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The Future of Banking<br />
their traditional banking mortgage books themselves. Ring-fencing, <strong>by</strong> itself, would not<br />
necessarily have reduced these exposures.<br />
In this regard, it is useful to consider the capital requirements announced in the Vickers<br />
report. Banks will be required to hold equity capital of at least 10% of risk weighted<br />
assets in the ring fenced business, and both parts of the bank will be required to have<br />
total loss absorbing capital of at least 17% to 20%. This seems substantially higher than<br />
what Basel III has proposed. The requirements are in fact more in line with the levels of<br />
capital requirements that Switzerland has been implementing. The requirements are also<br />
somewhat higher than those tentatively discussed in the US, though we are waiting for<br />
further clarity on what will be the systemic capital surcharge for systemically important<br />
financial institutions in the US under the implementation of the Dodd Frank Act.<br />
The key point is that whatever the capital requirements – 10% and 17% or 18% – it is<br />
as a function of risk weighted assets. The fundamental question that has not been put<br />
on the table is, are the current risk weights – and the overall framework for determining<br />
them – right? In particular, we have very low risk weights on residential mortgage<br />
backed securities. What that did was actually increase the lending to the residential<br />
mortgages as an asset class. Endogenously, therefore, ie, as a response to the capital<br />
requirement itself, the residential housing became a systemically important asset class.<br />
However, all through the crisis, and even post crisis, we have continued with a relatively<br />
attractive risk weight on this asset class – in spite of the fact that the crisis effectively<br />
told us that what banks were holding as capital against these assets was not adequate<br />
from a resiliency standpoint as far as bank creditors and investors were concerned.<br />
We are in fact facing a similar problem with respect to the sovereign debt holdings of<br />
the troubled countries in Europe. Their bonds are being held <strong>by</strong> banks all over the world,<br />
especially in other Eurozone countries. These bond-holdings have so far, as long as they<br />
are in banking books of banks (and hence, not ring-fenced), not received substantial<br />
haircuts in regulatory capital assessments. In turn, banks have not been asked to raise<br />
substantial capital against them (though we might finally see some pan-European bank<br />
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