Transatlantic Armaments Cooperation - Federation of American ...

the actual savings are difficult to quantify. Even
though cooperative development programs cost
more in total than solely national development
efforts, dividing development costs among
partners normally produces at least some
savings for each participant. The exceptions are
when one partner pays for the majority of the
effort, as the U.S. has sometimes done, or when
excessive gold plating of requirements dramatically
drives up the program’s cost. Promised
production cost savings based on greater
economies of scale have almost always been
negated by government-driven national work
share apportionment and less than optimal
industrial arrangements. Recently, life cycle
logistics costs have been given more attention
in DoD, but it remains to be seen what this will
portend for international cooperation. Hence,
the significance of whatever cost savings are
expected must be carefully weighed against the
difficulties that cooperation will bring.
From the PM’s perspective there is little
incentive to expose him or herself to the added
difficulties of an international program. PMs
are evaluated by the cost, schedule, and performance
of the programs they manage. Cooperative
programs inherently take longer for
reasons already discussed. The likelihood of a
schedule slip due to technical or industrial
problems is greatly increased with additional
contributors. Additionally, despite the potential
for cost savings, international cooperative
programs carry a greater risk of baseline cost
increases. Finally, there is likely to be greater
difficulty in meeting performance parameters
in order to satisfy all concerned. Cooperative
programs are not recognized as a distinct case,
however and while the PM involved in a cooperative
program usually has significantly less
of the control enjoyed in a national undertaking,
he or she is evaluated by the same criteria.
6-8
Correcting the structure of incentives for cooperative
programs will require a substantial and
coordinated effort. The DSB recommended
career incentives for the best in the field, much
as is the case for joint assignments in the Services,
and public awards for those who succeed
internationally. Assignment of personnel with
international experience is also advocated,
though the development of that particular pool
of talent, given the low rate of cooperation, will
be difficult. Perhaps even more challenging will
be to endow U.S. participation in international
cooperative programs with the same funding
stability enjoyed by intra-European partners.
Finally, PMs need the assurance that their
performance will be judged by criteria relevant
to an international program.
Motives to Cooperate
U.S. participants should recognize that in many
cases their motives for cooperating with an
international partner may be very different from
those of their partner(s). Development cost
savings are always a reason to cooperate, but
for U.S. programs it is really only a motive if it
is a low priority effort. This is probably not the
case with international partners. In most
instances, the only way they can afford even
their highest priority programs is through
cooperation. Political reasons, such as furthering
NATO unity, may be a strong reason
for collaboration from the U.S. point of view,
but probably will not carry as much weight for
Europeans. Conversely, political reasons are
one of the strongest drivers of intra-European
cooperation. Technology is the principal attraction
for many Europeans to cooperate with
the U.S. Each program will have its own
particular set of motivations on either side and
the PM who is aware of them will be much
more effective.