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(METHODO)LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THE WORK OF LEIBNIZ 17
present study aims to identify the broader domain of the (logical)
presuppositions responsible for the system of the pre-established
harmony.
Before any application of the theories of presuppositions to Leibniz’s
system takes place, the project itself must be justified. According to the
Fregean approach, any statement, if it claims to detain a value of truth in
the bivalent logic, holds the presupposition that the object that it (i. e., the
statement) refers to exists. Leibniz’s philosophy comprises such
statements. For the German philosopher, the discourse on reality poses
itself as true:
“It is necessary that both my nature and the nature of the things that
I think about are so that, when I proceed legitimately in making a
statement, that statement will be found to be either true, or false”
(Leibniz(i), p. 12).
Thus it seems that the work of Leibniz, being made of statements with
values of truth, can be submitted to at least the Fregean perspective on
the logical presuppositions. The fact that the possible world plays a
fundamental role in Leibniz’s ways of defining the values of truth sustains
the conclusion priory made. It is a well-known fact that the German
philosopher defines the analytical statements as the statements that
remain true in every possible world, while the synthetic statements are the
statements that possess a value of truth in any given world. Frege
understands by the logical presupposition of a certain statement P the
statement Q that, if for any possible context (possible world) C, P is true in
C or P is false in C, it follows that Q is true in C. Consequently, Q ceases
to be a logical presupposition for P as soon as a certain context (possible
world) C is being identified, in which P would lack a value of truth. Yet,
there are no such situations in the work of G. W. Leibniz.
The analysis of each statement included in the works of Leibniz is
most certainly a hazardous project, which, fortunately, is not necessary
because (as it will be shown at a later time) the logical presuppositions
are generally conserved by the material implication. Therefore, the study
of the fundamental theses extant in Leibniz’s philosophy will suffice the
making of this essay’s case. However, the statements that Russell (1937)
appreciated as not only futile in the system, but also subversive of its
logical coherence should not be forgotten. The very fact that Leibniz did
introduce these statements in his philosophical system proves that looking
up these statements’ logical presuppositions is a valid enterprise.
Oftentimes, the particularity of a philosophical system resides in such
ideas that exist in the system not because of logical exigencies (in fact,