Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation - Federation of American ...

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the genesis for the harmonization of military requirements for follow-on improvements or upgrades to these programs. Nearly always, these management meetings formally involve mid-level (O-6 level or O-6 equivalent level) operational users’ representatives as part of the international program management structure. Participation of the users’ representatives from all the program’s participants is the key to the success of harmonization efforts. Several follow-on cooperative programs have resulted directly from these types of discussions. Examples are the Guided MLRS (GMLRS), Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), F-16 Mid-Life Update (MLU), and Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block I programs that are discussed in Chapter 4. • Cooperative R&D Organizations and Activities Each of the Services has organizations that are dedicated to international cooperative research and development (R&D) activities. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) International Cooperation Handbook, which is available in the Defense Acquisition Deskbook, provides a summary of these R&D organizations and activities. Cooperative R&D efforts can be beneficial in harmonizing military requirements since those requirements are usually based on the technology that is available or thought to be possible. The more sharing of technology with potential partners, the more likely that common equipment requirements will be developed. Cooperative R&D can also serve as an essential building block for promoting interoperability and developing standards such as NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs) when 1-4 the ultimate goal of initiating cooperative development programs is not achieved. Difficulties and Considerations in Harmonizing Military Requirements Operational users’ representatives, PMs, and other acquisition personnel involved in harmonizing military requirements and cooperative development activities should be aware of some of the important factors to consider and common difficulties that are encountered in harmonizing military requirements. Inherent in the difficulties is the importance of military equipment in protecting each nation’s interests. Acquiring the best possible equipment in sufficient quantities as soon as possible from national industrial assets is the ideal for any military organization. Budget constraints, insufficient national capabilities, political objectives, or military interoperability considerations, however, lead nations to seek cooperation and harmonization of military requirements. Harmonization encompasses a collective assessment of the threat and agreement on the timeframe in which new equipment is needed and can be obtained based on national resources available. Harmonization then involves agreeing on the functions the new equipment must perform (i.e., how far it must shoot, how fast it must go, etc.), the characteristics it must possess (i.e., weight and size dimensions, etc.), and the environmental conditions that it must operate in (i.e., cold, heat, sand, rain, etc.) to counter the threat. The partners must then cooperatively determine the technical means to achieve the military performance requirements. Some of the common difficulties and considerations in achieving harmonization of military requirements are:
• Understanding a Potential Partner’s Military Requirements Most nations follow a set procedure to formulate and approve formal military requirements. The formats in which these requirements are set forth are not common between nations, and hence can lead to a degree of misunderstanding of their commonality. Analysis processes are based on national modeling and simulations (M&S) that include many variables. Some of the most significant of these variables are the potential threat scenarios, the operational doctrine of the particular branch of the military or the nation, and the technological assumptions about performance characteristics. Each nation’s M&S can generate different solutions to a common scenario. Thus, when undertaking to harmonize military requirements, enough details must be flushed out to ensure there is sufficient commonality before initiating a cooperative effort. The differences in how the requirements were derived must be recognized and thoroughly accounted for to fully achieve harmonization. 3 • Timing A fundamental principle of harmonizing requirements is that all the participants should have a common timeframe for when the equipment is needed. The amount of time available in a development program is one of the most significant drivers for the technological solutions pursued. So partners that need equipment at the same time are more likely to agree to the technical approaches and to be more willing to reach mutually agreeable technological compromises, if necessary, later in the program. 1-5 • Gold Plating The tendency in harmonization is for the potential partners not to budge from any of their original requirements, which leads to partners adding on to their original requirements the requirements of the other partners. This is termed “gold plating.” The more rigorous the national requirements generation process, the less likely that that potential partner(s) is going to be willing to compromise. In general, gold plating drives up both development and production costs and adds technological complexity. • National Variants When harmonization cannot be reached by compromise, and gold plating is deemed unsuitable, an alternative is to develop national variants. A common base system is produced upon which each nation then makes individual or (with a subset of the program’s participants) collective modifications to meet their national needs. National variants dilute some of the potential cost advantages, resulting in increased development cost and production unit costs. • Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) Objectives An important part of the harmonization of military requirements in a cooperative program is to decide which requirements cannot be compromised and those where compromises will be considered. During harmonization, the partners should agree on the KPPs and CAIV objectives. Identification of KPPs and CAIV objectives during harmonization provides the baseline for making difficult decisions, if necessary,
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Page 4 and 5: DISCLAIMER This book was produced i
Page 6 and 7: NOTICE Copies of this report may be
Page 8 and 9: PART II - TRANSATLANTIC AND INTRA-E
Page 10 and 11: Technology Transfer................
