by moderation and reasonableness”).
88. Cf. supra Part II.B.
89. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
90. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 49000 (West 1986); 49001 (West 1986); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
14, § 702(b) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-1141 (1996); IOWA CODE § 280.21 (West 1998);
MD. CODE. ANN. EDUC. LAW § 7-306(a) (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71 § 37G (West 2000);