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(METHODO)LOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS IN THE WORK OF LEIBNIZ 37
object of our analysis (that is, logical presuppositions). Among the
principles that Shand (1998) enumerates, the first two are purely logical.
The debate on their margins is futile: they comprise their own logical
presuppositions. There are yet to be discussed the last three: the identity
of the indistinguishable, the principle of sufficient reason, and the principle
of perfection.
Leibniz (1972) deduces, in a logical manner, the identity of the
undistinguishable from the principle of sufficient reason. This relation
between the two suggests, based on a result priory pointed out [see c)
(ii)], that the identity of the indistinguishable should be questioned in terms
of its potential for logical presuppositions (according to Frege’s semantic
approach). One of the numerous instances in which Leibniz defines the
identity of the indistinguishable reads:
“It is not true that two substances could entirely resemble each
other, the only difference between the two being solo numero”
(Leibniz(i), p. 77).
In other words:
“Any two monads are different”.
According to Frege’s theory and by applying the negation test, this
statement’s logical presupposition is:
“There are at least two monads”.
Therefore, the enunciation of the principle under consideration, according
to Stalnaker, limits the possible worlds to those in which the statement
“There are at least two monads”
is true. An immediate consequence is that the enunciation of the identity
of the indistinguishable excludes every monist-type substantialism.
“There are at least two monads”
decomposes in elementary statements and becomes equivalent with:
or
“There are precisely two monads”,