United Tribes ) Michigan - Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians

claims as barred by the applicable statute
of limitations, which required that suits
filed in the CFC be filed within six years
after the claim accrues. The Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part
and reversed in part, holding that (1) the
Tribes' pre-1973 fiduciary breach claims
were barred and were not saved by the
tolling provisions in the Department of
Interior appropriations bill, (2) the leases
approved under the 1938 act were invalid
for failure to follow the competitive bid
procedures of the act, (3) the current
lessees, therefore, were trespassers,
(4) because the trespass was ongoing,
the Tribes could assert claims for the six
years preceding the filing of the suit, and
(5) the case would be remanded for a
determination of the federal government's
obligations with respect to the trespassing
lessees.
In Rolling Frito-Lay Sales, LP v. Stover,
2012 WL 252938 (D. Ariz. 2012), Montiel,
a member of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa
Tribe (Tribe) owned On-Auk-Mor Trade
Center (Store), a store located on the
reservation. Rolling Frito-Lay Sales LP
(Frito) supplied food products to the Store.
After Stover, a non-Indian, tripped over
Frito boxes while visiting the Store, she
sued the Store, Montiel and Frito-Lay in
state court, but the court dismissed the
claims against Montiel and the Store for
lack of jurisdiction and, later, dismissed
the claim against Frito, without prejudice,
for lack of prosecution. Stover then sued
Frito in tribal court. Frito brought the
federal action to enjoin the suit. The court
granted Frito's motion for injunctive relief,
holding that (1) whether a tribal court has
adjudicative authority over nonmembers
is a federal question, (2) neither of the
exceptions of Montana v. U.S. justified
the exercise of tribal court authority over
the claims of Stover, a non-Indian, against
Frito, a non-Indian company, (3) Frito
would not be required to exhaust tribal
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court remedies because the tribal court's
lack of jurisdiction was clear, and (4)
tribal court was the appropriate forum for
Stover's claims against Montiel and the
Store.
In Robinson v. Salazar, 2012 WL 160976
(E.D.Cal.), Tejon Mountain Village, LLC
and Defendant Tejon Ranch Corporation
owned 270,000 acres of land where they
proposed to develop "Tejon Mountain
Village" with 3,450 residences, additional
commercial development, including a
hotel and resort facilities, a golf course
and other recreational and educational
facilities. Kern County, where the land
is located, approved the project pursuant
to California's environmental review
process. The Kawaiisu Tribe of the
Tejon (Tribe), an entity not recognized
by the federal government, claiming
ownership of the land, sued the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior, the corporate
developers and Kern County, alleging
unlawful possession by the developers,
violation of the Indian Nonintercourse
Act (INA) by the developers, violation of
the Native American Graves Protection
and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) by
the developers, violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871 and the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) by
the county against Kern. The plaintiffs
also sought recognition as a tribe. The
district court held that (1) the Tribe had
failed to allege facts sufficient to support
its land claim based on aboriginal title
in light of the 1848 treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and act of 1851 but would be
permitted to amend its complaint to allege
continuous occupancy of the claimed land,
(2) the Tribe had not properly alleged
rights under a treaty with the Utah, (3) the
plaintiffs would be permitted to amend
the complaint to allege that their claim
area was a "de facto" reservation, i.e., an
area where the federal government was
expending funds and providing services
for Indians, (4) the plaintiffs would be
permitted to file an amended complaint
addressing the recognition issue and
the court would await that filing before
ruling whether to defer to BIA in its
determination that the Tribe is not entitled
to be recognized, (5) the Civil Rights Act
claim would be dismissed since tribes are
not persons for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and (6) the CEQA-related claims
would be dismissed with prejudice since
those issues had been adjudicated by a
state court.
In J.L. Ward Associates, Inc. v. Great
Plains Tribal Chairmen's Health Board,
2012 WL 113866, (D.S.D.), J.L. Ward
Associates, Inc. (Ward) had prepared an
application to the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) for an "access to recovery"
grant application on behalf of the Great
Plains Tribal Chairmen's Health Board
(Board). The Board, a South Dakota
nonprofit corporation, was formed to
provide members of the 16 tribes of South
Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska and Iowa
with a single entity to communicate and
participate with the Indian Health Service
(IHS) and other federal agencies on health
matters and, in addition, to assist member
tribes in connection with health care
issues, including improvement of health
care delivery, advocacy and program
development. The application resulted in
a $13,119,400 four-year grant. Although
Ward did not charge the Board to prepare
the application, it understood that it would
be hired if the grant application were
successful. When the Board declined to
enter into a contract, Ward sued the Board,
alleging breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, negligent misrepresentation,
fraudulent misrepresentation, unjust
enrichment and infringement of Ward's
copyrighted material. The district court
held that (1) the Board was a citizen
of South Dakota for federal diversity
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