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of levels and is tailored to the needs of the participant. All international participants are provided access to JSF program information to assist in assessing their national requirements for a strike fighter. This can include use of modeling and simulation (M&S) tools to facilitate their requirement validation. Participation provides a channel for foreign industry to engage U.S. industry on possible future partnerships in future phases of JSF (e.g., EMD and Production). 25 Participants at the higher levels of involvement are afforded the opportunity to participate in and influence the final design. 26 This has included both governmental and industrial involvement as in the case of the U.K. The Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and British industries such as Rolls-Royce and BAE SYSTEMS have provided substantial design expertise in the development of JSF vertical lift systems and other aeronautical systems. Other European vendors are also participating in the current phase, performing such tasks as developing aerostructure demonstration articles using alternate manufacturing processes and materials. 27 It appears widely recognized that the window of opportunity for maximum technological participation will rapidly diminish as the JSF program progresses and the design stabilizes. Accordingly, further interest is rapidly growing for those participants wishing to gain a foothold in this relatively early phase of the program. 28 Business Management A key JSF Program tenet is affordability—reducing the development, production, and ownership cost. The program incorporated acquisition streamlining principles from the beginning, and has emphasized jointness and tailored international partnerships. Early on, attention 4-44 was focused on technology maturation, concept demonstrations, and early use of cost-performance trades in evolving weapon system requirements. 29 This evolutionary JSF requirements definition process, using CAIV guidelines, is markedly different from earlier acquisition programs. Technology maturation is an area of major focus. The JSF program concentrated on lowering cost and risk by maturing and demonstrating key technologies early—before the EMD phase. This atypical JSF strategy resulted from recommendations of a variety of panels on acquisition reform. 30 Human Dimension Individuals we spoke with in the U.K. were quite supportive of the program overall, particularly at the vendor level. 31 The feeling is that getting even ten percent of a U.S. program is big business and worthwhile for the U.K. 32 U.K. Ministry of Defence officials were quite positive about the program, and felt JSF was not an “American airplane” and that the U.K. was able to significantly influence requirements. 33 Further, there was a good atmosphere of trust and good flow of work, which should carry forward to work future EMD challenges. 34 Also cited as beneficial is the inclusion of a nine-man U.K. team in the JSF Program Office. These individuals have been there for some time and provide the U.S. good access to U.K. perspectives. 35 However, there remain lingering concerns over timely processing of TAAs, U.K. industrial content, and costs of U.K. production and support. 36 Access to stealthy technologies is viewed as “tricky, but workable,” 37 while frustrations remain with U.S. export of technology laws in the area of engine development. 38
Notes Joint and international interests are high and the government and industry teams are highly committed to making this unusual program succeed. The JSF program uses a number of new approaches in developing an affordable, mission-effective tactical aircraft. The JSF family of aircraft variants will be highly common designs built on the same production line with flexible manufacturing technology. The acquisition strategy is also new, with early and close involvement between 4-45 warfighter and developer and major emphasis on risk reduction. Requirements are refined through an iterative process, working a balance of capability and affordability. International partners, when they desire, are given significant voice in defining their unique requirements and have an attractive opportunity for technology transfer and substantial industrial participation. The program is maturing key technologies up front to reduce both costs and risks. Demonstration flights in 2000 will provide valuable data on basic aircraft performance, lowering risk as the program transitions to EMD. Artist’s Rendition of Lockheed Martin’s Air Force Version of the Joint Strike Fighter
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DISCLAIMER This book was produced i
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NOTICE Copies of this report may be
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PART II - TRANSATLANTIC AND INTRA-E
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Technology Transfer................
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PREFACE This publication presents t
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Objective: To pro
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INTRODUCTION “An unidentified pro
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international programs, work share
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the genesis for the harmonization o
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later in the program. Currently, KP
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For cooperative development program
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When negotiations are completed, th
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1. Interview with Frank Kenlon, Off
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The definitions of terms that are t
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Export Control/Technology Transfer
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using first class or parcel post. I
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If a disclosure is deemed to be in
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Its preparation must involve all pr
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Security Service, IAPs that have in
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For Official Use Only (FOUO) inform
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2-16
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2-18
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fight together in a potential confl
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Page 56 and 57: spending on R&D between Europe and
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Page 60 and 61: 1. Farr, Charles Michael, An Invest
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Page 64 and 65: European production did not start u
Page 66 and 67: involved in MLRS production. It gre
Page 68 and 69: estructure there were no more cost
Page 70 and 71: Background GUIDED MLRS (GMLRS) ROCK
Page 72 and 73: cooperation continues. The GMLRS pr
Page 74 and 75: In May of 1967, NNAG approved the P
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Page 78 and 79: Background ROLLING AIRFRAME MISSILE
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Page 88 and 89: team was still able to compress the
Page 90 and 91: Program objectives are outlined in
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Page 100 and 101: Background JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JS
Page 102 and 103: limited partners are provided acces
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Page 108 and 109: • Human Dimension - Selection of
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Page 120 and 121: It has been observed that U.S. arms
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Page 128 and 129: can be traced to the early 1970s. O
Page 130 and 131: 1. Interview with a U.S. officer as
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Page 134 and 135: atlanticism among mid-level officia
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Page 138 and 139: components follow a standard format
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Page 142 and 143: 1. John Vincour, “France Has a Ha
Page 144 and 145: cases to unstable nations that may
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A-6
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B-2
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F. Hand Carry. The hand carrying of
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C-2
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C-4
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D-2
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D-4
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E-2
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E-4
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F-2
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I. MISWG Document Number 10, “Tra
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F-6
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G-2
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G-4
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H-2
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November 14, 1994 WEU Ministers iss
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I-2
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When I came to the program in Septe
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• Second, even if the U.S. employ
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1. General Memorandum of Understand
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J-2
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Horizon Direction des Constructions
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K-2
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DCI Defense Capabilities Initiative
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MIDS Multifunctional Information Di
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STANAG Standardization Agreement ST
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L-2
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Susan Ludlow McMurray Director Inte
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BDir Gerhard Coors Chief, Missiles,
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Captain Mike Nixon Deputy Director
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Richard McCarthy Tank Main Armament
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LTC Ray Nulk, USA Office of the Dep
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L-14
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M-2
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Challands, Guy. Sense About Europea
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Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company
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M-8
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N-2
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N-4
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