Page 12 and 13: PREFACE This publication presents t
Page 14 and 15: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Objective: To pro
Page 16 and 17: INTRODUCTION “An unidentified pro
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Page 22 and 23: international programs, work share
Page 26 and 27: later in the program. Currently, KP
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Page 32 and 33: 1. Interview with Frank Kenlon, Off
Page 34 and 35: The definitions of terms that are t
Page 36 and 37: Export Control/Technology Transfer
Page 38 and 39: using first class or parcel post. I
Page 40 and 41: If a disclosure is deemed to be in
Page 42 and 43: Its preparation must involve all pr
Page 44 and 45: Security Service, IAPs that have in
Page 46 and 47: For Official Use Only (FOUO) inform
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Page 52 and 53: fight together in a potential confl
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Page 60 and 61: 1. Farr, Charles Michael, An Invest
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Page 66 and 67: involved in MLRS production. It gre
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Page 70 and 71: Background GUIDED MLRS (GMLRS) ROCK
Page 72 and 73: cooperation continues. The GMLRS pr
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In May of 1967, NNAG approved the P
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costs may be waived in part or in w
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Background ROLLING AIRFRAME MISSILE
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The CPA provided a specific answer
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Europeans are also accustomed to a
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Link-16 enables secure, jam-resista
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Command (SPAWAR) contracting person
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team was still able to compress the
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Program objectives are outlined in
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Initial operational capability was
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oversight for European audit bodies
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and specifically allowed the access
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Management Structure The FTMA manag
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Background JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER (JS
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limited partners are provided acces
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of levels and is tailored to the ne
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These transatlantic cooperative pro
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• Human Dimension - Selection of
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4-50 ROLLING AIRFRAME MISSILE (RAM)
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MLRS 1. Multiple Launch Rocket Syst
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16. Ibid, pp 13-14 17. Ibid, p. 15.
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JSF 1. David Mulholland, “Debate
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4-58
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It has been observed that U.S. arms
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success for exclusively European co
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Germany The German acquisition syst
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increases the incentive to find par
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can be traced to the early 1970s. O
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1. Interview with a U.S. officer as
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5-14
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atlanticism among mid-level officia
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Europeans often perceive a differen
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components follow a standard format
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the actual savings are difficult to
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1. John Vincour, “France Has a Ha
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cases to unstable nations that may
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the U.S. DoD is attempting to reach
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7-6
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A-2
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5. Project Management • Briefly d
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A-6
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B-2
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F. Hand Carry. The hand carrying of
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C-2
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C-4
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D-2
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D-4
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E-2
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E-4
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F-2
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I. MISWG Document Number 10, “Tra
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F-6
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G-2
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G-4
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H-2
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November 14, 1994 WEU Ministers iss
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I-2
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When I came to the program in Septe
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• Second, even if the U.S. employ
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1. General Memorandum of Understand
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J-2
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Horizon Direction des Constructions
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K-2
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DCI Defense Capabilities Initiative
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MIDS Multifunctional Information Di
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STANAG Standardization Agreement ST
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L-2
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Susan Ludlow McMurray Director Inte
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BDir Gerhard Coors Chief, Missiles,
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Captain Mike Nixon Deputy Director
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Richard McCarthy Tank Main Armament
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LTC Ray Nulk, USA Office of the Dep
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L-14
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M-2
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Challands, Guy. Sense About Europea
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Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company
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M-8
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N-2
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N-4
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