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(METHODO)LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THE WORK OF LEIBNIZ 23<br />

“everything in language is presuppositional phenomena” (Eco, p.<br />

322),<br />

which is absurd. This does not mean, however, that the internal logical<br />

structure of a text, in which the inferences among various theses are well<br />

emphasized, would not be the best terrain for an in<strong>vest</strong>igation of the text’s<br />

presuppositions. When seen as a macro-proposition (a “large” complex<br />

proposition), the structured text has the shape of a “tree”, the elementary<br />

propositions being connected primarily through the logical operators of<br />

conjunction and implication. Based on the argument in the previous<br />

section (see the problem of projection), one could assert that, once the<br />

fundamental theses and the logical relationships among them are being<br />

specified in the case of Leibniz’s works, one could also i<strong>de</strong>ntify the logical<br />

presuppositions in the hindsight of the philosopher’s worldview.<br />

The advantages brought about by the Fregean theory are of primary<br />

importance in interpreting Leibniz’s monadic system. When applying the<br />

Fregean analysis to the fundamental theses of Leibniz’s system, which<br />

are the logical and/ or methodological generators of his entire philosophy,<br />

one will first come up with existentialist statements such as:<br />

“The divinity exists”,<br />

“The is an infinity of monads”, etc.<br />

These statements target the ontological level, whereas the universe they<br />

configure proposes itself as the sole universe available. Therefore,<br />

Leibniz’s philosophy’s ontological frame appears to be (relatively) easy to<br />

pinpoint. Still, this is an important point to make, because it makes explicit<br />

the entire domain of the Being. Moreover, it becomes easier to <strong>de</strong>cipher<br />

the way in which the philosopher <strong>de</strong>montrates the “coherence” of the<br />

world as he conceived it and also the way in which he logically integrates<br />

the proposed existing things. For that purpose, Leibniz uses the terms<br />

possible and compossible in the following manner:<br />

“My thesis is that every thing that can exist and is compatible with<br />

the others does exist” (Dumitriu, p. 619).<br />

The very modality of integration for the extant things is <strong>de</strong>termined, in<br />

Leibniz’s philosophy, by other fundamental theses that are, in their turn,<br />

accompanied by certain presuppositions, whose survey <strong>de</strong>serves one’s<br />

full attention.<br />

The pragmatic approach to presuppositions can be a powerful tool in<br />

the research on the vast correspon<strong>de</strong>nce that Leibniz carried on with<br />

personalities of his époque (such as Arnold, Vol<strong>de</strong>r, Clarke in the name of

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