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(METHODO)LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THE WORK OF LEIBNIZ 41
statute of the monad seems to detain the objectivity and the vigour of the
fact.
The freedom, the “escaping gate” from the Leibnizean system
consists of the possibility to contest the fundamental principles on which
the entire construction is being built, along with their logical
presuppositions. The only freedom consists of retrieving a different world,
a world in which identity and non-contradiction no longer state the “law”, a
world in which identical entities can well exist although for no particular
reason, a world in which the principle of sufficient reason is futile and
where the concepts of perfection and divinity are senseless concepts.
That is, the world in which we live … The logical presuppositions of
Leibniz’s system have the methodological role of justifying the ontological
commitment of its creator and also the role of proposing, even at the risk
of losing a senseless liberty, Order in the universe.
Conclusion
The objective of the present study was to propose an interpretation of
Leibniz’s philosophy that draws upon the methodological suggestions
offered in that respect by the theories of logical presuppositions.
Obviously, this interpretation does not claim either exhaustiveness, or
uniqueness. What this study has managed to accomplish was the
identification – in a formal manner and strictly applying the theories of
logical presuppositions developed by Frege and Stalnaker to the
fundamental theses of Leibniz’s philosophy – of a logical presupposition
with major relevance for this interpretation: the presupposition of the
monadism. It is remarkably meaningful that this presupposition draws
one’s attention, perhaps in the most convincing manner possible, upon
the self-justifying power of the system of the pre-established harmony.
From this perspective, Leibniz makes a valuable asset for a first line of
modern thinkers in history.
Surely, Leibniz is one of the most important philosophers of all times.
Therefore, interpreting his philosophy can take multiple forms and
directions: they can originate in logic, in metaphysics, in physics, or even
in mathematics. Perhaps it would be difficult for these interpretations to
reach a point of consensus. This is not a shortcoming, but one of the
strengths of Leibniz’s philosophy. Not being able to reach a consensus
means being able to avoid the unique (macro)interpretation, that is, to be
able to develop a “product” that is specific for our age, in which there are
no facts, only interpretations.