Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation - Federation of American ...

Attempts so far—aimed at systemically improving
the harmonization process—have not
been very successful. The CNAD has facilitated
some scattered efforts, but given the composition
of NATO and the threat faced prior to
1990, the full potential was—and still is—far
from realized. The lines of communication
between allied armaments authorities have been
kept open but CNAD lacks the authority to
induce armaments cooperation. It remains to
be seen whether the recent NATO Armaments
Review and the fallout from the Kosovo crisis
will enable CNAD to realize a greater degree
of collaboration in allied armaments. The
NATO Armaments Review is expected to provide
a top-down focus on priority areas for
armaments cooperation, improve coordination
of cooperative opportunities at NATO headquarters,
and increase the visibility of those
opportunities through an expanded database of
allied military requirements. These efforts are
aimed at easing the harmonization problem
preemptively.
ICOG’s purpose is similar to that of the CNAD,
though its membership is limited to the largest
NATO nations in terms of defense spending,
the U.S., France, U.K., Italy, and Germany. It
has been in existence for four years, perhaps
not enough time for a fair trial of its ability to
promote cooperation. Nothing substantial has
been achieved so far.
All three military services have maintained
international cooperative R&D offices that have
been only minimally effective in spurring the
give and take essential to harmonizing requirements.
Recent reductions in staffing of cooperative
R&D offices only make the prospects for
progress in harmonization more remote.
The progress that can be made in ongoing
projects within program offices is evident. The
NATO Seasparrow Project Officer (NSPO) and
6-5
RAM Project Office (RAMPO) are both headed
by U.S. Navy captains with staffs at the O4-
O5 level. The day-to-day working relationships
in those offices have often produced the tradeoffs
essential to success. The follow-on programs
that developed out of the MLRS and
F-16 programs are also examples. (Further
discussions can be found in Chapters 4 and 5.)
Perhaps the most successful harmonization
efforts have been selective mid-level discussions.
Examples include the agreements
reached in the FSCS/TRACER and LW155
howitzer digitization programs. At the U.S. (or
U.S.-equivalent) O-6 level, participants have
the right combination of experience, specific
expertise, and influence to understand
challenges encountered, to propose harmonized
solutions, and to realize them. Colonels or their
equivalents are the most senior officials
normally dedicated full-time to an individual
program, so close working relationships form
and trust is established. Though these professionals
cannot normally bind their respective
governments, they can determine if the military
requirements of their nations are common
enough to justify a cooperative program. At the
mid-level career plateau there is often field
experience with similar equipment and a degree
of follow-through. Some officers have worked
on the program in earlier stages, acquiring
technical expertise, and are often in a position
to influence harmonization decisions favorably
through their credibility. The personal commitment
to make the extra effort required to
earnestly pursue international cooperation has
often been the crucial factor in reaching
common requirements.
Standardization of the format by which
requirements are set forth, at least on a NATO
basis, can render similarities and differences
more clear and aid in identifying areas for cooperation.
The U.S. has mandated that all DoD