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(METHODO)LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THE WORK OF LEIBNIZ 35
“all the possible truths strive for becoming actual truths as long as
their being true does not contradict the actualisation of other
possible truths” (Shand, p. 127),
and since the necessary truths are constitutive to any possible world, to
determine which of the infinite number of possible worlds is being
actualised necessitates the aid of a supplementary sufficient reason, i. e.,
“the principle of the optimum”. According to these criteria, the divine
monad, which is capable of pursuing the infinite analysis of the contingent
truths to its end, maximizes both variety and order, by bringing into
existence those series of (possible and at the same time compossible)
“complete beings” that materialize the maximum Good. The Goodness
appears to be a value transcendent to divinity. Goodness is anterior to
God’s will, rather than a consequence of “the formal grounding” that God
willed it.
The essential prerogative of the divine monad is the instauration of
“the pre-established harmony”, which renders the seemingly causal
connection between monads (between soul and body, in particular) a
divine (contingent!) decree, according to which the monads’ states
perfectly coordinate ab initio in conformity with certain laws. Their
subsequent coordination logically follows from the principle of the
predicate – within – the subject. In addition,
“the monads’ harmonious coordination implies the fact that each
monad mirrors the states of all the other monads, which means
that a change in any monad would result in the existence of a
completely different universe, because it would imply the necessity
of an adjustment in the systematic arrangement of all the other
monads” (Shand, p. 132).
This conclusion suggests that, even though they “lack windows”, the
simple substances convey – through their representative nature – the
entire universe. This is another piece of evidence that Leibniz’s attempt to
reconcile individualism and holism has been a successful enterprise.
Time and space, far from constituting mere appearances, comprise
phenomena that are “well grounded” on the monads’ subsistent reality.
They constitute
“something derived from truths that are being predicated about
monads” (Shand, p. 129).
Leibniz’s view on time and space is thus indebted to the principle of the
identity of the indistinguishable, which applies universally. Leibniz