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Internal consistency of risk free rate and MRP in the CAPM

Internal consistency of risk free rate and MRP in the CAPM

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at<strong>in</strong>g one notch to <strong>the</strong> equivalent <strong>of</strong> AA-, br<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong>g it <strong>in</strong>to l<strong>in</strong>e with S&P’s rat<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

which had been downgraded earlier <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> year. Despite rat<strong>in</strong>g changes, longterm<br />

government bond yields <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> United States <strong>and</strong> Japan have fallen<br />

s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> start <strong>of</strong> August as <strong>risk</strong> aversion has grown. (Emphasis added)<br />

104. In <strong>the</strong> same document <strong>the</strong> RBA reite<strong>rate</strong>s <strong>the</strong> fact that <strong>the</strong> fall<strong>in</strong>g CGS yields <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

second half <strong>of</strong> 2011 were contemporaneous with heightened <strong>risk</strong> aversion: 29<br />

Risk aversion <strong>and</strong> volatility <strong>in</strong> global f<strong>in</strong>ancial markets have <strong>in</strong>creased<br />

sharply s<strong>in</strong>ce <strong>the</strong> start <strong>of</strong> August (Graph 1.1) …. Across many countries,<br />

prices <strong>of</strong> shares <strong>and</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r <strong>risk</strong> assets have decl<strong>in</strong>ed sharply s<strong>in</strong>ce early August.<br />

Bank <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>surer share prices have been particularly affected, fall<strong>in</strong>g by more<br />

than 15 per cent <strong>in</strong> most countries, to be around <strong>the</strong>ir lowest levels s<strong>in</strong>ce early<br />

2009 (Graph 1.2)…<br />

This current episode <strong>of</strong> <strong>risk</strong> aversion <strong>and</strong> volatility follows a number <strong>of</strong><br />

periods <strong>of</strong> heightened market turbulence over <strong>the</strong> past couple <strong>of</strong> years.<br />

These periodic events <strong>in</strong>dicate that f<strong>in</strong>ancial market participants rema<strong>in</strong> sensitive<br />

to bad news follow<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> 2008–09. While <strong>the</strong> latest bout <strong>of</strong> market<br />

uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty is not on <strong>the</strong> scale <strong>of</strong> 2008–09, it is unclear at this stage whe<strong>the</strong>r it<br />

will be ano<strong>the</strong>r temporary episode or whe<strong>the</strong>r it is foreshadow<strong>in</strong>g a more serious<br />

market dislocation. (Emphasis added)<br />

105. It is important to underst<strong>and</strong> that it would be an error to argue, based on <strong>the</strong> last<br />

sentence <strong>of</strong> this quote, that <strong>the</strong> regulatory <strong>MRP</strong> should not be <strong>in</strong>creased to reflect<br />

heightened uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty/<strong>risk</strong> aversion because this may only be temporary. Even if we<br />

know that <strong>the</strong> heightened <strong>risk</strong> aversion is temporary (which we do not), if we are us<strong>in</strong>g<br />

prevail<strong>in</strong>g CGS as our estimate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>risk</strong> <strong>free</strong> <strong>rate</strong>, we must still reflect even<br />

temporarily higher <strong>MRP</strong> levels <strong>in</strong> our cost <strong>of</strong> equity estimate. To do o<strong>the</strong>rwise would<br />

be to pass through a temporarily lower CGS yield that is <strong>the</strong> ‘o<strong>the</strong>r side <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> co<strong>in</strong>’ <strong>of</strong><br />

temporarily higher <strong>risk</strong> aversion.<br />

5.2. Specific supply <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> conditions <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> CGS market<br />

106. Figure 10 <strong>and</strong> Figure 11 above clearly illust<strong>rate</strong> <strong>the</strong> negative relationship between <strong>risk</strong><br />

premiums <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>risk</strong> <strong>free</strong> <strong>rate</strong> that is driven by <strong>the</strong> flight to safety <strong>of</strong> CGS <strong>in</strong> periods<br />

<strong>of</strong> heightened <strong>risk</strong> aversion. However, <strong>the</strong>re is good reason to believe that <strong>the</strong>re are<br />

current aspects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> supply <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> dynamics for Australian CGS that will tend<br />

to depress CGS yields, <strong>and</strong> raise <strong>risk</strong> premiums, even <strong>in</strong> periods <strong>of</strong> ‘normal’ market<br />

conditions. Specifically, <strong>the</strong> experience <strong>of</strong> recent years is likely <strong>the</strong> supply <strong>of</strong> CGS is<br />

small relative to <strong>the</strong> size <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Australian economy <strong>and</strong>:<br />

29 Ibid, pp. 5-6<br />

� <strong>in</strong>ternational events have seen a significant <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> for CGS by<br />

foreign <strong>in</strong>vestors; <strong>and</strong><br />

Competition Economists Group<br />

www.CEG-AP.COM<br />

28

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