Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation - Federation of American ...

prospect of defining interoperable standards
(such as STANAGS) improves, as does the
technical basis for harmonization of military
requirements. The trend of diminishing staffing
for cooperative R&D activities should be
reversed, sending the signal that the U.S. is
serious about the future of transatlantic defense
cooperation.
The U.S. needs to develop an organizational
culture that supports international armaments
cooperation.
The pursuit of a cooperative program in the
U.S. DoD and Services is a lonely endeavor.
There are many supportive statements from
senior leaders and even official policies, but
the fact remains that international cooperation
is not a central concern in the realm of acquisition.
For many years an organizational culture
that is unfavorable toward cooperation has
existed for the understandable reason that
people within DoD or the Services value only
those things that the leadership emphasizes and
actively expresses interest in. That usually
hasn’t been the case regarding armaments cooperation
with U.S. allies. Only with a concerted
effort can this condition be reversed over time
to create a culture that is positively disposed
toward cooperation.
In order to increase the number and quality of
cooperative opportunities and their chances for
success, a series of steps are recommended
below for the U.S. These steps are aimed not
only at addressing European complaints, but
also at better preparing the U.S. acquisition
workforce and encouraging them to follow
commitments through to a successful conclusion.
Ultimately, an organizational culture
within DoD must emerge that is more oriented
toward international armaments cooperation.
7-3
Recommended Steps
Funding stability similar to that enjoyed by
the European partners must be provided for
U.S. international cooperative programs. DoD,
the Service components, and Congress all play
large roles in this regard. First, DoD should
rigorously adhere to the long-standing requirement
of programming for the entire expected
program cost (whether a cooperative program
or not) prior to entering any cooperative program.
Temptations to deviate from this procedure
in order to accommodate optimal timelines
for initiation of a cooperative effort should be
resisted. Second, DoD and the Services must
instill within their organizational cultures that
it is unacceptable, barring extraordinary circumstances,
to cancel or withhold funding once
a cooperative effort has been engaged in good
faith. This cultural change cannot merely be
another DoD policy proclamation; it must be
effected by example every time DoD and the
Services make funding priority decisions on
programs. Third, Congress must view the funds
in cooperative programs differently from those
committed to national programs. DoD and
Service staffs must associate armaments cooperative
efforts with our allies as significant political
benefits to the U.S. The influence of U.S.
defense companies lobbying for funding of
competing national efforts must be resisted.
Congressional support of cooperative programs
will send a strong signal to U.S. allies. The
above actions will help ensure funding stability
and provide significant incentives for the
pursuit of cooperative programs.
Export controls have received a great deal of
emphasis within DoD recently. An effort is
under way to reduce significantly the time and
amount of bureaucracy associated with processing
export licenses. DoD recently signed a
bilateral agreement with the U.K. to facilitate
defense trade and armament cooperation with